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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

An Analysis of Social Behavior

BY

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*"Human nature is so large, life touches life
at so many points, and words are so elusive."*

ERWIN F. SMITH

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TO
MY MOTHER
ANNA MARIE ROSEBERRY YOUNG

PREFACE

Social psychology is concerned with the personality as it operates in a world of other personalities. The writer has tried in this book to show that the behavior of the individual is determined both by the more intimate, non-standardized, person-to-person relationships and by those aspects of social interaction which rest upon the conventionalized, group-accepted forms of behavior which the anthropologists call culture patterns. Many of the chapters approach the study of the personality from the angle of the group or collective life rather than from that of the theoretically isolated individual. This fact, of course, reveals the author's bias or standpoint, but it seems to him to throw a more understanding light on the individual's social behavior.

The reader will find this volume rich in descriptive, illustrative materials, much of it drawn from contemporary life. There is no better way to reveal the mechanisms of personality than to observe it in its present social milieu. While many of us hope to see an increasing number of quantitative studies in social psychology, the importance of descriptive case analysis can not be gainsaid. In fact, it is the author's contention that for a subject like social psychology which is too young for very definite systematic formulation as yet, the observational, descriptive treatment is invaluable. There are some individuals in psychology and sociology whose over-anxiety to employ the statistical method sometimes misleads them into a faulty conception of the relation of quantitative methods to the inception of an objective science of social behavior. At best, as Yule puts it, "statistical methods should be regarded as ancillary, not essential" to scientific procedures. Until we can frame our observations under rigidly controlled conditions the genetic-historical, or case study, treatment of our social-psychological data will have a place. In the present volume statistical materials have been introduced where they throw light on certain aspects of behavior but frankly the use of case data is more frequent.

The present volume is not highly theoretical. It is concerned more with a standpoint and method of analysis than with the statement of elaborate

systematic formulas. It seems wise to present the student of social behavior with concrete analysis at the outset before loading him down with the weight of heavy phrases of more or less philosophical significance.

A word may be said about the use of terminology in the present book. The author believes that the more naturalistic approach of behavioristic psychology is sound, but that behaviorism at the moment has not offered any marked advance over functional or dynamic psychology in the analysis of covert or "mental" behavior. For this reason in dealing with internal aspects of behavior he has been forced to use such words as attention, perception, image, ideas, concepts, and attitudes. It seems that this mixture of terms from two somewhat divergent phases of psychology is inevitable in the present chaos of behavior analysis. Whenever possible, however, an attempt has been made to put these terms into a somewhat behavioristic setting.

This book is arranged for use in conjunction with the author's *Source Book for Social Psychology*. The chapters, however, do not correspond exactly, and there is much source material in the present book on which there is no corresponding reading in the other. Further reading assignments to source materials are made at the end of each chapter. Moreover, the assignments in the present volume and those in the *Source Book* should be used together. The bibliographies are suggestive rather than complete. There is no duplication of the bibliography found in the *Source Book*. Those papers and books which are valuable for classroom purposes and which have appeared since the publication of the *Source Book*, are mentioned in the special assignments for class reports or longer studies.

The author wishes to acknowledge his debt to the many persons who have helped him in the preparation of this book. He is especially indebted to Professor Robert E. Park for suggesting some aspects of the analysis of the newspaper as it appears in Chapter XXV although Professor Park may not recognize the discussion as an outgrowth of the stimulating conversations which he and the writer have had on the subject of public opinion and the newspaper. The author desires to thank the many writers and publishers who have so graciously permitted the use of their publications. Special gratitude is due Magdalene Anderson Young for her patient assistance in preparing the manuscript and in the final stages of editing the same. Thanks is also due Mr. Sidney Gair and Miss Sara Boyajian, for

their assistance in editing and publishing this volume. Finally, the author thanks his daughter, Helen Ann Young, for her effective assistance in preparing the index.

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PART ONE

The Social Setting of Human Behavior

"The roots of the present lie deep in the past."—STUBBS

Perhaps the commonest fallacy of the textbook psychology lies in the assumption that the beginnings of social behavior exist only in the individual. It is because of this misconception that we introduce the material in this book with two chapters bearing on the social-cultural background of human personality. This brief discussion of group life should not mislead the reader into any unscientific notions about "group mind" or "collective consciousness." Rather it simply acquaints him with the fundamental types of social-cultural stimuli to which the individual is exposed from birth to death, and without which he could not carry on. Following this introductory division we turn to a psychological analysis of individual behavior.

The first chapter presents the social antecedents of human behavior; the second reviews the nature of group life and surveys the place of human culture as a background upon which human personality itself is developed.

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIAL ANTECEDENTS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

Social Psychology deals with the study of personality as it develops in relation to social environment. Social environment consists of groups of other personalities and the methods of living which they have evolved. The latter we call culture. From the angle of psychology, group life, including culture, furnishes the environment to which the human being must adjust himself if he is to survive. What the sociologists and anthropologists call culture patterns constitute for the individual the basis of his ideas, attitudes, and habits. The individual does not grow up in a vacuum. He is at all times reacting to a world around him, consisting of physical and organic objects, especially, of other human beings. It must have been thus from the beginning of social life.

Actually, of course, social origins are lost in mystery. However it was in the dim days of early paleolithic man or before, certainly both common sense and science teach us that the individual today is, willy nilly, born into various social groups. The hypothetical man growing up alone on a hypothetical island acquires, in the minds of most writers about him, purely hypothetical attributes. Such myth-making lends very little to the understanding of a person in either ancient or modern times. We may lay it down as a systematic postulate that, for purposes of social-psychological analysis, the group is antecedent to the individual. By group here is meant, not any mythical entity independent of individuals, but the congregations of persons into such associate forms as families, neighborhoods, communities, schools, churches, lodges, capital and labor groups. These groups begin at once to impinge upon the new-born individual, and before many years the growing boy or girl has taken on the characteristics of his family, his class, his race or nationality, and, in a minor degree, of the other groups to which he belongs.

There is no doubt that the individual brings with him, from his bio-

logical background, potentialities for growth and modification. We do not deny the place of heredity or the significance of biological mechanisms; yet these alone, we hold, do not account for the human personality which we shall study. Truly there are marked differences in the capacity of the individual to learn of the social and physical world around him. There are variabilities in his reaction time, in his physical make-up, etc. As we shall see, these matters must be taken into account in any analysis. Still, what the individual becomes as an adult personality, what he does and thinks, is throughout determined very largely by the impress of other persons upon him.

The fallacy of an individualistic psychology is its failure to recognize the important place which social interaction plays in determining the life organization and development of the human being. What the child becomes is the product not alone of his organic make-up, but of his participation in the social milieu around him.

The description and analysis of the social behavior of the person really require a recognition of both the environment and the organism, if the matter is to be stated with any degree of completeness. Without attempting for the moment to evaluate in any way the relative weight of these factors,¹ we may say that there is, first, in point of time perspective, the biological organism which comes into the world from the previous generation, with its potentials for development, with the general predisposition for physical growth, with a set of characteristics which it has inherited from its ancestors. This physical organism, with its roots in the animal world, possesses the essential structures and functions from which eventuate the human personality. From this ancestry come the mechanisms which are the basis of living and the foundation of being. In describing and analyzing the organic basis of the personality we must rest our case upon the findings of bio-chemistry and psychology. These sciences point out to us the essential mechanics of behavior and indicate how behavior is modified by environmental stimulation.

The other factor to be taken into account in the social process is the environment with which the organism must come to terms if it is to survive at all. In our analysis we shall be concerned chiefly with the environment as it is made up of other human beings and the material world as men have

¹ The writer doubts that this could be done, since they are not comparable and exist in different dimensions,

modified it. This environment consists largely of groups or clusters of other persons, and we must differentiate between two sets of influences. The first of these may be called, for want of a better term, the personal-social or inter-individual influences. Here the stimuli are the natural and more or less spontaneous responses of other individuals of your own or near species whose responses constitute an environment toward which you react. It is evident, in turn, that the individual constitutes a stimulus for these others, and that his own reactions affect the stimuli which reach him from them. Personal-social influence here means the effect of another individual or group of individuals upon one, outside of codified forms of behavior. It is the person-to-person relationship, uninfluenced by standardized habits and ideas common to one's group and considered as right, proper, or fashionable. Some writers might prefer to describe this as personal influence. The present writer has no objection to their doing so, except that to him personal-social better expresses the interactional aspects of the situation. After all, the term "social" connotes person-to-person.²

The influence of other individuals upon the new individual in this world is not merely that of one animal upon another. These influences are so profoundly affected by certain standardizations or universally accepted frames of behavior that a second set of environmental influences must be taken into account. These we shall denominate the cultural patterns of our group or groups. These are the universals of conduct which Sumner called the *folkways*, including the moral codes or mores and the non-moral manners, social techniques, and conventions as well. Once more let us not confuse ourselves by imagining that these cultural patterns affect us in the form of some social or collective mind or as some non-human entity. Both the cultural and the personal-social effects are made possible through inter-individual stimulus and response. It is only that the two should be differentiated in analysis and description, in order the more clearly to uncover the process of living. In reality the two are intermixed, often to an extent which baffles the student of human relations. In fact, in the changing social codes of today we are witnessing the interesting process of the death of some cultural patterns and the evolution of others. In more stabilized societies, perhaps, the individual variations through personal-social inter-

² The word *personal* alone is objectionable chiefly because it often connotes private or even non-social effects. What we need to emphasize is the *social*, not the *private*, aspects of the interaction of individuals.

action are probably less evident, although the work of Radin and especially of Malinowski has demonstrated that even in primitive groups, which are so often thought to live completely under "the cake of custom," there is a wide latitude between the theoretical code and actual practice.

We may illustrate how the group influences the individual in two ways: by personal-social influences of various sorts, on the one hand, and by cultural pressures, on the other. We must not forget that both of these influences reach one person through other persons. The family, the neighborhood, the church group, the citizenship group, into which you are born, have certain more or less ideal or standardized codes of action into which you must fit if you are to get on. Actually, both the child and the adult may and do escape full participation in these patterns which the groups set down for them. For example, in many upper classes of Europe, it is customary to employ a wet-nurse for the new-born baby. It is against the convention for the natural mother to nurse her infant. To do so would cause her to lose caste. On the other hand, there may be no social convention as to the time intervals between nursings, and the indulgent nurse may let the baby have the breast at any time and at irregular periods whenever the baby fusses and cries. On the basis of psychiatric findings we have good reason to believe that irregular nursing often produces certain habits in the individual which may influence his attachments to his mother or to the wet-nurse. These attachments affect his later behavior in distinct ways; for example, the demand to have every whim satisfied often begins here. The custom of employing wet-nurses is in the *folkways*, in the social code of the upper classes; but that any particular wet-nurse indulged a fretful baby is not, and would be counted as a personal-social as over against a cultural influence.

We may mention another example, in which admittedly some cultural factors may also operate. The behavior of a man in a mob may be largely the result of personal-social stimuli thrust upon him, in which the rawer and less cultivated emotions and feelings would be brought to the surface. In contrast, the behavior of a man in an army-corps under orders and under the impress of drill and military code would be behavior distinctly colored in every respect by the cultural patterns of war-making. Still another contrast would be the actions and attitudes of a person going through an elaborate religious ritual handed down by dozens of generations, often without any realization of its historical setting and meaning, as compared

with the person's activities, say, under a great crisis like a famine, a flood, an earthquake, or other natural disaster for which there had been no cultural preparation. Actually, in the case of disasters we know that many persons disintegrate, as we say, and become almost animal-like in their behavior, in contrast with others who transfer or carry over their attitudes from other situations and remain as moral and as socialized in the face of crisis as at any other time.

Emotional appeals to friendship, to love, to fear and anger between person and person in many situations typify this, in contrast with the behavior of the group according to the code. Thomas describes such a situation in a narrative of a village decision regarding anti-social conduct in which personal appeal is offset by adherence to the code, even though family connections had to be sacrificed. The following excerpt gives the substance of the incident:

In front of the volost administration building there stands a crowd of some one hundred and fifty men. This means that a volost meeting has been called to consider the verdict of the Kusmin rural commune "regarding the handing over to the (state) authorities of the peasant Gregori Siedov, caught red-handed and convicted of horse-stealing." Siedov had already been held for judicial inquiry; the evidence against him was irrefutable and he would undoubtedly be sentenced to the penitentiary. In view of this I endeavor to explain that the verdict in regard to his exile is wholly superfluous and will only cause a deal of trouble; and that at the termination of the sentence of imprisonment of Siedov the commune will unfailingly be asked whether it wants him back or prefers that he be exiled. Then, I said, in any event it would be necessary to formulate a verdict in regard to the "non-reception" of Siedov, while at this stage all the trouble was premature and could lead to nothing. But the meeting did not believe my words, did not trust the court, and wanted to settle the matter right then and there; the general hatred of horse-thieves was too keen. . . .

The decisive moment has arrived; the head-man "drives" all the judges-elect to one side; the crowd stands with a gloomy air, trying not to look at Siedov and his wife, who are crawling before the *mir* on their knees. "Old men, whoever pities Gregori, will remain in his place, and whoever does not forgive him will step to the right," cries the head-man. The crowd wavered and rocked, but remained dead still on the spot; no one dared to be first to take the fatal step. Gregori feverishly ran over the faces of his judges with his eyes, trying to read in these faces pity for him. His wife wept bitterly, her face close to the ground; beside her, finger in mouth and on the point of screaming, stood a three-year-old youngster (at home Gregori had four more children). . . . But straightway one peasant steps out of the crowd; two years before some one had stolen a

horse from him. "Why should we pity him? Did he pity us?" says the old man, and stopping goes over to the right side. "That is true; bad grass must be torn from the field," says another one from the crowd, and follows the old man. The beginning had been made; at first individually and then in whole groups the judges-elect proceeded to go over to the right. The man condemned by public opinion ran his head into the ground, beat his breast with his fists, seized those who passed him by their coat-tails, crying: "Ivan Timofeich! Uncle Leksander! Vasinka, dear kinsman! Wait, kinsman, let me say a word . . . Petrushenka." But, without stopping and with stern faces, the members of the *mir* dodged the unfortunates, who were crawling at their feet. . . . At last the wailing of Gregori stopped; around him for the space of three *sazen* the place was empty; there was no one to implore. All the judges-elect, with the exception of one, an uncle of the man to be exiled, had gone over to the right. The woman cried sorrowfully, while Gregori stood motionless on his knees, his head lowered, stupidly looking at the ground.³

Here we might say that cultural factors stand in opposition to social influences of person-to-person, outside the village code. Such contrasts are not infrequent. The notion of tempering justice with mercy is nothing else than this. Justice demands the penalty for infraction of the social code or the mores. Mercy, an outgrowth of social sympathy—more definitely a product of personal-social experience—asks for extenuation.

Often, too, the social codes of various groups come into conflict with one another, producing other problems for social adjustment. For example, the code of the South Italian based on blood vengeance stands in clear opposition to the American code as typified in our law. Blackhand murder and gang warfare are difficult to handle in our cities, because the men involved in such crimes are attached to the European code more than to the American. Here as elsewhere well-meaning persons who attempt to explain the behavior of individuals on the basis of individual instincts, reflexes, or habits fail to recognize the tremendous force of these cultural patterns in molding human motives and actions.

At this point the reader may legitimately ask if social psychology really attempts to cover all three aspects of the social process—individual, social interaction, and cultural pressures. And if so, what place does psychology in the traditional sense, and what places do sociology and anthropology, occupy in the description and analysis of human behavior? Space does not permit elaboration, nor is this the place for a lengthy theoretical discus-

³ W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, 1923, pp. 47-48. Copyrighted by Little, Brown and Company.

sion of the interrelation of these fields and of the delimitation of social psychology. Without wishing to seem dogmatic, the writer may briefly state his standpoint.

To him there is no difference in point of view or in method between what is commonly called cultural anthropology and sociology. Any differences are in the objects of scientific attention rather than in fundamental points of view and method of approach to the data. These two sciences are concerned essentially with the cultural processes, the patterns and institutional precipitates of group life. These processes may be described entirely without recourse to psychology, as the brilliant work of the recent American ethnologists has demonstrated. Anthropology made its greatest strides as a social science when it gave up psychologizing the life of primitive peoples and began to study its data in the field in reference to historical antecedents and in terms of culture areas, cultural traits, cultural complexes, diffusion, and parallelism. Sociology, which is nothing if not the study of our own contemporary culture, is just now beginning to learn this important lesson. It is gradually giving up its interest in immediate social improvement as its first aim, and is abolishing its interpretative psychologizing by developing its own concepts from its study of group data. Small defines sociology as "that technique which approaches knowledge of human experience as a whole through investigation of the group-aspect of phenomena." In the words of Spencer, sociology and anthropology are concerned with the super-organic world.⁴

Psychology, on the other hand, is concerned with the individual organism, and particularly with the manner in which it works or behaves. This puts psychology distinctly on the borderline of physiology; but unlike physiology, psychology studies the organism as a whole in relation to its environment or the configuration of stimuli. The response of the total-going organism rather than the response of the isolated muscle or gland in the laboratory is the concern of the psychologist. Since, however, so much of the environment to which the organism reacts is made up of other individuals, since it is so largely social, may one not ask if psychology is not largely social psychology? This is a point which is debatable at least. Though the very mention of this idea often sets off the anger reactions of

⁴ Cf. A. W. Small's article "Sociology," *Encyclopedia Americana*, vol. XXV, p. 208. Also see A. L. Kroeber "The Possibility of a Social Psychology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1918: vol. XXIII: 633-50, and W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, 1919, for discussion of the super-organic or culture.

the laboratory psychologist, Dewey, Mead, Balz, and others have raised this issue. It may be that in time, even in systematic psychology, the social factors in the range of stimuli will at least be more fully recognized than they were by the classical laboratory psychologists. However, Weiss in his *Theoretical Basis of Behavior* appreciates the importance of social-cultural stimuli.

The present writer is willing, if necessary, to grant to the psychologist the field of the study of the mechanisms of behavior and mind, no matter whether the stimuli be other individuals or the physical universe. The social psychologist will borrow from the laboratory psychologist whatever data and methods of analysis he needs. There is, however, a phase of behavior of the individual which can be stated in psychological terms and which the traditional psychologist has slighted. To the writer this seems, if not the essence of social psychology, certainly a very important part of it. This phase concerns the content of mind and behavior as contrasted with the forms or mere mechanics of stimulus and response. Strict psychology deals with the forms, with the mechanisms of mental processes and action, without regard to what it is in the way of concrete or abstract content which goes through the human machine. Social behavior is not understandable in these terms alone. If we are to describe and analyze the behavior of individuals in groups, we must know also what kinds of ideas, attitudes, and habits they have. In other words, we are concerned with the content of mind and behavior.

It must be evident at once that the source of the content of mind and behavior lies in the fields of personal-social and cultural experiences. For the sociologists these things may be described in sociological terminology, but for the social psychologist they may be stated as the content of ideas, attitudes, and habits. An illustration will help to make this clear. On some of the islands in the West Indies stones are placed upright along the native pathways. To the traveler they are merely stones somehow put upright in the ground, and he first supposes that they are road-markers or perhaps mile-stones. But they are so irregularly placed that they could hardly be used to indicate distances. He then notices that natives, as they pass these stones, go through some odd gestures; and every native who passes these stones repeats the same odd gestures. The traveler can soon learn that to the natives the stones are of a half-religious, half-magical character. To explain the actions of the natives in terms of mere stimulus alone omits

the most essential factors in their actions. To learn why the natives react so oddly toward some stones and not toward others, we are forced to take account of their ideas about the peculiar character of particular stones.

We wish to know how images and ideas get stereotyped in the mind, so that reactions to politics, economics, and religion may be predicted on the basis of mental habit. We also wish to know what the content of a man's mind is. If we do not know the ideas controlling a man's behavior, we cannot believe that we understand his behavior. After all, we cannot attempt to control or even alter another's mind until we know *what* he thinks as well as *how* he thinks. Frequently in the process of reëducation we cannot stop at an effort to change slightly the images in a man's mind; we must definitely substitute one image for another. For instance, days and nights of fear in the trenches have filled the minds of shell-shocked soldiers with images of terror and distress. The sight or even the image of four walls and a ceiling may recall these hours of terror spent in a dugout. The image may be so terrible that the patient must be forcibly restrained from breaking out of the house which reminded him of his ghastly experiences. By long training, we must bring new trains of imagery and new forms of emotion in this soldier, so that merely being in a closed room does not bring to his mind the visual image of his comrades buried in a dugout that has been struck by a high-explosive shell, or the kinesthetic (muscular) imagery of himself running down the trench away from the awful scene. Again, a person may be obsessed by a violent hatred of the Negro race. Here there is a specific mental set, with a definite, almost automatic reaction. Intimately connected with that is usually a series of emotions, mostly unpleasant, and visual images of a blackamoor attacking white women, or pushing white men off the sidewalk. If one has lived in the South and has heard tales of Reconstruction days, one may see images of drunken Negro legislators rolling whiskey barrels up and down the marble steps of the state capitol. In order to describe and to explain the attitudes and behavior of this type of person, it is quite as essential to know the content of his images and his feeling-tones as it is to know the psychological mechanism of habit formation and habit breakdown. In brief, to understand any social behavior it is necessary to know *what* lies in the mind as well as *how* the brain, the muscles, and the glands operate.

Let us take still another instance: the psychologist has taught us a good deal about the fallibility of memory and the manner in which recalled

memories are modified by imagination and associated experiences. The mechanisms of this process have been exposed in numerous studies. In the description and analysis of the patriotic person, for example, it is not only important to know the mental mechanisms of learning and recall, but for social psychology it is even more important to know where he got the "pictures in his head" about Washington or Lincoln or Lee which are the roots of his ardent patriotism. Another striking example of the influence of ideology on behavior occurs in the political-economic field. The Marxian socialist has an image of the class struggle very different from that of the capitalist employer. The recognition of the power of image content is seen over and over again in the education and propaganda carried on by these two groups. Sometimes we wonder if the two factions are describing the same phenomena.

The social psychologist, then, must take into account the pictures or images in people's heads, the kinds of slogans, words, and stories or legends which lie at the foundation of their emotional beliefs. These are the roots of their behavior. Merely to know the mechanism of the conditioned response and the whole psychology of associationism upon which it rests, will never give us the full knowledge of the behavior of the individual in the social group which we desire for scientific analysis and for ultimate prediction and control.

Thus social psychology borrows from physiology and experimental psychology the description of the mechanisms of behavior. From sociology and anthropology it derives the patterns which produce in the individual the content of his mind and behavior. Its own function is to trace the development of attitude, idea, and habit in the human individual on the side of both mechanism and content, always with reference to the attitudes, ideas, and habits which rest upon inter-individual stimulus and response. The sociologist and anthropologist may—and should—describe his data without any reference whatsoever to psychological concepts. The experimental psychologist may describe his data in terms of reflexes, habits, and mental mechanisms without reference to content of these or to the sociological formulations. The social psychologist, while he borrows from the latter the mechanisms, must also be concerned with tracing the content of the individual mind and behavior as it is affected by his social and his cultural stimulation. In describing the stimuli he may use sociological concepts, but in treating the personality he must, in the strict sense, employ psychological

terms. For instance, he must treat the content of ideas, attitudes, and habits as individual counterparts of the social world outside.⁵

In concrete detail, therefore, social psychology must take into account the individual as a person. On the side of development this must include reference to innate mechanisms: reflexes, instinctive trends and emotions, and the potential capacities for growth and modification of these in terms of habit, attitude, and the power of controlling future action through thought or deliberation. From this matrix we hope to trace the motives for human action and the factors which produce the various facets of human life.

On the one hand, social psychology is based firmly on individual mechanisms; on the other, it reaches up into personal-social and cultural phases, since the content of reaction and mental processes arises from these influences. It is not a question of segregating the individual from the group. It is rather a problem of how persons act and interact under social stimulation. This must then involve three phases: (a) other persons, as they stimulate the person or are stimulated by the person, (b) the person's own social reaction (that is, in relation to the others), (c) the institutions to which the individual responds or which he in turn modifies. The latter is, as we have indicated, simply a cultural phase of the first two.

It remains to dispose of the concept of the "group mind," "collective consciousness," "mob mind," "folk mind," and such terms as the subject-matter of social psychology. It is unnecessary, however, to go over this ground in critical detail, since this has been done so well already.⁶ The

⁵ The writer is aware that he has sketchily touched on fundamental problems here. Allport doubts the reality of the group; would deny to sociology and anthropology any substance except as merely descriptive sciences. There is, of course, nothing new in Allport's denial of the reality of the group. It seems necessary to point out that in *entropy* even physics employs a definite concept of the group. Cf. e.g., A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, pp. 103-107.

This whole question goes back to the age-long controversy of nominalism and realism. Furthermore, the social psychologist of the present time may see no point in the emphasis upon mental content, so long as we have a thorough-going sociology which describes fully the cultural patterns which correspond more or less to this content. The writer would say that not all the content of mind and behavior is determined by cultural patterns. Much of it arises from what he defines narrowly as personal-social experience. Moreover, the personality is the particular concern of the social psychologist. Personality is really the product of the individual organism, with its mechanisms, plus the effects of personal-social and cultural pressures. The content of mind and behavior may be stated in terms of the psychology of personality. Without this material at hand the study of personality seems to be incomplete. The present-day psychiatrist is beginning to realize this in part, although usually his descriptions are misty or so involved as to seem incomprehensible to the uninterested. Cf. for example, T. Burrow, *The Social Basis of Consciousness*.

⁶ Cf. J. W. Sprowls, *Social Psychology Interpreted*, 1927, especially Chapter V; *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, 1925, Chapter IV, pp. 158-164, and F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, 1924, Chapter I, pp. 4-10.

essential criticism to be leveled against the whole "group mind" thesis is the questionable use of psychological terminology and concepts to describe and analyze what essentially belongs to sociology and anthropology, that is, to group phenomena. Tarde, Durkheim, Le Bon, McDougall, and in part such American sociologists as Ward, Giddings, Small, and Ross, have discussed group phenomena in psychological terms. This has resulted, especially in the European writers mentioned, in much loose psychologizing about "mob mind," "group consciousness," "folk soul," and the like. The whole problem is resolved into its proper perspective if we understand that the phenomena described by these writers in psychological terms may more adequately be treated in concepts of sociology and anthropology, that is, as group or cultural data.

To conclude, then, social psychology deals with the personality as it is affected by other persons and as it, in turn, influences them. The personality, first, is an outgrowth of the personal-social and cultural stimuli which impinge upon the individual from his first appearance in this world. Secondly, it is also a product of the responses of the individual to this personal-social world which is made up of other persons and of the precipitates of earlier social life which we call culture.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapters I, pp. 3-6; III, pp. 30-53.
- ✓ B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises in assignment in *Source Book*, Chapters I, p. 6; III, pp. 53-54.
 2. Distinguish between personal-social and cultural stimuli. Illustrate from your own experience and observation.
 3. Distinguish between mechanism and content of behavior.
 4. Criticize the concept of "group" and of "collective consciousness."
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
 1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapters I, p. 6; III, p. 54.
 2. Review critically J. W. Sprowls, *Social Psychology Interpreted*, especially Chapter V, on the group mind theories in social psychology.
 3. Review critically Allport's discussion of group mind, culture patterns, etc. in his articles.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF GROUP LIFE AND HUMAN CULTURE

A. *Evolution and Group Life.*

1. *Group Life in Lower Animal Forms.*—Social life did not begin with man; it was only expanded and enriched by him. Some species of the insect world are witness to an amazing development of social life. While much of the literature about the social life of the bees, the ants, and other insect orders is permeated with fancy and anthropomorphic imagination, there is nevertheless a sound body of data which indicates a high degree of social organization and considerable interdependence with other species. For instance, some species of ants, aside from distinct division of function, keep under their care a particular species of aphid in order to obtain the syrupy-like substance exuded by these insects. The ants guard their aphids, move them about with them, and “milk” them by gently stroking the dorsal spines which give forth this liquid. Again, not only do the ants have something like a division of labor and even social arrangements between species, but some species carry on a kind of warfare with other species. Throughout the whole range of the social insects there is clear evidence of the fact that living in social groups modifies the behavior of the individual members of the group.

It may rightly be said that the social and communal life of the lower forms serves merely as an analogy for human social groups. Nevertheless there is some merit in indicating that it is not alone among higher mammals that nature has produced forms of communal living. The following selection from McGee serves to illustrate the interdependence of individuals on one another in a desert environment producing a kind of community configuration distributed both as to space and as to function:

A mesquite springs up on the plain; within two or three years the birds resting in its branches drop the seeds of cacti, some of which, like vines, are unable to stand alone; and the cactus and the mesquite combine their armature of thorns for mutual protection. Then wind-blown grass seeds lodge about the

roots, and grasses grow and seed beneath the sheltering branches; and next small mammals seek the same protection and dig their holes among the roots, giving channels for the water of the ensuing rain and fertilizing the spot with rejectamenta. Meantime the annual and semi-annual plants which maintain a precarious existence in the desert take root in the sheltered and fertilized soil beneath the growing cactus and mesquite, and in season it becomes a miniature garden of foliage and bloomage. Then certain ants come for the seeds, certain flies and wasps for the nectar, and certain birds to nest in the branches. In this way a community is developed in which each participant retains individuality, yet in which each contributes to the general welfare. So advantageous is the communal arrangement that few organisms of the dryer portions of Papagueria pursue independent careers; the vast plains are dotted with communities or colonies from a few rods to some furlongs apart, while the intermediate stretches are practically lifeless; and the very soil is molded into a succession of hillocks with bare glades between, which persist even after the extermination of the colonies through climatal change or through human intervention. Thus do a large part of the plants and animals of the desert dwell together in harmony and mutual helpfulness; for their energies are directed not so much against one another as against the rigorous environmental conditions growing out of dearth of water.¹

2. *Group Life in Higher Animal Forms.*—The data of biological evolution show that among the mammals the social group was in many cases an evolutionary unit. The herding of sheep, the banding of wolves for hunting, the rudimentary forms of social grouping observed, for instance, among wild horses on the western plains—all are cases of rudimentary associations. If the members of a species become accustomed to one another in the course of their life history, so that the gestures and actions of one become a cue to the behavior of the others, we have the roots of social groupings. Protection, securing of food and shelter, and a number of fundamental wants may be better attained in coöperation with others of one's species than alone. Moreover, in the relation of mother to young the reactions of protection and dependence are decidedly forms of interaction. As we reach the anthropoid apes, the evidence of the importance of social life becomes stronger. Köhler has shown that there is a rudimentary type of group organization among the apes based apparently on feelings of familiarity, and that within this group of apes, moreover, there is some tendency for closer "friendships" to grow up. Often, for instance, a weaker chim-

¹ W. I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, 1909, pp. 55-56, from W. J. McGee, "The Beginnings of Agriculture," *American Anthropologist*, vol. VIII, pp. 362 ff.

panzee attached itself to a stronger one and followed him about throughout the day. Then, too, the appearance of a strange ape in the group was a signal for a concentrated attack upon the newcomer. In contrast, the separation of one of the apes from the others led to a great hubbub in the group. Yet, curiously enough, this disturbance lasted only so long as the fellow-apes could see and hear the isolated ape. When he disappeared or no longer cried out, they lost interest and concern in him. Thus, as Köhler points out, we are not to imagine, as some people do, that the apes have human intelligence. There is not yet that independence of memory images which marks man, just as there is no true language development among the apes.

The significance of the study of the apes is that we find here the rudiments of sociability which, in turn, seems to root in the gregariousness of the lower mammalian forms. Gregariousness may be thought of as involving a certain instinctive tendency to common aid, to the herding together of like members of a species, while sociability is an additional growth which involves something of sympathy and imaginative appreciation of the others' situation. It seems to arise with an extended period of infancy, and is probably correlated with what McDougall calls the tender emotions. In the human being it certainly involves imagery and memory in a degree not seen in the lower forms.

The more highly developed the group life in the higher mammals seems to be, the higher is the development of prehuman traits of behavior. While articulate speech is a distinctly human characteristic, we find among the apes an extensive range of vocalization; for example, in fear the voice is different from that in anger or in love-making.

Associated with the rise of group life, there occurred other changes in the organism which ultimately played an important part in the evolution of human intelligence and higher social life. As the mammalian forms began more and more to assume an erect posture, distinctly significant changes were imminent. The erect posture afforded, first of all, an increased range of visual attention, thus greatly expanding the environment. The musculature of the mouth and throat regions became freed from the immediate demands of holding and rending food or of holding the mate, because the forepaws now became modified in the direction of hands capable of grasping and manipulating food or shelter objects, sexual mates or enemies. The muscles of the throat and mouth began to be more and

more specialized in the direction of gesture rather than of act. They came to have significance for the other members of one's species as clues to oncoming behavior. The foundations of speech were thus laid down in the development of an erect posture, as are also the foundations of skill in manipulation of the physical environment more particularly. If the hand may be said to have now become correlated with the eye in the additional control of the material world, the speech mechanisms and the facial movements became definitely correlated with the control of other members of one's species and ultimately with the control of the group culture itself. Further on we shall discuss more particularly the place of language. Here, however, we have only to note that these changes in posture and the play of vocal-facial functions with the related modifications of brain organization have been of great importance in the evolution of group as well as individual life.

B. Types of Groups in Human Social Behavior.

While we do not know at what point anthropoid groups became human, we have indirect evidence of a gradual but nevertheless continuous evolution toward higher intelligence, more developed social life, and more complex culture. As will appear again and again in this book, it is evident everywhere that man is not a solitary but a social animal, playing a rôle now in this group, now in that. His attitudes, ideas, and habits are affected everywhere by his membership in a family, a church, a club, a business or a labor group, a nation, and so on. Without attempting to arrange the types of groups in historical sequence, since we know really nothing about the matter of origins, we may note briefly the essential kinds of groups, some of their characteristic functions, and the effects of these upon the individuals who compose their membership.

✓ 1. *The In-group or We-group versus the Out-group or Others-group.*—Perhaps the most universal and most characteristic division of group attachment lies in the distinction between the in-group or we-group and the out-group or others-group. Our membership and participation in group life, running from the family on to such large groups as church or state, are marked by certain attitudes and values which are more or less common to all.

a. *The In-group.*—The in-group is that association of persons toward whom we feel a sense of commonalty and mutuality, with whom we par-

ticipate in the group's social function, with whom we carry out the group standards. It is characterized by a feeling of "we belong," "we believe," "we feel." The simplest in-group, perhaps, is the family, where in face-to-face relationships we develop attitudes of sticking together against outsiders. It is marked throughout by the feelings of we-ness, or our-ness. The attitudes and habits of the members of the in-group are those of mutual aid, coöperation, sense of familiarity, and, above all, loyalty and social unity or solidarity. We understand the gestures, the words, the actions of those of our own we-group. Thus the members of a family long separated may at a family reunion find themselves soon reminiscing over common childhood and youthful experiences. Little jokes are repeated which have a meaning only for the members of the family, and in everyone there is a sense of well-being and expansiveness.

J. O. related how he had just returned from the funeral of his mother where he met again, after many years, a number of his brothers and sisters. The family members had drifted apart in the course of time, and during the reunion, for a day or two, particularly at meal times, the conversation consisted very largely of narrating stories of hikes, hunting trips, events, and situations shared by brothers and sisters during childhood. As adults these persons had little in common; on reuniting their universe of discourse focused largely on family in-group experiences of long ago.

At another level the members of a trade union have a common slang. They have similar ideas. They have a sense of loyalty to one another. So, too, in time of war or national danger the citizens of a nation forget their differences of opinion and divergent ways of life, and unite for the preservation of values which they hold sacred in the name of the state. The flag, the map, the national heroes serve as stimuli to set off these unified patriotic attitudes and actions.

b. *The Out-group*.—The out-groups or others-groups, in contrast, constitute those groups which are outside the range of the face-to-face or secondary participation, the coöperation, the loyalty, of which we have just spoken. The family across the street is not quite "in our class." The hats that Mrs. Jones wears are not in the latest mode as "are those of our girls." The morals of the other family may not be so high as ours. The neighborhood down the street has a set of values distinctly inferior to our own. Our attitudes are those of mild avoidance or actual dislike for the members of the out-group. Again, at another level, the out-group may consti-

tute an actual conflict group for the in-group. This is the case of trade unions as opposed to employers' associations. It is the situation when one nation is arrayed against another in war. Toward the out-group the attitudes are those of avoidance, of ridicule, of competition, of dislike, perhaps of actual conflict. The sentiments of superiority always exist in reference to our own group in contrast with the out-group. In tribal or national life this sentiment of superiority is called *ethnocentrism*. Every tribe or nation believes itself, at least in some matters, superior to all others—if not in military or economic strength, possibly in scholarship, art, or morals.

c. Interrelation of In-group versus Out-group Attitudes and Habits.—The emotions of love and the feelings of pleasure are correlated with attachment to the we-group. The emotions of fear and anger are directed toward the out-group. Around the we-group one may integrate one's habits, attitudes, and emotions just noted, and toward the others-group the opposite habits, attitudes, and emotions. In fact, the life situations wherein a person may at the same time both love and hate, both condemn and praise, both avoid and approach, are those involving in-group—out-group relationships. The matter is nicely illustrated in time of war between nations. Toward his own people, toward their standards and behavior, the patriotic citizen feels expansive, loyal, coöperative, and sympathetic. His sentiments are those of love and pride. Toward the enemy, toward their standards and behavior, he feels only superiority, disgust, fear, hate, and desire to injure and, in the most violent forms, to destroy. This is a case emotionally of having one's cake and eating it too, something which is denied us ordinarily in life situations. Upon the enemy we load all of the atrocities and villainies imaginable, as most of us did during the World War. At the same time we paint our own country and her ideals in beautiful and humanistic colors. It is the old conflict of good and evil, of the Devil and God, of Satan and Jehovah, with righteousness, truth, and all of the virtues on our side, and the corresponding vices and sins on the other side. True enough, in ordinary life the contrast does not stand out so boldly, but wherever conflict comes into play there is a tendency for this ambivalence to assert itself. The integration of antagonistic attitudes and habits is one of the most significant psychological facts to be noted in analyzing social behavior.

2. Primary and Secondary Groups.—Another dimension in group life is found in the contrast of primary and secondary or derivative groups.

Here we are concerned really with forms of group organization within the in-group or out-group.

a. *The Primary Group*.—Cooley, who has so well discussed the function of the primary group, remarks:

By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and co-operation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group.²

The primary group is characterized by its unconscious growth, its spontaneous formation in an area inhabited by people of more or less homogeneous blood and culture. We might say, with Ross, that the primary groups refer to the "natural order" of society. The primary groups with which we are most familiar are the family, the play-group, out of which grow the gang and congenial group, and the neighborhood or small village group. The primary groups are the literal nursery of the personality. It is here that the fundamental personal-social experience is acquired, here that the fundamental culture patterns, at least on the side of moral conduct and many fundamental attitudes, are impressed on the growing boy or girl. Social interaction takes place at a face-to-face level. The social stimuli are direct; that is to say, voice, facial gestures, touch, smell, and visual stimuli are involved.

Without doubt the family is the basic social group. It is the matrix in which the most significant habits and attitudes are laid down in the individual. Here he acquires his personal habits, his primary conditioning to his mother, father, brothers and sisters, and other relatives. Here he gets his first training in the moral codes of his society. Here he obtains most of the fundamental values which are woven into his life organization. Moreover, the family is the only social group which integrates the biological and the socio-psychological aspects of human behavior. The family is rooted in the procreation and rearing of children. Perhaps, at the outset, the family unit revolved around the mother and her children, with the male playing in the situation as protector of the mother as a sexual object. At any rate the biological foundations of the family unit are apparent.

² C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 1909, p. 23. Courtesy of Chas. Scribner's Sons.

On this substructure the personal-social and cultural elements were later developed.

The play-group is another important primary group. At play the child meets his fellows on a natural, that is, personal-social rather than cultural basis. The play-group is more or less spontaneous in its formation. At its best it is conducted outside the stimulation and formulation by adults. The play of children in a neighborhood is, of course, not unaffected by adult attitudes. Yet children, unless spoiled by their elders, do tend to form natural social attachments and to develop their spontaneous capacities in the play-group. The play-group of small children in time gives rise to two other groups which are largely primary groups in nature, but which are somewhat more consciously formed. The first of these are those small congenial groupings formed by children, young men and women, and even adults, in which common interest, mutual pleasure, and sense of intimacy play a large part. The older congenial groups often run over into clubs and more formalized organizations and thus tend to move completely out of the range of the primary groups. The congenial group often originates from the play-group and is in a sense transitional to the secondary associations.

The second of these groups which arise out of play-life is the gang. This group has, at the outset, the features of the primary group, but again it may later become rather more formalized, with rituals, codes, and standards which carry it over to the borderline of the derivative groups. Primary group virtues are emphasized in the gang life, and participation in the gang is an important step in many a boy's personal development. In some instances the adult never rises above the morality of the close-knit gang organization, even though he may be no longer a member of a gang but of a club, fraternity, labor union, or employers' association.

The neighborhood or village group of elder persons constitutes a third illustration of the primary group which is important in the development of social personality. The group of elders carry the folkways and moral codes, the techniques of getting a living, and the whole range of manners and conventions which are thrust upon the rising generation and which compress them into the mold laid down by the older ancestral generations. The neighborhood or small village group in many instances was an outgrowth of earlier small locality units of tribe or clan. It serves as the modern survival of these more primitive forms of social grouping. Today the

neighborhood and small village are disappearing before the changes in production and distribution associated with rapid communication and transportation.

b. *The Secondary or Derivative Group.*—The secondary group is characterized by the fact that it is much more consciously organized than the primary group. Its organization rests upon the existence of common interests more or less well recognized. Often these groups are called "interest groups." The secondary group does not depend altogether on face-to-face contacts. While actually most secondary groups operate more or less at the face-to-face level for at least some of the members, much of the interaction depends upon long-distance communication of stimuli and response. Easy transportation, the postal system, telephone and telegraph, the press, and other means of conveying materials, ideas, and attitudes, are important for the development of derivative groupings.

While the primary group tends to be more or less involuntary, the secondary group is voluntary. Modern culture is distinctly characterized by the growth of secondary associations. The larger political state, trade unions, employers' associations, clubs, fraternal orders, religious sects, political parties, and scientific societies—all are examples of secondary groups. True, many of the attitudes and habits of the primary group are carried over into the secondary group. These attitudes of morality and interstimulation of the face-to-face sort are lost, in part, in the expansiveness and ritual of the larger organization. The secondary group is marked by the development of formal codes and social rituals, as also of techniques for securing the objects of common interest, be it increased wages, shorter hours, greater profits, more liberal interpretation of academic freedom, or what not. Secondary groupings, moreover, very easily run over into institutional forms. Sometimes the fundamental distinctions of social groups are made in terms of institutional or non-institutional characteristics. Certainly the primary groups do not, on the whole, take on any high degree of institutionalization, whereas secondary groups lend themselves easily to this sort of organization.

c. *Temporary Quasi-Primary and Secondary Groups.*—The distinction between institutional and non-institutional is not precisely the same as that between primary and derivative. Mobs and temporary street crowds may scarcely be called primary in the sense of the family, the play-group, or the neighborhood; yet they are not secondary groups. These temporary

contiguous groups, however, must be reckoned with as types of relatively unorganized groups. These forms of collective association may distinctly influence personality. So, too, the non-contiguous crowd or public is a form of grouping highly significant in our society. As we shall see, the public, or better said, the publics, are closely related to secondary interest groups.

We need not further discuss the general sociological features of groups, as in subsequent chapters we shall have occasion to consider group backgrounds of personality development. It is important for our standpoint to realize, at all times, that the personality development of the individual is constantly modified and directed by his participation in groups of other persons somewhat similar to or different from himself.

C. Nature of Culture.

1. *Morality, Socialization, and Group Life.*—Rather more important for us than any elaborate treatment of the sociology of groups, is the need of pointing out that modern life has come to be dominated more and more by secondary and institutionalized groups. Division of labor—meaning specialization—rapid communication and transportation, and the enormous expansion of organized business enterprise have completely altered the forms of human relationships. The primary groups of family, neighborhood, and village have steadily been losing ground as the major groups in our society. In their place the urban community, the specialized institution of education, the industrialized and commercialized types of association, dominate our life organization. Throughout this volume we shall have occasion to indicate how these newer forms of associate life affect the personality of the individual and his relations with his fellows.

In the field of moral codes these changes are most apparent. Most of our moral codes were formulated under the impetus of the primary group organization of society. It is self-evident that moral codes and other psychological aspects of our culture patterns persist far longer than changes in the material civilization. The upshot is that, while we have made tremendous changes in our physical comforts, in our standards of living, in our means of travel and communication, the socio-psychological aspects of our culture have lagged behind these changes. In other words, as our material universe has expanded enormously under the guiding hand of science and engineering, our moral codes remain largely those devised in

the days of superstition, hand manufacture, the stagecoach, and the pioneer. This has produced the strain of inconsistency between the material aspects of social life and the codes of social conduct. Every student of juvenile delinquency and crime realizes the influence of, say, the automobile in the problems of anti-social conduct, just as modern business methods have made possible newer forms of dishonesty. The whole range of what is considered worth while in life has changed under the new influences. For instance, the church codes, which embody many of the social mores, seem to have little weight with people, largely because other values have arisen. All this leads naturally to the necessity of considering briefly at this point the relation of culture patterns to group life and social control.

2. *Culture Patterns, Group Life, and Social Control.*—We shall have to treat briefly the rise and course of culture patterns as they influence the personality.

a. *Crises and Culture Patterns.* Personal-social experiences, as defined in the first chapter, are no doubt antecedent to all our culture patterns. The latter are formalized, standardized, and commonly accepted ways of doing and thinking in various groups, particularly communities of families and political states. When man meets the daily problem of securing his food supply, notes the existence of certain regularities in the seasons and in the climate, discovers basic sources of food, he develops more or less uniform methods of securing his living. Social techniques of fishing, hunting, herding, and horticulture come to be common to groups securing their food in these various manners. Likewise techniques of making tools and instruments to assist in this process arise and are handed down in what is often called the "social heritage," but in what is, following modern anthropology, coming to be termed "material culture patterns." The formation of habits is thus effective in making the solution of life situations simpler. So there arises a natural conservatism, a tendency always to perform acts in the traditional manner. It takes a new situation, that is, a novel arrangement of stimuli, to give rise to new methods of getting a living. For example, the techniques of farming the peasant land in Europe, which go back to the feudal order, may not apply in pioneer America, Australia, or South Africa. The European settler in these parts had to develop new ways of doing things. Likewise, in the whole range of food habits, in standards of living, and in attitudes of thrift, new methods may arise. New situations demand new habits, which, when made more or less common to

a group, we may call, in sociological terms, folkways or culture patterns. In our own society the invention of a new machine for doing manual or skilled labor may throw thousands of men and women out of employment and demand a radical reorganization of their lives. This was a common phenomenon during the Industrial Revolution, beginning with the introduction of power machinery into England in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The profound and extensive changes inaugurated in this period, and the awful social misery caused by these changes, are commonplaces of economic history.³

Not only in the field of material culture patterns do crises produce alterations in social organization and personal development, but in the field of moral codes which conserve the values of social conduct the same phenomenon is apparent. Changes in the forms of the family, in the nature of political government, in religious organizations, always take place under novel conditions. The present abolition of polygyny in Turkey is an instance of the first; the shift toward political democracy in the nineteenth century, an instance of the second; and the rise of the Reformation churches in northern Europe of the third.

b. *Folkways and Mores as Definitions of Situations.*—All of these methods of meeting environmental situations may be termed forms of definition of the situation. That is to say, the individuals in their group life come to delimit the stimuli in certain standardized, stabilized ways. These socially accepted definitions, moreover, are kept alive by the elders of the group, be they medicine men, chieftains, priests, labor leaders, or executives of the modern state. It is true, as Thomas, Malinowski, and others have shown, that individuals usually incline to a hedonistic or pleasurable interpretation of life, the group to one of utilitarianism or usefulness for all. This produces a conflict between the individual definition and the codified one which is apparent in most societies. It is particularly true in our time when the older codes are breaking down.

Some of the definitions of situation do not possess any moral value. These may be called the non-moral folkways. Such details of our culture as table manners, styles of dress, and use of various sorts of machinery illustrate this dimension of culture patterns. Infraction of these non-moral folkways by the individual leads simply to ridicule and avoidance. Thus among some

³ Cf. Ernst Toller's *The Machine Wreckers*, and Hauptmann's *The Weavers*. These two dramas depict the situation, one for England, the other for Germany.

American Indian tribes it is the practice for the guest at a meal to make as much noise as possible while eating. This is supposed to show his appreciation of the hospitality of his host and his group. With us, such conduct would be distinctly frowned upon. The college boy or girl who so acted on being invited to a fraternity dinner would be forever ostracized in polite society; on the other hand, he would not be put in jail or driven out of college.

Infractions of those definitions of situations which are called moral codes or mores lead, however, to more severe social pressures. The mores involve those codes which are related to group welfare, which are considered sacred to social stability. They cover the concepts of *right* or *wrong* in conduct. Here the non-conformist is looked upon as anti-social. Ridicule, physical punishment, imprisonment, ostracism or banishment from the group, even death, are penalties. Murder, stealing, perjury in court, dishonesty, sexual irregularity as defined by the respective codes, being traitor to the group's existence, particularly in time of warfare—these illustrate the fields of behavior in which the more severe group pressures are applied.

The situations which bring about such action on the part of others are defined in terms of taboos. Definitions of situations and taboos are phrased largely in language terms. Thus certain terms, such as, "scab," "traitor," "adulterer," "thief," "criminal," "immoral," come to be applied to persons who infringe the code. And the situations are defined in the unwritten moral codes or, else, in our society, are embodied in the formal statute law; or again they acquire, through legal decisions, the force of statute law by what is known as legal precedent.

c. *Social Rituals*.—Associated both with non-moral folkways and with the mores are the social rituals. This term, while often applied only to the standardized form of behavior in the church or the secret fraternity, really may comprehend the whole range of those more or less standardized, institutionalized situations which recur in business, education, family life, church activities and even recreation. Graduation from college is marked by certain social formalities. Initiation into a church group or worship in a church has other formalities. Voting is carried on in certain standardized ways. Other illustrations may be observed all about us. Some cultures seem to be more highly colored by intensive ritualism than others. The Hebrew people furnish a familiar example. The Tharauds illustrate this very well

in their book, *The Shadow of the Cross*. Ritualism with the Jews reaches into hundreds of life situations where it does not affect Christians. These authors describe a group of village lads, all Christian but one, who is a Jew, on a walk through the country. The boys spy a clump of berry bushes hung with ripe fruit, and they all, except the Hebrew boy, clamber over the low stone wall. The Hebrew boy hesitates because he is uncertain, not whether he should or should not help himself, but rather whether he should eat the fruit. The following paragraph presents the picture:

"Why aren't you eating?" asked the bold Micha.

Ah, yes; why? How should that little Christian know that for every act in our lives there is an appointed benediction: the benediction to be said on getting up and lying down, at the beginning of a meal and the end of it, on taking rest and on starting our work; one to be said when we see the lightning, one when we hear the thunder; one when we stand before a tree or flowering bush; another when we breathe the scent of an aromatic plant or the perfume of spices; one to be said when we see the rainbow or look upon some very beautiful thing; another when we put on a new garment or throw away an old caftan; one to be said on seeing an eminent rabbi, a distinguished scholar, or a king or a giant or a dwarf (praise be to Thee, Eternal, for the diversity of Thy creatures!) and among a thousand more there is one to be said before eating the fruit of a tree and another for the products of the ground. . . . [Doubt as to raspberry being a bush or a tree.]

"Is the raspberry a bush, a tree or a plant of the ground?"

"The raspberry is a tree," answered the baker's son, for whom the world had no mysteries.

"Blessed be Thou, Eternal, our God, King of the universe, Who hast created the fruits of the tree!" the pious child murmured in his heart.

And having said the benediction, he joined his comrades, and plundered his neighbor's raspberry bushes without remorse.

Yet even though our present-day life is not so carefully circumscribed by social rituals as this, such rituals are constantly forming. Some of them are highly stabilized, like the manners of polite society and the rituals of the church; others, such as extending road courtesies in driving a car, are less conventionalized. Institutionalization, in fact, is another way of stating that along with definite code, with corporate existence under the law, and often with the erection of certain buildings on a particular locality, and the establishment of a hierarchy of authority, there usually goes the development of formal social rituals.

Some historical periods and some peoples seem much more characterized

by extensive and intensive social ritual than others. The Hebrews we have mentioned. The medieval period was rich in rituals. The Hindu and Chinese cultures are also markedly so. Cooley in his brilliant discussion of formalism in society holds that in modern democracy there is much less of it. He believes that the true democratic ideal (value) tends to destroy it. Yet in our own day we see about us a distinct movement toward ritualism and formalism in certain fields of behavior. The universal standardization of dress, speech, literary tastes, food habits, commercialized recreation, etc., expose its growth in the field of non-moral folkways. The increased tendency witnessed in our own country, at least, toward putting the moral codes concerning liquor, sexual behavior, and the whole range of more personal habits into formal law, indicates a movement in that direction in the mores. Machine production and capitalistic business enterprise with their emphasis on regularity of all habits, on punctuality, honesty in payment of debt, stability of working habits, carry these ritualizations over into all of the attitudes and habits concerned with dress, food, recreation, and sexual morality.

Ritualism or formalism in social behavior means predictability of responses. When the individual member of a group is permitted to make his own private definitions of situations and to carry these out in action, predictability of his response is difficult if not impossible. Social rituals of all sorts thus cut across private or personal interpretations or meanings and produce those uniformities of behavior which make social interaction simpler and less likely to produce strain and disorder. They are the heart of culture patterns.

d. *Authority, Social Control, and Definitions of Situations.*—One can scarcely mention taboo, social ritual, and social control without considering the place of authority in social life. Authority is carried in verbal tradition, in crystallized law or other forms of codes. Actual authority, that is, the power of coercion, is exercised by priests, warriors, police officers, or other such executives who personify authority for the rest of us. The forms of authority differ in various culture periods. They are related to the forms of culture, and change as the latter change. Ross, in his *Social Control*, mentions the various types of prestige-bearers, or the élite, in all periods who carry forward the codes of their society. Pareto has also exposed the importance of the élite who crystallize, as it were, the social codes and who are the bearers of authority. We must not lose sight of the importance of

the prestige-bearer and the person vested with power in carrying out the codes of the group, those involving the mores as well as the non-moral folkways.

Aside from personal leadership and vested authority as factors in social control, we may mention the great importance, in historical periods, of other carriers of the mores, such as sacred writings. The Bible, the Koran, and all history, literature, science, and philosophy furnish additional bases for our control.

e. *The Ethos*.—Any particular culture, if it persists over a long period and has a certain degree of isolation, that is, it is only slightly diffused with other cultures, ultimately comes to possess certain distinctive characteristics which set it off from others. For example, the Spartan group in ancient Greece possessed some distinguishing features which were lost to the more cosmopolitan Athenian peoples. Likewise Venice in the Middle Ages and early modern period acquired cultural features which rather marked it off from Italy and the rest of southern Europe. Sumner employed the word *ethos* to describe this "totality of characteristic traits by which a group is individualized and differentiated from others." We can easily differentiate the Occidental cultures of the present age from those of the Orient, especially in the case of China and India. The cultures diverge in philosophy, in modes of thinking, in life organization, in the scheme of values—material and intellectual and emotional. With the diffusion of Occidental culture into the Orient, these distinctions, in time, will probably fall away. Still, the ethos of a country represents its most abiding features, and while modern comforts and standards may reach the Orient in the field of materialistic culture patterns, the anthropologist and the historian have taught us that in other fields the alteration goes on much more slowly. For example, it may not be difficult to introduce improved lighting, sanitation, and western methods of manufacturing into the Orient, but whether we can so rapidly change the family institutions, or the religious and philosophical formulations, is quite doubtful. These patterns change but slowly and may, in fact, have a definite repercussion upon the intruding material culture itself. That is to say, a sort of syncretism of Western and Eastern culture characteristics may result. Something like this is already taking place in Japan.

Since the ethos of a people constitutes their most fundamental patterns, it seems to them one of the most sacred, universal, and immortal aspects

of their life and valuations. One of the benefits of an objective study of various cultures and the socio-psychological processes correlated with them is the recognition of the relativity of various systems of cultures and their schemes of values. We must always realize in our socio-psychological analysis that we are viewing our data from the angle of the Western World with its curious faith in science, in industry, in commercial expansion, in formalized missionary religions, in political democracy, in universal education. When we attempt to project our own schemes of values on other cultures and on persons living under them, we at once lay ourselves open to serious criticism. Unless we adopt the view of relativity in our study of both culture and personality we shall never come to grips with the fundamental facts of that interrelation of human organism and personal-social and cultural stimuli which produces the subject-matter of social psychology, namely, the person in his social and cultural environment.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapters II, Section B, pp. 17-27; IV, pp. 56-75; V, pp. 78-116.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises in assignment in *Source Book*, Chapters II, p. 28; IV, p. 76; V, p. 117.
 2. Why do our in-group out-group attitudes and habits furnish a balance in the personality? Illustrate.
 3. Distinguish between primary and secondary groups. Illustrate each.
 4. What do we mean by culture? Illustrate.
 5. Distinguish between a personal definition of situation and a cultural or group-sanctioned one.
 6. List some of the distinguishing social rituals: (a) in our educational institutions; (b) in the democratic political state; (c) in our economic order.
 7. What are the outstanding features of our Euro-American ethos?
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
 1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapters II, p. 28; IV, p. 76; V, p. 117.
 2. What light does the study of social life among animals throw on the evolution of human behavior? (Cf. Alverdes, *Social Life Among Animals*, and references to Park and Burgess, Köhler, Wheeler and Yerkes cited in *Source Book*, Chapter II.)
 3. Study of immigrant personality documents as a revelation of how immigrants meet new definitions of situations when they come to America. (Cf.: Bibliography of Chapter V in *Source Book*.)
 4. Contrast of Oriental and Occidental ethos.

PART TWO

The Psychology of Individual Behavior

"Emotions are not only the most important forces in the life of the individual human being, but they are also the most powerful force of nature known to us. Every page in the history of nations testifies to their invincible power."

—LANGE

"We see things not as they are but as we are."—PATRICK

"No one supposes that all the individuals of the same species are cast in the very same mold."—DARWIN

In this section we shall briefly review those aspects of behavior in the individual which constitute the biological foundation of his social relations. The opening chapter discusses certain fundamental biological mechanisms. The further chapters treat instinctive-emotional behavior, habit formation, the development of intellectual functions, and the important fact of human variability. There is no need in a treatise in social psychology to devote undue space to general psychology. To review the psychological foundations of behavior the reader should consult the standard textbooks in systematic psychology. Particularly pertinent are those of Woodworth, Wheeler, Gates, Perrin and Klein, Dashiell, Leary, Carr, Martin, and Watson. A briefer review of general psychology will be found in Allport's *Social Psychology*, chapters II-IV inclusive.

CHAPTER III

THE BIOLOGICAL BASES OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

No matter just how our species came to be, the essential features and functions of our life are rooted in our animal ancestry. In this chapter we shall first discuss the problem of heredity and environment, then review the basic data relating to the organic foundations of behavior, especially the neuro-muscular-glandular system, and finally indicate the relation of personal-social and cultural stimuli to the physical functioning of the organism.

A. Heredity and Environment not Antagonistic but Correlative.

There has been much discussion concerning the relative weight of heredity and environment in the determination of man's behavior. These discussions seem to the writer useless, because they fail to note that the two influences are not mutually exclusive and opposite but correlative to one another. Most of the old controversy of heredity versus environment is thus rather pointless. Hereditary factors operating through the germ plasm seem to determine the general forms or patterns of physical development. Just how these shall develop seems largely determined by the environmental pressures. The significant work of Child makes this clear. He pointedly indicates that what the individual becomes depends upon the chemical forces operating inside the organism in terms of certain environmental pressures outside:

The conception of the organism as a behavior pattern appears in its clearest aspect in the development of the individual organism. Each organism begins its life as a distinct individual entity, in the form of a fertilized egg, or spore, or something similar. From these, there develops, by an orderly definite process, an individual of the particular species, with its characteristic structure and functions. In the past this development was regarded as a process predetermined by something intrinsic in the protoplasm; in other words, by heredity. The underlying idea was that the organism was a mechanical system, like a machine, for

a machine in the hands of its maker is completely constructed before it starts to operate and perform the definite functions for which it was made.

The modern theories of heredity, as a result of the more recent experimental work on the lower organisms, incline to the belief that the cell, so far as heredity is concerned, does not become fundamentally altered—at least not in the earlier stages of its development. Every cell inherits the whole germ plasm; all cells are primarily alike, up to a late stage in their development. Present-day theories of heredity do not include an explanation of development. Therefore development appears all the more clearly as a real problem open to observation and experimentation.

It has been found that development can be controlled and that it can be profoundly altered by external factors. We can even make out of eggs organisms which could never be recognized as belonging to the same species as the parent form. Yet the eggs of these individuals will produce, ordinarily, perfectly normal individuals in the next generation. Instead of the outcome being a matter of inherent traits of the germ plasm, it is open to a wide range of modification and to prediction through experimental methods.

The organism is not the same as the substance called protoplasm. The protoplasm itself is made up of a great variety of chemicals, in various proportions, such as water, salt, etc. Protoplasm may be defined as a chemical system made up of a multitude of molecules and atoms. It is, of course, also a colloidal organization constituted by multiplex colloids; but the organism is something more than this—it is a system on a still larger scale than protoplasm. The organism is a relation between protoplasmic systems; it is an integration, on a grander scale, of protoplasmic systems.

But how is this integration of protoplasmic systems possible? Are there intrinsic factors in the protoplasm, or factors extrinsic to it that produce this result? Does protoplasm integrate itself, or is it integrated by outside influences? How does an orderly, related organization arise from a mass of protoplasm? This is a basic problem in the notion of an organism.

A new conception in biology is that of the organism as a whole. Different biologists have read different meanings into this idea. There is a somewhat mystical interpretation that the organism is something more than the sum of its parts. Then there is another explanation of the organism as the relation existing between its component parts. As a matter of fact, the wholeness and unitary character of the organism does not arise simply from the facts that it has parts, but from the fact that these parts are physiologically related to one another. This influence between parts is called physiological correlation. By physiological correlation is meant all the possible influences that one part, or different parts, can have on other parts. In general, these correlative effects fall into two groups: first, the chemical or transportative relations; and second the dynamic or transmissive relations.

1. There are first the chemical factors which are present in the higher organisms. These may be spoken of as chemical correlations. These chemical

factors, such as hormones and internal secretions, are produced in one part of the body and transported in mass from that part to another part, or parts, and produce effects on other parts. These relations, of course, are tremendously complex. Illustrations of these chemical factors are the substances produced by the thyroids, adrenals, and gonads. As a consequence of such effects, every organism has a specific metabolism. Indeed, this type of relationship, where substances produced in one part are transported to other parts, resembles commercial activities in the field of human social life. However, while transportive relations exert correlative effects in the higher organisms, it does not appear to be the primitive type of integrative influence.

2. The dynamic transmissive relation involves something different from transportation in mass; it involves transmission of energy. A multiplicity of mechanical relations can be discerned in every movement of the muscles, as, for example, the flow of blood, chemical energies, thermal energy, electric energy. Through the pressures and tensions there is produced a transmission of a chemical reaction occurring at one place to other places in the organism. We cannot move a muscle without starting minute currents in the body but the most important factor is not any one of these, but a combination of several of them. It is the process of excitation.

All living protoplasms, as far as we know, are capable of becoming excited. No protoplasm can excite itself, nor can it be excited independent of conditions outside itself. Excitation in its most general form is an acceleration in the rate of living, or the physiological changes associated with the processes of living. It speeds up the chemical processes of living, particularly the catabolic side, with the consequent liberation of energy. Now, this process of excitation occurs first, of course, at any point of the protoplasmic exterior, but remains localized only a short time, and is soon transmitted over the whole body. Excitation may be defined as a complex electro-chemical process, in which excitation produces electrical changes resulting in currents which are transmitted, which in turn are transmitted to other points. The nervous system is primarily the organ for the transmission of excitation. The excitation of primitive structures loses its intensity in the process of transmission. The result is that in plants and lower animals gradients in the transmission of excitation may be determined.

In the nerves of higher forms there is little or no loss in the intensity of transmission. Through the nerves excitation is transmitted to an indefinite distance. The nervous system is like a powder trail, where a spark igniting one point spreads, without loss of intensity, through the entire length of the trail. An important fact, however, is that although all the points in the organism may have been alike before the excitation, differences arise after excitation. Any point of excitation secures control or dominance, for the time being. This is a very simple form of integration; indeed it is the most primitive form of integration possible. After excitation, however, the organism seems to show no perceptible change from its condition before excitation. In other words the effects of temporary excitation, for a short period of time, seem to be transient.

When we investigate the earlier stages of development, three main or general patterns, not merely structural but physiological, can be distinguished. The simplest is the exterior pattern. The organism, in this case, is nothing, so far as we can see, but a mass of protoplasm with an outside layer differing from the rest—maybe only in the fact that it is a little denser. Those who have seen the amoeba know how the ectoplasm is differentiated. These differences are not directly due to heredity, but to the relation of the protoplasm to the external world about it. We can cut off a piece of the surface and expose the interior. When the amoeba takes food into its body, it does so by surrounding it. That is, the ectoplasm flows around the food, so that a part of the outside layer becomes a part of the interior. Under these circumstances it loses its characteristics as outside layer. This differentiation is one which is determined directly by the outside world. In such cases heredity represents merely the possibility of that particular protoplasm to produce an internal and external structure as determined by exposure to the world about it.

Most organisms are not so simple as this; most of them have differences between the interior and the exterior, and also display polarity and symmetry.

What are polarity and symmetry? This has been a problem of biologists for a long time. The earliest indications of their existence in organisms are in a form of crude differences in the activity of the protoplasm. Consider any organism possessing a head, for example. The head always arises from the region of the egg which is most active, and the other organs arise symmetrically along an axis of the body.

In many of the simplest forms we have a long, slender body, with attachments in the mud, and the mouth at the tip. If we cut it into little pieces, each is capable of producing a new animal. Normally the structure will arise at the upper end of the piece. The end which is down will become the basal end. The difference in this case is the oxygen supply. The part at the top gets more oxygen; consequently it becomes more active, and therefore produces a new axis.

What I want to point out about these structural features is that so far as we can see, they are not different in any way from those excitation transmission gradients already mentioned. These gradients result from internal activity which persists for a considerable length of time. In certain types of cases, a gradient so produced becomes a permanent difference in the protoplasm. This is a matter not of the inherited capacity of the protoplasm alone, but of the reaction of the protoplasm to external stimuli also. Heredity determines whether we are going to get a fish, a worm, or a man out of that kind of egg. But in all cases this quantitative gradation and the activities based upon it appear to be the starting point of what we may call the development of the individual.

When these gradations become permanent we have a fixed region of control or dominance in the individual. We find that all relations between parts resolve themselves into quantitative relations depending merely upon such dominance and subordination. Thus it becomes quite clear that the order and unity

of the organism are really products of the reaction of the protoplasm. In the broad sense, they are the products of behavior. The protoplasm, from the first moment of its existence, is behaving with reference to its environment.

In this general biological sense, life is reaction to environment.¹

The following quotation from Hoyt describes the type of experiment which shows the nice balance of hereditary tendency and environmental influences.

Stockard, exposing the eggs of a marine fish, *Fundulus*, to sea water with the addition of certain magnesium salts and of some other substances, obtained developing young showing marked difference from the characteristics usually shown, notably the development of one-eyed fish. Sometimes this single eye was on one side of the head, giving a cyclopean form. It seems that, in these fish the two eyes will develop in their usual places if the eggs are exposed to untreated sea water, but that various modifications of eye development and location appear if the sea water contains an unusual amount of certain magnesium salts. If, now, the sea water regularly contained larger amounts of these magnesium salts, should we not have these unusual forms of the eye as the usual characteristics of the species? In that case, by removing some of the magnesium salts we should obtain "abnormal" forms bearing two eyes, one on each side of the head. We can not too strongly emphasize the fact that many of the so-called abnormalities are normal developments under particular conditions.²

While the hereditary factors may determine the possession of eyes, the place and number of eyes in the fish in question seems a result of changes in the chemical nature of the environment. Thus, although the transmission of adult characteristics and organs depends upon the hereditary carriers called the *genes*, these units of heredity do not develop *in vacuo*, nor are they some minute mysterious traits or organs which merely unfold in the course of bodily growth. As Jennings puts it:

The genes, then, are simply chemicals that enter into a great number of complex reactions, the final upshot of which is to produce the completed body. The characters of the adult are no more present in the germ cells than is an automobile in the metallic ores out of which it is ultimately manufactured. To get the complete, normally acting organism, the proper materials are essential; but equally essential is it that they should interact properly with one another

¹ C. M. Child, "The Organism as a Behavior Pattern," *Bulletin of Society for Social Research*, No. 2, Aug., 1926.

² W. D. Hoyt, "Some Aspects of the Relation of Species to their Environment," *Science*, n.s. 1923, vol. LVIII, pp. 432-34.

and with other things. *And the way they interact and what they produce depends on the conditions. . . .*

Clearly, it is not necessary to have a characteristic merely because one inherits it. Or more properly, characteristics are not inherited at all; what one inherits is certain material that under certain conditions will produce a particular characteristic; if these conditions are not supplied, some other characteristic is produced.³

In our psychological analysis of social behavior we shall see again and again that no one-dimensional, particularistic explanation is sufficient.^{3a} In tracing the development of the biological organism into a more or less socialized personality, we must at all times take into account both hereditary and environmental factors; and the latter, as we noted, must include not only other persons or social experience, but those precipitates of social living-together in the past which we denote as *culture*. Much of the argument over intelligence measurement, over racial differences, over the effectiveness of education in changing human nature, would disappear if the participants in the debate were only more conscious of the twofold rather than the one-sided nature of the factors which produce variations. Apparently hereditary influences put definite limits upon the intellectual development and the habit-forming capacity of most of us, but what we do in our world of social participation depends also upon environmental conditioning.

B. Fundamental Structures and Functions.

Like all other animals, man is made up of a certain organization of protoplasm living in an environment. The essential attributes of protoplasm with which we are concerned are first, irritability or capacity to receive stimuli from the environment; second, ability to respond to them; and third, plasticity or modifiability of this protoplasmic organization. This capacity for modification of tissue makes possible alterations in subsequent contacts with the environment. Life consists, at the physiochemical level, of a continuous series of energy changes through which adaptation to the world around us takes place. For us, then, the capacities of irritability and modifiability are the particularly significant aspects

³ H. S. Jennings, "Heredity and Environment," *Scientific Monthly*, 1924, vol. XIX, pp. 230, 233.

^{3a} Particularism refers to attempts to explain complex behavior by a single-track formula. Cf. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, pp. 22-26.

of these energy changes, which take place through the various organic structures. In order to form a picture of the organism in its adjustment to the environment, we may note the principal structures and their functions which have to do with social adjustment.

The adaptation of the organism to its surroundings involves the total-going complex of organs and functions. The basic physiological systems are those of digestion, respiration, circulation, reproduction, and elimination. Food is changed into chemical energy; the blood is aerated through oxygen; carbon dioxide and other waste products are thrown off from the organism. These systems are concerned with the maintenance of life and its propagation in a new generation. In order to facilitate these biological purposes, however, the neuro-muscular-glandular systems have developed. The coördination of all these functions into an integrated whole takes place through the autonomic and central nervous systems. For our purposes these systems are most significant. Still, it must be recognized at all times that they function largely to facilitate the continuance of these other life-supporting organs. All of the systems together constitute the integrated organism; and this integration is made possible through the neuro-muscular-glandular system. The adjustment to environment with which we are concerned, therefore, takes place through the mediation of these systems.

1. *The Nervous System.*—The nervous system is the coördinating arrangement of nerves and their processes. It makes possible the necessary continuous adaptation of muscles and glands. For convenience we may divide the nervous system into two major divisions: the central or cerebro-spinal, and the autonomic. These, however, are not separate but closely allied organizations of neural tissue.

The gross structure of the complete nervous system reveals the cerebro-spinal or central system to be composed of the spinal cord and the brain. The brain is divided into three major sections: hind-brain or brain stem, the mid-brain, and the fore-brain. The most important portion of the fore-brain consists of the cerebrum. From the central system proceed thirty-one pairs of spinal nerves and twelve pairs of cranial nerves reaching out over the entire body.

The autonomic system consists of a double chain of nerve-ganglia and nerve-fibers extending on both sides of the backbone from the base

of the brain to the end of the vertebral column. These ganglia are connected throughout with the central nervous system. Their function will be discussed below.

a. *The Reflex Arc as a Basic Functional Organization of Neurons.*—The adjustment of the organism to its environment is controlled through the nervous system centralized in these larger units. It is through the coördination of muscles, tendons, and glands that bodily movement in reference to the environment takes place. Both internal and external stimuli impinge on the neural-muscular-glandular system, and the transmission of nervous energy sets off various forms of activity. The nervous system can not be properly understood without reference to both the inception of this action and its carrying-out. The nervous system is nothing but a highly specialized organization of tissue making possible more effective irritability, modifiability, and reaction in the organism. In the higher animals, including man, the taking-up of stimuli is facilitated by the receptor organs—the sense organs—of the body. From the receptor the impulse is carried over a nerve called the afferent or receptor neuron to the central or adjustor neuron located in the spinal cord, hind-brain, mid-brain or cortex, and thence outward to the motor or efferent neuron which links up with the response organ—muscle, tendon, or gland. These three neurons—afferent, central and efferent—constitute the fundamental reaction unit of the nervous system. The afferent or receptor neuron is a kind of private pathway leading from the sense organ or receptor to the central neuron system. This central switchboard, as it were, makes possible the direction of the nervous impulses outward to a large number of accessible efferent or effector neurons ending in muscles, tendons, or glands. In contrast with the privacy of the receptor process, the effector processes may be considered property common to the whole range of sensory or receptor pathways; that is to say, a visual, auditory, tactile, or other sensory stimulation may lead to innervation of the same muscle or gland, because the central neurons make possible the convergence of any one or a number of these private or specialized neural impulses from the sense organs upon the final common pathway to muscle or gland. For our purposes this is important because it indicates how varied the stimuli may be in producing similar or even identical responses. At the simplest level of reflex behavior, such as, the knee jerk or reaction to painful, cold, hot, or other direct stimulus, perhaps only three neurons are involved. In

the higher functions, habits and associative thinking, hundreds or even thousands of neurons no doubt come into play. Yet the basic threefold conduction principle holds throughout. This functional unit of reaction is termed the reflex arc. In the higher activities the brain plays a very important rôle in shunting the impulses into various paths and ultimately into complex motor responses. The cerebrum, in particular, functions to control and integrate the impulses from the receptors into more and more complicated action patterns. The whole complexity of higher behavior—habits and associative thinking—is dependent on this cerebral control.

We must emphasize the integrative nature of all reactions. The simple explanation of the action of the reflex arc found in some of the behavioristic accounts frequently ignores the fact that the organism-as-a-whole is involved in behavior. The neural-muscular-glandular system operates more or less in a unitary manner in the presence of stimuli or situations. The notion of three distinct units of reaction working together in additive fashion does not seem to be borne out by the work of Coghill on the development of the reaction system or by that of Lashley on the place of the cerebrum in learning. For expository purposes, however, we may describe the three phases of the total stimulus-coördination-response system.⁴

The fundamental unit of the nervous system is the neuron with its nerve processes, axons, and dendrites. These neurons are hitched together in more or less definite reaction patterns. Some exist at birth; others are built up through learning. It is not necessary here to describe the histological sections of the nerve and its fibers, or to discuss the nature of nervous impulses. For this purpose the student may consult the standard works on neurology. The significant fact is that the organization of the functional unit or reflex arc is related to the simplicity or complexity of reactions. There are literally hundreds of bodily reflexes concerned in digestion, respiration, circulation, and elimination, and in the biological protective work of the organism which are laid down before birth. There are also a great many uncharted reflex arcs which are coördinated and integrated together in the course of learning. This process of integration takes place very largely through the mediation of the fore-brain, but it

⁴ Cf. K. S. Lashley, "Basic Neural Mechanisms in Behavior," *The Psychological Review*, January 1930, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 1-24. Also consult R. H. Wheeler, *The Science of Psychology*, 1929, for a comprehensive statement of the organismic point of view. Chapters XVI, XVII and XVIII are especially valuable.

must always be borne in mind that the habits and associative, integrative processes which are made possible through the fore-brain, are carried into action through the lower brain centers and the spinal cord processes.

b. *The Receptors or Sense Organs.*—The receptors may be classified as exteroceptors, interoceptors, and proprioceptors. The first consist of the external sense organs: vision, hearing, smell, taste, tactile (pressure), external cold, warmth, and pain. Vision and audition are sometimes called distance-receptors because the stimulus need not be in direct contact with the organism at all. The interoceptors consist of the internal, systemic, or visceral sense organs which are closely linked with digestive and other vegetative functions and are distinctly significant in feeling and emotion. The proprioceptive organs are found in the semicircular canals and in the muscles, tendons, and joints. The first gives awareness of equilibration. The latter give rise to sensations of movement. The sensation is called kinesthetic (from the Greek, meaning sensation of motion). This sense is particularly important in learning, and it plays a distinct part in the formation of motor habits and in vocal responses.

In social behavior all of these sense organs play a rôle. As we shall observe, some of them, such as visual, auditory, and tactile, the systemic and proprioceptive, have more place than others. In certain types of social interaction some are distinctly significant. Hearing and seeing are especially important in person-to-person interaction. Yet the systemic receptors and effectors also have a definite place in giving us the feeling-emotional background behind all of our social behavior; and in the early intimate social contact of infant and parent touch plays an important part, as do smell and temperature senses also. The latter also have a definite rôle in love-making—a distinctly social activity.

c. *The Effector Organs.*—The effector organs are the muscles and glands. They are set in operation by the efferent neurons. Muscles are of two sorts: striped, and unstriped or smooth. The former are concerned with overt, bodily movement, and the maintenance of posture. The latter are found in the digestive and other visceral organs, and are related to the more vegetative functions of the body. The glands are of two types, duct and ductless. Their muscular organization is of the unstriped type. The duct glands are concerned directly with digestion and elimination. The salivary, gastric, tear, and sweat glands are of this sort. Their products

reach the appropriate parts of the body through the ducts leading from the glands. Still others, such as the sex glands, both energize the body and serve the purposes of reproduction. The ductless glands throw their substances, hormones or autocoids, directly into the bloodstream. Some of these glands, such as the thymus, the thyroid and pituitary, have a distinct place in bodily growth and in the maintenance of certain morphological proportions. Others have an energizing effect; the adrenals, for instance, stimulate the release of blood-sugar from the liver and otherwise increase bodily activity. The ductless glands are peculiarly significant in emotional expression.

d. *The Central Nervous System.*—The cerebrum is the seat of the central neurons which make learning possible. A large part of the cerebrum is taken up with association neurons and their nerve-fibers in a great network of relations. The receptor neuron is a single conduction path which leads into a vast system of conductive paths made up of central neurons. In contrast with the receptor schema, the latter may be said to be a system of multi-pathways made possible by a rich array of synaptic connections. The potential connections of this central or cortical system are manifold to an extent little realized. From the receptor neurons the impulses may radiate in many directions. In the case of general convulsions induced by strychnine poisoning the impulses discharge into practically every muscle and effector organ in the body. Ordinarily the irradiation is limited to the ranges laid down by native and especially by acquired connections. It was once thought that various areas of the cerebral cortex were highly specialized as to function. One region was believed to have to do with verbal speech reactions, another with written speech, another with audition, and so on. There is doubtless considerable localization of function, as is shown by clinical data on aphasias. Yet the present evidence seems to be that the whole cerebrum operates in most complex behavior with focal centers at any particular time or in reference to particular situations. Lashley has shown that after extirpation the alleged functional areas may be replaced by others through a process of re-learning.

The cerebral cortex is the seat of learning. The receptor and effector ends of the arc are not modified, but the direction of the efferent impulses may be controlled by changes made in the central neurons. As Herrick states:

All functions of the nervous system are facilitated by repetition, and many such repetitions lead to an enduring change in the mode of response to stimulation which may be called physiological habit. This implies that the performance of every reaction leaves some sort of a residual change in the structure of the neuron systems involved. These acquired modifications of behavior are manifested in some degree by all organisms, and this capacity lies at the basis of all associative memory (whether consciously or unconsciously performed) and the capacity of learning by experience. This modifiability through individual experience is possessed by the cerebral cortex in higher degree than by any other part of the nervous system; and the capacity for reacting to stimuli in terms of past experience as well as of the present situation lies at the basis of that docility and intelligent adaptation of means to ends which are characteristic of the higher mammals. It is a fact of common observation that those animals which possess the capacity for intelligent adjustments of this sort have larger association centers in the cerebral cortex than do other species whose behavior is controlled by more simple reflex and instinctive factors, that is, by inherited as contrasted with individually acquired organization. This is brought out with especial distinctness by a comparison of the brains of the higher apes with that of man. In our own mental life we recognize the persistence of traces of previous experience subjectively as memory, and memory lies at the basis of all human culture. From this it follows that psychological memory is probably a function of the association centers; but it must not be assumed that specific memories reside in particular cortical areas, much less that they are preserved as structural traces left in individual cortical cells, as has sometimes been done.⁵

Correlated with the associative-learning and retentive function of the cerebrum, is the important inhibitory function. The lower reflex levels of behavior may be termed impulsive. Where the cerebral cortex operates, the behavior is indirect and controlled. The function of the cerebral cortex is, then, not only to give more adequate direction to response, but to inhibit the more impulsive, rapid responses of the lower centers.

The cerebral cortex is particularly concerned in the higher functioning of the organism. Social experience and the building of culture are absolutely dependent upon the operation of the higher brain centers. Throughout the whole range of materials dealt with in this book it must be recognized that our social behavior—language, social intercourse, following of fads and fashions, crowd action and the development of public opinion, the acquirement of cultural norms, prejudices and the techniques of survival—could not go on without the existence of the human brain. These

⁵ C. J. Herrick, *An Introduction to Neurology*, 1918, pp. 328-29. Courtesy W. B. Saunders Company.

complex activities result from various combinations of neuron processes in the cerebral cortex, related, of course, to the afferent processes on the one side, and to the efferent ones on the other. It is the cerebral cortex as coördinator and integrator, however, which is important for us. Even though the action of the basic reflex arcs is mediated through the lower brain centers and the spinal cord—such activity as is involved in hunger, thirst, sex, crying, and emotional responses in fear and anger—still these activities are modified, held in check, and integrated with learned behavior through the function of the cerebral cortex.

Man's superiority over the lower animals and over his environment, therefore, rests upon the heightened organization of behavior made possible through the cerebral cortex. On the side of original tendencies man does not differ greatly from his mammalian forebears. But the cerebral cortex makes possible extensive and long-continued learning. In the case of the fundamental reflexes, man inherits these, as do other animals, from his ancestors. In the case of social-cultural experience, these come to him through acquirement or learning. In other words, not biological, but social-cultural heredity dominates man to an ever-increasing extent. Hence whatever there is of social and cultural change depends, not on alteration of the spinal reflexes, but on modification and elaboration of reflexes controlled by the central neuron system of the cerebrum.

Nevertheless, the vegetative system lies at the roots of all this modification and elaboration. We can not understand man's social interaction, or even his culture which is a precipitate of this, without taking into account the fundamental features of his biological urges or bodily demands. These functions are carried on by the autonomic system in corroboration with the central system. Whatever we may say of the profound modifications in man's nature due to social and cultural conditioning, we must remember that he still remains an animal with appetites or urges which require satisfaction. These processes are basically related to the autonomic system.

2. *The Autonomic Nervous System.*—The autonomic system is not independent of the cerebro-spinal system. The two are intimately related and doubtless grew up together.⁶ The autonomic system is a part of the

⁶ Considerable controversy has arisen over the theory that the autonomic system developed prior to the cerebro-spinal system, but since the central neurons of the autonomic lie in the cerebro-spinal system, we may take it that the autonomic constitutes that phase of the peripheral system which is connected with the visceral organs and glands. Cf. F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, 1924, pp. 36-37; E. J. Kempf, *The Autonomic Functions and the Personality*, 1919; L. L. Bernard, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1927, p. 62.

peripheral neuron system. The central neurons all lie within the cerebro-spinal system, as do those from the peripheral exteroceptors and proprioceptors. The function of the autonomic system, as we noted above, is to supply the visceral organs with nervous connections. Its receptors lie principally in the muscular and mucous lining of the internal organs. They are stimulated by the positions or postural tensions of these organs. On the other hand, the autonomic efferent fibers set up contractions in the smooth or unstriated muscles of the viscera. In short, the reactions of the autonomic system are largely those of tension or posture rather than of movement, as is the case with the striped muscles controlled by the efferent neurons of the cerebro-spinal system.

There are three major divisions of the autonomic system: the cranial, the sympathetic, and the sacral. Each of these divisions is made up of a series of related neural processes, leading to and from the visceral organs, via a series of ganglia, through the cerebro-spinal system. The cranial division arises from five of the paired cranial nerves. The nerves run to the eyes, the salivary glands, the heart, the bronchial tubes, and the digestive system. The cranial segment serves the organism in controlling the pupillary contractions of the eyes and the glandular and muscular activities involved in digestion. This division functions in emotional responses connected with the satisfaction of hunger and thirst. The general bodily tone correlated with it is pleasant.

The sympathetic division is made up of ganglia and autonomic fibers associated with the spinal nerves found in the thoracic and lumbar regions. The nerves supply the sweat glands, the hair of the body, and the peripheral blood vessels. Others run to the heart, the lungs, the digestive tract, and other visceral organs. Some sympathetic fibers also run to the organs of sex and elimination. The sympathetic system is concerned with speeding up the heart action, constricting the blood vessels, inhibiting the digestive processes by constriction of the smooth muscles, and stopping the flow of digestive glands. This system plays a distinctive rôle in the emotions of fear and anger. An unpleasant organic toning tends to be associated with its operation.

The sacral division is made up of fibers and associated ganglia connected with the sacral segments of the spinal nerves. The fibers connect with the organs of defecation, urination, and sex. The functioning of the sacral division is connected with processes of bodily elimination and sexual activ-

ity. Under normal conditions these activities produce a decidedly pleasant toning.

It must be pointed out, moreover, that the cranial and sacral divisions operate in antagonism to the sympathetic. When either of them is in operation, the sympathetic is inhibited. When the sympathetic comes into play, there is a blocking of the cranial or sacral division. For instance, in fear, the sympathetic may serve to release the sphincter muscles controlling defecation and urination, just as it acts, in an opposite manner, to inhibit the digestive processes. The cranial-sacral divisions are related in function to hunger, sex, and bodily elimination, the sympathetic to the fundamental emotions of fear and rage. The former set may be considered positive and pleasant in function, the latter negative or protective and unpleasant. We shall return to this matter in our discussion of the emotions. The schematic figure on the following page gives an idea of the distribution of the autonomic system in relation both to the central nervous system and to the various internal organs which it controls.

It must be borne in mind at all times that the autonomic and the central nervous systems function together. There is always a distinct link-up of the reflexes controlled through the cerebro-spinal system, such as the muscle groups of the legs, arms, head, trunk, and throughout the entire somatic system, and the autonomic reflexes of the visceral region. For example, a stimulation of the ear by a loud sound leads over a central reflex arc to produce movement of the head, arms, legs, and trunk, but at the same time it sets in operation the sympathetic division of the autonomic system and produces those bodily changes which are evidenced in crying, blanching of face, inhibition of the digestive processes, alteration in heart action and in respiration.

Any peripheral or internal stimulation, therefore, has possible autonomic connections with the visceral system. Throughout our entire treatment of social behavior we shall see how both central and autonomic functions are correlated. The first essential point for us is that no major action takes place in the body which is not mediated through the nervous system. Secondly, the fundamental drives or urges or tendencies to behavior rest in the vegetative system in which the autonomic plays a large part. However remote the behavior may seem from this substratum, in the last analysis no description and interpretation of social behavior is complete which ignores this fact. While it is clear from much evidence that the autonomic func-




FIGURE I.

Showing Schematically the Relation of Central and Autonomic Nervous Systems.⁷

⁷ From L. Clendening, *The Human Body*, 1927, p. 205. Published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

tions may be conditioned, modified, and partially controlled by the action of the cerebro-spinal system, it is not altogether clear that the central system is dominant over the functioning of the autonomic system. In other words, the social as well as the biological evidence supports our fundamental thesis that emotions, feelings, and instinctive or prepotent reflexes are the cornerstones of behavior on which the superstructure of human personality is constructed. Man is always a feeling and emotive being. Only in a secondary way is he an intellectual, rational, and deliberative person. To say this is not to fall into the error of holding that the autonomic system completely dominates the cerebro-spinal, but rather that the two are inextricably correlated. To deny the place of the cerebral cortex in the modification and elaboration of behavior is foolish. Still it is equally unwise to deny that the foundations of human motivation lie in the emotions and feelings associated with the basic vegetative demands of the organism.⁸

C. The Levels of Reaction.

If we move from a study of the general structure and function of the central and autonomic nervous system to an examination of the reaction levels of the entire organism, we are impressed with the fact that the complication of behavior is correlated with the number of reaction patterns involved. This, in turn, indicates the place that our dual nervous system has in the behavior of the organism as a whole. For our purposes we may mention three levels of behavior. These will be dealt with in more detail in subsequent chapters. The first of these is the reflex level, the second the level of habit, and the third the level of intelligence or associative thinking. In the first we include the basic vegetative reflexes of digestion, respiration, heart action, and bodily maintenance. Although these, as we have seen, are fundamental to all other action, we shall not discuss them further. Rather let us note briefly the more general aspects of these three levels of reaction as an introduction to the chapters which follow.

⁸ It should be stated parenthetically that the writer did not arrive at this standpoint from his biological training at the outset, but from his examination of concrete social behavior of persons in groups, operating in regard to their social experience directly and as it is modified by culture. He may confess further that some years ago he was strongly inclined to the view that the cerebro-spinal system dominated the autonomic and hence gave support to a theory of social improvement based upon conscious rational control; but further examinations of his social data, and then a more extensive acquaintance with the biological data, have forced him to the present point of view.

1. *The Emotional-Instinctive Reflexive Level of Behavior.*—From our animal forebears we have inherited certain fundamental behavior patterns, which lie at the basis of all others that are built upon them. These we refer to as the instinctive overt reflexes and the emotions, or covert reflexes. The latter seem to arise in those situations in which the overt reflexes of the organism are blocked by some condition in the environment to which the organism must readjust itself. The instinctive or prepotent reflexes and the emotions operate together in the survival of the organism at the purely biological level. Behavior here tends to be impulsive and direct. Since so much ink and paper have been dedicated to the subject of instincts, especially in reference to social psychology, and since the basic motivations for behavior do seem to lie in these hereditary tendencies, the next chapter will be given over to a more extended discussion of instincts and emotions.

2. *The Level of Habit Formation.*—Although man begins the struggle for existence in terms of his emotional and innate reflexes, experience soon organizes these tendencies into habits. The capacity to form habits, to arrange the reflexes into new patterns, to integrate the new patterns into larger patterns, rests on the inherited nature of man. Thousands of reflex coördinations are possible because of the modifiable nature of the central neuron system.

3. *Intelligence and the Higher Levels of Behavior.*—Man, however, does not stop with merely forming habits on the basis of crude trial and error. By development of his cortical control he can anticipate his behavior. The development of his fore-brain has meant that he can make associations in his responses which are not permitted the lower forms of life. These higher integrations rest upon better perceptual ability, upon a more highly developed associative capacity, and a better retention of things learned. The correlation or integration of these into concepts and abstractions, in which language plays such a rôle, marks the highest complexities of man's nature. The social life of man would remain on a level with that of the anthropoids were it not for these higher capacities. Certainly culture, as we know it, even of the most primitive peoples, would simply be impossible without these more developed capacities. The most delicate associations of scientist or artist, the most abstract ideas of the logician or mathematician, the most refined metaphysics—would not be possible without the complex organization of the brain.

D. *The Cycle of Activity.*

All of these levels of reaction are related fundamentally to the cycle of life activities set up by demands of the vegetative system. Through the changes in the vegetative organization tensions ensue which demand release. Much of the reflexive, habitual, or intelligent behavior of the individual is given over to the accomplishment of this release of tensions. There is first the tension, then restlessness and movement toward a stimulus or situation which will release the strain. The stimulus, if adequate, brings about the more or less complete release of these tensions, and the organism slips back into a stage of complacency or vegetative adaptation to the environment. Craig has laid out a scheme of fundamental activity along this line in his theory of appetites and aversions as the dynamic force in behavior; and the appetites or aversions rest for their inception on the vegetative system. The following is slightly modified from Craig to take into account the factor of visceral tensions in which the autonomic system plays such an important rôle.

The type cycle would show four phases as follows:

Phase I: Presence of a visceral stimulus or tension, and absence of external stimulus to satisfy this physiological state. Restlessness, varied movements, effort, search. Incipient consummatory action.

Phase II: Reception of the appetited stimulus or release of the tension by elimination or other response. Consummatory reaction in response to this stimulus. State of satisfaction. No restlessness or search.

Phase III: Surfeit of the said stimulus, which has now become a disturbing stimulus. State of aversion may ensue in order to escape or avoid the surfeiting stimulus. Restlessness, trial, effort, directed toward getting rid of stimulus.

Phase IV: Freedom from the said stimulus or tension. Physiological state of rest and relaxation. Inactivity of the tendencies which were active in Phases I, II, III.⁹

Actually the third phase may not be apparent or may not even occur. In the case of bodily elimination the surfeit of stimulus rarely occurs. The whole cycle may be thought of as a method of releasing tensions and such release occurs through the complete response—an integrated activity of highest importance to the balance of the organism. This freedom from strain is a pleasant, serene state, a sort of complacency in the organism

⁹ Cf: W. Craig, "Appetites and Aversions as Constituents of Instincts," *Biological Bulletin of Marine Biological Laboratory*, of Woods Hole, Mass., 1918; vol. XXIV, pp. 91-107.

which persists until a new cycle ensues. Much of the problem of maladjusted personality rests in the failure of the vegetative tensions to find socially acceptable releases. The partial response is unsatisfactory. Too frequently a more or less complete blocking of the releasing responses leads to pathological developments.

In the course of life the purely reflexive releases of the tensions are modified profoundly by personal-social and cultural conditioning. From birth on, these forces begin to operate. The tensions of adult social life are many and varied. Much of our material will be concerned with a revelation of the manner in which these conditionings modify and direct the course of the vegetative demands of the organism. Frank has discussed the subject in an effective manner:

Social life is a product of learning to manage the visceral tensions in accordance with the requirements and usages of the family and of the social group. This learning takes place through the instruction given to the young, who, almost from birth, are subjected to adult supervision in the adjustment of these tensions, and in general the child is expected to learn to sustain, diffuse, and release his physiological tensions only as and if the group-sanctioned occasion and custom permit.

The first problem of this tensional control arises from the parental management of feeding, which requires the child to learn to sustain the hunger contractions of the stomach until the appropriate time for feeding arrives. He must learn, not only to sustain those tensions, but to regularize his metabolism so that he can assimilate and release sufficient energy to endure the intervals between feedings. Later he must learn to obtain food or the means thereto by work or effort undertaken in anticipation of these recurrent hunger tensions.

The second problem of tensional management confronting the child is to learn how to sustain the pressures arising in his bladder and rectum until the appropriate time and place for their release are presented. This problem calls for a progressive raising of the threshold of the sphincters and learning to respond to the accumulating pressures sufficiently early to permit the necessary warning to parents, and, later on, the appropriate activities for eliminations. To meet this problem adequately the child must learn to sustain these pressure tensions in accordance with the requirements of the group life. This and the hunger problems may be taken as the prototypes of his adult behavior, since they involve not only the ability to sustain tensions but to use these accumulating visceral tensions as the cue or stimulus to whatever activities are necessary to reach or achieve a group-sanctioned release. This means learning to deal with present situations and stimuli with due regard to their more remote consequences and their utility or disutility for tensional adjustment. In other words, growth to maturity calls for an increasing ability to respond to absent or re-

mote situations which are adumbrated by the rise of visceral tensions and by their situational antecedents.

The next problem facing the young child is to learn the inhibition of the sympathetic reaction, which we call emotional response, evoked by shock, surprise, pain, and ambiguity or uncertainty. When stimuli of this character are received, the organism, as Cannon and others have shown, is profoundly altered physiologically, the sympathetic division of the vegetative nervous system becoming dominant.

The child must also learn to employ the verbal stimuli of approval and reassurance as substitutes for the close tactual stimuli received in infancy, as in mothering, caressing, and cuddling. Along with that he must also learn to respond to disapproving verbal stimuli as substitutes for physical coercion and the blocking of responses not meeting with adult assent.

Finally, at the beginning of adolescence, the specific sex tensions make their appearance and present new problems of tensional management, since the youth and maiden, in Western society, are expected to refrain from release of sex tensions until they have reached full maturity. This means that they are called upon to sustain and diffuse their sex tensions and to avoid any approach to the person of the other sex.

These lessons begin during the first and second years of life and call for the management and control of the several varieties of visceral tensions arising within the child. As the infant grows older and achieves locomotion he is brought into contact with an ever widening environment of things and persons presenting the stimuli for immediate release of these tensions or for arousing emotion. The same kind of problem is continually presented. Under the tutelage of parents the child must learn to refrain from approaching and using these stimuli, however freely exposed to his approach and despite the urgency of his visceral tensions. If hungry, he must learn to sustain his stomach contractions and forego the easily appropriated food around him unless and until the elders give approval. If other persons intervene between him and the stimuli he seeks, or otherwise interfere with him, he must learn to refrain from approaching them or from attempting forcibly to remove them, just as he must learn to desist from approaching them for any direct tensional release. In other words, he must learn that each individual enjoys a varying degree of immunity from approach or invasion, which he must observe in all his behavior. Again, he must learn that objects and situations are likewise to be left untouched because they also are not to be approached or used, however strongly they exhibit stimuli to tension release. Such lessons involve the inhibition or repression of the naïve response, which is gradually learned under adult instruction: the parents frustrate the naïve response or inflict pain after such forbidden responses until the child learns to observe the parental prohibitions even in their absence. In other words, the child is negatively conditioned until the stimuli of these things and persons are rendered partially impotent. To put it another way, the child, under the guidance and instruction of elders, learns to observe the differential taboos upon

people and things which we call the sanctity of the person and private property. Private property is thus not a thing, but the learned behavior toward things.

We see then in early childhood how the institutional patterns of behavior are inculcated in the child as he learns to manage his tensions in accordance with the prohibitions and sanctions of the family life. The cultural tradition will, of course, set the general patterns, but the individual family life and circumstances will give these patterns their individual character and variations.

The management of tensions and the capacity to maintain the physiological energy for achieving a remote objective (i. e., responding to a distant stimulus) are achievements of no mean order. For they require, not only effort and the energy to sustain that effort, but the ability to forego the relaxation of tensions that are so ready to release to the first available stimulus. All the social virtues of courage, perseverance, strength, loyalty, virtue and chastity, and their multitudinous synonyms and derivatives are but aspects of the management of tensions. Hunger, pain, emotion, such as fear and panic, and sex desire, are all ready to betray man from pursuing the long-term achievements and goals set by culture. To raise crops and animals, to build houses and buildings, to establish a family and to nurture the young—these call for endurance, patience, and the postponement of immediate consummations for the future achievement. Everywhere we find man has invented methods of sustaining his efforts and reinforcing his continence against the ever present stimuli to relaxation. We call these aids to his long-term pursuits and tensional management his values. For whatever a man uses to keep himself at work, to ward off the panic or the lure of quick consummation while he carries on, is a value. Put in another way, we might say that any behavior addressed to a remote stimulus is a form of value behavior.¹⁰

Behavior, in short, begins in physiological reactions to organic urges or tensions, but becomes organized through learning so as to satisfy not only these direct demands but all sorts of indirect needs which are socially acceptable and which make possible participation in group life.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter IX, nos. 55, 56, pp. 194-208.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises in assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter IX, p. 217, nos. 1-3 only.
 2. What are the major criticisms of the older view in psychology which sepa-

¹⁰ L. K. Frank, "Physiological Tensions and Social Structure," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1928, vol. XXII, pp. 74-75, 76-77, 81. Cf. also "The Management of Tensions," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1928, vol. XXXIII, pp. 705-736.

rated sharply heredity from environment? What has Child contributed to this problem?

3. What are the basic neurological structures and functions?
 4. How does the nature of the receptors determine the world to which we respond? Illustrate from the case of the blind, the deaf.
 5. How do the cerebro-spinal and the autonomic systems interact?
 6. Illustrate behavior at the reflexive-emotional level. At the habitual level. And at the level of intelligence.
 7. Illustrate cycles of activity at each of these levels.
 8. Why must we take the social-cultural environment into account in describing and interpreting behavior? Would not a study of physiological tensions and their modifications be sufficient?
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
1. Review Carmichael's "Heredity and Environment: Are they Antithetical?" *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1925, vol. XX, pp. 245-60.
 2. The contribution of C. M. Child to social psychology.

CHAPTER IV

THE UNLEARNED BEHAVIOR OF THE INDIVIDUAL

The literature of social psychology, like that of general psychology, has been replete with discussions of the place of the instincts and emotions in human behavior. While our purpose is not to write the history of theories of instincts and emotions, the controversies over the nature of unlearned behavior warrant a short review of at least two rather divergent schools of thought. Such a review will occupy the first section of this chapter. The balance of the chapter will be given over to an expansion of the standpoint indicated at the close of the last chapter, and offer an introduction to the material to follow in subsequent chapters.

A. The Controversy over Instinctive-Emotional Tendencies in Behavior.

It was once rather common practice to distinguish somewhat sharply between the instincts and the emotions. McDougall in his *Social Psychology* (1908) paired off the major instincts with the major emotions. Watson in his *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist* (1919) presented a long list of instincts and instinctive tendencies which were differentiated from the emotions. Today Watson avoids the very word *instinct* and has replaced it with the term *reflex*; but more than that, he has, like many other writers, done away with the sharp distinction between instinct and emotion. The present conception seems to be that the instinctive tendencies and fundamental emotions shall be considered together as the basic innate and original behavior patterns. If there is any distinction it lies in the locus in the organism where the reactions take place. The instinctive tendencies are expressed through the peripheral muscles. The emotions involve the internal or smooth muscles and the glands. The two are certainly correlated, but hardly in the simple fashion imagined by Professor McDougall. In the present chapter we shall consider the inherent emotions and the instinctive tendencies as the reactions of the organism as a whole at the biological reflex level.

The nature and scope of these fundamental biological reactions have given rise in recent years to a great deal of controversial literature concerning the entire concept of innate tendencies. Especially violent has been the discussion whether or not the human being has any instincts, and if so, how they may be described in terms of unlearned behavior. We may say at the outset that most American writers in psychology have long since given up the practice that still persists in continental Europe and among the social scientists and literary people of all countries, to use the term instinct or instinctive tendency in the sense of any more or less deep-rooted reaction pattern or habit system. Bernard at one time collected over five thousand examples of loose and illogical use of the term instinct. One can find these examples in older writings in philosophy and social science and in all *belles lettres*. One reads: "The heroine instinctively pulled the trigger of the gun"; or "Her subtle feminine instinct told her that her brother was not what she had imagined him to be"; or "Men reason, women possess instincts." One writer mentions the "instinct of any profession." Even James somewhere remarks: "I imagine that more than half of you share our instinctive belief in free will." Henry Adams in his autobiography makes the statement that, "the religious instinct had vanished and could not be revived, although one made in later life many efforts to recover it." We find even so careful a writer as Leonard Darwin, son of Charles Darwin, stating that "the prejudice (against sterilization of the feeble-minded) is likely to be instinctive."

The whole drift in this country has been away from such loose usage. More careful writers define instinct in terms of inherent structures which furnish the basis for unlearned bodily functions. To use such a term as instinct to cover any form of more or less habituated or automatic behavior, to use it as a kind of mystical intuitive principle, or to use it in a broad sense to explain prejudice or belief, is to rob it of any accurate meaning. From the welter of more serious technical articles and books on the subject of the human instincts have emerged what seem to the writer to be two views. One of these considers the entire matter of instincts from the angle of their service and purpose to the organism; the other views the whole question from the angle of demonstrable mechanisms found in the organism at birth.

1. The Drive Theory of Instincts. The upholders of the first view look upon the instincts as the drives or urges which are basic to behavior. Upon

these, higher or habitual nature is added by one's adjustment to the environment, physical and social. Older writers often spoke of the instinct for self-preservation and for race-preservation. Freud and Jung adopt much the same view. They employ the term instinct in the broad sense of general drive or purpose for survival. They pay little attention to the niceties of technical language, as do the animal psychologists of America who wish to circumscribe carefully their description of original behavior. The matter really rests, of course, upon certain fundamental philosophical and methodological bases of interpretation. McDougall may be considered a spokesman, in a way, for those who hold to this first view. He writes:

I have insisted that all mental activity is purposive, that it is a striving toward a goal, however vaguely the goal may be thought of. . . .

The view that all animal and human behavior is purposive in however vague and lowly a degree, and that purposive action is fundamentally different from mechanical process, may be conveniently called the *hormic theory*. The word "hormic" is from the Greek "*horme*" . . . , which means a vital impulse or urge to action. Schopenhauer's "will-to-live," Professor Bergson's "*élan vital*," and Doctor C. G. Jung's "libido," are alternative expressions for the purposive or hormic energy that is manifested in human and animal behavior. . . .¹

In another place he writes:

We may say, then, that directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct or of some habit derived from an instinct, every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. The instinctive impulses determine the ends of all activities and supply the driving power by which all mental activities are sustained; and all the complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but a means towards these ends, is but the instrument by which these impulses seek their satisfactions, while pleasure and pain do but serve to guide them in their choice of the means.

Take away these instinctive dispositions with their powerful impulses, and the organism would become incapable of activity of any kind; it would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring had been removed or a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn. These impulses are the mental forces that maintain and shape all the life of individuals and societies,

¹ W. McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, 1923, pp. 71—72. Courtesy of Chas. Scribner's Sons.

and in them we are confronted with the central mystery of life and mind and will.²

McDougall presents a philosophic rather than an experimental setting for his thesis. Clearly there is a distinct tone of vitalism in his view.

Throughout the entire literature of the hormic or drive school of instinctivists, the main problem lies in the idea that there are certain fundamental urges and purposes in the organism. The study of the particular muscles, glands, and segments of the organism which carry out these urges is not their concern, and whether the urges are learned or innate seems to them of little consequence. The whole thing is nicely illustrated in the criticism which this school makes of Kuo's discussion of the concept of instinct. Kuo quotes Whitman's experiments. Whitman found that pigeons mated with the particular species with which they were reared. Moreover if males were reared with males only, they would attempt copulation with males; and if raised in isolation, they would attempt copulation with the hand of the experimenter or with some material object, such as a stick placed through the wire netting. From this evidence Kuo argues that there is no sex instinct or urge for the male to copulate with the female. He goes so far as to remark "that all our sexual appetites are the result of social stimulation. The organism possesses no ready-made reaction to the other sex."

Now those who accept the hormic view of instincts may and do inquire at once how it comes about that the pigeon or man, for that matter, attempts copulation at all. That is, while it may be admitted that social-environmental stimuli to sexual behavior may vary considerably, there still remains in the pigeon, as in all other higher animal forms, some bodily condition, whatever it is, which causes the animal to offer itself for copulation if a female, or to seek copulation if a male, or even to attempt copulation with inanimate objects if no mate is present. McDougall calls this tendency to perform the sexual function the drive or *horme*. Likewise hunger, thirst, and other bodily conditions which seem antecedent to certain rather distinctive types of behavior would be looked upon as drives or urges. McDougall has given us a long list of instincts which act as fundamental urges. These include, among others, flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, self-assertion, and self-abasement. McDougall, it must

² W. McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1923, pp. 45-46. Courtesy of John W. Luce & Company.

be recalled, does not hold that these tendencies necessarily operate through a particularly innate system of motor patterns, but contends that an instinct may "make use at need of a large array of motor mechanisms, different instincts expressing themselves on different occasions through the same motor mechanism; although it may be true that any one instinct most readily finds expression through some such mechanism, or through some one coördinated system of such mechanisms."³ Many adherents of this school besides McDougall hold that the instinct may express itself through either innate or acquired mechanisms.

Other writers who hold this drive or hormic theory are the psychoanalysts, particularly the followers of Freud and Jung. For Freud the term *libido* describes the energy which gets into operation through the sexual appetites. For Jung libido means the urge or "psychic" energy which is inherent in the organism and lies at the foundation of all behavior. Whether we can accept the concept of mental or psychic energy apparently depends on our basic philosophic premises rather than on the scientific objectivity. The question is: Does the concept help us to deal with human behavior in a more consistent and predictable form? This is precisely what the adherents of Freud and Jung claim for the idea. In any case the psychoanalysts use instinctive tendencies in much the same way as McDougall uses them.

The biological mechanisms for them do not assume a significant place. MacCurdy, however, has attempted to reformulate the Freudian concepts into something more in line with McDougall. He posits four fundamental drives in the organism: hunger, sex, gregariousness, and ego-expansion. His viewpoint represents no fundamental addition to the hormic school, aside from the evident recognition by an eminent psychoanalyst that the sex urge alone is insufficient either as a descriptive or as an explanatory concept.

2. *The Mechanistic School of Bio-psychology.*—The followers of this school of thought rest their case for instincts largely on experimental evidence from comparative psychology. At best the term instinct, if used at all, is considered a series of concatenated innate reflexes which are observed in the organism under certain specific stimuli. They do not find

³ W. McDougall, "The Use and Abuse of Instinct in Social Psychology," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 1921-22, vol. XVI, p. 311.

evidence for any general drives whatsoever. Lashley's statement regarding sex drive gives their essential viewpoint on the whole question:

There is no sex instinct or sex drive in the meaning with which the words are ordinarily used. Sexual behavior consists of a number of acts, each a definite response to a definite pattern of stimulation. These reflexes are independently conditioned by specific hormones, by nutritional factors, and by habitual modifications. There is no evidence here for the existence of free energy. There is no unity among the sexual reactions such as is essential to prove their common motivation. There is no source of energy which could fulfill the requirements of the libido.⁴

In like manner hunger and other innate responses, such as withdrawing from a hot stimulus, a cold one or sharp one—all must be related to certain definite acts in a series.

It must be recognized, however, as Stone has shown so well for the sex trends, that the origin of certain particular series of acts depends upon the internal changes in energy manifestations within the organism. Sex behavior is incited by the accumulation of autocoids or hormones in the sex glands which produce restlessness and movement normally ending in sexual acts. That is to say, the stimulation is interoceptive. Likewise, hunger starts off from metabolic changes which give rise, in turn, to peristaltic movements in the stomach. These we sense as hunger pangs. They lead to restlessness, movement, heightened sensibilities to food stimuli, and so on through a cycle till hunger is appeased. Thirst also is dependent upon internal stimulation brought about by metabolic changes in the organism. In other native activities, such as fear and rage, the stimuli clearly lie outside the organism. So, too, withdrawal and rejection reactions depend on exteroceptive stimulation. Moreover, sex responses, while dependent for their expression upon interoceptive stimulation from glandular changes, are correlated with external stimulation of the erogenous zones.

The bio-psychological school holds, in short, that only objective description and experimentation of unlearned behavior will give one the correct clue to the nature of the fundamental reactions. These reactions rest upon

⁴ K. S. Lashley, "Physiological Analysis of the Libido," *Psychological Review*, 1924, vol. XXXI, p. 198. The word *hormone*, as used by Lashley is not to be confused with the term *horme*, used by McDougall above. Hormones or autocoids are glandular products.

chemical or tensional pressures in the organism which set off responses, or upon exteroceptive stimulation which brings internal changes as well as overt response. For this school of workers there is no need to posit *a priori* any *élan vital*, or libido. The critics who follow this school, among them Bernard, Kuo, Faris, and Lashley, have hurled vigorous and effective arguments against the whole conception of instinct as used by the Purposive or Hormic School. They charge the latter with mysticism, misstatement, and faulty interpretation of facts.

Yet, in spite of all that has been written against the Purposive School, one must recognize the soundness of their insistence upon the active, dynamic character of the organism in the presence of the environment. There has been some tendency on the part of some adherents of the general behavioristic position to look upon the organism as somehow the passive victim of a stimulating and dynamic environment. Such a view scarcely follows either from careful field observation of animal life, including man, or from laboratory experimentation. The recognition that behavior, in part at least, originates with changes within the organism need not lead us to the views of McDougall or the psychoanalysts. One may take into account the dynamic character of the organism without laying oneself open to the charges of vitalism or mysticism. The theory of Kempf, Frank, and others that the basis of behavior lies in the internal bodily tensions gives as objective a picture as any mere stimulus-response doctrine which views the organism as the passive object of external environment. Even the concept of mental energy might find adherence without necessarily ending in a metaphysics of the soul. Aside from this, however, the dynamic interaction of organism and environment, indicated by Child's work cited in the previous chapter, must be reckoned with in treating the instinctive or unlearned levels of behavior, just as it must be recognized in discussing the interplay of organism and environment at the levels of habit formation and associative thinking.

3. *Instincts in Social Theory*.—Something should be said about the use of the concept *instinct* in the social sciences. Many writers, past and present, have assumed a set of social instincts to explain human society. Imitation, gregariousness or the herd instinct, and natural sociability are perhaps the most commonly cited examples. The doctrine of instinctive sociability comes down to us from Aristotle through the Christian church fathers to the present, to find its most recent exponents in Trotter and

Woodworth. The theory is that society is based originally and fundamentally upon some innate, original tendencies of men to gather in groups and to respond in some unique, social manner to the presence of others of their own species. The concept of instinctive imitation has also had much place in the sociological and psychological theories of Bagehot, Tarde, Ross, and Baldwin, to mention some of the best-known writers. Similarity in men's behavior is explained by recourse to a biological urge to duplicate the acts of others around us. Again, an instinct of sympathy has been used to explain human associations from Polybius to Spinoza, Hume, Adam Smith, and Kropotkin.

We need not examine these theories in detail. It is clear that the use of the term instinct in social theory has little in common with the more objective analysis of unlearned behavior made by modern biology and psychology. Imitation and sympathy, as we shall see, are forms of conditioned response. Human gregariousness, however, seems acquired, not innate, and is to be examined in reference to the fact of personal contiguity and conditioning. Likeness or difference of behavior must be scrutinized in terms of the fundamental organization of reflexes, and the modification and elaboration of these in terms of social-cultural conditioning. In conclusion, then, the evidence for social instincts, as such, disappears in the careful analysis of the interaction of the biological organisms in their physical and social-cultural environment.

B. Some Fundamental Features of Unlearned Behavior.

Unlearned behavior consists of emotional or covert behavior and of reflex activity of an overt sort. If we refer to the latter as instinctive, we have only the difference of locus between this and the emotional kind. As we noted above, emotional reactions concern internal, covert changes in the organism, involving especially the glands and the smooth muscles. The basic reflex patterns, or instincts, if we wish to retain the word, involve overt responses and bring into play the skeletal framework and the striped muscles. Originally both of these types of behavior are closely bound together. Rather than attempt to segregate the unlearned behavior into two nice bundles, let us turn to examine the activities as we find them in the new-born child and in early infancy before learning or changes in stimulus-response mechanisms take place.

If we begin with an examination of the behavior of infants, we have a

good idea of what the major unlearned tendencies are. The new-born individual possesses a structural-functional organization making possible a host of reactions of simple sort. More important, of course, is the fact of plasticity or modifiability in stimulus-response systems. Through the mediation of the central neurons, the integration of these fundamental reflex units of behavior into attitudes and habits of far-reaching significance takes place.

1. *Simpler Reflexes.* As we have seen, the basic organic unit of reaction is the reflex arc. Many of the reflexes of purely vegetative sort involved in the automatic actions of respiration, circulation, digestion, and metabolism are present at birth. Very quickly a considerable number of protective reflexes appear: eye wink, knee jerk, coughing, withdrawal of hand or foot from painful, cold, or warm stimuli, and others. Also the grasping and Babinski reflexes appear at birth, the latter to disappear very shortly. Warren in his *Human Psychology* (1919) lists sixty-seven reflexes, many of them denoting really groups of simpler reflexes. But these basic physiological and protective reflexes deal only with the mere survival of the organism at the lowest level of adjustment to its environment. As the individual matures, other reflex systems come into operation. For example, family organization, based originally on biological care of the young, makes possible protection of another sort. Presently all sorts of additions are made to the reaction patterns of the individual through social-cultural stimuli.

A number of systematic observations have been made of babies to discover the course of development of some of the fundamental reflex patterns. Mary Cover Jones reports a study of the early responses of 356 white and colored babies of both sexes. She studied smiling, blinking, and eye-coördination, opposition of the thumb to the fingers, and some others.

Blinking at birth occurs if the face is touched near the eyes, but in the experiment reported by Jones a moving visual stimulus was used. Smiling was of the spontaneous sort, not that which occurs later when others smile at the infant. Horizontal eye-coördination was tested by moving a small light horizontally in front of the eyes, and the verticle eye-coördination by moving the light vertically. Opposition to the thumb, like smiling, was noted when it appeared spontaneously for the first time.

The following table presents the time of the first of five of these reflexes.

Table I. Showing Time of First Appearance and Variability in Percentiles Among 356 Infants of Smiling, Eye-coördination, Blinking, and Thumb Opposition.⁵

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Days when the activity first appeared</i>		
	25th Percentile	50th Percentile	75th Percentile
Smiling	45	58	68
Eye-coördination (Horizontal)	45	58	72
Eye-coördination (Vertical)	53	65	78
Blinking	60	76	92
Thumb-opposition	129	148	181

2. *Complex Reflex Patterns.* Aside from these simple reflexes, certain series of reflexes of coördinated sort appear very early. The nursing pattern is one of the earliest. During the first day, if the child is placed at the mother's breast and the nipple is put in contact with the infant's lips, the sucking reflex will be set up. As the milk flows into the mouth, the swallowing reflex follows and the feeding pattern becomes established. The whole hunger-feeding pattern consists of internal metabolic changes producing hunger pangs, crying, restlessness, taking the breast when presented, sucking, swallowing, and the consequent digestive activities. Here both individual variability and early personal-social conditioning to such fundamental reactions are illustrated. Aside from the case of babies born prematurely, where at the outset there seems to be a definite lack of muscular strength sufficient to perform the sucking reaction, there are individual differences in the ease with which infants take to the nursing act. Nurses, physicians, and mothers all report that sometimes babies do not take at once to nursing. The nipple will not be grasped by the lips. The head may be turned aside from it. Sometimes the placing of a little milk in the mouth will set off the swallowing reaction first and then later the sucking reflex will take place more readily. But sooner or later the pattern of nursing is established.

Other unlearned reactions, aside from more distinctly vegetative ones,

⁵ Summarized from Mary C. Jones, "The Development of Early Behavior Patterns in Young Children," *Pedagogical Seminary & Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1926, vol. XXXIII, pp. 537-85.

are bodily elimination, rejection of nauseous substances, and the fatigue-demands leading to sleep. There are early apparent sex reactions arising from the manipulation of the sex organs. These external sex responses indicate that, although the sex functioning proper arises fundamentally from the internal stimulation from the sex glands at sex maturity, the infant is prepared structurally for external manipulation of the sex organs. There also early appears reaction to tickling, slight pressure on the nipples, cheeks or lips, stroking of the back, thighs, and neck. These seem to produce a pleasurable feeling-tone on the part of the infant. Watson calls them erogenous zone reactions, but Allport, Tolman, and others refer to them as "sensitive zone reactions." Only with later learning do many of these areas become associated with sexual stimulation proper. The affectionate stimulation of mother, father, or other persons in kissing, patting, and fondling the infant furnishes an early shift of these reactions distinctly toward the sexual field.

There are also a host of reflex activities of the infant called "random movements." These are largely free and untrammelled actions of arms, legs, and torso. Doubtless these random actions constitute the first practice in many muscular reactions which later become integrated into important motor habits. They seem correlated originally with the maturation of the neuro-muscular-glandular system.

Then, too, there are the sensory developments of the child. We have mentioned eye-coördination. Hearing, smelling, and tasting are evident in earliest infancy. Perhaps kinesthetic sensations are built up even before birth. They must be associated with "random" activity as well as other more "directed" movement. As times goes on, kinesthetic sensations assume more and more importance in providing awareness of bodily movement.

Anger and fear reactions appear very early. These responses are themselves made up of an organization of simpler reflexes. Watson's experiments on anger and fear are so well known that they need not be discussed extensively. He has shown that the original stimulus for anger or rage is constraint of untrammelled movement of legs, arms, and torso. Fear is originally set off by loud sounds, dropping through space, shaking when in light sleep. There is no unlearned fear of the dark, of snakes, toads, furry animals, insects, and a host of objects or animals, as the uninformed usually assume. We have already mentioned the arousal of what




FIGURE 2.

Showing Time of Appearance of Basic Behavior Patterns.⁶

⁶ From J. B. Watson in *Psychologies of 1925*, 1926, Chapter I, p. 35. Courtesy Clark University Press. Solid lines show unlearned, the dotted lines, the conditioned behavior.

seem to be sexual or love responses by stimulation of the sexual organs.⁷

Watson has discussed the variety of unorganized, native responses of the infant. Some of these appear at birth; others seem to depend upon maturation for appearance, and most of them are soon affected by experience. The diagram from Watson on the preceding page provides a convenient summary of the unlearned behavior of the infant and also furnishes an idea of the time of maturation and the inception of social influences.

There are thus many simple reflexes in the organism at birth. Others appear shortly thereafter. Some of them are evidently adaptive and protective at the outset. Others seem to depend on environmental pressures to become organized into units of adaptive sort. In contrast with the lower animals, man's unlearned reflexes, aside from rather basic physiological ones, are more diffuse, less well organized, and more dependent upon experience for their organization into working patterns. These fundamental reflex patterns may be called instincts or instinctive tendencies. Allport has listed six of them as "prepotent reflexes." He names hunger, sex, sensitive zone reactions, starting and withdrawing, rejecting, and struggling. The first three of these are positive or approaching in type, the other three are negative or avoiding. Associated with them are doubtless internal states commonly called emotions. Tolman has a tentative list of similar sort: hunger, sex, fatigue-demands, excretion demands, sensitive zone demands, fear, and pugnacity. Other writers have slightly different lists. Whatever classification we give, there seem to be somewhat more or less definite unlearned concatenations of reflexes which are present at birth or appear in early infancy. These are common to all peoples. They seem to depend only upon internal bodily changes or specific external stimuli to set off the accompanying, definite responses.

3. *Reflex Patterns and "Drives."*—Those reflexes which thus become organized early in life are called by Tolman "drives of the first order." They become significant in setting off various secondary or tertiary activities which are built upon experience. Upon the foundation of sex, hunger, fear, and rage, reactions of self-assertion or dominance are constructed. So, too, curiosity, gregariousness, and other so-called instincts

⁷ The Shermans, in their recent book *The Process of Human Behavior*, 1929, have shown how difficult it is to judge the early expressions of emotions. But for our purposes we need only note the situations which arouse the fundamental emotional reactions.

are actually secondary developments upon the basis of unlearned tendencies which have become organized into new patterns by early conditioning or learning. The whole matter of the organization of the structure and function of the individual through learning is so vital that the next chapter will discuss in detail the mechanisms of this process. Yet in spite of the universal significance of learning in the organism, there remain certain fundamental trends which rest upon the unlearned mechanisms. Of these, without doubt, hunger, thirst, sexual activity, sensitive zone reactions, fear, rage, and withdrawal from painful stimuli are most important. They rest distinctly upon structures chiefly determined by our biological heredity. They are related to or are a part of the vegetative and protective processes largely controlled by the autonomic system. These and other early patterns furnish the foundations for later habit systems. Learning begins very early, as we saw in the case of hunger; and one learned experience leads to another. Nursing gives way to drinking milk from a spoon or cup, and later to the taking of solid food from a spoon, and finally to the adult techniques of eating. Likewise, struggle reactions and rage find expression through a number of channels—some native, some acquired. One may strike out at an opponent in more or less inherent fashion, or one may use the sometimes more effective rapier of wit or sarcasm to “cut” or “strike at” one’s opponent. How these modifications take place we shall discuss in the next chapter. We wish to emphasize here that the prepotent reaction systems of infancy become the drives or stimulators of habits of a higher sort; that is to say, these basic reflexes, more or less patterned from birth on, constitute the fundamental inciters to other forms of behavior. As Woodworth well puts it:

“Drive” . . . is not essentially distinct from “mechanism.” The drive is a mechanism already aroused and thus in a position to furnish stimulation to other mechanisms. Any mechanism might be a drive. But it is the mechanisms directed toward consummatory reactions—whether of the simpler sort seen in animals or of the more complex sort exemplified by human desires and motives—that are most likely to act as drives. Some mechanisms act at once and relapse into quiet, while others can only bring their action to completion by first arousing other mechanisms. But there is no absolute distinction, and it will be well to bear in mind the possibility that any mechanism may be under certain circumstances the source of stimulation that arouses other mechanisms to activity.⁸

⁸ R. S. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, 1918, p. 42. Courtesy of Columbia University Press.

Through early learning, such integrations as curiosity, dominance, submission, gregariousness, and sociability may become drives to other activities leading to consummation or completion of the total-going response mechanism of the individual, that is, to the accomplishment of some end.

This view of drives seems much more satisfactory than that of the Hormic School represented by McDougall and the psychoanalysts. There are, no doubt, basic urges in the organism of the sort described in the previous chapter and expanded above, but these are not some mystic *libido*, *élan vital*, or *horme*, but physiological, vegetative tensions which set up reactions inside the organism leading to external responses, or else they arise from external stimulation itself, as in the case of fear, rage and, withdrawal from painful or nauseous stimuli. As we have seen, these protective mechanisms, in turn, involve profound internal changes which are a part of our emotions and feelings. All in all, the naturalistic approach to human behavior leaves us in a better position to analyze this behavior and in time to come to control it for social ends.

4. *Unlearned Behavior and Theory.*—The theories of unlearned behavior or original nature are varied. We have examined briefly the two most outstanding schools of thought on the matter. The Hormic School posits urges or drives which determine human action. The principle criticism of this school is twofold. First, it tends to a particularistic, unilinear, single-track explanation, as with the overemphasis of the Freudians on sex. Secondly, it is open to criticism because of its philosophical, mystical, rather than biological, statement of the nature of these urges. The Mechanistic School builds upon the concrete observation and experimentation of animals and man, with a view to discovering the precise stimuli which set off the unlearned reactions. It recognizes the place of the vegetative or physiological tensions or urges, but states these in terms of bio-chemical changes and neuro-muscular-glandular reactions to the environment, internal and external.

So far as the long controversy over instincts and emotions is concerned, we have come to realize that the basic unlearned reaction patterns are made up of reflexes, more or less organized at birth or in early infancy. The emotions of infancy are those features of reaction which involve internal bodily changes mediated through the autonomic and central nervous system. The overt behavior which has been called instinctive, consists of reflex activities concerned with the peripheral muscles and gross

bodily adjustments to the stimuli from the environment. Man possesses literally hundreds of reflexes which get organized through learning. But there do seem to be relatively unlearned or easily formed patterns in such behavior as involves hunger, thirst, sex, sensitive zone reactions, rage, fear, and withdrawal from painful or nauseous stimuli.

More important than the mere enumeration of unlearned reactions is the recognition of the fact that human behavior rests fundamentally upon physiological needs of the organism, and that personal-social and cultural pressures are from the outset of life constantly modifying and enlarging the scope of activities in reference to these biological demands. Associated with these organic responses are the feelings or affective states of pleasantness or unpleasantness, to be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter VII, pp. 146-73.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises in assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter VII, p. 173.
 2. Discuss the strength and weakness of the Purposive and the Mechanistic viewpoints in regard to instincts.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
 1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter VII, pp. 173-74.
 2. Report Woodworth, "A Justification of the Concept of Instinct," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1927, vol. XXII, pp. 3-11. Also, Wyatt, "The Recent Anti-Instinctivistic Attitude in Social Psychology," *Psychological Review*, 1927, vol. XXXIV, pp. 126-32.
 3. Report Eggen, "Is Instinct an Entity?," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1926, vol. XXI, pp. 38-51.
 4. Report Schoen, "Instinct and Man (A Preliminary Note on Psychological Terminology)," *Psychological Review*, 1927, vol. XXXIV, pp. 120-25.

CHAPTER V

HABITS AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

A. Importance of Habits in the Social Life of the Individual.

As we noted in the foregoing chapter, the new-born infant is provided with a vast array of reflexes which are the basis of his later learning. In contrast with the lower animals, man does not, at the outset, possess ready-made and highly-organized patterns for stimulus and response. He is helpless in the hands of his group of elders—the family or sib organization which takes him over at birth. This very unorganized feature of his make-up, this capacity to learn, ultimately proves to be man's greatest asset. We have noted that this looseness of organization of original patterns is correlated with the high development of the fore-brain or cerebrum which so distinctively marks off man and the anthropoids from the lower animal orders.

Fiske, in his admirable essay on *The Meaning of Infancy*, points out that this very plasticity, which makes the new-born child so dependent on his elders, is of the greatest ultimate significance. He writes:

This steady increase of intelligence, as our forefathers began to become human, carried with it a steady prolongation of infancy. As mental life became more complex and various, as the things to be learned kept ever multiplying, less and less could be done before birth, more and more must be left to be done in the earlier years of life. So instead of being born with a few simple capacities thoroughly organized, man came at last to be born with the germs of many complex capacities which were reserved to be unfolded and enhanced or checked and stifled by the incidents of personal experience in each individual. . . .

It was through the lengthening of his infancy that the highest animals came to be Man,—a creature with definite social relationships and with an element of plasticity in his organization such as has come at last to make his difference from all other animals a difference in kind.¹

¹ John Fiske, *The Meaning of Infancy*, 1909, pp. 11, 13. Used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

In addition to the basic reflex patterns of hunger, thirst, elimination, withdrawal, rejection, rudimentary sex behavior, sensitive zone responses, anger, and fear, there are innumerable less highly-organized reaction arcs which later become connected in the process of maturation and learning. We have described the basic prepotent reflexes as constituting drives of the first order upon which drives of secondary or tertiary orders are built up by this further organization. As a matter of fact, we need some term to describe these fundamental organizations of reaction which constitute such permanent phases of personality, but which are not, strictly speaking, to be called instincts or prepotent reflexes. We shall follow common practice, however, and refer to these as basic or fundamental habits. But habits frequently refer merely to skills of various sorts, such as those involved in learning to write or in acquiring vocational training, as in carpentering, typing, typesetting—in fact, all of the manual dexterities of the skilled occupations. Also related to these are the techniques of artistic production—piano playing, painting, sculpturing, and architecture. Too often in the traditional academic psychology, we think of habit only in terms of these acquired skills, or in terms of psychological experiments in ball-tossing, typing, or mastering telegraphy, or in learning to recall nonsense syllables. But the term habit comprehends more than merely acquiring these proficiencies. It applies to the development of fundamental traits of personality: attitudes toward oneself, toward others, and toward the physical universe. It involves acquisition of behavior patterns which lie at the root of curiosity, acquisitiveness, desire for prestige, desire for new experience, and all sorts of wishes expressed in social interaction and participation. It is basic to one's conception of oneself.

In studying the social behavior of the adult, it is necessary to recall both the narrow and the broader concept of habit. We might call the latter social habits to distinguish them from habits in the narrow sense. Dewey has made clear the tremendous importance of habit in the broad sense:

The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to *ways* or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express a way of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It means will.²

² John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922, p. 42. By Courtesy of Henry Holt and Company.

Furthermore, attitudes must not be considered essentially different from habits except as to completeness of response. Attitude, as we shall see, is a tendency to act, but its relation to habit is well stated by Dewey.

Attitude and, as ordinarily used, disposition, suggest something latent, potential, something which requires a positive stimulus outside themselves to become active. If we perceive that they denote positive forms of action which are released merely through removal of some counteracting "inhibitory" tendency, and then become overt, we may employ them instead of the word habit to denote subdued, non-patent forms of the latter.³

Habits and attitudes, therefore, are basic for social psychology. Throughout this book we shall note how habits and attitudes are formed and how they affect the social behavior of persons in various situations. While we may not with scientific impunity ignore the power of the physiological demands of the organism, the direction which the satisfaction of these takes is dependent on habit. And although we must give a place to intelligence and the higher mental functions, we shall see that even the methods of interpreting social behavior on the part of ourselves and others, and the meaning of the physical universe, for that matter, are dependent upon habits of thought. The balance of this chapter will be given over to an examination of the mechanism of habit formation. Subsequent chapters will indicate the place of the social environment in determining the course that such habit formations take.

B. The Mechanisms of Habit Formation.

It is not necessary in a general treatise in social psychology to discuss extensively or intensively the mechanisms of habit formation. These can be found in the standard textbooks in psychology. All we need here is a summary of the generally accepted concepts. The field of habit formation, or learning, is to be thought of as an active dynamic process of modification and elaboration of the unlearned stimulus-response patterns rooted at the outset in the physiological needs of the organism. The individual is not a mere passive creature of the environment, as the old associationist school taught, or as some behaviorists would have us believe. The organism is concerned with keeping alive. In a sense, it actually goes out to meet the environment, to draw the forces of the environment into itself in order

³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

to keep going. Learning begins, as we have seen, with the fundamental reflexes concerned with bodily survival. Throughout this discussion we must bear in mind the dynamic nature of learning. A structural description of the learning process may give one an idea that the whole affair is one of simple association and coördination. But these very processes are not passive; they are active and involve the organism in its totality.

1. *Fundamental Factors in Learning.*—For social psychology the two most important principles of learning are the mechanism of conditioned responses and the attendant integration of these responses into larger patterns. The older psychologies had much to say in regard to repetition, recency, and vividness in learning, but these terms merely refer to certain aspects of conditioning. They do not describe the mechanisms themselves. Yet surely the frequency, the recency, and the intensity or vividness of stimulus-response relationships must be taken into account in a discussion of learning. Of course, some reactions are acquired without any repetition, such as great fear; some are made without reference to intensity, as responses to tickling; and perhaps some phases of learning are retained without regard to recency. But the associative or conditioning processes, however important, must be taken into account, together with the manner in which they are correlated in the formation of order and sequence and in reference to other patterns. The integrative function of the cerebral cortex system is apparently basic to this process.

The speed, quality, and permanence of learning are also important. There are marked individual differences in learning capacity. Some individuals acquire new responses much more rapidly and much more adequately than others. Learning the social code may be much more difficult for a moron than for a bright girl or boy. Ruch has shown, for example, that in materials of simple motor-perceptual sort, such as card-sorting, differences in learning were not great among three groups of students measured by standardized intelligence tests as bright, average, and dull or borderline. In material of more difficult sort, like learning a secret code of writing, the divergences among the three groups were much more noticeable. The dull pupils fell considerably behind the average and the bright groups. In connection with still more complex material, involving abstract problems of logical reasoning, the differences were extreme. The dull group accomplished little if anything with this material, while the average group made but slight improvement. Only the bright

pupils were able to show marked progress. The importance of differences in intelligence will be noted in more detail in another chapter, but the universal fact of variability in intelligence must be borne in mind throughout the discussion of habit formation.

The whole learning process is affected by social suggestion, both favorably and unfavorably. The fond mother leaning over her child may produce in him such a state of anxiety as to curb his acquisition of the multiplication table or his mastery of piano technique. Many a bright boy or girl has been spoiled for an appreciation of literature by the overbearing and sarcastic attitude on the part of the school teacher. In turn, the positive suggestion of a group of playmates may be a great factor in a boy's learning to swim, to skate, to smoke, or to play truant from school. There is, in truth, considerable experimental evidence to show that students do better in certain kinds of learning when working in the presence of others. Weston and English report that higher scores were achieved in certain intelligence tests when their subjects worked in a group than when they worked alone. Other experiments show similar facilitation when individuals are working in a group. Perhaps competition and heightened attention play a part in this increased efficiency.

2. *Mechanism of the Conditioned Response.*—Most readers of social psychology today are familiar with the famous conditioned response experiments of Pavlov. If one presents a dog with a piece of meat, the salivary glands are stimulated and a copious flow of saliva into the mouth follows. This secretion can be rather easily measured by the use of proper laboratory apparatus. The meat is a biologically adequate stimulus to set off the reaction of salivation, the first step in the digestive process. If on another occasion one should ring a bell in the neighborhood of the dog, he might wiggle his ears, or bark, or turn his head toward the sound, but he would not begin salivation. But Pavlov found by simultaneous stimulation of the dog with the meat and the bell, that after a number of trials he was able to produce salivation by ringing the bell alone. The artificial or biologically inadequate stimulus will now give the reaction originally associated with stimulation of a natural sort, such as meat. Moreover, the amount of saliva secreted from the gland by the bell stimulus will equal the amount called forth by the meat. If the bell is rung a second time alone, the salivation will continue but the amount will fall off. A third time, the saliva will still flow but not in such quantities as the second

time. From this point on the bell has less and less effect on salivation until the novel association of stimulus and response disappears. Pavlov has characterized the simple conditioned reaction as relatively temporary and unstable.

If, after the new association has disappeared, one again introduces the meat, or the original biologically adequate stimulus, the conditioning takes place more rapidly, that is, with fewer repetitions than on the first occasion. Moreover, the persistence of the new association is longer. An occasional introduction of the meat will finally make relatively permanent the new stimulus-response connection.

We may define the conditioned response, in the words of Morgulis, as "a reaction to an indifferent stimulus, occasioned merely by a repeated coincidence of the latter with a physiologically active stimulus."⁴

Now whereas the simple reflexes, such as salivation, swallowing, and reactions to tactile, tonal, and visual stimuli of unlearned sort, are mediated through the lower brain centers and the spinal cord, these new reflexes call into play and are dependent upon the cerebral cortex of the fore-brain. Krasnogorski, a follower of Pavlov, states it in this manner:

The conditioned reflex differs from the ordinary unconditioned reflexes only in that in them the stimulation of the centripetal and centrifugal paths (afferent and efferent) is carried on by a fixed mediating activity of the higher centers of the central nervous system.⁵

This merely restates the facts brought out in Chapter III, that the whole range of learning is carried on through the medium of the cerebral cortex with its vast extension of association fibers and its wide possibility of elaborating and modifying unlearned responses.

Not only are conditioned reflexes built up by simultaneous stimulation, but Pavlov has shown also that simple associations may be built up if the stimuli are successive. One of Pavlov's students introduced a scratching stimulus to a dog two minutes prior to the presentation of the physiologically active stimulus and produced a conditioned response. Furthermore, he found that he could introduce the artificial stimulus *after* the biologi-

⁴ S. Morgulis, "Pavlov's Theory of the Function of the Central Nervous System," etc., *Journal Animal Behavior*, 1914, vol. IV, p. 363.

⁵ N. Krasnogorski, "Conditioned Reflexes in Childhood," Paper from the Children's Hospital of the Prince of Oldenburg, Petrograd. Translated by Florence Matcer at Clark University.

cally adequate one and still condition the animal. That is to say, on the basis of reactions already set up and their continuance after the stimulus is removed (memory traces), the conditioning is still possible. The higher the animal is in the scale of organic complexity, the longer may be the stretch of time between the successive stimuli. In the case of children the time may be considerably extended as they grow older.

The range of conditioning in animals is very large indeed. The salivary reflex has been associated by a number of experimenters to a wide variety of artificial stimuli such as a tone, a whistle, odors, cooling of skin, warming of skin, mechanical stimulation of skin, and use of various acids. Furthermore, the rapidity of the formation of the conditioned response depends upon the nature and intensity of the stimuli. For example, the sound of an electric clock began to call forth a secretion of saliva without simultaneous direct stimulus after 111 feedings of the dog with meal powder and the simultaneous sounding of the clock. The smell of camphor produced the conditioned reflex after 19 simultaneous stimulations, a red light after 100 feedings. In some of the conditionings to temperature stimuli, the results were obtained with much fewer stimulations. Intensity and repetition of stimulation are the two fundamental factors at the outset in making for the permanence of the association. It is clear that emotional accompaniments, under intensity of stimulation, often enhance the fixation of the new connection. This factor will be dealt with below. Some conditioned stimuli may be considered more closely related to native stimulus-response patterns than others. Krasnogorski remarks that those involving sight and hearing form more slowly and disappear more rapidly, in the case of salivation, than those artificial stimuli which are drawn from the field of smell or mechanical stimulation. In one experiment where a whistle was used as the learned stimulus, it excited the secretion of saliva alone only after practice of two and one-half months. As a result of the association of salivation with the smell of camphor, one could still observe the conditioning, although greatly weakened, it is true, nine months after the learning period.

Not only do tactile, auditory, visual, taste, and smell stimuli serve as conditioning possibilities, but more significant is the fact that the locomotor organs, the muscles themselves, may become conditioned stimuli for native reactions. This throws new light on the tremendous importance of kinesthesia in the integration of habits or skills into more complex pat-

terns. No doubt much of the learning of rats in mazes may be related to a series of conditioning where kinesthetic sensations are associated with certain successful responses. Krasnogorski found that he could establish the conditioning for salivation from the movement of the knee of the hind leg of the dog. This was definitely shown not to be due to the stimulation of the tactile areas by the failure of the once established connection to take place after the extirpation of the muscles involved in the flexion of the hind leg.⁶

The principle of conditioning is nicely illustrated in the field of animal training. Teaching a dog to come when one whistles is a case of successive association. The trainer whistles to the dog and then feeds him, either at the same time or immediately afterwards. Soon the dog will come to the trainer whenever he whistles. He need not feed the animal every time. Hunting dogs in similar manner are taught to fetch in game without injuring it. So, too, a dog may be conditioned to hundreds of verbal commands by both simultaneous and successive stimulation. The dog does not understand language in the human sense, but is conditioned to various vocal sounds.

3. *Inhibition of the Conditioned Reaction.*—Suppose that one has conditioned a dog to salivate when scratched on the side. After this new pattern has been established, one introduces a tonal stimulus and finds that the salivation ceases. The second inadequate or artificial stimulus inhibits the action of the first one. This inhibition of the conditioned response is highly important, as it indicates a means of blocking or changing the first conditioning. Experimental literature presents many instances of this sort. Almost any second new stimulus seems sufficient to break up a pattern of the simple conditioned response.

Now suppose that after the conditioning has been broken up, one introduces still a third artificial stimulus, say, a pressure or heat stimulus. The inhibition disappears and the first conditioned reaction reappears. That is, in the case cited above, the dog will salivate again. Here we have the inhibition of an inhibition. This raises still further complications of learn-

⁶ Morgulis writes: "It was a simple matter to prove that the conditioned reflex thus formed was actually associated with an internal motor and not with an external tactile stimulation. . . . If in a dog with such a reflex to the bending of the leg, the *gyrus sigmoidens* was excised the reflex immediately vanished, although a salivary response to the stimulation of the skin still persisted. If, on the contrary, the *gyri coronarius* and *ectosylvius* were removed, the knee conditioned reflex could be obtained while the tactile reflex completely disappeared." *Op. cit.*, p. 365.

ing, for with this mechanism at hand one may be able to reproduce some desirable conditioning which has been temporarily blocked by the breaking-in of a second inadequate stimulus-response pattern. This sort of conditioning is nevertheless much less durable in effect than is the primary conditioning. Morgulis remarks:

The results of all investigations point strongly to the conclusion that the process of internal inhibition is much less stable than the process of conditioned stimulation and can be offset by the least outside disturbance.⁷

Inhibition, however, is as important a function of the central nervous system as is conditioning. Anrep makes the following pertinent theoretical statement on the matter:

Each extra stimulus in turn inhibits the conditioned activity of the brain, superimposing itself on the process it encounters in every part of the same. If it meets excitation, it inhibits the excitatory process; if it meets with inhibition, it inhibits the inhibition.⁸

Morgulis points out various types of internal inhibition which are possible largely because of the unstable character of conditioned reactions generally. He writes:

There are several kinds of internal inhibition. Waning conditioned reflexes, due to a repeated application of the conditioned salivary stimulus without the aid of an unconditioned stimulus, are one kind. Another kind is the delayed reflex which appears if the conditioned stimuli are regularly followed by feeding a few seconds or even minutes after the conditioned stimulation has ceased. Conditioned inhibition is likewise a form of internal inhibition arising when an irrelevant factor is added to the conditioned stimulus, the combination not being reinforced by feeding. In such a combination the conditioned stimulus is quite ineffective, but alone it exerts the usual influence. The process of differentiation and concentration . . . represents a still other type of internal inhibition—the inhibition of differentiation. Furthermore, it is a very common and very important occurrence that one inhibition checks another inhibition, the result being a reactivation of the inhibited reflex.⁹

Pavlov distinguishes two sorts of inhibition, internal and external. External inhibition arises when new stimuli reach the cortex from other

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 372.

⁸ G. V. Anrep, "Pitch Discrimination in Dogs," *Journal of Physiology*, 1919-20, vol. LIII, p. 384.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 372.

stimulation-reaction patterns, thus breaking up established habits. The internal types may be divided into four major classes: (1) The disappearance or extinction of the conditioned response from disuse and from failure to recondition by the introduction of the original physiologically adequate stimulus. (2) The delayed or so-called memory reflex where the unconditioned stimulus is not presented until a lapse of time after the conditioned stimulus is given. (3) The conditioned inhibition, as where a tone combines with another mechanical stimulation such as a tactile or electrical stimulus applied to the skin. Burnham remarks regarding this:

In this case the conditioned stimulus gradually loses its effect completely in this combination, but is still effective without it. That is, whenever the tone is given at the same time with the stimulation of the skin its effect is inhibited.¹⁰

(4) The inhibition of differentiation which may be described as follows:

Mechanical stimulation of a definite part of the skin is used as a conditioned stimulus. Then likewise stimulation of other parts of the skin, more so the nearer it is to the definite place, has the same effect, that is, acts as a conditioned stimulus. This generalization of the stimuli has a definite biological significance and represents the externalization of the irradiated stimulus in the mass of the cortex. In case of repetition of stimulation of this definite part of the skin with the accompaniment of feeding, and with repeated application to other parts without feeding, the latter parts gradually lose their stimulating effect. This form of inhibition Pavlov calls the differentiating inhibition; and with this the analyzing ability which produces the fine adjustment of the organism to the elements of its internal and external world attains its acme.¹¹

The cerebral cortex is thus not only the seat of the important association mechanism of conditioning, but also the seat of inhibitions. While some associations of new stimuli and responses may facilitate and enhance each other, others definitely block or inhibit each other. In the process of recasting and elaborating unlearned behavior into socially acceptable frameworks of habit, these two principles of facilitation and inhibition are of great importance.

4. *Conditioning in Children.*—Taking his cue from the work of Pavlov, Krasnogorski began a series of experiments upon conditioning in children. Employing a simple device for recording the swallowing reflexes produced

¹⁰ W. H. Burnham, *The Normal Mind*, 1924, p. 73. Courtesy of D. Appleton and Company.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

by inserting a stick of candy in the child's mouth, he made a number of experiments conditioning the children to various artificial stimuli: tones, scratchings, etc. As in the case of animals, at the outset the conditioned responses were marked by their instability; they rather quickly disappeared unless the original conditioning was repeated. One divergent feature became apparent. This was the greater range of individual differences among children than among the animals used in Pavlov's laboratory. Mateer, who followed up Krasnogorski's method in this country, has shown a close relationship between general intelligence and learning capacity through conditioning. With mentally normal children, in a certain experiment, the acquirement of the new reaction took from three to nine trials. With mental defectives the range of trials was from three to fifteen. Furthermore, the number of trials necessary to produce the learned response decreased with the increase in age.¹²

A second important feature became evident. The range of association of the conditioned stimuli was markedly greater for children than for animals. In the case of dogs, for example, the pitch discrimination is very highly developed. Such conditioning is very specific. In some cases changing the tone as much as one-eighth of a note failed to elicit the conditioned reflex. In children, in contrast, tones lying adjacent to the original note brought out the acquired reaction. Likewise with scratching, in the dog this must be repeated on a very specific area. In children, at the outset, there is a marked carry-over of stimulation, so that scratching on any other area will produce the conditioned reaction. However, if the first spot chosen is repeatedly stimulated, and no other, a localization develops and other areas subsequently will not serve as the conditioned stimulus point. Krasnogorski thus remarks:

In this manner the conditioned reflexes to mechanical stimulation are not in children distinguished by a clearly localized zone of functioning, but they can easily acquire it, if the mechanical stimulation of a given spot is constantly reinforced through the working of the conditioned stimulus, and if with that, the repeated mechanical stimulation of other parts of the body is left without reinforcement.¹³

The phenomenon of inhibition is shown very readily in children. The introduction of a second conditioning stimulus during the operation of the

¹² Cf. F. Mateer, *The Behavior of Children*, 1918, especially Chapter VIII.

¹³ *Op. cit.* See footnote 5 above.

first blocks its action and prevents the desired response. Mateer reports that the number of trials needed for developing the inhibition "ranged from three to twelve." With children there was a much wider range of interfering stimuli than with animals. The human being is much more plastic. He possesses more complex possibilities for both conditioning and inhibition than the lower forms of life.

5. *Emotions and Conditioning*.—We noted above that the intensity of a stimulus had some influence on the persistence of the conditioning. One of the most significant findings of the Pavlov school is that the conditioning which takes place during emotional disturbance of the organism is far more lasting and effective than that which takes place in a calm and undisturbed state. We have already discussed the place of the emotions in the unlearned behavior of the organism. Equally significant for us is the fact that the emotional-affective states profoundly influence the process of conditioning. This is highly important in building up social habits and attitudes. If ordinary conditioning is relatively unstable, the conditioning under emotional excitement may persist over long periods of time. There is ample clinical evidence of this. Cases of phobias and anxieties are reported in which the source has been but one occasion of great fear. Everyone who knows children realizes how easily they are conditioned to fear, anger, and love.

The whole matter is made clear by the case of Albert, studied by the Watsons. Albert was a thoroughly normal baby of eleven months when the experiment was undertaken. His fear reactions were confined, as with other unconditioned children, to stimulation of loud, sharp sounds, to loss of support, and to shaking when in light sleep. He showed no fear responses to the dark, to furry animals, or to anything except the definite stimuli just mentioned.

A rat was presented to him and at the same time a sharp, loud sound was produced by striking a steel bar. He jumped and showed other fear reactions. A second trial produced whimpering as well as violent jumping. Five days after he had shown the full effects of two previous sets of trials, he was first shown some blocks. To these he reacted by grasping and playing as usual. Likewise the room, the table, and other such objects did not seem associated with the fear response. Then the rat was shown him. There followed whimpering, withdrawal of the hand, turning the head and the torso away from the rat. This was repeated twice. The blocks

were again introduced, but without the conditioned stimulus. It was clear that the conditioning to the rat persisted, but that the association of fear did not carry over to the room, the table, or the blocks. Through subsequent trials he became completely conditioned to starting and crying when presented with the rat only.

The next step was to test the possible transference of the conditioning to objects which were similar to but not identical with the conditioned stimulus. For this purpose a rabbit was used. The fear reaction appeared. So, too, with a dog, a sealskin coat, and to some extent with cotton wool. The experimenters remark:

The transfer was immediate and without any additional experience in connection with these other objects. In these transferred emotional reactions we thus would find a reason for the widespread change in the personality of children and possibly even in adults once a strongly conditioned emotional reaction has been set up to any object or situation. It accounts for the many unreasoning fears and for a good deal of the sensitiveness of individuals to objects for which no adequate ground for such behavior can be offered in the past history of that individual.¹⁴

This experiment is important not only in showing the place which emotion plays in conditioning, but also in indicating the transfer of emotionally toned conditioned responses to allied types of stimuli.

6. *Transfer of Conditioning*.—We see here a difference between animals and human beings. In the case of dogs used by Pavlov and his students, we saw that their reactions to visual or auditory stimuli were very specific. Dogs can discriminate between the fractions of a full tone. In the case of infants and young children no such sharp discrimination is possible. The differentiated conditioning was much less specific. So, too, in the case of the furry object, it was the quality or attribute of furriness which was significant in setting off the fear response, not the rat alone. This diffusion of the association to new objects, illustrated by the more generalized response to furriness, is highly significant for human behavior. This flexibility of human association is basic to the rise of concepts and abstractions; and concepts are important for man's more complex life.

This fundamental transfer is due not only to the employment of the more

¹⁴ J. B. and R. R. Watson, "Studies in Infant Psychology," *Scientific Monthly*, 1921, vol. XIII, pp. 513-14. Cf. also, "Conditioned Emotional Reactions," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1920, vol. III, pp. 1-14.

complicated cortical "analyzers," to use Morgulis' term; it is due also, in part at least, to the additional factor of irradiation of impulses through the cortex. According to Pavlov, the differentiating function of the cortical analyzer may be broken down by the irradiation produced by the action of some other stimuli, especially an emotional one. In the case of the dog where the differentiation in tone is very sharp, another tone as near the first as one-eighth of a note will not ordinarily arouse the conditioned reaction. Morgulis, however, states:

If . . . some unusual noise should be made during the experiment which excites the animal, the differentiation of the auditory conditioned reflex will be temporarily lost and the salivary reflex will occur in response to any tone. This state of affairs may last fifteen to thirty minutes, when the differentiation becomes once more very rigid. . . .

Psychologically speaking, the animal was in a state of affectation. Physiologically, the strong irradiation radiated over a large territory in the brain and so affected the tonus of its nervous elements that all signs of inhibition were temporarily masked.¹⁵

The emotional toning in the cortex, then, serves to heighten the conditioning by the principle of irradiation. It has been shown that conditioning to pain is greatly facilitated by feeding the animal at the same time, so that a little later intense electric shocks will produce the salivary reflex. The following case of Pavlov is cited by Morgulis:

The skin of a dog is irritated by an electric current of such strength as to cause a painful sensation (or a destructive action, in accordance with the objective terminology). Each time this stimulus is applied the mechanism of self-defense is set into vigorous reaction; the animal attempts to break loose from the stand, to snatch the instruments, and so on, in other words, a strong defensive reflex results. If food is given to the dog at the same time (this must frequently be done through the stomach tube) it sooner or later comes about that the defensive reaction is gradually subdued and at last vanishes altogether, while the electrical irritation becomes a conditioned stimulus of the salivary gland. Two important things must be considered in this connection. First, the blocking of the irritation of one centre (defensive) by the activity of another (nutritive) and, secondly, the diversion of the stimulus into a new channel towards a point in the cortex of more intense function. The nutritive centre which is physiologically very important, draws to itself the available nervous energy, leaving thereby other centres ineffective. The force of this interpreta-

¹⁵ Morgulis, *op. cit.*, pp. 369, 373.

tion is easily recognized by a modification of the above experiment. If, instead of food, an acid is used in stimulating the salivary gland—the acid likewise being an unconditioned stimulus of salivary secretion, but one which is ordinarily rejected by the animal—the painful sensation of the electric current can not be overcome nor can a conditioned salivary reflex be developed under these circumstances. Many seemingly miraculous events of human experience become intelligible in the light of these experiments. The mutilation of the body practiced by certain sects in an ecstasy of religious fervor, the apparent insensitiveness to excruciating pain demonstrated by many martyrs of a creed or ideal, absolute disregard of fatal injuries when the nervous energy is mustered in a life or death struggle—these and many others are phenomena obeying definite physiological laws.¹⁶

Thus pain, fear, rage, love, and any other emotional state will have much to do with the direction which conditioning takes. It is now clear why the prepotent reflexes, internal and external, are so significant for later behavior. Those which in the course of their expression have a distinctly autonomic component of emotion and feeling will be those which in the process of social conditioning will become the most significant for behavior. While thousands of reflexes are associated in a general way, those which are linked up through the emotions are the most persistent and dominant in the personality. This fact will be illustrated in our treatment of images, ideas, and attitudes, in patriotic and crowd behavior, in prejudice, in leadership, in fads and fashions, and in public opinion.

We are now in a position to summarize the features of the conditioned response mechanism. First, there is a wide range of possible conditioned stimuli and responses. Second, the associations are built up rapidly. Third, there is a ready disappearance of the conditioning, unless the physiologically adequate stimulus is re-introduced from time to time in order to reinforce the first conditioning, or more significant, when the conditioning is greatly facilitated by emotional-affective accompaniments. Fourth, one conditioned response may inhibit another, and a third conditioned stimulus may inhibit the inhibition. Fifth, simultaneity of the two stimuli, native and artificial, is not necessary; that is to say, conditioning may occur with successive as well as simultaneous stimulation. Sixth, the pathways mediating the nervous discharge from the conditioned stimulus to native response pass through the cerebral cortex. They are thus under the domi-

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 374-375.

nation of the fore-brain, which is the most recent acquisition in animal evolution and the seat of man's intelligence and skill.

The conditioned reflex mechanism is one of the most significant in the learning process. This is particularly so in the field of social behavior, where emotional-affective factors play such an important part. Not only are people conditioned to fear of all sorts of objects and persons, but anger, love, and the compound emotions of grief, awe, jealousy, and others come to play a distinct rôle in the acquisition of attitudes and habits.

C. The Integrative Function of the Neural-Muscular-Glandular System.

We noted above the influences exerted on simple conditioning by the introduction of second and even third new stimuli. The inhibition of the conditioned response by another, and the inhibition of the inhibition by still a third stimulus-response pattern, make it clear that the whole process of habit formation is not so simple as it at the outset appears. Throughout the whole conditioning process the cerebral cortex plays a very important part. It acts as the dominant gradient in revamping the native or unlearned behavior of the individual.

1. *The Mechanism of Integration.*—Another of the major facts of habit formation is the building-up of simpler units of learning into larger and larger patterns of reaction. This process may be called *integration*. Not only is the cerebral cortex, with its widespread synaptic correlation, fundamental to the formation of conditioned reflexes, but the associative areas of the cortex seem to have the function of tying the units of behavior together into ever larger wholes. Let us consider a few examples of co-ordination and integration in the field of human learning. From these we may draw some parallels for social behavior.

Many years ago Bryan and Harter made a study of learning to send and to receive telegraphic messages. In receiving, for instance, they showed that at the outset only letters were recognized and written down; later on, combinations of letter sounds into words were made. Such a combination was not a mere series of letter sounds added together, but the whole word was recognized as a unit. Still later, words in the form of short sentences were recognized and taken down, again not as a series of words added together, but as a unity—a whole sentence carrying meaning. In time, longer sentences could be taken in the same manner, and soon the whole

mechanism of receiving messages became more or less unconscious. Likewise in learning to send messages, one begins with the single letters, passes on to words and then at the end comes to the sending of whole sentences. In each step there is an integration of the individual units of learning into a larger pattern. From time to time there appeared in the learning process certain periods when the progress in time and the elimination of errors practically ceased, to be followed by increased facility thereafter. These plateaus in the learning periods have been interpreted as periods in which the integrations at new levels are being formed.¹⁷

Similarly in learning to type, in acquiring the technique of piano playing and in hundreds of games and skilled occupations, the same principle applies. For instance, in mastering handball, tennis, or golf, at the outset there is considerable muscular cramping, much attention to particular items in the methods used in striking the ball, to hand-eye relations, to the matter of position of feet, arms, and torso. Sometimes one attempts to improve one aspect of one's form, at other times another. Frequently there are long periods when improvement seems impossible, to be followed by a spurt of success. Often, when least expected, the stroke one has been working for comes easily, naturally, and without conscious effort. The rest periods between practice seem to be very important in this learning; and while it is not literally so, there is a deal of truth in James' comment that we learn to swim in winter and to skate in summer. That is to say, the integrative functions of the neural-muscular system get in their work during the rest periods between practice.

The hangover from practice affects the future stimulus-response pattern of the organism. Retention or memory refers to this persistence of effects. In the field of habits the retentive power of the brain is active and dynamic. In other words, the brain recasts the single items of the learning, largely conditioned reflexes, into larger patterns of response which we may call the integrated habit systems. Thus in typing, in playing golf, and in the operations of the skilled mechanic the behavior is not an additive process of first one single item of stimulus-response, then a second, then a third;

¹⁷ There is some evidence from the work of Snoddy and others that the plateaus, at least in motor learning, may be a function of the distribution of the practice periods. Snoddy believes that by a properly spaced series of practice periods correlated with rest periods, the plateaus may be eliminated. But his work does not invalidate the possible interpretation of the place of the rest periods in integration; in fact, his work rather confirms it. Cf. his monograph: "An Experimental Analysis of a Case of Trial and Error Learning in the Human Subject," *Psychological Monographs*, 1920, vol. XXVIII, No. 2, Whole No. 124.

but the whole reaction system is synthesized together into a larger schema. One is not aware that the writing of the words and sentences on a typewriter is a matter of individual finger movements, but the fact is that both hands have become synchronized to brain changes. This makes possible the writing of sentences, so far as the actual spelling and typing is concerned, without a thought of the mechanics of the operation. Instead, the attention is focused wholly upon the expression of the meaning. It would be a mistake to fail to see that the organism responds as a whole to its environment. This unified response system itself is made possible both by the integrative mechanisms of the neuro-muscular system itself and by the nature of the stimuli, which come to us in configurations.

In the case of social interaction of persons, we find this principle in operation. The commands of the officer are stimuli to the integrated movements of marching on the part of the military squad. In building up one's reactions to parents, brothers and sisters, friends and enemies, the single items in the process become linked together into unified wholes. Gestures, physical appearance, bodily habits, ideas and attitudes of these others, constitute a configuration of stimuli. On the side of the individual, the responses to these stimuli are distinctly woven together into organized habits and attitudes. For example, the reaction of the speaker to his audience is conditioned by the form of the audience—number, seating, and so on. The response of the listeners to him is determined by the integration of his voice, his facial and manual gestures, his posture, and his expressed thoughts. In the field of social interaction, the rapid shifting of the environment, that is, the change in other persons, often makes for rapid shifting in the integrative centers of our own behavior. For example, suppose we have met an individual of importance in our social world and some weeks or months later we see this person again in another social gathering. We approach the individual, offer him our hand and in a pleasantly-toned voice begin to greet him. We are thus integrated to a certain kind of response pattern. This anticipatory phase of behavior is highly significant in social intercourse. It is a distinct phase of the cycle of social behavior. But suppose the great man, instead of greeting us in a friendly manner, turns away with a curt nod, or with a remark that he does not recall a previous meeting, or with some other gesture of avoidance. The whole environmental situation changes, and with it the center of our integrated reaction changes. We are no longer expansive. We flush in embarrassment

and turn away in anger and usually with a sense of inferiority. The reaction pattern then has shifted from one correlation center to another because of a shift in the environment.

In any case the complete response of the individual to a situation is unified and coördinated. The integration of habits and reactions is a phase of the whole principle of complete or consummatory response. In all major activities of the organism the whole reaction system participates.

D. Ambivalence of Habits and Attitudes.

It must be recognized, of course, that some patterns of our behavior are suited for some types of action, some for others. One can not, at the same time, fight and run. One can not at the same time secure food and make love. There rests within our organism, therefore, the possibility of dissociation, or disparate or opposite types of reaction. The psychoanalysts have used the term ambivalence to describe this principle in reference to the emotions. For instance, the opposite of hate is love, of sorrow is joy. The significant point for us is that when the flight patterns are in operation, success in flight consists in not being inhibited by any tendencies to stop and fight. When engaged in food-seeking, any gestures in the direction of love-making may result in someone else securing the wanted food.

Activity seems to be divided into forms of approach or withdrawal in reference to all situations, physical or social. As a result of conditioning we are often at a loss to know which sort of activity to undertake. For example, patriotic attitudes toward our country incite us to follow the lead of statesmen into war, but knowledge of the injustice of war or horror at killing other human beings may inhibit us from doing so. Again, a person's early theological training may impel him to join a fundamentalist church, but his later college education and wider experience may cause him to develop antagonistic attitudes toward such affiliations. If a man's parents and early friends belong to a conservative church, his emotional attitudes toward them may make it difficult for him to discontinue his relationship. Yet other friends, whom he emulates, holding opposite views, impel him in the other direction. Or a man may have accepted the romantic code of love, been married under it, and later develop other attitudes to find himself in conflict whether to divorce his wife or to accept the conventional code with its implications of ethical duty. Examples could be multiplied. It is evident that in the ambivalence of habits and attitudes we

have the source of mental conflicts. Such conflicts lie at the root of a great deal of neurotic conduct and have distinct reverberations in one's relations with other persons. However, participation in various groups, fostering different standpoints, usually affords a measure of personal stability without recourse to that more fundamental integration of personality which has been the concern of philosophers and wise men throughout the ages. For example, a man may be friendly and coöperative as a church member but severe and exacting as an employer. So long as these divergences do not clash too badly, a person may get on fairly well in his social contacts.

There is a social situation, however, wherein even ambivalent or opposite patterns of behavior may become closely integrated. Group conflict furnishes for us a situation in which the organism most completely fulfils itself, except possibly in eating or in sexual embrace. Where there is conflict between the in-group and the out-group, there is the possibility of carrying within oneself, antagonistic and kindly emotions and tendencies at the same time. An easy example is afforded by war. Toward one's fellows of the in-group or nation, there is an attitude of loyalty, coöperation, sacrifice, and common endeavor which is pleasant and whole-hearted. Toward the members of the out-group, there is hatred, fear, desire to injure, or to kill and destroy. All of the virtues of social life are attributed to the in-group. The out-group is the arch-demon of the world and filled with all manner of evil. This is one situation in which individuals in a group may emotionally have their cake and eat it too. It gives a psychological clue to conflict reactions running all the way from minor controversies concerning neighbors or members of other political, religious, or fraternal groups, to more distinctly conflict groups such as trade unions versus employers' associations or nation versus nation. Further on we shall have occasion to call attention to this principle as it operates in developing the personality and in crowd behavior, in public opinion, and elsewhere in social activity.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapters IX, no. 57, pp. 208-10; X, pp. 219-40.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 - 1. Discuss questions and exercises in assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter X, pp. 240-41.
 - 2. Contrast the behavior of the young of one of the domesticated mamma-

- lian forms with that of the human infant in order to show the differences as well as likenesses in dependence of young offspring on parental care.
3. What is the significance of inhibition of conditioned responses in social-cultural learning? Illustrate.
 4. Why is the integration process as important as that of conditioning?
 5. What is the social significance of the fact that conditioning is more effective when accompanied by emotional toning?
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter X, p. 241.

CHAPTER VI

ANTICIPATORY HABIT SYSTEMS

A. External and Internal Factors Determining Behavior.

Behavior is determined by factors external and internal to the organism. The external influences are brought to the individual through the exteroceptive sense organs. The internal come through the proprioceptive and interoceptive organs. Moreover, conditioning and integration of past sensory-response reactions intervene between the present stimulus and response. From the very outset of life, both internal and external stimulation play a part in activity. As we have seen, "drives" to hunger, thirst, and sex come from internal bodily changes, while withdrawal from pain, rage, and fear are stimulated by external situations. These two sets of factors determine the adjustment of the organism to its environment. In terms of a functional psychology, we may describe the whole field of direction of response to situations under the rubric of attention. By attention we mean merely the orientation of the organism toward the environmental situation. This orientation is always selective. Some features of the total environment are neglected for others. We focus our reactions upon the core of the selected segment of environment, leaving other segments on the margin of awareness. This orientation is determined by two sets of factors: external and internal.

1. *External Factors Determining Behavior.*—The size, form, intensity, and mode of presentation and repetition of the stimuli greatly affect the orientation of the organism toward the same and hence affect the response. At the level of original nature, we noted that intensely loud sounds set off crying and other emotional responses; likewise that the blocking of free movements of the legs and arms produced rage, and that bright lights, large objects, intense odors caused different responses. The facial and bodily stimulations of the mother, for instance, have a definite place in the social conditioning of the child. As we grow older, all sorts of conditioned

stimuli come to affect us in terms of novelty, size, intensity, repetition, and mode of presentation. The newness of fads and fashions, the size and type of advertisements, the vigor of emotional appeals through speakers and the press, illustrate these external factors in behavior. Visual, auditory, and tactile stimuli are perhaps the three most significant exteroceptive determinants of conduct. The sight of our mother, father, and relatives around us, the hearing of their voices, the tactile fondling of us as children, the clasping of hands in friendship, are typical examples.

2. *Internal Factors in Behavior.*—The internal conditions of reaction, however, are quite as important. Not infrequently in these days of tremendous and rapidly changing external stimuli, in which everything mechanical and in large quantities is so overemphasized, we neglect the significance of the internal or covert changes which help to determine our conduct. Yet these factors are highly significant, for they determine the meanings and values which we give the world outside ourselves. Without the current internal conditionings even the material world we worship so abjectly today might be otherwise interpreted. After all, it is ideology which supports both our physical and our social world.

As we saw in Chapter III, the basic internal stimuli are the physiological determinants of behavior—hunger, thirst, sex, fatigue, eliminative needs. Correlated with these physiological conditions, but dependent upon the functioning of the cerebral cortex, are the feelings and emotions which accompany the responses. Likewise the muscle tensions produce the proprioceptive stimulations which give us an awareness of bodily movement. These are especially significant in gestures, attitudes, and speech reactions. In crowd situations, for example, the sense of bodily movement is correlated with exteroceptive stimuli of visual, auditory, and tactile sorts from others around us.

Very important internal factors, however, arise through conditioning in relation to retention and association. Wundt used the term *apperception* to describe the whole array of images and ideas which, themselves the product of past conditioning, alter and transform the manner in which we perceive and react to the world around us. The images and ideas of mother, father, brothers and sisters, friends and enemies, country, church, of right and wrong conduct—in fact, the entire range of imagery and ideas connected with our behavior in reference to other persons—comes into play here. What we shall discuss hereafter under the *content* of behavior, in-

ternal and external, as illustrated by stereotypes, myths, and legends, is dependent upon the apperceptive mass. Growing out of these internal associations retained from earlier experience are aims, ideals, purposes, attitudes, and values which affect the orientation of the individual to his social world.

It is evident that the external and internal factors which direct behavior are combined. They do not exist in separate compartments of our being, but are at all times a part of the total stimulus-response arrangements. It is often impossible to state which set of factors has most weight in any particular activity. Yet any attempt to understand and interpret human behavior which fails to recognize both sets of factors must be inadequate if not actually false. In the balance of this chapter we shall be concerned particularly with the internal factors.

B. Anticipatory and Consummatory Responses.

1. *Long and Short Circuit Reactions: Covert and Overt Behavior.*—The individual, as soon as he comes into contact with the social world, begins to exhibit two distinct types of reaction. One of these is direct, the other indirect. The one is a kind of short circuit, the other a long circuit between stimulus and response. The direct, short-circuit type of activity is evident in the infant. His hunger and thirst needs lead, ordinarily, to immediate satisfactions, unless modified by other persons. His eliminative functions operate with a directness which only time and training can change. His responses to pain, fear, and anger stimuli are direct and animal in character. Such behavior as this in an older child or adult is called "impulsive" or "primitive." The response follows very directly upon the stimulus. This is the purely unlearned biological, almost vegetative, reaction. Through social conditioning, there are interposed between the stimuli and the final response, other types of stimuli and response which alter the course of the impulsive behavior. Through training, the hunger and thirst demands are compressed into a regularity of time which at the outset runs counter to nature's way. Rage and fear are conditioned and inhibited in manifold ways. Bodily eliminations become habitual according to the cultural standards of the group in which one happens to be born. In this manner indirect and long-circuit items are introduced between bodily need or tension and the consummation of activity provoked by these needs.

The final, completed activity at the organic level, then, is immediate and impulsive. At the psychological or conditioned level, the final consummatory activity is controlled through delay. This control is possible through the mechanism of conditioning and inhibition. As we know, the unlearned impulses from the receptor organs pass in the first instance through the spinal cord and lower brain centers. The central neurons make but slight modification in their course. The learned behavior, on the other hand, takes place through the interposition of the cerebrum. Between the stimulation and the final overt act, therefore, cerebral processes intervene which give a new and more complicated direction to the final act itself. We may then distinguish between the direct, impulsive activity and the indirect, circuitous type in terms of the presence of these central cortical changes.

These cortical changes become a system themselves. They are known to us in the form of attitudes, images, ideas. The attitude is a form of incipient habit. The image is the result of retentive capacities in the cerebral cortex. The idea or concept is an outgrowth of imagery. It is closely related to the rise of language. Through manipulation not of objects outside oneself, but of representations of them called images, one may decide a course of action which in the end is much more satisfying to the organism as a whole. At a higher level one may rearrange ideas or verbal concepts about the attributes and relations of objects and in similar fashion be better able to control one's environment in the final consummatory activity. Likewise the attitudes, being incipient motor habits, are the key to the final activity. In a sense the attitude is a shadow of the consummatory activity, but confined to incipient responses in the peripheral musculature and not to more obvious and complete acts. The meaning of behavior depends upon a combination of image or idea and the accompanying incipient attitude or overt act. We may thus divide man's range of behavior into two systems. One has to do with anticipatory activity confined largely within the organism; the other, with final, complete or consummatory activity in reference to the external environment, physical and social. The first type of behavior we may call covert, the latter overt. The first is a form of preparation, a looking forward to activity, usually, of course, with some reference to the past. It is a method of preliminary trial and error, although it is not necessarily of a rational sort. The world of art, literature, science, and philosophy exists, in a

measure, in this area of behavior. The whole scope of language is related to this covert field of behavior. This separation of covert from overt behavior is the source of the classical controversy over the mind and body in psychology and philosophy. The former is the field of mind. The anticipatory type of experience may become so extended that it scarcely ever reaches any final, overt, practical activity. This is the case with much symbolic logic and the elaborations of non-euclidian systems of mathematics. So, too, in the field of literature, and the other arts, it might be held that these also never reach any culmination in overt action except that involved in writing and printing or otherwise producing them. In the chapters which follow we shall see, however, that this covert, anticipatory sphere of human experience is the veritable basis of social reality. The final pragmatic test of any image, idea, or attitude may be: Will it work? Will it engage the total organism in modification of the physical or social world? Much depends on what one means by the word "work." Certainly, as we shall see, the images and ideas of men, even of the most fantastical sort, profoundly modify not only their conception of the world, but their consummatory habits as well.

To summarize: Overt behavior involves the total organism in some adjustment to the external environment, be it material or social. This is the field of habit formation, of consummatory response patterns. Here it is we come upon the completion of response which ends any particular cycle of activity. In the case of covert activity, however, there is a kind of cycle built up within the anticipatory field when this cycle does not directly involve the organic survival of the individual. Nevertheless, as valuable as anticipatory activity is, the physiological demands of the organism sooner or later put a limitation upon the extent to which it may go. For example, while images and ideas may be of great assistance in seeking food, ultimately this internal anticipation must lead to some overt act of grasping and eating food, else the organism perishes. Still in many types of activity, not immediately concerned with survival, a certain cycle of internal, indirect sort may be constructed. This is illustrated in art, in systems of philosophy and in science, which reinterpret our world for us. It is also seen in more fantastic forms. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine some aspects of this anticipatory system. In subsequent chapters its social implications will be uncovered.

2. *Intelligence and Consciousness as Phases of Anticipatory Response.*—Consciousness is a function of this anticipatory, incomplete aspect of the total behavior. Whatever the controversialists may say about consciousness the evidence is clear from clinical and experimental observation that it belongs in that dimension of behavior which is dependent upon the functioning of the cerebral cortex. In short, it is a name for a large section of anticipatory behavior. It is distinctly concerned with the field of images, ideas, and attitudes. In the older psychology the first two were said to belong to the cognitive or intellectual phase of man's life. Intelligence, in the sense used by students of mental measurement, is but another name for an aspect of this conscious, anticipatory phase of behavior. When we speak of intelligence as the capacity to learn and of differences in intelligence as measured by the ability to master new conditions, to acquire new techniques of response, we are simply stating, in other language, certain facts about covert, anticipatory behavior and its variability among individuals. Learning by experience is man's greatest asset, and the degree to which he can do this is a measure of the control which the covert phase of behavior has over the overt. Stern defined intelligence as "a general capacity of an individual consciously to adjust his thinking to new requirements—it is general mental adaptability to new problems and conditions of life."¹ Binet, who is famous for his scale for measuring intelligence, describes intelligence, according to Terman, as "(1) the tendency of thought to take and maintain a definite direction, (2) the capacity to make adaptations for the purpose of attaining the desired end, and (3) the power of self-criticism."² Intelligence is defined by many psychologists as the ability to carry on abstract thought, to handle conceptual symbols, to generalize—in brief, to indulge in logical reasoning.

There are some situations in which a man may be more intelligent than in others. Thorndike has maintained that there are three general categories of intelligence: motor intelligence, abstract or logical intelligence, and social intelligence. The first has to do with control of material things in terms of manual dexterity, as in the skilled trades and certain arts. The second is witnessed in mathematics, science, and philosophy. The third is seen in control of other social beings and in the capacity to make social

¹ W. Stern, *Psychological Methods of Testing Intelligence*, 1914, p. 3. Courtesy of Warwick and York.

² L. M. Terman, *The Measurement of Intelligence*, 1916, p. 45. Used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

adjustments. Whatever one may make of Thorndike's classifications, it is evident that intelligence has a distinct relationship to social approval or disapproval and to social situations. What one's group considers sane in the way of responses, will have much to do with the direction which one's intellectual choices will take. Tredgold recognizes the factor of social approval and social adjustment when he defines feeble-mindedness or paucity of intelligence as:

A state of restricted potentiality for, or arrest of, cerebral development, in consequence of which the person affected is incapable at maturity of so adapting himself to his environment or to the requirements of the community as to maintain existence independently of external support.³

C. Psychological Processes in Anticipatory Behavior.

To get a closer view of the influence of anticipatory behavior—conscious and unconscious—on overt behavior, we must examine the psychological processes on which it rests. The long-circuiting of the total behavior is due to the existence of three fundamental capacities of the organism: that for sensation-perception; for retention of past impressions, or of behavior changes; and for conditioning and integrative alterations. It is through the operation of these processes that our experience acquires meaning. And this meaning rests firmly, as we shall see, on our exposure to the social environment. All three of these processes correlate to determine the course of anticipatory responses. Sensation alone from any of the receptors, internal and external, does not give direction to behavior. Changes made in the course of stimulus-response patterns by the effects of retained experiences, and the manner in which they are associated and integrated together, are highly important. It is not only what the eyes, ears, tactile organs, and other senses bring us which directs our activity, but associated past experiences have much to do with such direction. The images of previous experience arise to help us interpret and to direct the course of present action. Moreover, these images give rise to ideas or concepts which aid in the process of perception. All of these internal processes are tied together in patterns or forms by the associative and integrative function of the cerebral cortex. Let us briefly review some important phases of perception, memory, and association which throw light on the mechanisms which come into

³ A. F. Tredgold, *Mental Deficiency*, 1916 (2nd edition), p. 8. Courtesy of William Wood Company.

play in social conditioning. The interaction of persons in producing the content of anticipatory responses will be dealt with subsequently.

1. *Perception.*—The following incident from Binet at once introduces us to the problem of perception:

One evening, when [a friend] was walking alone in a country broken up by a large woods, he perceived, in a clearing, a large fire lighted. Then, immediately after, he saw an encampment of gypsies around this fire. There they were, with their bronzed faces, lying on the ground and engaged in cooking. The night was dark, and the place very lonely. Our young man was afraid, he lost his head completely, and, brandishing the stick he held in his hand, he dashed furiously into the gypsies' camp. A moment after he was in the middle of a pond, convulsively clasping a tree-trunk with his arms, and feeling the chill of water which rose as far as his knees. Then he saw a will-o'-the-wisp flickering on the surface of the pond; it was this shining spot which had been the starting point of his sensory illusion.⁴

We see at once the true nature of perception. It is sensory stimulation plus its interpretation from the images, ideas, and emotions which accompany it. The question whether there is anything such as pure sensation




FIGURE 3.
Illustrating the Principle of Visual Perception.

need not detain us. From birth on, one experience or another has added a component to all sensation which makes whatever is new in our stimulation area interpretable in terms of past experiences. Look at Figure 3. Is it a staircase? Does the original perception remain, or does it change to

⁴ A. Binet, *The Psychology of Reasoning* (3rd ed.), 1912, p. 6, Courtesy of The Open Court Publishing Company.

another? Is it a staircase viewed from underneath? Is it a section of a type of cornice? Sometimes this figure is called the staircase illusion, but it is not an illusion unless all perception be so denominated. What one *sees*, however, is determined by what one contributes to the sensation from past seeing and interpreting. The term *apperception mass* designates the combination of factors from past experience which contribute to present perception. We might better say that we apperceive external objects. As Witmer remarks, "every perception is a synthesis, or combination, of the part contributed by apperception and the part contributed by sensation." The significance of previous conditioning in present perception is nicely illustrated by the ancient story of the six blind men of Indostan who went to see an elephant.

First blind man, falling against the elephant's side:

"God bless me! but this elephant
Is very like a wall."

Second blind man, feeling the tusk:

"This wonder of an elephant
Is very like a spear."

Third blind man, grasping the squirming trunk:

"I see," quoth he, "the elephant
Is very like a snake."

The fourth blind man, clasping the knee:

"'Tis clear enough, the elephant
Is very like a tree."

The fifth blind man, catching the ear:

"This marvel of an elephant
Is very like a fan."

The sixth, seizing the swinging tail:

"I see," quoth he, "the elephant
Is very like a rope."

And so these men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right,
And all were in the wrong.⁵

All interpretation rests upon personal-social and cultural conditioning plus any admixture of individual organic emotional and feeling responses which may accompany the perception. The perception of space and time has been a favorite subject of the psychologist. Stratton many years ago showed how the wearing of glasses which invert the world around us handicaps a person only for a short time. Very soon upside-down-ness seems as normal as right-side-up-ness. So, too, the alteration of left and right makes no difference so soon as past association and present sensation become integrated in activity. Similarly, customs at first considered strange seem later quite natural and right.

As we shall see in describing behavior of people in the field of prejudice, the negro is apperceived very differently by some than by others. Again, to some persons the world around them is rich in fantasies that to others are nonsense. In the excitement of the mob, men apperceive very differently than in the calm situation of a deliberative counsel. What we apperceive will be the subject of subsequent chapters. The essential thing is to understand that perception is not a mere passivity of the organism in the presence of stimuli, but an active, dynamic, integrative process.

2. *Imagery*.— If one looks steadily at a picture for a moment, one will be able to retain an impression, or positive after-image, of it with considerable detail for a brief time thereafter. Here, however, we are concerned more particularly with the true memory image. This is the recall or revival of the representation of the perception some time after the originating stimulus for the perception has disappeared. A perception, although distinctly affected by central or internal factors, is externally aroused. Its inception lies in the stimulation of the receptor organs. In contrast, the inception of the memory image is through association from the internal or cortical field. The image is a kind of incipient, anticipatory perception centrally controlled.

⁵ Quoted by C. E. Scashore in *Elementary Experiments in Psychology*, 1908, p. 147-48. Courtesy of Henry Holt and Company.

Types of images follow upon the sense organs concerned in perception. In social intercourse, after all, visual and auditory stimulation are most significant. It naturally follows that visual and auditory imagery are the most common, although there are distinct individual differences in imagery. In the process of so-called thinking, vocal-motor or speech imagery is highly important.

3. *Memory*.—The image, then, rests upon retentive capacity. Let us look more closely at the nature of this process of memory. The conditioning by successive stimulation described in Chapter V is a form of memory reflex, in which the effects of the first stimulation are associated with another set before the first have disappeared. But as we go up the scale of intelligence, in human beings and animals, the delay between first stimulation and the association with new response may be extended. A number of studies of the delayed reaction have been made:

In one experiment, apparatus is arranged so that the animal or child may be placed in front of three boxes or doors. The animal or child's exit from the apparatus is blocked except through the door of the lighted box. When the animal or child is released it must learn, by conditioning, to go through the door over which the light appeared and return to the release box where food is given. After this conditioned reaction is set up, the real problem begins. The animal or child is now placed in the release box. The light is turned on over one of the three doors to the boxes. When the subject has seen the light, it is turned off. The subject is then retained in the release box for a certain period of time before being let go. Will animal or child go out the door of the box which was most recently lighted? If this is the case, the interval of time between stimulus and release is increased until the limit of ability is reached. The maximum periods of successful delayed reaction from a number of experiments are given in the following table from Hunter:

Table 2: Showing Differences in Delayed Reaction Times

Rats	1 to 5 seconds
Dogs	1 to 3 minutes
Raccoons	10 to 25 seconds
Cats	16 to 18 seconds
Child 1¼ yrs.	20 seconds
Child 2½ yrs.	50 seconds
Child 5 yrs.	At least 20 minutes ⁶

⁶ Adapted from W. S. Hunter, *General Psychology* (1st ed.), p. 33. Copyright by the University of Chicago Press, 1919.

As Hunter says, the cue to this delayed response is very likely a kinesthetic orientation. In the case of rats, cats, and dogs the animal's body must be kept oriented toward the proper box if the delayed response is to prove successful. In the other subjects this orientation was unnecessary. The function of this set is much the same as that of an idea, "because it enables the animal to react to an absent object in a selective manner, although it—the cue—has not been continuously present." These associations of present stimuli with past stimulus-response processes are basic to memory, image, and all of the higher associative mechanisms.

The whole memory process, however, is not a mere reproduction of perceptions. The memory images are constantly being altered by additional conditioning, by the effects of fading out of vividness, and by association with other images. Modern psychology and psychiatry have made us particularly aware of the dynamic, changing character of memory and associative processes. Freud long ago pointed out that the dream showed evidences of memories which were thrown together in novel forms, often unrecognized as actual experiences by the sleeper. He showed how elements of time and space were displaced or interchanged, how items in experience were condensed into mere symbols of the perceptual experience, how secondary elaboration took place, that is, how details were added to the dream from other experiences having no relation to the basic images of the dream. Finally, he pointed out the personified, dramatized form in which the dream appeared. Studies made in the field of forgetting, especially by Whipple, Crosland, and others, indicate that these processes operate in ordinary memories. Crosland exposed a number of pictures, bits of sculpture, writing, and other stimuli to a number of observers and then had them return to the laboratory, at intervals of a few days, for periods ranging from one to even three years to tell him how much of this material they could recall. He points out how details of the original perception were lost, how only parts of pictures remained to stand for the whole, how the recalled images showed confusion of two perceptions, how transpositions of time and space relations took place, and how absolutely extraneous details were added. Moreover, the persons were often very certain that their own elaborations were a part of the original perception. These facts lead us at once into the heart of the whole problem of perception, imagery, memory, and association.

Many studies have been made of memory recall in order to test the

validity of our perceptions and their reproduction. One of the best known is that of the famous experiment at the Congress of Psychologists at Göttingen, where a faked murder was put on, unknown, of course, to the psychologists, and a report was asked for from every one present. Even with men trained to careful observation in the laboratory, it was found that there were a large number of errors. Of the forty reports sent in, only one had less than twenty per cent of mistakes; twelve, from forty to fifty per cent; and thirteen, more than fifty. In more than half of the accounts ten per cent of the details were pure inventions. Some accounts had even more than ten per cent of actual added material which was superimposed on the recalled perception.

Marston reports an experiment with eighteen lawyers in a class in Legal Psychology in which there was no effort at stage melodrama, but a rather simple incident in the classroom. Each of the students was asked to give a free narration of the event, and to submit, in turn, both to direct and to cross examination. The author thus describes his experiment and gives the results from the three forms of testimony:

The incident used was that of an unknown youth rapping on the door of the lecture room, soon after the beginning of the lecture, entering on the lecturer's request, and delivering an envelope to the lecturer. The latter removed a yellow paper from the envelope, pretended to read a message, and exchanged remarks with the stranger, who thereafter left the room. There were no deliberately false suggestions in the affair to lead witnesses astray, and the actions were of such a usual nature that no emotion beyond mild surprise or curiosity could be evoked from the witnesses.

There were a large number of details, however, of possible and connected legal significance. The predetermined plot was trial of the strange youth for the knifing of a person of his acquaintance. In strict adherence to realism, the youth chosen was a Texan, very quick of hand and temper. He possessed a long, green-handled pocket-knife, the blade of which might well be used for stabbing purposes. With one hand the young Texan could draw and open this knife, all in the same motion. Under his left arm he carried three books, one red, one green, and one blue (colors to furnish psychological primaries), and the predetermined plot included the finding of these books at the scene of the crime. Besides the envelope handed the lecturer, the young man carried a second envelope in the same hand, which might have contained a taunting letter, just received from the murdered acquaintance. While the lecturer read his supposed message, the Texan faced the audience, drew and opened his knife, and scraped at his gloved thumb with it, in supposed embarrassment. The points of usual legal significance, therefore, would be all those details serving to identify

the Texan, his books, his envelope, and his knife—a not unusual type of legal meaning for any testimony offered. I may anticipate the results by stating that not a single witness noticed the knife at all!

Each observable detail in the above-outlined incident was allotted a score of one point, summing into a total of 147. Similarly, the number of possible points scorable in answering direct and cross-examinations were separately compiled, giving a total of 120 points for direct, and 107 points for cross-examination. Most of these points, of course, were included in the original 147 which might have been obtained, as a perfect score, in the free narration; but for the purpose of comparison of the three methods of eliciting testimony, it was necessary to score each part of the test separately. Table 3, gives the results.

Table 3
Scores of Witnesses Reporting an Unexpected Incident

	Free Narration	Direct Exam.	Cross Exam.
Average of all witnesses—			
Completeness	23.2	31.2	28.7
Accuracy	94.05	83.2	75.7
Caution	...	40.1	51.8
Highest witness—			
Completeness	31.9	48.7	43.9
Accuracy	100.	94.5	97.2
Caution	...	77.7	88.8
Lowest witness—			
Completeness	6.4	7.5	19.6
Accuracy	83.7	64.2	61.9
Caution	...	15.3	10.

The figures in Table 3, above, represent percentages. The percent "Completeness" means the completeness of the correct points given by the witness. Thus the first figure given in Table 3, which is 23.2 percent completeness as the average for all witnesses in free narration, means that the 18 witnesses testified, correctly, to an average of a little over 34 points during this portion of their testimony. . . .

The figure for these witnesses' average "accuracy" in free narration, which is 94.05 percent, signifies the percentage which their correct points are of their total points given. . . .

The percentage of "Caution," as used in Table 3, signifies that percentage of the total times the witness really didn't know a point, in answer to a question, when that witness declined to answer, or said, "I don't know." The figure is arrived at by totaling the number of errors, "don't know's," and no-answer responses, which total clearly represents the actual total of points unknown to the witness, and then figuring what fraction or percentage of this total is represented by the number of "don't know's" and "no-answers," which clearly constitutes the actual total of points the witness knew he didn't know.⁷

⁷ W. M. Marston, "Studies in Testimony," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, 1924, vol. XV, pp. 8-10; 10-11.

It is evident from this study in perception and memory that free narration is uniformly less complete and more accurate than either direct or cross examination. "Direct examination is both more complete and more accurate than cross examination," whereas cross examination shows greater caution than direct examination. There is, in this latter, no gain in either completeness or accuracy on the average. This study, like others of similar sort, indicates clearly the fallibility of human perception and memory. The figures for completeness, accuracy, and caution show variations under three types of reporting, but all prove how uncertain our testimonies about the world around us may be.

Whipple made a study of observation and report which bears directly upon our problem. He showed that whenever any interval of time intervened between the actual observation and the recording of it by word, gesture, writing or otherwise, the accuracy and completeness of the record tended to be reduced by errors of memory. He gave a group a short paragraph of 180 words of descriptive material entitled "The Dutch Homestead." There were approximately ninety-four items or ideas in the paragraph. Amazing differences in the recall of the items in this paragraph were revealed. The revival was affected by a number of factors which influenced the whole process of memory. We may summarize the more noteworthy of these as follows:

1) The recall of observed materials is open to falsification by the insertion of erroneous items. That is to say, people add details that were not in the original situation at all. These insertions are usually plausible. They generally fit the new experiences into old ones so as to make them accord with ordinary experiences. Moreover, the person is not conscious of any deliberate fraud in his additional material.

2) The recall of observed materials is apt to be falsified by substituting other experiences from the past. This refers not to simple addition as above, but to the dropping-out of some items and the substitution of others, again unconsciously.

3) "This recall is likely to be false because of transpositions in the time, order, and space arrangement of various features." This is frequently seen in all court testimonies as to what occurred in accidents. The writer recalls seeing an accident in New York City some years ago when a Fifth Avenue bus crashed into a large touring car. An old lady, who had just stepped on the bus a moment before, was thrown violently upon the floor. There were eight or nine people in the bus at the time, but no two accounts were the same even five minutes after the event. Some said that she was just sitting down when thrown

on the floor, others that she was still standing in the aisle, and so on. Within a day alterations in report are still more noticeable, and a week afterwards even more so. As time goes on, accuracy recedes into a vague shadow of the actuality.

4) The observer is often unaware of the omissions, insertions, substitutions, and transpositions which influence the accuracy of recall. It is amazing what confidence people have in their recall of events seen and heard. Often it seems that the more confident a person is, the more suspicious one may be of his accuracy, for many people make up in self-assurance what they lack in scientific caution.

5) To recall correctly one feature of an object or event does not mean that the correct recall of other items of the same object or event is forthcoming, although these other features appear logically related. Because a man reports on certain details, it does not follow that he is correct in others. Some people note only one part of a situation; some are trained to see only some things and not others. This is seen very frequently in the giving and taking of expert testimony in the law courts, when experts disagree because each has focused his attention upon the section of the situation with which he is familiar by training and interest.

6) If several people reporting upon the same situation agree on certain details, it is generally considered that such recall is correct. This is the basis upon which testimony at law is built, and we may assume that, on the whole, this social criterion of agreement is valid.

7) Yet if several individuals agree absolutely in their reports about many minor details under conditions such that observation must have been difficult and recall of the details open to unconscious mistakes, then we are justified in being suspicious of probable collusion. This principle is well known in court procedure, so that too great agreement on details in regard to riots, murder, assault, etc., is looked upon with grave suspicion.

8) Communication of information by one person to another invariably gives rise to inaccuracy. For example, give to a number of persons separately a set of familiar objects, such as a penholder, a pocket knife, a snapshot, a bunch of keys, and ask them to describe the object so completely that anyone who heard this description would have as sufficient an idea of the object as the person who saw it. Let each description be listened to at the time or read afterwards by another individual. Then request this last individual to imagine just how the object will look. Then show the object to him and ask him if it differs at all from his expectations of it. Was the inadequacy due to the verbal description or to the hearer's interpretation of it?

Such experiments reveal that discrepancies of this sort do not arise from faulty sensations, or from distractions of attention, or omissions, additions or transpositions, but rather from the difficulty of "translating" the objects and events, that are well perceived, into suitable language terms. By suitable terms is meant such words as arouse in the listeners images fairly comparable with

the original perception. Ordinarily the mistakes are due both to the speaker and to the listener. Like results are found when the observer uses pantomime or gesture or drawings to convey the meaning.

It is further apparent that when the communication of information has to do, not with immediate perceptions, but with materials recalled from memory, the likelihood of inaccuracies in the process of "reporting" (as the psychologist calls this) is greatly enhanced.

9) The most outstanding inaccuracy in description consists in incompleteness or simplification. Omission of details or simplification of details is common in all observation. In a test conducted by Whipple a photograph was exhibited to a group of observers. Taking all the reports into account, twenty-two objects were noted, yet the average number mentioned by any one person was but 9.4.

10) If we mean by an error any definite discrepancy between items recalled and the actual facts, we may say that, even with competent adults observing and reporting under favorable conditions, an errorless report is most unusual. Moreover, if the report gives details the average observer is about seventy-five percent accurate in his report when we do not count omissions as errors."⁸

It is evident from these ten pertinent psychological comments that perception and memory processes are prone to considerable error. And the errors become more and more evident with the lapse of time. Conversely, imagined details are added with time. We are always faced with a double source of change and alteration in reporting. More and more is forgotten and more and more items are altered and even added to in the recalling. We see, therefore, that both perception and memory change with lapses in time, new perceptions, old associations, and emotional states, and that the added details are often of imaginary character. This leads us at once into the problem of imagination and fantasy.

4. *Imagination and Associative Thinking*.—The recall of the actual perception in as accurate a form as possible has been called reproductive imagination or memory image. What is normally termed imagination involves more than this. It is marked by decided changes in the make-up of the material or content of the imagery, and has been termed productive imagination. We shall use the term imagination in this latter sense. The line separating true and accurate reproduction and imagination is very indistinct. We can be sure, of course, that productive imagination is limited by experience. Whatever elements appear in imagination have at some time been experienced by the individual. It is the novel organization of im-

⁸ Adapted from G. M. Whipple, "The Obtaining of Information: Psychology of Observation and Report," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1918, vol. XV, pp. 235—45.

ages and ideas that makes the imaginative product what it is. Imagination rests definitely upon the associative and integrative mechanism.

On the side of person-to-person relationships, imagination plays a part in the building-up of sympathy. It is distinctly a phase of identification and projection. We shall deal with these in the next chapter.

Imagination may recast the world of perception and memory into forms more acceptable to our emotions and desires; or it may serve the purpose of invention and science in the construction of hypotheses, laws, and new devices. The former type has been called passive imagination, the latter active. Both of these are found in everyone at various degrees of development. In all forms of imagination, associative thinking plays such an important part that passive and active imagination may really be discussed as phases of association. Imagination or associative thinking is but a phase of anticipatory response which is built up in the organism. The passive type of imagination is oriented through those of our wishes that please our egocentric or selfish impulses—those that enhance us in our own eyes or would enhance us in the eyes of others if carried out. This is the world of fantasy or day-dream, and theoretically of the night-dream as well. It is concerned with the world of make-believe. This type of associative thinking or imagination has been called autistic, dereistic,⁹ or fantastic thinking. If the child is denied all the jam or candy he wishes, he may dream at night of satiating his appetite. If one's parents are cross and difficult, one may, in time, fancy oneself a foster-child and not really a member of the family in which one is living, but actually someone far superior, from a wealthy or aristocratic background, who has had the misfortune to be left in the hands of these alleged parents. This type of imagination runs all the way from dreams of infantile sort to creative art and literature.

In an associative process of this sort emotions, feelings, and concrete imagery play an important rôle. Stransky has called dereistic thinking, the "logic of feeling" in contrast with the logic of intellect. The world of fantasy thinking is so bound up with language and social-cultural conditioning that we shall take occasion in Chapter XVI to indicate the importance of the content of this sort of associative thought in a study of behavior and social reality.

Active imagination, in contrast, is oriented to some definite phase of external reality or some task or goal growing out of scientific or common-

⁹ From *de reor*, away from reality.

sense experience. It is objective, open to verification by others, and thus capable of statistical and experimental check-up. It has been called directive, objective, or realistic associative thinking.¹⁰ It rests essentially on our experience in manipulating objects or persons outside ourselves and bringing them under our control. The objects and their situational complexes may be checked against a certain consistency of motion and force in the world outside ourselves. Here the association lies between cause and effect of motion and action in the external world. We soon learn, for instance, that planting and reaping of crops give us food, that killing an animal provides meat, that thrusting our hand into hot water produces pain. Thereafter we construct a series of techniques or habits in reference to these experiences. Our imagination based on these, and at all times oriented to them, does not go astray into wish fulfilments and fantasies. It remains anchored to actual, concrete, hard experience with the world of men and objects outside ourselves. Objective imagination is the basis of science. As Karl Pearson puts it, "disciplined imagination has been at the bottom of all great scientific discoveries." In his *Grammar of Science* he goes on to say that this disciplined imagination means an appreciation of the whole range of facts which have been uncovered through observation and experimentation. These must be subsumed under some generalized statement, and the hypothesis or law so evolved must be checked up in every conceivable manner, in order to discover if the imagination which lies at the basis of the hypothesis or law has played us false and failed to put the law "into real agreement with the whole group of phenomena which it resumes."

In the case of autistic or dereistic thinking, the associations are fantastical. They grow out of mere contiguity of terms, of events or of persons which have no generic cause-and-effect relationship. This is evidenced in the free association of day-dreaming, in magical associations wherein the name comes to stand for the object, as when the primitive wizard or medicine man casts a spell over a man by the use of his name, or by other associations, as when a clay effigy of a person is used to invoke magical power in order to affect injuriously the person's health or fortune. The associations of similars, opposites, of contiguities of time and space are employed, as in objective thinking, but in dereistic associations the connection is imagined rather than genuine. As we shall see in Chapter XVI,

¹⁰ As I shall attempt to show in Chapter XVI, the term realistic hardly applies to this sort of thinking alone, since what is real or unreal is more or less dependent on the cultural norms.

however, this association may for the personality be as significant as if the association were actual. The contrast of dereistic and objective thinking rests fundamentally, then, upon the social acceptance of the conditioning stimuli and responses, and not upon the mechanisms themselves. It is the manner in which these stimuli are integrated in reference to themselves and to consummatory and socially meaningful behavior which determines the differences between the two sorts of thought. The conditioning in the dereistic field takes place more and more in the realm of imagery and verbal concepts rather than in terms of the objects and situations for which these images and words stand. The full discussion of the place of this type of thinking in social behavior must be left to subsequent treatment.

5. *Conceptual Associations*.—Abstract thinking constitutes the highest form of anticipatory response. Active and passive imagination, with directive and dereistic associations, leads directly over into the world of abstract conceptualization. The basis of the concept or abstract idea lies in the specificity of response, not to the entire object or situation, but only to some section of it. The fundamental conditioning in the formation of the concept is found in the illustration of the carry-over of emotional fear responses in the child from the furry rat to the furry rabbit, the muff or cotton wool, such as were described in the case of Albert in the foregoing chapter. As we noted above, in dogs for instance, the discriminatory response is very acute, while in children it is not. This very flexibility makes possible transfer of response to other stimuli, similar in some particular but otherwise different from the first artificial or learned stimulus. Thus, in the case of Albert, we may say that his fear reactions were to the quality or attribute of furriness and a certain general form, rather than to a specific rat or other specific furry object.

In the course of time children come to make judgments, that is, to determine courses of action not alone in terms of total stimulus situations, but in reference to specific features of them. Thus, gradually differential systems of response are built up to what we call qualities, attributes, or segments of the situations, which, in turn, may be linked up with like qualities or attributes in other situations or objects. The highest forms of thinking, or anticipatory response, make use of universals or concepts which arise out of these differential reactions. Language furnishes us a means of handling these abstractions. The names of objects or persons in time give way to names or symbols for qualities, attributes, and relation-

ships. The names of the latter like the names of objects and persons we learn from our group. Concepts, furthermore, are fundamental to giving meanings to situations, objects, and persons. For the child and illiterate adult most meanings exist at the level of practical usage. A chair is "something to sit on," a knife "is something to cut with," and so on. Conception goes far beyond this and involves us in universals of classifications, categories, and relationships which it is the purpose of formal logic to expose. The whole development of the concept, as the development of associative thinking, is tied up with language, and this, in turn, is related to social conditioning and communication. We shall indicate more fully the place of concepts in behavior when we discuss the rise of language and the place of associative meanings in building up our world of social reality.

Conceptual associations are fundamental to the reasoning process. Reasoning is a form of anticipatory response in which the behavior is foreseen in terms of images, ideas, or concepts before it actually passes over into consummatory or overt conduct. The reasoning of most persons is relatively simple. It depends upon the practical use-concepts such as we noted above: objects and persons do certain things or exist in certain relationships; hence our reasoning about hundreds of daily situations involves habitual judgments which have been built up for us in our social contacts. In matters involving experimentation, invention, and social decisions of more complex sort, the reasoning may involve concepts of more attenuated type. Usually reasoning does not take definite form, the logic books to the contrary. Dewey has analyzed the process into five formal steps, although actually these may not be recognized by the person. At the outset there is a felt difficulty. This means that the habitual, overt systems of response do not satisfy us or that they fail to accomplish our purposes. Secondly, there is an effort to locate and define the difficulty. Ordinarily this definition of the situation is determined for us by our personal-social and cultural conditioning, and we pass at once to overt behavior. But when this fails, we may go on to the third stage of working out, by imagery or ideas, possible solutions to the felt difficulty. In other words, we try to frame a new definition of the situation. In children and adults of little critical training the fourth stage involving development of the bearings of these suggestions, follow fantastic associations, emotional desires, and traditional forms, but in the higher reasoning new combinations of objectives, images, and ideas may take place. The final stage leads to further observa-

tion, perhaps experimentation, or preliminary trials at the behavior implications of the suggestions, leading to their rejection or acceptance, that is, to the belief or disbelief in the solution. Upon the basis of this belief, action takes place.

As Lund has pointed out, belief exists in the whole range from mere opinion, "hunch," or guess to thoroughly verified scientific knowledge. In this way the conclusion of the reasoning process throws us back at once upon attitudes in which feelings and emotions play a part. The belief of the scientist in his verified observations and experiments is so complete that he manufactures poison gas, constructs railroads and bridges, enacts tax legislation, or evolves a theory of biological evolution with a certainty that can not be gainsaid. The difference between objective, directive associations, then, which leads to abstract, verifiable reasoning, and dereistic, fanciful associations is found in the ultimate applicability of these processes to human conduct. The voodoo doctor may cure patients of fever, but the chances are that he loses a great many in death, while the sanitary engineer and the physician drain swamps, inoculate patients with serums, and control the spread of infection. As we shall see, in the world of social behavior there still persists an enormous amount of belief and behavior which rests upon dereistic associations. The world of social reality is shot through and through with it. Any understanding of the conduct of persons toward their fellows must take into account the persistence of this sort of conceptual associative thinking. Prejudices, crowd actions, public sentiments, the contact of leader with masses, and dozens of other relationships are overlaid with personal-social and cultural factors in which dereistic thinking, past and present, plays an enormous rôle.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapters VI, Section B, pp. 139-43; IX, no. 58, pp. 210-17; XII, Section A, pp. 268-83 and Section C, pp. 286-90.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 - 1. Discuss questions and exercises in assignment in *Source Book*, Chapters VI, p. 143, nos. 7-8; IX, p. 217, nos. 5-6; XII, p. 295, nos. 1-7, 9-10.
 - 2. Why is the field of anticipatory internal behavior of significance in the study of social behavior?
 - 3. Illustrate how social-cultural standards determine largely our concept of who is intelligent.

4. Just what does Patrick mean by his statement: "We see things not as they are, but as we are"?
 5. Cite cases of faulty memory and testimony of which you know.
 6. Illustrate (a) objective and (b) dereistic thinking.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapters VI, p. 144, Section B, nos. 1-5, and Section C, nos. 1-3; XII, p. 295, Section C, nos. 3-4.
 2. Report Wells, *Mental Adjustments*, Chapters II, III on dereistic and objective thinking.

CHAPTER VII

SOME ADDITIONAL PHASES OF ANTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR

Earlier social psychology laid stress upon imitation, suggestion, and sympathy in describing social behavior. More recently there has been considerable emphasis upon attitudes and values as basic features. And through the influence of psychiatry the mechanisms of compensation, sublimation, identification, and projection have been used in interpreting social conduct. All these are phases of anticipatory behavior, and in the present chapter we shall attempt to discuss them from that standpoint. We shall, moreover, make an effort to bring some consistency out of the variety of interpretations which follow from the use of these concepts.

A. Imitation.

Aside from instinct no term has been more loosely used in social psychology than imitation. It is employed to cover such actions as yawning when others yawn, running when others run, to account for learning one's native language, to describe conscious following of dress fads of one person by another, or even more remotely, as with Bagehot and Tarde, to explain what is known today in anthropology and sociology as the diffusion of culture. Baldwin, an early American writer in social psychology, employed the word to explain nearly all behavior processes—simple or complex—association, memory, and learning. Our clearest conception of this term is derived from comparative psychology and from objective studies made on human subjects. We need not go afield into the experimental studies on the lower animals, but we may summarize some of the more important findings.

1. *Imitation among Animals.*—Writers on imitation of both man and the animals have used the term in two senses. One group has thought imitation a purely instinctive process by which, in some more or less mysterious manner, animals and human beings learn from one another without

recourse to ordinary trial and error or to rational learning. As in much of the earlier discussion of instincts, one was left in the dark as to just what constitutes the mechanism of imitation, but was assured that it was an instinct. Others have used the term as the "relatively instantaneous re-grouping of old habits," in some sort of brief, but intelligent manner. As Watson remarks, most animal experimentation on so-called imitation reduces itself to some means of enhancing the stimulus which will lead to this re-grouping of old habits largely by the following methods: (1) by the experimenter showing the animal how to do the desired act; (2) by allowing an animal already trained to the act to perform the same in the presence of the untrained animal; (3) by actually "putting the animal 'through the act,'" that is, by directing with one's hands the various muscular coördinations of the animal necessary to acquire the act; (4) and finally, by "encouraging" the animal by rewards, such as sweetmeats. It must be said, furthermore, that much of the earlier work on imitation is unsatisfactory because we know so little of the experimental controls.

With birds, the evidence seems fairly conclusive that imitation plays little rôle in learning. Breed found that newly-hatched chicks got no added impetus or improvement in learning to peck grain from observing older chicks doing so. The behavior observed by Whitman, Craig, Scott, and Conradi on the social influences of other birds on those reared with strange species has sometimes been attributed to imitation. Conradi found that sparrows raised with canaries learned to sing; Whitman found that one species of pigeon reared with a strange species refused to mate with any but the accustomed although alien species. These data point pretty conclusively not to some mysterious instinct, or some spontaneous recasting of old habits, but to the mechanism of the conditioned response.

The results of experimentation on lower mammalian forms are very contradictory and for the most part unsatisfactory. Cole thought that he found some instances of imitation in raccoons, but Shepard found no such evidence in similar studies of the learning of raccoons. Perseverance and trial-and-error methods seemed more effective. Yerkes "failed to get imitation in the dancing mouse." His findings agree with like studies on other varieties of mice.

Thorndike and Watson, working with monkeys, which are held to be peculiarly imitative, got no positive results either by methods of doing the act in the presence of the animal, by putting the animal through the acts,

or by having them watch other trained monkeys set the pattern for them. Watson remarks:

The monkeys very quickly form by their own unaided efforts such habits of manipulation, but so far as our observations went they were entirely uninfluenced by tuition.¹

The experimental controls of some of the earlier studies on monkeys have been most unsatisfactory. Animals of uncertain age and previous experience have been used. Furthermore, among the animals themselves the activity of one monkey in securing food may direct the other animals to some food object and thus set up a response of grasping food in the second. But, one asks, is this imitation in the ordinary sense in which the term is used?

We may summarize the matter of so-called imitation in the animals by the following comments (1) There is no evidence for the existence of a special instinct or concatenated reflex pattern which operates to shorten the period of learning when the untrained animal watches a trained one perform the desired feat. As one writer puts it, there is no indication of a general instinct of imitation "leading an animal to copy any action whatsoever." (2) In observing alleged imitation we must look upon the pacesetter as directing the attention of the other animal to the stimulus. This is especially so where sex or age differences are involved between the trained animal and the untrained animal. (3) The fact of similar neuro-muscular-glandular mechanisms must be reckoned with in discussing the foreshortening of learning. (4) Likewise, when the experimenter does the "stunt" in front of the animal, he may be orienting the animal to the significant parts of the mechanism to be manipulated. That is to say, the direction of attention may somewhat direct the random movements of the animal toward the solution of the final problem, such as securing food or escaping from the prison box. (5) Again, as Cole implies, actually putting the animal through the paces with one's hands, with the accompanying kinesthetic cues to the animal, may be of value in learning. It gives a set or orientation to the subsequent acts, but it can hardly be called imitation. (6) One must be certain that the matter is not one of conditioned response in which the act of one animal serves as the novel stimulus to the

¹ J. B. Watson, *Behavior, An Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, 1914, p. 284. Courtesy of Henry Holt and Company.

other. For example, a band of horses may start to run when one of their members runs, but at the outset the situation may be as follows: Suppose some horses are grazing quietly in a pasture or on a range. A loud sound or a rapidly moving object, such as a piece of paper or rolling weeds, may stimulate them to a fear reaction followed by running. All of the horses then run away together, but the running of their mates serves as the artificial or new stimulus along with the original one. Hence later, when the stimulus of another running horse appears, the second horse is conditioned to run also. This explanation is far simpler and more in harmony with known facts than to posit some mystic instinct that informs the animal to run when another of his species does so. In contrast, older and trained animals may serve, by conditioning, to assist in inhibiting the fear of the untrained or younger animal, so that otherwise emotionally determined reactions may be directed to some feat demanded by the situation. This is illustrated in the training of fire-horses and hunting-dogs.

In brief, the evidence from comparative psychology on imitation in the old sense, is extremely scanty. We must at all times take into account the factors of conditioning, the possible direction of attention, and the general kinesthetic orientation of the animal to the wanted act by the manipulation of the experimenter himself.

2. *Imitation in Man*.—In the case of human beings the evidence for an instinct of imitation is as unsatisfactory as it is in that of the lower animals. Sociological writers with a psychological bent have used the term in a broad and loose manner. Thus Ellwood employs imitation "as a name to cover the social method of developing the instincts," or as "the tendency to conform, to be like one's fellows," and for him there is even a "rational imitation," which consists in the "copying of the action of another, not merely for the sake of social conformity, nor yet because it satisfies some primitive impulse, but because it is in accord with some rational purpose to do so." McDougall, following his penchant for logical arrangement, lists suggestion, sympathy, and imitation as general innate tendencies. These three, in a sense, furnish the *modus operandi* for the elaboration of the basic instincts and emotions. Suggestion comes under the head of the intellectual or perceptual phase of this development, sympathy under the emotional or affective, while imitation represents the motor or action side of the process. His scheme is seductive because of its simplicity. He gives five types of behavior which are characterized by imitation: (1) "Sympa-

thetic induction" of actions, such as laughing when others laugh; (2) ideomotor action; (3) following the pattern of behavior laid down by another; (4) action which is similar to another's due to one's directing another's attention to the act, which act is later more or less reproduced by the second person; and (5) the very unreliable type of "imitation" in young infants, as reported by Preyer, wherein the protrusion of the lips of the parent led to a like action by the child. Other experimenters have not been able to verify Preyer's statement for similar ages. McDougall also is suspicious of the evidence for this sort of imitation.

Others have used the term in almost as broad and divergent a manner as these two writers. Even so careful a writer as Thorndike, who criticizes the loose use of the term, continues to state that imitation appears in the following instances:

Smiling when smiled at, laughing when others laugh, yelling when others yell, looking at what others observe, listening when others listen, running with or after people who are running in the same direction, running from the focus whence others scatter, jabbering when others jabber and becoming silent as they become silent, crouching when others crouch, chasing, attacking and rending what others hunt, and seizing whatever object another seizes.²

When we come to examine the alleged cases of imitation we find that most of them can be reduced to instances of conditioned response, where the activity of like forms becomes the secondary stimulus toward which one is conditioned. Smiling when others smile, running, talking, etc., come very largely under the same sort of procedure as that discussed above in regard to running away from danger among animals. In these types of behavior, which Thorndike notes as common, the individuals seem to respond so automatically that it is easy to assume some instinct as the basis for the behavior. Yet, if the history of the learning of the person were uncovered, one could find the early instances of the conditioning. Couple this with the learning which arises from paying attention to what others attend to or approve or reject, and most of this sort of so-called imitative behavior is explained.

Mead has used the term imitation in the sense of conscious following of the action of another where there is imagery of the other person acting as

² E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, 1923, vol. I, pp. 120-21. Courtesy of Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University.

a stimulus. This may be kinesthetic, visual, or vocal-motor. "Imitation comes in when we get the same attitude as the other person" whom we are following. For him imitation is not a blind mimicry or duplication of the act of one person by another, but is always related to the situation:

When another self is present in consciousness doing something, then such a self may be imitated by the self that is conscious of him in his conduct, but by what possible mechanism, short of a miracle, the conduct of one form should act as a stimulus to another to do, not what the situation calls for, but something like that which the first form is doing, is beyond ordinary comprehension. Imitation becomes comprehensible when there is consciousness of other selves and not before.³

To limit the meaning of the term, as Mead has done, is to take imitation out of the field of innate mechanism and to tie it up with the capacity of the organism to control its behavior, through imagery, in reference to that of another person. The existence of this form of anticipatory reaction, which we call imagery, simply means that from previous experience with other persons the secondary stimulus is now within the organism itself. Hence, one may "imitate" an ideal figure, or some character in history, or a parent or teacher, as readily as one does another person in the flesh. Imitation, then, is simply a phase of the whole conditioning and integrating function found in learning, in which the secondary stimulus and the reaction are similar if not identical. As Humphrey remarks, "this secondary stimulus may originate either in the same or in another organism, so that imitation may technically be either of self or others."

Imitation, therefore, whether it be a simpler sort described by Thorndike or of the sort involving acquisition of culture patterns, may be explained as a special phase of the integration of conditioned responses into habits and attitudes. It is not some special device of nature added to other mechanisms, but is merely a part of the whole capacity for alteration of responses through the association areas of the cerebral cortex. When one recalls the fact of more or less identical mechanisms of learning in all human beings and the more or less common patterns of personal-social and cultural environment to which the individual is exposed, it is not difficult to understand why human behavior, in many dimensions of life, is similar in form and content.

³ G. H. Mead, "Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1909, vol. VI, p. 405.

B. *Suggestion.*

Suggestion is often looked upon as the subjective aspect of imitation. Upon examination it also resolves itself into a phase of anticipatory reaction involving both the stimuli and the images, ideas and attitudes which more or less unconsciously affect conduct. The types of incipient or overt responses that any given set of stimuli will arouse depend upon social conditioning. Once the image and accompanying attitude are set off, conduct tends to flow in that direction. This is the foundation of Scott's statement that "every idea of an action (or function) will result in that action unless hindered by a competing idea or physical impediment." That is to say, anticipatory reactions become overt unless some other anticipatory responses inhibit them. We have here nothing else than the sphere of conditioning and inhibition transferred into the organism. Since we are moved by emotions and feelings far more effectively than by rational ideas, the most far-reaching effects are produced by appealing to those emotionalized images and attitudes to which we have become conditioned.

Suggestion, then, involves both the external and the internal factors which determine behavior. Titchener defines suggestion as "any stimulus, external or internal, accompanied or unaccompanied by consciousness, which touches off a determining tendency." Other writers define suggestion without reference to the stimulus as a state of internal or mental expectancy or emotional setting. It would seem that, rather than accept either of these views to the exclusion of the other, we may look upon suggestion as a form of stimulation and response relationship between persons in which both stimulus and internal conditioning play a part. Suggestion, therefore, is not some special mechanism, any more than is imitation. It is, rather, a term used to describe a certain form of social stimulation wherein the vocal or other stimuli of a person or persons set off images, ideas, attitudes or acts on the part of another person or other persons because other images, ideas, and attitudes do not inhibit them. Suggestion is but slightly, if at all, influenced by thought or deliberation. This is what McDougall means when he says:

Suggestion is a process of communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance.⁴

⁴ W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 14th ed., 1921, p. 100. Courtesy of John W. Luce and Company.

Suggestion plays a significant part in social behavior, for much of our attitude and action is stimulated by others and followed out without recourse to reasoned and deliberate consideration of the situation and the action in reference to it. To mention the conditions of suggestion is to repeat in more special form what we have already discussed briefly under the topics of internal and external conditions as they determine behavior. There are, however, some particular features of suggestion which we may note in passing. Illustrations of these features will appear especially in our treatment of prejudice, fashions, crowd behavior, and public opinion.

1. *External Conditions Making for Suggestibility.*—Without attempting to be exhaustive, we may say that stimuli which are rhythmic and monotonous tend to set up responses in terms of the desires of the person making the suggestion. The hypnotist resorts to rhythm and more or less monotonous repetition of verbal expression and tone of voice to induce hypnotic sleep. The public speaker may employ somewhat similar methods with an audience in the repeated use of certain phrases spoken in pleasing vocal tones. Connected with these are volume, duration, and repetition of the stimuli. Again, prestige-bearing persons, leaders in various groups, by their very presence may set up conditions of suggestibility, as may books or printed pronouncements of leaders or authorities. Children are especially suggestible in the presence of older persons—parents, teachers, and older children—when these persons stand in the position of dominance, physical or social, or both.

2. *Internal Conditions of Suggestibility.*—All of the internal conditions noted in Chapter VI play a part in suggestibility, but of particular importance are fatigue, the effect of intoxicants or fasting, and the whole range of internal conditioning arising from attitudes of submission to authority, to principles of moral or social conduct, to various prejudices and preconceptions about group superiority, or class conscious differences, as in fashion or social philosophy. Especially pertinent to suggestion is the place of emotional disturbances as they develop dissociation from the inhibiting tendencies and give rise to the play of autistic associations in image and behavior. Since the emotions arise most easily in crises, any dislocation of the balance of social activity, such as a flood, a crime, a war, a religious or political campaign or a financial panic, produces an excellent setting for the operation of suggestion.

It should not be imagined that only children or ignorant or feeble-minded

persons are suggestible. Given the crisis in matters believed serious or of great value to life, any person is reduced to a condition of easy suggestibility. Only in this way can we explain why during race-riots, wars, and political and religious controversies men of otherwise seeming wisdom give way to violent behavior of primitive and anti-social sort. While there are distinct individual differences in the degree of suggestibility, there are but few men sufficiently well-balanced, emotionally and intellectually to be able to resist impulses to action which in calmer moments they would imagine insane or, at least, unbecoming to themselves.

It is evident, then, that suggestion is really a phase of inter-individual stimulus and response in which the play of external and internal determinants of conduct operates more or less independently of inhibiting attitudes and ideas. Suggestibility may be described as a phase of the anticipatory reaction system developed around certain images, ideas, and attitudes regarding the values of our group, or around particular internal patterns related to our more strictly non-cultural social contacts. Suggestion operates to arouse us in regard to the mores and to non-moral behavior as we see in fashion and other non-institutionalized types of collective activity.

C. Sublimation and Substitution as Conditioned Responses.

A number of terms have been introduced into social psychology from modern functional psychiatry, especially from the various schools of psychoanalysis. Among these are sublimation, substitution, compensation, identification, and projection. All of these are closely bound up with the field of anticipatory reactions as the latter affect social intercourse. If these concepts, however, can be brought under the common denominator of conditioning and integration, it will greatly facilitate recognition of the essentially close relation of social psychology to psychiatry.⁵

⁵ This is not the place to point out the significance of the interrelationship which exists among psychiatry, abnormal psychology, and social psychology, and between these and the interpretation of the social processes. One can not refrain, however, from indicating that these three fields, somewhat independently of each other, have attacked the problem of the personality. At the outset the first two failed to recognize or, at least, tended to ignore the place of social environment, especially as we have discussed it in this volume under the head of cultural and non-cultural or personal-social milieu. On the other hand, earlier social psychology was either under the domination of a loose psychology of imitation, suggestion and instinct, or else under the ægis of sociological theorizing. Today, following a generation of work in these three fields, they find themselves reaching a *rapprochement*, inhibited only by the continued use of separate concepts for the same phenomena and by the natural inertia of men to relinquish attitudes developed in the course of professional research. Within the next

Sublimation refers to the replacement of an original response pattern by an acquired one. The original response is thought to be more primitive, more animal, while the new response is more ethical or socialized. What we have in so-called sublimation, then, is a clear case of conditioned response in which, first of all, the stimulus is modified, and which in many cases means modification of the response as well. Moreover, in sublimation the factor of social or ethical approval is profoundly important, although the content of this approval may distinctly differ in various groups. In the case of anger or rage, the new stimulus may not be some form of bodily restraint, but restraint of the expression of ideas held radical by others. Then, too, the expression of the rage may itself be toned down to verbal renunciation rather than express itself by striking out and throwing the bodily force against the individuals, be they policemen or others, who deny one the right to speak freely. In the case of sexual behavior, the responses in women may be modified from the direct expression of sexual activities and the attendant maternal functions to a concern with child welfare. Much of the literature illustrating sublimation carries with it this socialized aspect of the conditioning process. There is no objection to such use of the term, but it must be borne in mind that the mechanism is at root a biological one of conditioning. The ethical or socialized aspect is one of interpretation. Some tribes of people might not consider the social welfare work of a spinster to be anything particularly praiseworthy as over against bearing children in or out of wedlock. In fact, in peasant societies in our own time the unmarried woman is looked upon with some disdain. It is only in complex modern society that unmarried women receive social approval for activities which rest biologically on sexual drives, but which in practice take a substitute form. In short, the mechanism is one of substitution, and the form it takes is determined in large part by the cultural standards of the group in question. Profanity as a substitute response for the full expression of rage is not different in its biological aspects from the production of a poem of hate during a war. Neither is the writing of a love sonnet or a romantic drama very different in reference to thwarted love life than is the development of a dislike for women or the production of

few years we shall see more and more synthesis of standpoint and procedure in research in these fields: the clinical psychologist and psychiatrist will recognize the need of the social-psychological interpretation of culture and personal-social factors, and the social psychologist, in turn, will draw more and more upon the data of the former two in dealing with individual mechanisms.

ribald or lascivious stories about sex life. The range of substitutions for sexual activities is very wide. The quality of these substitutions is determined by the social group. The particular form of the substitution, in the main outlines, remains the same. Once more we see how important a recognition of the cultural norms is in the interpretation of the social behavior of individuals; moreover, how important social approval is in terms of culture standards for the individual who so conditions his behavior. The biological mechanisms do not differ greatly, but what the activities mean for other persons and for oneself, in reference to them, is determined by the content of these substitutions. The man who releases his sexual suppressions in the form of lascivious stories or ribald verse may be avoided by others, just as the man who indulges in sexual perversions is punished by his group. On the other hand, the woman who has been deprived by circumstances of normal motherhood may win great respect for her work as a nurse, as the head of an orphanage, as a social worker, or as a juvenile judge dealing with children's cases. For this reason, the mere analysis of the mechanism, the *how*, of behavior can never give us the complete picture which we wish in the field of social behavior. It may be sufficient for experimental, laboratory, individual psychology, but it is hardly sufficient for a social psychology which is concerned with the interaction of individuals.

Sublimations are perhaps most prominent in the field of rage and sex because these are the two fundamental drives which are most held in check in the present cultural order. In our society we have provided channels through which these tendencies may be sublimated. To put it differently, we lay down the framework of habits which will drain off these physiological impulses into activities given social approval by others. In addition, substitutions exist for fear, for the more primitive egoistic acquisitiveness of the person, for more primitive concepts and fantasies about the supernatural, and in other dimensions of behavior. One of the most distinctive examples of this is seen in the Christian moral codes which put so much pressure upon sex and freedom of expression, but which, in turn, through the link-up with the nationalistic political order and with the capitalistic economic system, permit the tremendous energy thus accumulated to be siphoned off into activities which increase material comforts in the world.

While in broad outlines sublimation is akin to other forms of substitu-

tion of stimulus and of response, the very fact of social approval adds a factor in the first case which it does not in the second. This additional factor makes sublimation more satisfactory to the person concerned with it than balder unsocialized substitution possibly could. We may define sublimation, then, as a type of substitute stimulus-response pattern in which social approval adds the quality of ethical valuation not found in other forms of substitution.

D. Compensation and Sense of Inferiority.

Dr. Alfred Adler of Vienna has become so well known that his concept of compensation for felt inferiority is commonly used to explain all sorts of human behavior, sometimes rightly, very often incorrectly, and most often incompletely. Such terms get the bad repute of all particularistic explanations; that is to say, some one mechanism, simple and easy to state, becomes the basis for explaining or interpreting the complex behavior of personality.

The concept of compensation has been used in at least two divergent senses. The most common one describes an individual who, lacking strength in some particular feature of his make-up, attempts to develop some other trait or characteristic to offset this. For instance, the boy who is too fat to run and jump with other boys on the playground, who is hailed as "Tubby" or "Fatty" or "Butch," gets his social approval, his prestige, his sense of security, by outdoing his tormentors and would-be playmates in arithmetic, geography, spelling, or declamation inside the schoolroom. Or at the level of physical activity, the boy with crippled legs may develop into a skillful person where his hands come into play; that is, he may make beautiful toys, do artistic wood-carving, or learn to play the piano well. The man who is unsuccessful in love-making may boast of his conquest of women, or he may turn his attention to some other form of prestige-producing activity.

The second use of the term presupposes the existence of a weakness which leads to a determination to overcome the same by developing, not a substitute tendency, but the very tendency itself. The most often cited illustration of this is the case of Demosthenes, who being a stammerer and wishing to take up the law and public speaking, practiced long and diligently to improve his speech until he became the greatest orator of his day. It seems to the writer that this is not compensation in the proper

sense of the word. The overcoming of handicaps by direct attack upon them is common enough, but this should be designated by some term other than compensation. We shall consider compensation only as a form of substitute response as described in the first instance; that is only the sort of activity in which a boy or girl, man or woman, finds some substitute response system for one in which he is not successful socially, is a proper case of the compensatory conditioning. The stimulus may be desire for social prestige in forms laid down by the group, but physical, emotional, or intellectual handicaps bar the way. Because the substitute response, the activity in another field, gives prestige, we take it up instead.

The sense of inferiority, which is so common with most of us in one way or another, has led Alfred Adler, G. Stanley Hall, and others to say that compensation for inferiority is a universal fact. While the concept should not be overworked, there is no doubt that the conditioned response mechanism operates in hundreds of social situations where we do feel inadequate. Whistling to keep up one's courage is as true of the politician facing a difficult campaign as it is literally true of the small boy passing a graveyard at night. The fanaticism of the religious bigot is often a compensation for lack of the very qualities which he finds in others. This is frequently seen in crowd behavior. It is a factor in our persecution of the underdog whom we fear. It plays an important part in the development of those forms of defense mechanisms which we call prejudices.

On the other hand, inferiority may give rise to a direct attack upon the weakness involved rather than lead to compensation. It may be an incitement to fine performance. As a stimulator of ambition it is not to be ignored, although the writer is under the impression that we have sometimes had too much of the theory that the lack of a trait or talent is all the more reason for striving for it. Many students strive for the impossible in education, in training for art or the professions, because of the attitudes of their parents and others who stimulate them to attempt activities for which they are actually organically weak. All of us have seen very disappointed men and women who were the victims of the faulty advice that one can do anything one wants to do. The answer to that problem is an intelligent selection of what one wishes, not a blind battle against the impossible. There are some genuine sins of this sort to be laid at the doors of the out-and-out environmentalists in psychology, education, and sociology.

In the end, whether one takes the indirect route of compensation or the direct and frontal attack upon the weakness, success or failure rests largely upon the social responses of approval for one's actions which come from one's family, neighbors, fellow club members, profession, or community. In the one case the mechanism of acquirement is a conditioned response; in the other it is a matter of practice in the habit of tendency already under way.

E. Sympathy, Identification, and Projection.

1. *Sympathy and Social Stimulation.*—Sympathetic responses to others rest distinctly upon conditioning. Sympathy is not some instinct or mysterious innate capacity or one distinct emotion, but depends upon social intercourse. While it involves early training and experience, sympathy probably does not come to full expression until the development of social imagery, that is, until the covert, anticipatory types of response arise in which other persons' experiences can be associated with one's own. In other words, sympathy rests upon imagination, and it is not full-grown until imagination reaches out to other persons. Human communication, particularly that of speech, is essential to mature sympathy.

Sympathy rests first of all on the common experiences of the persons concerned. All of us are more or less exposed, in a given cultural and social set up, to many common situations. As Cooley remarks in his *Human Nature and the Social Order*, "a man's sympathies as a whole reflect the social order in which he lives, or rather they are a particular phase of it." We have all suffered hunger, thirst, rage, fear, disappointment, success, love or hate in the course of our conditioning to the world around us. We suffer at the death of loved ones. We are pleased at the success of our friends and family. But sympathy is dependent, also, upon maturity of imagination which makes possible the arousing of images, ideas, emotions, and feelings similar to, but by no means identical with, those of others. That is to say, it is not only the emotional experience of the other person which makes for sympathy, but the fact that we understand or comprehend through imagination the situations which arouse in him these images, ideas, emotions, and feelings. To put it otherwise, sympathetic responses involve the perception of some symbol or expression of others which we associate with somewhat similar experiences of our own. We do not duplicate the other person's emotions, images, or ideas; at best we only

approximate them. Certainly to witness the expression of emotions in animals or men is not necessarily to induce similar emotions in us, as McDougall's thesis of the sympathetic induction of emotions would lead one to believe. To see an adult or child cry in the street does not cause one to cry, but it may lead to covert associations and even actions which depend upon a host of past experiences of one's own. And yet, to be sympathetic one need not have gone through every experience of everyone else. The very nature of imaginary responses makes it possible for one to recombine one's own experiences in anticipation, so that one may imagine how one feels at the death of a loved one or at the loss of prestige or property without having had exactly the same experience. As Cooley puts it:

It is not to be inferred that we must go through the same visible and tangible experiences as other people before we can sympathize with them. On the contrary, there is only an indirect and uncertain connection between one's sympathies and the obvious events—such as the death of friends, success or failure in business, travels, and the like—that one has gone through. Social experience is a matter of imaginative, not of material, contacts; and there are so many aids to the imagination that little can be judged as to one's experience by the merely external course of his life. An imaginative student of a few people and of books often has many times the range of comprehension that the most varied career can give to a duller mind; and a man of genius, like Shakespeare, may cover almost the whole range of human sentiment in his time, not by miracle, but by a marvelous vigor and refinement of imagination.⁶

2. *Sympathy and the Conditioned Response.*—The origin of sympathetic responses rests upon conditioning and integration arising out of social interaction. If a child cries, his own crying serves as a secondary stimulus to himself and becomes thus a further stimulus to his own crying. Furthermore, the crying of another baby may serve as a substitute stimulus and set off his own crying. That is to say, the movements of another may serve as secondary stimuli to one's own movement, as we noted in discussing the conditioning in so-called imitation. The expression of fear in another's face and voice may set off our own fear responses, built upon an earlier experience of being frightened by some biological stimulus, but having with the particular stimulus at the moment no connection other than this secondary stimulus. We might meet a man or a group of men

⁶ C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, 1902, pp. 105–06. Courtesy of Chas. Scribner's Sons.

running down a street showing great anxiety in their faces and the perception of these gestures would be sufficient to frighten us, without our knowing anything whatsoever about the situation that set off their fear. Again, suppose I stick a pin into my flesh. There is a sensation of pain, the sight of blood, and an unpleasant feeling. Suppose, instead, I see someone else being pricked with a pin. I do not ordinarily experience the pain,⁷ but I do experience the feeling of unpleasantness associated with it. As one grows older and the imagination extends to images and ideas, as well as to emotions and feelings, the perception of emotion and feeling in others may give rise to associated but scarcely identical images and ideas in oneself. We can only infer, of course, that our emotions and attendant images and ideas are akin to those of others. Speaking of sympathetic emotional responses produced by news from a friend of the loss of his wife, Allport remarks that one's reaction is more adequately "described as sympathy with my own past experience than as sympathy with his." Yet since we are exposed to such a multitude of common social situations, we may, without doing injustice to the facts, speak of sympathizing with a friend's feelings.

From our contacts with various social groups—family, play group, school, church, community, and so on—our entire habit system is built up. Thus, when someone breaks the social code to which I am habituated, that is, breaks my own fixed response system in reference to some situation, I experience displeasure almost as if I had broken the code myself. If someone portrays for me the suffering of Armenian children, I imagine how it would be if my own children were in want. This vicarious experiencing of the action of others, especially on the side of emotions and feelings, is precisely what is meant by sympathy. Hence, through imagery of another, we grow like him in many fundamental traits. When this person suffers injury, sorrow, or joy, we participate with him in the experience, even though he be quite removed from us in time and space. It is possible, in this vicarious manner, to sympathize with people in other regions of the world, or to re-live the sorrows and joys of characters portrayed in literature or other art. Sympathy is really the root of sociability. Mere gregariousness may mean a certain sense of security and coöperation for survival with members of one's own species, but sociability goes beyond this to

⁷ Cases are on record, from introspection and from clinical cases, which report that some people seem actually to experience the pain sensation also, but this reflects perhaps a somewhat hysterical- or hyper-emotionality.

cover the field of identification with others or vicarious experience through common social imagery.

3. *Sympathy and Identification*.—Identification, brought into social psychology from psychoanalysis, is distinctly a phase of the sympathetic reaction. Jung defines identification as:

An estrangement of the subject from himself in favor of an object in which the subject is, to a certain extent, disguised. For example, identification with the father practically signifies an adoption of the ways and manners of the father, as though the son were the same as the father and not a separate individual. . . . Identification may be related to things such as spiritual movements or business as well as persons and to psychological functions.⁸

Hinkle thus characterizes this process:

By this [identification] I mean an unconscious *assumption* of the attitudes and feelings, the burdens or sorrows of others, and thus through identifying themselves with them they take on the life experience that properly belongs to another and live this experience instead of, or as well as, their own.⁹

To identify oneself with another is to play the rôle of this other. And to do so implies, for its development the enlargement of imagination. At the outset, the confusion of one's own body and one's own reactions with those of another is apparently common, but in time there results a separation of one's own self from other selves. In this way the sense of selfhood is established. What one's own self turns out to be depends upon one's conditioning in the family and other groups. And the building-up of this self rests upon identification, or upon introjection, a term frequently applied to the process of identifying oneself with another. Introjection begins as soon as the child is brought into contact with various groups of persons who intrigue his attention. Participation in the group, in fact, rests upon the conditioning of persons in this way toward others. The putting of oneself into another's place, which is so common in sympathy, has simply here a somewhat wider connotation. As Eliot states:

Introjection is what happens when spectators push their neighbors toward the opponents' goal; when negroes swell when Jack Johnson wins; when Ghandi fasted for his people's offenses, and "all India crawled on its belly when

⁸ From *Psychological Types* by C. G. Jung, p. 551. By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

⁹ Beatrice Hinkle, "A Study of Psychological Types," *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1922, vol. IX, p. 132.

one Hindu crawled at Amritsar"; when the mystic is in communion with his god, or the subject *en rapport* with his hypnotist; when the humble Mr. Preemby takes on the rôle of Sargon King of Kings; when the adolescent, before or after his father's death, wishes to behave in his rôle; when a savage fears to divulge his true name or have his picture taken, because it is too closely a part of his self to give it to a stranger; when the reader feels himself the hero of the romance or drama.¹⁰

Identification, then, is a phase of the general field of sympathy. The ability to place oneself in another's position depends upon common conditioning. The earliest conditioning is toward the mother or nurse and then, later, to other persons—father, brothers, sisters, relatives, friends, and various groups. The mother image, which the Freudian analysts discuss, really arises in this process of identification of oneself with the mother in the acts of feeding, bathing, being carried about, and attended to. And how a person responds to himself and to others is definitely determined, in part at least, by these early social contacts with the parent. Later his identification reaches into all of his group experience. The person feels and speaks for his group: "He behaves as if the group's unity were his own." Some persons so easily identify themselves with various groups that we dub them "joiners." These persons, as Eliot remarks, easily think in terms of "we." They are versatile, play many rôles, and become rather easily adjusted to other people, at least in the outward form of participation.

4. *Projection*.—Closely associated with identification is the opposite process of projection. This consists of transferring subjective or anticipatory attitudes, images, and emotions to other persons. Eliot describes projection as follows:

The attributing of experiences to the not-self or to other selves. A frequent usage of "projection" is to describe the process by which attitudes and traits imagined within the self are projected upon the screen of another self.¹¹

Projection is thus an externalization of inner anticipatory processes. The psychological process itself, however, is imagined to be located outside of us. Ordinarily projection is perfectly normal. It lies at the basis, perhaps, of the very distinction between an internal and an external mental world. The cause of the projection, in its more morbid forms, is unknown; it lies,

¹⁰ T. D. Eliot, "The Use of Psychoanalytic Classification in the Analysis of Social Behavior: Identification," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1927, vol. XXII, p. 76.

¹¹ T. D. Eliot, "The Use of Psychoanalytic Classification in the Analysis of Social Behavior: Identification," *Publications of American Sociological Society*, 1927, vol. XXI, p. 188.

so the psychoanalysts tell us, in the unconscious. To project a cause or situation outward is merely another phase of the effort of the organism to control its overt adjustment through the anticipatory responses. Some repressed or unwanted idea or attitude is thrust outward into some situation or upon another person, real or imaginary, who is thought to be the cause of the idea or attitude. Bernard Hart remarks that "people who possess some fault or deficiency of which they are ashamed are notoriously intolerant of that same fault or deficiency in others." The incident in *Hamlet* where the player-queen shows excessive aversion to the possibility of a second marriage, although a secret wish for such a marriage is already present in her mind, is a nice illustration; and the real queen, who harbors similar thoughts, is in a sense caught up by her identification with the projection of the player-queen before her.

Projection comes into operation in prejudice wherein the members of the in-group attribute to the out-group characteristics which they themselves hate, or emotions which they themselves feel but are ashamed of because of social taboos. It occurs in the development of delusions of persecution so frequently seen in prejudice and mob behavior. Likewise it is seen in delusions of grandeur in regard to the superiority of oneself or one's group. It is familiar to every student of family relationships in the projection of thwarted ambitions of parents upon their children. This attribution of traits, attitudes, ideas, and wishes upon others is so universal that it assumes a particularly important place in much of our social behavior.

Identification and projection represent somewhat ambivalent processes in building up social contacts. Both are phases of anticipatory response in which imagination aids in the adjustment of the person to other persons. In identification this consists in a type of sympathetic replacement of the qualities of the other in oneself; in projection it consists in imaginarily thrusting outward upon others qualities which we ourselves possess. The excessive pathological manifestations of the identification process are seen in the hysteric, with his excessive sympathy and his painful feelings which he picks up from the world around him. The pathological features of projection, on the other hand, are seen in the paranoiac who attributes to others the vicious, unsocialized ideas and attitudes which originate in his own behavior. The one leads to extreme sentimentality and romanticism, the other to cruelty and persecution. The one is connected with high emotional over-evaluation of the inner world, the other with an attempt to

avoid over-emotional evaluation of the inner world by thrusting it away into the environment.

F. Purposes, Values and Attitudes as Anticipatory Behavior.

1. *Nature of Purpose.*—Out of combinations of imagery and external stimulation grow ideals, purposes, or aims which profoundly influence attention and action. In the determination of behavior what the German psychologists called “die Aufgabe,” or what Burnham terms the “task,” is highly important. Aims, tasks, or purposes consist largely of verbal concepts, visual images, and accompanying attitudes. While the introspective psychologist has concerned himself particularly with more immediate, conscious attitudes as they affect his experimental results, the social psychologist is interested in the more permanent goals, aims, or purposes that are built up in the person. These aims are rather completely set up for us by personal-social and cultural conditioning: by our parents and family, by our playmates and gang affiliations, by our teachers, preachers, business associates, and professional or vocational associates. The purposes of an individual are not the result of some divine power or the supernatural product of a soul or an instinct, but are distinctly the outgrowth of one’s environment which determines one’s life organization in this or that particular direction. Purposes are closely linked with attitudes and values, and these, in turn, are often covered over for us by rationalizations. Let us examine more closely the function of these three factors in the make-up of the more permanent phases of our behavior.

2. *Attitudes.*—The word attitude has been variously used in social psychology. Thomas and Thurstone seemingly use it to include all the internal determinants. Thus Thurstone once defined attitude as:

The sum total of a man’s inclinations and feelings, prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and convictions about any specified topic. Thus a man’s attitude about pacifism means here all that he feels and thinks about peace and war. It is admittedly a subjective and personal affair.¹²

This is much the sense in which Titchener used the phrase “determining tendencies” which are concerned with the orientation of the person to any

¹² L. L. Thurstone, “Attitudes Can Be Measured” *American Journal of Sociology*, 1928, vol. XXXIII, p. 531. Professor Thurstone now holds (1929) that attitudes may be best defined in terms of measurable aversive or appetitive reactions.

particular problem or situation. Some writers have used it synonymously with the phrase "mental set" and in this usage it somewhat overlaps the term "Aufgabe." Warren, who represents a somewhat more traditional psychology, describes how attitudes arise:

When a certain type of experience is constantly repeated, a change of set is brought about which affects many central neurons and tends to spread over other parts of the central nervous system. These changes in the general set of the central nervous system temper the process of reception; they lead to the formation of certain general modes of receiving and integrating stimuli. In terms of the subjective mental life these general sets are called *attitudes*. A man's attitude toward any situation which confronts him is quite as important a factor in his mental life as the nature of the specific stimuli which enter into that situation. . . .

Attitudes alter from time to time with the growth of experience; but changes of attitude proceed far more slowly than changes of specific mental states.¹³

Attitudes in the narrow and more specific sense are essentially motor sets of the organism toward some specific or general stimulus. They rest upon innate stimulus-response patterns as these have been modified, elaborated, and integrated together through learning in the social world. But these elaborations and integrations become reduced again to sets or tendencies to action. In fact, the attitude partakes of the nature of an incipient reaction. It is fundamentally a form of anticipatory behavior. Attitudes, in a sense, telescope behavior into shorthand forms. For this reason it is highly important to recognize their place in the total complex of social activity. Associated with attitudes are images and ideas, but attitudes are not to be confused with the latter two. Likes, dislikes, avoidances, approaches, withdrawals, appreciations, hatreds, and loves are fundamentally the core of attitudes, as these are directed to various situations. The attitude marks the inception of behavior toward situations. It gives direction to it. For the prediction of his behavior therefore, it is more important to know the attitude of a person than to know his mental images or verbal opinions. Attitudes are really forms of habit and bespeak one's actual trends in conduct better than do the verbalized rationalizations which we call opinions. Attitudes thus offer a clue to the unraveling of human motives. The building-up of attitudes, however, is so largely unconscious that often we

¹³ H. C. Warren, *Human Psychology*, 1919, pp. 360, 361. Used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

are not aware of how they arose. Frequently the marginal impressions of an experience determine our response, because these marginal stimulations seem to touch off the deep-lying attitudes. Emerson's remark that "What you are sounds so loudly in my ears that I can not hear what you say," expresses precisely the influence of attitudes rather than mere verbalisms in our judgment of those about us.

3. *Attitudes and Values*.—Attitudes do not exist without reference to value meanings. And meanings are related to situations of all sorts around which we have constructed our habits and built up our series of images. Value represents, as Znaniecki puts it, the counterpart to attitude. Attitudes are not developed *in vacuo* but always in reference to something in the environment. These relations of organism to situation constitute the world of meaning. Thomas and Znaniecki put it thus:

By a social value we understand any datum having an empirical content accessible to the members of some social group and a meaning with regard to which it is or may be an object of activity. Thus, a food stuff, an instrument, a coin, a piece of poetry, a university, a myth, a scientific theory, are social values. Each of them has a content that is sensual in the case of the foodstuff, the instrument, the coin; partly sensual, partly imaginary in the piece of poetry, whose content is constituted, not only by the written or spoken words, but also by the images which they evoke, and in the case of the university, whose content is the whole complex of men, buildings, material accessories, and images representing its activity; or, finally, only imaginary in the case of a mythical personality or a scientific theory. The meaning of these values becomes explicit when we take them in connection with human actions. The meaning of the foodstuff is its reference to its eventual consumption; that of an instrument, its reference to the work for which it is designed; that of a coin, the possibilities of buying and selling or the pleasures of spending which it involves; that of the piece of poetry, the sentimental and intellectual reactions which it arouses; that of the university, the social activities which it performs; that of the mythical personality, the cult of which it is an object and the actions of which it is supposed to be the author; that of the scientific theory, the possibilities of control of experience by idea or action that it permits. The social value is thus opposed to the natural thing, which has a content, but, as a part of nature, has no meaning for human activity, is treated as "valueless"; when the natural thing assumes a meaning, it becomes thereby a social value. And naturally a social value may have many meanings, for it may refer to many different kinds of activity.¹⁴

¹⁴ W. I. Thomas & F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 2d edition, 1927, vol. I, pp. 20-21.

In short, the field of social value is the field of meaning, and attitudes are incipient responses in regard to these values. Faris describes attitudes in the following terms:

The nature of attitudes will be clearer if we consider them in relation to the objects and the emotionally toned objects which are appropriately called values. Here also there is evident some confusion, but the question is really not difficult. For the attitude is toward something to which the attitude is related. When equilibrium has been disturbed and a conscious and deliberate act results, one effect is the formation in experience of a new object, and the attitude or residue is the correlate of the object. At the party Romeo meets Juliet, and very shortly the girl becomes to him a beloved object, a value. We can speak of the attitude of Romeo toward the object Juliet. They are correlative terms, arising simultaneously in experience. When the object changes, the attitude changes, *pari passu*. But it should not be difficult to distinguish my hatred from my enemy who is the object of the hatred. Until men become hopelessly unable to distinguish hunger from beefsteak there should be no difficulty in telling the difference between a value or object and an attitude.

It must be observed, however, that objects belong to experience, not necessarily to nature. Psychology is not concerned with what the object is, but with what it is experienced as. For we live in a world of "cultural reality," and the whole furniture of earth and choir of heaven are to be described and discussed as they are conceived by men. Caviar is not a delicacy to the general. Cows are not food to the Hindu. Mohammed is not the prophet of God to me. To an atheist God is not God at all. Objects are not passively received or automatically reacted to; rather is it true that objects are the result of a successful attempt to organize experience, and the externalized aspect of the organization is the object of value; the internal or subjective tendency toward it is the attitude. Let it be said again, the name by which this aspect of human nature is referred to is absolutely irrelevant. The essential point is that tendency, predisposition, organized inclination is centrally important, and that corresponding to this aspect of the experience of the person there is an externalized object of the tendency to which men give the name object or value.¹⁵

Values thus become definite and important data for social psychology. We are not concerned with them as is the student of social ethics. In ethics the problem is to evaluate various values themselves in their social setting. Rather we must take values into account in the analysis of social behavior as a part of the whole complex of anticipatory behavior which determines the meaning of our reactions to our fellows. Attitudes and

¹⁵ E. Faris, "Attitudes and Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1928, vol. XXXIV, p. 278.

values are linked together in a very definite set of patterns, the former representing the habitual reaction tendencies, the latter the objects or situations toward which these tendencies are directed. But the relation of value and attitude is not always understood.

Attitudes and values are built up unconsciously in so many instances that we are at a loss to understand their significance. When confronted with the demand of our fellows, or ourselves, to explain our conduct, we are more or less habitually forced to seek out some conscious motive for our behavior. Very often these reasons are not the genuine ones, but merely those explanations which are socially accepted by our fellows and hence by ourselves. The real motives or bases of our conduct are frequently quite otherwise than we imagine. These socially-acceptable, assumed reasons, or motivations, we term *rationalizations*.

4. *Rationalization*.—Rationalization, then, is a term used to describe the giving of *good* reasons in place of the *real* reasons for our conduct. By "good" reasons we mean those which pass current in our particular social group. Here is an instance of rationalization following post-hypnotic suggestion:

A teacher was told during hypnotic trance that at a certain hour she would remove a wooden cone from her desk and place it upon the flat top of the schoolroom stove. She did so, but when asked her reason for this somewhat unusual act, replied that the cone was in her way and that she needed her desk cleared for certain papers which she wished to examine.¹⁶

Social and cultural conditioning furnish us with acceptable labels for our behavior. The "real" reasons are often quite hidden from us or only vaguely sensed at best, and when even marginally recognized they are quickly inhibited by the appearance, usually in verbal form, of culturally conditioned patterns which have been built up in us from past experience. Actually, social pressure is so evident in most situations that the man who frankly admits that he does somewhat unconventional things because these acts represent to him his inner desires is looked upon as out of place.

It has often been implied and even openly stated that rationalization is a pathological and somewhat "evil" type of behavior. Really, however, this device serves man admirably in soothing his conscience, or his socially

¹⁶ W. S. Swisher, *Religion and the New Psychology*, 1920, p. 42. Courtesy of Marshall Jones Company.

conditioned sense of right or wrong. It provides a defense reaction against the exposure of violent, anti-social, or unethical motives. The genuine motives can often be brought to light only by careful analysis of past behavior and most frequently only by other persons sufficiently outside one's social picture to manifest objectivity about one's conduct. Rationalizations, at least those acceptable to our group, make for smooth and uninhibited behavior. It is hard to live in the world of our fellows, to participate in social life, if we are constantly aware of even some of the true or actual foundations of our conduct. In truth, any interpretation of one's own conduct or of one's own culture is likely to turn out to be an elaborate rationalization. James Harvey Robinson believes that most philosophy as well as most historical interpretation is just this. In contrast with the ordinary, every-day garden variety of rationalization, which in toto has little rhyme or reason to it, the more systematic but ethnocentric explanation of one's own culture Robinson calls "secondary rationalization."

Rationalization, then, is most in evidence where the person expresses some thought or performs some act that runs counter to what one's group expects. A man with a salary of five thousand dollars a year may fail to marry and explain the failure to his friends on the ground that he can not support a wife and family. Most men marry on much less than this, and the man in question may have some distinct resistances to women or the current schema of marriage of which he is quite unaware. Yet his group may accept his "reasoning" just the same. Another example is offered in the following comment on love by a spinster in explaining why she had never married:

Love is the magic which makes a woman work twenty-four hours a day for rather poor board and just sufficient clothing to keep her from being arrested, that throws a glamour over some poor worm which disguises him as a young god, and that causes a woman to pity all the rest of womankind because there is only one of these gods to be had.¹⁷

Again, a great employer whose labor policy has been a laissez-faire, cruel, and violent one, faced by a strike of his men, may fail to analyze the reality of long hours, low wages, and frequent unemployment, and raise the bugaboo of Bolshevism or anarchism as a reason for the strike. This enables him to fight the efforts of the employees for betterment of

¹⁷ From *Oregon Journal* (Portland), January 6, 1924.

their conditions while at the same time winning the approval of his fellow employers as a defender of the political state and the *status quo* in the economic order. In the field of prejudice, class struggles, competition, and international conflicts rationalizations are an ever-present stock in trade.

As a matter of fact, it is difficult to tell where rationalization leaves off and genuine, realistic thinking about our motives begins. In handling natural phenomena, through the natural sciences, we have made great progress in the study of causal relations. It is doubtful if we have advanced very far toward an objective analysis of our own culture. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, fanciful, emotional thinking has so ingratiated itself into the behavior framework of our culture and our personal-social experience that we are loath to look at the foundations of our conduct in a realistic manner. Yet modern psychology and social science are uncovering some features of social conduct which should assist us in moving toward a more objective understanding of our society.

To conclude this chapter, we need but reemphasize two points. First, the older explanations of behavior in terms of imitation, like the newer explanations in terms of compensation, sublimation, identification, and projection, may all be regarded as phases of internal changes in the person through conditioning to the social-cultural world around him. These conditionings form the basis for the field of anticipatory response, which, taking place within the organism, makes possible differential and socially acceptable overt responses. Secondly, the basic features of this anticipatory system constitute the images, ideas, attitudes, and values through which the person interprets or defines his world and his behavior. Social conduct of individuals can not be explained by recourse to a study of the external environment alone, or by attention to the observable overt reactions of the person. Further on we shall examine in detail some aspects of the *content* of this field of internal, anticipatory behavior, to discover just *what* it is that makes us behave as we do.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapters XI, pp. 242-65; and XII, Section D, pp. 290-94.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises in assignment in *Source Book*, Chapters XI, pp. 265-66; XII, p. 295, nos. 11-13.

2. How may imitation and suggestion be considered, in part, phases of anticipatory behavior?
 3. Does one have to have precisely the same experience as another in order to sympathize with the other?
 4. Distinguish between identification and projection.
 5. Distinguish between attitudes and values. Psychologically are values to be separated from the anticipatory field, even though in sociology they may be considered part of the cultural framework?
 6. Illustrate how rationalizations may become group-standardized or culturalized.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter XI, pp. 266-67.
 2. Report on Travis, "The Effect of a Small Audience upon Eye-Hand Coordination," *Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1925, vol. XX, pp. 142-46; and Cason, "Influence of Suggestion on Imagery in a Group Situation," *ibid.*, 1925, vol. XX, pp. 292-99, as illustrations of attempts to study suggestion experimentally.
 3. Review pertinent sections in Jung, *Psychological Types*, on identification and projection from a psychoanalytic point of view.
 4. Analysis of cases of culturalized rationalization in modern society.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FEELINGS, EMOTIONS, AND THE UNCONSCIOUS IN MAN'S BEHAVIOR

Brief reference has already been made to emotions and feelings as components of man's native endowment. Since conditioning greatly modifies these reactions, it is necessary for us to discuss the outstanding features of man's affective and emotional life as it develops through experience. Human behavior is divisible into intellectual and affective sections for descriptive purposes only. Actually, conditioning, both in the form of overt consummatory habits and in the intellectual or anticipatory response field, is shot through and through with accompanying feelings and emotions.

A. Feelings and Cyclic Activity.

We have observed that there is a certain cyclic or rhythmic course to all behavior. Beginning in internal or external stimulation, the organism goes through a series of activities ending normally in a completion or consummation of response. These consummatory activities mark the successful adaptation of the organism to its environment. In unlearned behavior the stretch between urge, impulse, tension or stimulation, whatever one may term it, and completed response is relatively short. In the adult this range between urge, desire or wish, and fulfilment may be greatly extended by the development of anticipatory covert behavior. Yet the principle of cyclic activity nevertheless holds true in all completed adjustments.

In the course of these cycles, as a phase of their resultant effects on the organism, arise feelings either of satisfaction, pleasure, and well-being or of dissatisfaction and displeasure. The feeling of pleasure or euphoric toning accompanies the completion of an act, the final culmination of a series of activities. Displeasure, or unpleasant toning, comes, in part at least, from thwarted and incomplete responses. Here the stimuli reaching the organism are harmful. No one contends that the whole scope of feelings arises from completeness or incompleteness of response. But certainly the consummation or lack of consummation of an act has much to do with sat-

isfaction or its opposite. Where the consummatory reactions are blocked or unpleasant, moreover, the escape into pleasant feelings may be made through dereistic thinking.

Affective states commonly called pleasant or unpleasant, then, are a kind of tonal quality arising from the state of the whole organismic activity. They seem to follow rather than to determine activity at any particular time and place. Feelings seem especially associated with emotional responses, and emotions are the fundamental states of the organic reaction systems.

Allport has presented a theory of feelings which correlates the pleasant feelings with the operations of the cranial or sacral divisions of the autonomic system and the unpleasant feelings with the activities which involve the sympathetic or thoracic-lumbar division of the autonomic. He writes:

The cranio-sacral division of the autonomic, supplemented under certain conditions by the cerebro-spinal system, innervates those responses whose return afferent impulses are associated with the conscious quality of pleasantness. The sympathetic division produces visceral responses which are represented in consciousness as unpleasantness.¹

The theory of Allport is suggestive and valuable as an attempt to link up feelings with bodily reactions. Certainly pleasant feelings accompany the satisfactions of hunger, thirst, sexual urge, and sensitive zone reactions, such as tickling and laughter. As we grow to maturity, they are distinctly associated with ego- or self-expansion and sociability. In contrast, unpleasant feelings most often seem associated with rage, fear, pain, and associated inhibitive, protective, and withdrawal reactions of the organism. Whether these latter responses may be considered in themselves consummatory or complete, one may not say.

It must be recognized that conditioning does much to alter feeling-tone. Certainly some anger reactions are pleasant, as with the fanatic in his righteous indignation at social abuses. Even pain may have pleasant connotations, as in the case of a religious or political martyr who "suffers for the cause." In both of these instances, the social approval substitutes a new end for what is ordinarily an unpleasant experience. One wonders if even mild fear may not be somewhat pleasant when one overhears children en-

¹ F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, 1924, p. 90. Used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

joying ghost stories or otherwise frightening each other. In these cases, doubtless, the "make-believe" character of the activity leaves a residue of consciousness of security and safety while the playtime activity is going on. As noted above, escape into the make-believe world of fantasy may be very pleasant in the face of ordinary failure at complete reactions.

Theory aside, we must realize that states of pleasantness and unpleasantness have a distinct bearing on social interaction. The child avoids pain and seeks pleasure. The original, unlearned reactions arising from tensions or external stimuli carry with them pleasant and unpleasant feelings, which the social-cultural pressures distinctly modify. Learning to conform to the cultural code may involve much pain at the outset, but social rewards easily offset this. So, for example, docility in the school child may lead to rewards of an acquired sort which substitute for the original satisfactions at the biological level of response. It is evident that society is constantly conditioning us to get our pleasures in the forms which it approves, rather than on the more primitive level of physiological urges. Thus the wide variations in sexual expression seen in different culture groups result largely from the fact that the biological tendencies are siphoned off into channels of action which meet the approval of our fellows. This approval offsets or may even go beyond the immediate states of pleasure which indulgence in the original urge would give. It is often remarked that the violent, impulsive emotional and feeling responses are less satisfactory than milder but more persistent ones. At least, society furnishes us with this satisfactory rationalization in support of such substitutions; and this itself may assuage any disappointments.

Pleasantness does seem correlated with the reaction of the organism-as-a-whole. For child and adult this means a distinct link-up of this state with the satisfactions of self-assertion or ego-expansion. Whatever enhances one's position in the eyes of oneself or one's fellows—and the two are closely correlated—tends to be pleasant. On the other hand, behavior destructive of self-values—whether of bodily survival or of social prestige—is likely to be unpleasant. The reason why fear, pain, anger, and the compound emotions of sorrow, shame, and remorse are unpleasant is that these states are destructive of the expanding, positive reactions of the personality. The blocking of these expansive movements—motor or mental—is unpleasant. Yet if fear and anger enhance the self, they, too, may be anything but disagreeable.

B. *Feelings and Emotions in Adult Life.*

1. *Theories of Emotions.*—It seems clear that so long as the organism is quiescent, there is no emotion or feeling. Such a state is the end of the cyclic process which we have already discussed. While there may be such completely complacent, serene states in Oriental meditation or in musings and some day-dreaming, most activity is marked by slight if not more vigorous emotional-feeling tone associated with activity. At the more biological, impulsive level of behavior the emotions have a distinctive preparatory function. The arousal of fear or anger inhibits the digestive processes, releases from the adrenal glands adrenin which, in turn, sets free glycogen or blood-sugar from the liver. This is carried in the blood to the peripheral striated muscles, thus making ready additional energy for fighting or flight or whatever activity the situation demands or the individual has been conditioned to undertake. Hunger, which has distinctive emotional concomitants, at least so far as organic changes go, enhances digestive processes and otherwise prepares the organism for this pleasant activity of eating. Love likewise sets up organic changes in the sexual glands in preparation for sexual congress. Crile, Cannon, and others have made both experimental and clinical observations bearing out the hypothesis that emotions are concerned, on the physiological side, with preparation for organic responses along new directions set up by the situation toward which the individual is responding.

a. *Critique of the James-Lange Theory of Emotions.*—The recognition of the organic factors in emotion is as old as any observation of the nature of man. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century William James in this country and C. G. Lange in Europe independently announced what is now known as the James-Lange theory of the emotions. Says James:

Bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact and . . . our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect. . . . [Rather] we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble.²

² W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. II, pp. 449-50. Courtesy of Henry Holt and Company.

While this theory has been the center of much discussion for over forty years, the weight of present-day evidence seems against it, at least in the extreme form stated by James. No one denies the profound importance of the organic changes in emotions, made possible by the autonomic system operating in relation to the smooth muscles and the glands. What the theory disregards are the perceptual factors which must always be taken into account. In the first place, the bodily changes are much the same in anger and fear, and yet no one confuses these two emotions. There seems incontrovertible evidence that emotions are set up through the cerebro-spinal system and that the autonomic-glandular components but furnish an additional quality in the total picture. Sherrington experimented with dogs in which the autonomic system had been largely eliminated and still found ample proof that the animals experienced emotional states. This great authority freely grants the important rôle which visceral and muscular activity plays in emotions, but remarks: "We are forced back toward the likelihood that the visceral expression of emotion is secondary to the cerebral action occurring with the psychical state."³ Cannon, whose work on the bodily changes in emotions is now almost classic, takes much the same view. He writes:

We do not "feel sorry because we cry," as James contended, but we cry because when we are sorry or overjoyed or violently angry or full of tender affection . . . there are nervous discharges by sympathetic channels to various viscera, including the lachrymal glands. In terror and rage and intense elation, for example, the responses in the viscera seem too uniform to offer a satisfactory means of distinguishing states which, in man at least, are very different in subjective quality. For this reason I am inclined to urge that the visceral changes merely contribute to an emotional complex more or less indefinite, but still pertinent, feelings of disturbance in organs of which we are not usually conscious.⁴

Without following through the intricacies of the controversy, it seems clear that variation of bodily states is a most unsatisfactory criterion of emotions. As a matter of fact, there seems to be ample experimental evidence that people express emotional likes and dislikes of all sorts in a much shorter time than is necessary for the bodily changes to occur. It

³ C. S. Sherrington, *The Integrative Action of the Nervous System*, 1906, p. 265.

⁴ W. B. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*, 1922, p. 280. Courtesy of D. Appleton & Company.

usually takes two seconds or more for these bodily "expressions" to take place, while simple emotions may be amply demonstrated to arise in less than one second. Such stimuli as pictures and smells have been used to show this. Wells suggests that for all we know the bodily changes which have been made so much of are actually instances of conditioned responses. That is to say, through emotional shock the bodily processes become associated with various emotions.⁵ But, however severe the criticisms of the James-Lange theory may be, the place of visceral reactions must always be taken into account in interpreting emotional behavior.

2. *Criteria of Emotions.*—Any organic theory is dependent upon the notion that expressiveness is the key to emotion. This raises the problem of what are the proper criteria to emotions. What is emotionality? Shall we measure it by tests of bodily changes, by the amount of facial movement, including head movements, or by stability as measured by various motor or verbal tests, or in still other ways, such as rating schemes? Landis, reviewing his own work and that of others, comes to the conclusion that many of the criteria of emotion are of little or no value. On the basis of statistical inter-correlations and measures of reliability, he draws a number of important conclusions, the pertinent ones for us being the following:

1) On the organic side, "range of blood pressure is not a direct measure of emotionality." Moreover, "variability of blood pressure is of doubtful value as a criterion of emotionality."

2) In contrast, "increased reaction time, as a result of emotional disturbance, gives evidence of being a good criterion of emotionality." But "speed of tapping is of doubtful significance" as a criterion.

3) Facial movements, including head movements, are the most satisfactory measure of emotional expressiveness. Among the best of these is laughter.

4) Subjective estimates of emotional stability are of little significance. In fact the concept of stability or instability is one of doubtful use at the present stage of experimental work on emotions.⁶

Although the problem of criteria of emotionality is confusing, we must consider the major adult emotions which everyone recognizes. In view of present limitations our discussion of emotions is dependent on subjective

⁵ Cf. F. L. Wells, *Pleasure and Behavior*, 1924, p. 172.

⁶ Summarized from C. Landis, *et al.*, "Criteria of Emotionality," *Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1925, vol. XXXII, pp. 209-34. The student may consult the bibliography cited in this paper for further study of this interesting problem. Cf. also M. and I. C. Sherman, *The Process of Human Behavior*, 1929.

evaluations and on our rudimentary analysis of the situations which set off the emotions.

C. *The Major Emotions and Their Relation to Feelings.*

While we treated rage, fear, and love as unlearned reactions, it must not be imagined that the emotions of the adult or even of the child remain long at this simple level. While these three are basic, emotions in later life are definitely conditioned to specific and general situations of all sorts. The emotions of grief, remorse, horror, hatred, pity, love, and shame are frequently linked up with ideas, attitudes, and habits which have taken years to develop. Sometimes these compound emotions are called sentiments. Moreover, it is evident that various emotions fall into two groups: those which are pleasant and those which are unpleasant. For convenience we may list four major groups of emotions which play a distinct part in social behavior. We may call these, for want of better terms, the types dominated by anger, sorrow, fear, and love. The first three tend to be unpleasant, although there are exceptions, while the last one is definitely pleasant unless blocked in its expression. Let us take up these four types in some detail.

1. *Various Anger Types.*—These include anger proper; hatred, which is a combination of anger and fear with the former predominating; envy; and jealousy. These belong to aggressive-defensive reactions. Anger, as we saw, is set off by restraint of bodily movement. It seeks relief in throwing off the object causing it. Through conditioning, the restraining object may be a popular idea, a word of another, or any number of situations not originally provocative of anger. Anger often begins in a preliminary period of irritation at some object, situation, or person. It is sometimes associated with a distinct negative self-feeling or sense of inferiority. One feels irritated because one can not cope with the situation. Ego-expansion is prevented by some power outside oneself.

a. *Anger Emotions.*—Richardson has made a most interesting analysis of anger in adults. He lists three sorts of behavior in anger: the attributive reaction, the contrary reaction, and the indifferent reaction.⁷ He found that of 1468 observations of anger, seventy per cent were of the first kind, eighteen per cent of the second, and eleven per cent of the third.

The attributive reaction is characterized by pugnacious responses of

⁷ Cf. R. F. Richardson, *The Psychology and Pedagogy of Anger*, 1918. Some of the material on anger which follows is drawn from this volume. Courtesy of Warwick & York.

some sort—actual attack, cutting remarks, hostile witticisms, sarcasm, and joking at the other's expense. The early stage of anger is always of this type. Later, social pressures operate to shift the direction which the more violent anger might take. These re-directions of response are listed by Richardson as substitution of (1) visual and motor imagery, (2) irascible playfulness towards the other, (3) imaginary invective and cutting remarks, (4) witticism and irony, (5) disguised meanings, (6) exaltation of self, (7) general attitudinal reactions. Under the first there is frequently a development of imagery in which one sees oneself doing some violence to the person with whom one is angry. A subject of Richardson's reported:

The first impulse was to kick X., the restraint was accompanied by motor images of kicking him, followed by the image of his being hurt in the face.

Another said:

I felt like I wanted to bite or hit something.⁸

The substitution of irascible play is illustrated by the indulgence of rough behavior toward the object of anger but with a playful demeanor so that social disapproval will not follow on the action. The indulgence in imaginary invective is common experience. One fantasizes conversation with the opponent in which one tells him in no uncertain terms what one thinks of him. Usually the "imagined verbal combat" is decidedly one-sided, with victory always for oneself. Witticisms, joking, and such devices are common substitutes for more vigorous action against the situation or person that arouses anger. This is a socially acceptable device. Sneers, varied tones of voice implying the *double entendre* of the remark, and sarcasm are common. Sometimes one disguises one's attack on the other by making it impersonal and indirect. If one is angry at a merchant over his bill, one may phrase one's dislike in a general attack on the tendency of merchants in the town to overcharge strangers or students. Exaltation of self through imaginary means is common. The offender may not be dealt with, but the person offended day-dreams about his own superiority. Sometimes this takes the form of moral superiority. One would not deal with others as this man has done with oneself. At other times one imagines oneself wealthy and powerful, and one would deal fairly with everybody except X, who incited one's anger.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

What Richardson calls "attitudinal reactions" are perhaps the most important of the attributive reactions, because here we find the individual constructing more or less permanent dislikes or anger attitudes toward the object of his anger. The person consciously or unconsciously resolves to vent his anger at some future time. The attitudinal resolution, then, is the basis of the chronic form of anger which we call hatred. It is particularly likely to develop when the anger has been unsuccessfully expressed. In such cases the blocked expression throws the anger into a more permanent attitudinal form. It remains in the system to return again and again in the presence of associated situations, ideas, and attitudes. On the pathological side this sort of thing is seen in the extremes to which the paranoiac person will go to obtain his "rights" or his "revenge," depending on the depth and extent of his anger. Hatred is distinctly bound up with a felt attack upon one's self-esteem. This more permanent development of anger patterns in the individual is highly significant, as we shall see, in reference to all sorts of prejudice, mob-mindedness, and various sorts of reactions witnessed in conflict situations.

The contrary reaction introduces us into the theory of ambivalence. It is evidenced in the religious-ethical teachings of Christianity to "love one's enemies," "to do good to them that hate you," "to turn the other cheek." Instead of following up the anger tendencies in the manner just described, there is a reversal of reaction. While the inception of all anger, as we observed, is of the pugnacious sort, there follows upon this, in the ambivalent reaction, the tendency to do good for evil, to be kind instead of gruff. Sometimes this is seen in more violent instance, by an excessive politeness or friendliness which almost always gives the case away. Pleasant tones of voice, kindly remarks, and socially-approved deeds cover up the real feeling. Only eighteen per cent of Richardson's cases showed these responses.

Such activity is distinctly the outcome of social conditioning. Moral-religious training, causing fear of social disapproval of violent anger or hatred, leads to this sort of conduct. This is especially true in cases where one is expected by the cultural code to be friendly and lovable, such as in the family and neighborhood or other in-group relationships. The psychoanalysts have exposed the frequency of this sort of reaction in the neurotic person who shows over-concern for the welfare of those whom he utterly dislikes and despises. Uriah Heep is a type of person found the world over.

The indifferent reaction is even less frequent than the contrary one. It is often built up on the basis of repeated experience with anger situations. It, too, takes on an attitudinal character. It may even become a sort of life philosophy. The offended person assumes an indifferent attitude toward the situation or person. It often appears with the realization that nothing is to be done about the matter. If this attitude arises early in the situation, the anger reaction may not develop far. There is a distinctly passive feeling-tone associated with it. From the point of view of personality balance this attitude is perhaps superior to either of the other two.

The disappearance of anger may take place quickly with the appearance of another emotion or ideational process, or it may disappear more gradually. Richardson holds that the aim of angry behavior is threefold:

(1) To enhance self-feeling which has been lowered; (2) to get rid of the opposing obstacle to the continuity of associate processes; (3) to recover from one's wounded sense of justice.⁹

While unpleasantness is associated with the period of restraint in anger, the lessening of the tensions is distinctly a period of increasing pleasantness. Sometimes the disappearance takes the substitutive forms noted above, sometimes by resolving the difficulty with the opponent, and very often by shifting attention to something else. There are great individual differences both in the form which anger reactions take and in the methods of their resolution. One interesting fact is that anger often induces people to undertake their tasks with renewed vigor. The following comment from a student is in point:

When Professor A. told me that I did not grasp the implications of my thesis subject I was both humiliated and angry. I resolved then and there to "show him" that I could make good. My work from that point on improved and later there was distinct satisfaction in the compliments which my work received, both from him and from others.

Another case is that of a writer who reports that not infrequently his ablest work is done following a disagreement with his wife. He states that he inhibits the more violent impulses which arise in these situations and finds that in the period thereafter he is able to work at long uninterrupted periods of time without fatigue. However, the after-effects of anger are

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

varied. In some persons anger completely unnerves them for a considerable period. Often they have to go to bed following such an emotional upheaval. Sometimes other emotions follow in the wake of anger. Pity may follow the imagined humiliation of the offender. Shame at oneself for being angry may be a subsequent effect. In other instances, there may develop fear or anxiety that the other person may take one's anger too seriously. Sometimes an attitude of caution is aroused from fear that a recurrence of anger may lead to more serious results for oneself and the offender. Occasionally joy and active pleasantness follow anger. This often accompanies either real or fancied victory over the opponent.

In conclusion, anger may be classified from a number of different angles. It may be pleasant or unpleasant, depending on the course it takes. Again the anger may be violent or mild. Or it may be treated as to its function for the person. It relieves unpleasant tensions as a kind of purgative. It may have a distinct survival effect, especially in the more primitive situations of great bodily danger. And it may have a surrogate effect of stimulating the individual to work. Anger throughout has distinct reference to self-feelings and the persistence of social status. It is distinctly a phase of the egoistic development, and comes into play where there is any threatened or actual thwarting of desires. Some anger arises in the form of mild irritability at situations or objects. Or it may be sublimated into anger at social injustice and be correlated with attitudes of fair dealing. This is the type seen in the righteous indignation of the cultivated person in the presence of social evils and personal wrongs. Here the immediate self-interest may be covered over by culturally-acceptable rationalizations to such an extent that the anger is mild but persistent over long periods of time. If integrated with ideologies of various sorts it may be the driving force of a lifetime activity of highly ethical sort.

b. *Envious and Jealous Reactions.*—Envy is an emotion built fundamentally upon the anger pattern. It is the product of conditioning. It seems basically to involve anger at seeing desired objects appropriated by others. The response is caused by observing others enjoy what is denied oneself. There is in envy a good deal of sense of inferiority, a feeling of unpleasantness at perceiving or imagining things which one may not possess.

Related to envy is jealousy. This is usually considered envious behavior in reference to some person. As McDougall remarks, one may be envious

of a second person, but in jealousy there is always a triangular relationship. Some third person threatens to take one's place in the affection of another. Often the elder of two children is jealous of the younger because the latter receives more attention from the mother. There is here a mingling of fear with anger. Fear of loss is followed by anger at the one who thus steals away the affections of another. The jealousy of lovers in regard to third persons is the source of comedy and tragedy the world over.

In short, anger, hatred, envy, and jealousy form a group of emotions in which rage plays a principal part. The wide range of conditioning in the anger type of emotion is noteworthy. There is no doubt that these emotions are distinctly concerned with the preservation of self-assertive or egoistic values. Much of anger, hatred, envy, and jealousy is directly the outcome of felt inroads on the ego-expansion of the personality.

2. *The Sorrow Group*.—Sorrow is hardly to be considered a fundamental emotion in the sense that anger, fear, and love are, but it looms so large in life that we may designate a congeries of related emotions under this general heading. It includes grief, regret or remorse, and shame. At the outset it is probably based upon conditioning to crying at painful situations. Sorrow is a distinctly unpleasant emotion in which the elements called negative self-feeling and love are doubtless correlated. The loss of some object of affection causes sorrow. In a sense sorrow is a kind of negative side to love. Grief, on the other hand, is a type of sorrow in which depressed feelings are more constant, as when a person loses his object of affection through some carelessness of his own, or through some power over which he had no control, as in the case of death. Remorse, says Wells, "generally designates a chronic grief in response to an injury inflicted upon another."¹⁰ Regret is rather more closely associated with the sense of failure to perform some function expected or failure to do something which now appears worth while.

Shame is an emotion of much significance in social behavior. It is distinctly related to bashfulness and the inhibition of ego-expansion or self-assertion. Shame usually arises when the standards of the social group which one accepts are broken. This may be a mere peccadillo in manners, or it may be in reference to something far more serious for the person, as infraction of the moral code. A man among a strange people does not feel shame in his failure to live up to their mores and folkways. The

¹⁰ F. L. Wells, *Pleasure and Behavior*, 1924, p. 179.

behavior which one is to follow is laid down by the group one considers correct. Thus, a man who does not accept contemporary morals is said to be "shameless" by those who do. Shame is, moreover, a distinctive part of the inferiority feelings which play such a marked rôle in the life organization of many persons. Failure to meet the standards set by those around us produces in us a sense of insufficiency, the emotional tone of which is largely one of shame.

3. *The Fear Emotions*.—If anger emotions are aggressive and positive in character, those dominated by fear are negative and defensive. Both fear and anger are forms of unlearned responses, to protect the personality. The fear activities are powerful incentives to keep away from the situations which set up disturbances. They keep the individual from resolving the difficulty directly. Fear inhibits positive, expansive action and may set up retreat from external reality. We have noted already how widespread the conditioning of fear may be. While the fundamental stimuli to fear are few, the fears which are built up in individuals are almost as numerous as the possible situations to which one may become accustomed. Almost any object or person may become the stimulus to fear and its accompanying unpleasant feeling.

Fear in the adult, at least, seems to be of two degrees of intensity—shock and apprehension. The former produces much more intense reactions, while in the latter the apprehension of danger increases slowly with realization of the situation. The shock type of fear is more reflex and unlearned in character. It appears suddenly and disappears more quickly than apprehensiveness. In the latter there are present more perceptual and ideational factors.¹¹ Fear of the second sort in the experienced individual consists in an anticipation of pain. Fear, in fact, is one of the commonest forms of anticipatory response, and is, therefore, significant as a measure of attitude or oncoming activity of the organism. Fear is thus related to the future state of the organism, but in child and adult always in terms of past experience.

Fears which are regarded by one's group as out of focus with socially-accepted reality are called morbid fears or phobias. G. Stanley Hall, who made a considerable study of fear in its genetic aspects, reports 136 medical names for distinct phobias. He remarks, further, that there are a great

¹¹ Cf. Nancy Bayley, "A Study of Fear by Means of the Psychogalvanic Technique" in *Psychological Monographs*, 1928, vol. XXXVIII, No. 4, Whole No. 176, pp. 1-38.

number of other fears for which there are no scientific terms, for instance, the various fears of several hundred diseases cataloged by one of the British medical societies. Many of these types of phobias are produced by violent shocks of one sort or another. When fear becomes chronic in the personality, it gives rise to anxiety neuroses or constant worries. Fears of this sort are of the apprehensive type in which ideas and attitudes from social experience play a very important part. And these fears, in turn, give impetus to all sorts of fantasies and nocturnal dreams of wild and disordered sort, which, however, may come to affect distinctly the whole course of the personality.

Fear, like anger, is a highly significant emotion in the building-up of social attitudes and habits. It comes into the picture, as does anger, in dealing with prejudice and collective phenomena especially. In the latter instances, as we shall see, heightened stimulation of the crowd situation causes a sort of fear contagion to run through a mob or through even a passing street aggregation. In the case of prejudice, the fears, like the angers, get standardized into attitudes, ideas, and habits which persist throughout generations of groups living in antagonistic accommodation to each other. Public opinion, moreover, is profoundly affected by appeals to fear attitudes.

4. *The Love Emotions.*—Love is a distinctly pleasant emotion when it attains the object of its attention. It is positive, approaching, and expansive in tone. When love is thwarted, it is unpleasant and runs over into the sorrow type of response. Love is doubtless rooted in the sex drives of the organism, but its ramifications pervade the entire area of human relationships. The basis of love reactions, on the sexual side, are tensions set up in the sexual glands, but the conditioning of love is very wide. Moreover, it is early built into the ego-pattern, and love of self is a dominant factor in human behavior. On the other hand, love is also closely linked with sympathy. As we have seen, to sympathize is to be able to put oneself in another's place. And the sympathetic responses may contain admixtures of both sorrow and love. This is particularly true of the emotion of pity, wherein love and pain are mingled in reference to some person or animal.

The love emotions are bound up with all sorts of social relations. The in-group attachments are largely controlled by love and sympathy. The whole course of friendship and congeniality rest there. Even in secondary groups such mutual relationships must have a distinctly pleasant and af-

fectionate turn in order to persist. In the growth of altruism, love has a distinct part. Love of others, in fact, is a kind of counterpart of love of self. As we find ourselves in sympathetic relations with others in our group, our own self-love seems to grow.

Another sphere of love lies in the field of sentimentalism and chivalry. The romantic pattern is distinctly related to the fantasy life of childhood and adolescence. Romantic love as a culture pattern is merely the conventionalization of this sort of emotional activity. In many societies such notions have never been codified into the folkways, but in our society these patterns have a distinct place. They are a part of our marriage arrangements. They give rise to romantic novels, poetry, and love themes in plastic and pictorial art and in music.

We must note again that of the four groups of emotions discussed, sorrow and fear are largely unpleasant in their tone, and anger, with certain exceptions, tends to be so. Only love is pleasant, and if this is thwarted it moves to the opposite pole of feeling. It must be evident from everyone's experience that the emotions in daily life are very mixed in type, and that they vary as social situations demand. As Wells puts it: "Pure emotions are as rare in nature as pure colors." Although ordinarily the emotions we experience are mixed, in most cases, either anger, fear, sorrow, or love predominate among the components.

D. Laughter and Emotions.

It is said that man is the only animal that laughs. The origin and explanation of laughter have long baffled both philosophers and psychologists. It is not our purpose to attempt another explanation. We are more interested in the fact that laughter arises largely in social situations, and that it has distinctive emotional features. Even when one chuckles to oneself one has other persons, or at least some auditor, in mind. Laughter implies some instability of inner images or attitudes that lead to those spontaneous vocal expressions which we call laughter.

One approach to the origin of laughter is to observe its appearance in children. It seems, in part at least, tied up with tickling of the sensitive zones, but this tickling must not be too prolonged or intense, else the laughing response is apt to give way to irritation or even anger. Too severe tickling leads to the act of riddance. At the outset two features stand out. The stimulus to laughter is primarily social. Other persons

tickle one, either by touch, or, figuratively speaking, through conditioning, by words and grimaces. Secondly, laughter is related to play responses. It is in fun. It is not serious so far as defensive bodily survival is concerned. It is, at the outset perhaps, just this make-believe at being serious and yet not so that produces laughter. That is, the thrust at the person leads to preparation for defense or aggression, but turns out to be playful rather than serious. Crile holds that the organism when prepared for vigorous defensive or aggressive activity of some sort, only to discover, out of the situation, that no such activity is needed, turns to laughter for a release of the physiological tensions. Laughter is thus a *diversion* of energy—as Gregory puts it, “a pleasant expenditure upon the body of energy released from other activities.” Through conditioning the tensions may take on all sorts of forms. Tensions may arise in the field of various anticipatory responses. While one may not be able to defend all laughter as release of tensions, certainly very much of it is of this sort.

Laughter, as a social process, concerns at least three types of situations, all of which are related to the ego- or self-assertive trends in the personality.¹² The first of these we may designate as release of taboo. The second concerns the sense of personal superiority and safety. The third is closely related to the second, but arises out of incongruous situations or juxtaposition of persons or ideas. The release of taboo or social pressures is most evident in the joke of *double entendre* which affords us a release of inhibited sexual expression. It is enlightening to sit in a vaudeville or burlesque audience and note the hearty laughter of married men at jokes which release secret and half-conscious wishes for sexual adventure outside conventional matrimony. One common element in these jokes of double meaning is autistic in form. This is seen in punning. Another example of the release of taboo is clear in jokes on prohibition and its enforcement or non-enforcement. While drinking has long been a favorite topic for humor, since 1920 the United States has seen the rise of a distinct type of joke which constitutes a thrust at the laws against consumption of alcohol. These jokes persist in spite of efforts of motion picture review boards to censor them, or of vaudeville managers to prevent their expression on the stage. It would be interesting further to know how many people who believe in and practice prohibition indulge in laughter about

¹² These three may not cover all of the situations which give rise to laughter.

prohibition along with those who do not. It is probably a fair guess that many of the former do "enjoy" such humor.

The second set of situations leading to laughter bears on the sense of safety and superiority. We laugh to see a dignified preacher or banker slip on an icy pavement. It is likely that these experiences enhance momentarily our sense of personal security and superiority. The release of tensions probably occurs here also. On the principle of ideo-motor action, witnessing someone else fall may set up in us incipient bodily tensions such as we would experience if we were ourselves to start to fall; but not falling, we find a release from these incipient tensions through laughter.

The third type stimulus to laughter involves witnessing or hearing the incongruous. In some societies the physically deformed have been the object of laughter as is apparent from Homer's references to the laughter of the Gods at Hephæstus and to the attitude of Achilles toward Thersites. In our day we are less inclined to laugh at incongruities of physique, although children often do. Adults, due to cultural norms, pity rather than laugh at or ridicule malformations of body or expression. Yet we do laugh at incongruous speech, and postures, especially under the "Aufgabe" or mental set to be amused, as in a vaudeville. Back of such laughter there is probably some enhancement of feelings of superiority. As a part of this, doubtless, there is an empathic, imagined participation in the incongruous postures or expressions with subsequent release in laughter.

It is clear that laughter is related to the presence of other persons, especially those whom we know. People chuckle to themselves in reading amusing stories and jokes, but uproarious laughter is best witnessed in a crowd. In fact, amusement crowds are tuned to laughter. We expect funny stories at vaudeville performances and in comedy dramas. We hardly anticipate such stimulation in a church or a courtroom. Laughter, then, is distinctly related to the field of anticipatory reactions followed by release of tension in overt expression. Although complete and consummatory in its final form, its inception depends upon earlier conditioning, particularly in the field of taboos and in the development of self-assertive behavior patterns. In laughter of the first type we laugh with others, while in the second and third types we rather laugh at others. The first sort is thus more sympathetic, more socialized in a sense; the latter two more egoistic and personal. In laughing with others sympathetic attitudes arise.

The gentler humor of the civilized, humane person has much of this quality. One may smile or even laugh at human foibles, including one's own, but without the rancor, bitterness, or triumph found when we egoistically laugh *at* others. In the case of this egoistic laughter there is a touch of personal victory. As Gregory remarks, "the triumphant laugh of aggressive or satirical wit has an echo of war, and scorn or contempt or superiority may tinge laughter according to the relief precipitated."¹³ In other words, the animus in laughing *at* others is a secret wish for superiority which has its roots in person-to-person conflict or competition for social status. And an improvement in social status always reverberates to expand one's ego.

In short, the different external situations and anticipatory states which give rise to laughter make clear that various emotions may enter into the process. Sympathy and affection may be components of gentle humor; dislike, envy, anger, and even hatred may enter into other forms.

Laughter, therefore, gives a clue to the personality in its contacts with others. The implications of this sort of social response are numerous. As Gregory says, "the ways men laugh and the things they laugh at are excellent *indexes* of their natures." What they laugh *at* or whom they laugh *with* depends pretty largely upon their culture norms and their personal-social conditioning. While it furnishes release of tensions, thus enhancing physical well-being, laughter is a most significant form of social stimulation. To quote Gregory again:

Laughter varies its function as it varies its nature and it can divide by bitterness as it can join by sympathy. It does all these things—dealing out discipline, sowing discord, and genially uniting. But its central fundamental role, from which other effects secondarily spring, is the enlivenment of those breaks or momentary termini that constantly recur in human activity and supply laughter with its generative respite.¹⁴

The social-cultural implications of laughter, then, vary with the form which it takes. The laugh of ridicule plays a decided part in social control. The boy or girl who suffers from such stimuli from others is often forced by a sense of inferiority to seek compensation in other social contacts, as with adults, or in day-dreams, or in other forms of substitutive

¹³ From, *The Nature of Laughter*, by J. C. Gregory, 1924, p. 221. By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

activity. Again, laughing at a person may produce disharmony in a group and disrupt otherwise free-flowing social contacts. In contrast, pleasant, joyous laughter with others may enhance conversation and play or make easy consensus of opinion where disagreement has previously loomed upon the social horizon. It stimulates congeniality and facilitates social intercourse.

Finally, laughter, it must be repeated, is predetermined as to its objects by one's culture. That which amuses an Englishman may not so stimulate an American. The type of wit and humor found among the laboring classes seems curiously barbaric and indecent in the drawing-room. In other words, laughter, like other social responses, is related to one's universe of discourse, and can not be understood aside from this. As Gregory puts it, "a jest's prosperity lies in the ear that hears it."

E. Emotions and Feelings in Anticipatory Behavior.

It must be recognized, furthermore, that the emotions and feelings which we have been describing are bound up with attitudes, ideas, and habits of the personality. All of those attitudes which control us most profoundly have strong emotional-feeling components. We must remind ourselves again that the basis of behavior lies in the organic changes, and that man is more distinctly a feeling, emoting animal than he is an intellectual one. This is not to deny the tremendous place of intellectual achievement which is made possible through the operations of the higher brain centers. Nevertheless, we must at all times guard ourselves against the fallacies of easy rationalism which would see man's activities as the result of clear intellectual decisions and predeterminations, as was the wont of the philosophy of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Moral philosophy and social science in the past have been retarded by a failure to recognize the biological roots of man's behavior, by the neglect of these very emotional, feeling, and reflexive roots in his higher achievements. In spite of all the criticisms hurled against McDougall for his theory of instincts and emotions, he it was, among others, who helped to put social psychology in a more substantial position by his insistence that we recognize the profound influences of the physiological foundations on man's social behavior. His criticism of the assumptions of classical economics may be applied to the whole field of philosophy and social science of pre-Darwinian date. As he puts it, "The great assumption . . . was that man is a reasonable being

who always intelligently seeks his own good or is guided in all his activities by enlightened self-interest." This is untrue not only of man's economic and political life, but of all phases of his activity. As he remarks further, "Mankind is only a little bit reasonable and to a great extent very unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways."¹⁵

1. *Feeling-Emotional Tone and Ideation.*—The intellectual processes, images, and ideas are related to specific conditioning situations. Through the verbal concept in the field of objective association these become exact and definite. And yet, these specific conditionings are accompanied by feelings and emotions. Certainly, the meaning which accrues to concepts and images is distinctly bound up with the feeling-emotional toning and with the corresponding motor attitudes. As determinants of overt response, those images and ideas which have a basis in emotion and feeling dominate those which do not. As has been long recognized in psychology, emotions and feelings determine the fixation of an object in consciousness and constitute the basis of attention and hence determine behavior. It is clear that both perception and imagination are bound up with feelings and emotions. The meanings which arise from past experience lie largely in the continuity of the emotional-feeling tone. They furnish the foundation of the carry-over from one idea to another. It is often evident in recall that the revival of emotion precedes the image or concept which serves to locate the experience in time and space. The whole sense of familiarity, the arousal of pleasantness and unpleasantness and the emotional tone, are of great importance in interpretation or meaning. In truth, the affective element is a constituent factor in the formation of the concept. Edmund Burke put it well when he wrote:

Whatsoever power such words as virtue, honor, persuasion, docility may have on the passions, they do not derive it from a representation in the mind of the things for which they stand. Nobody, I believe, immediately on hearing the sounds virtue, liberty, or honor, conceives any precise notions of the particular modes of action and thinking for which these words are substituted.¹⁶

Rather, as Burke says, the basis lies in the feelings associated with the original experiences out of which these concepts arose. That is, feelings

¹⁵ Cf. W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 1923 (15th edition) Introduction. Courtesy of John W. Luce Company.

¹⁶ E. Burke, *Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful; Works*, vol. I, p. 303.

and emotions are the basis of perceptions, images, and ideas rather than *vice versa*. Even in abstract ideas of science, sense of familiarity and of direction, and various other features of feeling and attitude appear. In the most abstruse concepts these feelings and attitudes can be represented only by a word which is accompanied by what may be called the "concept-feeling." Mathematicians and logicians often report just such evidence in introspecting upon the manner in which they handle their concepts.

Feelings, emotions, and associated attitudes, or incipient actions, therefore, are basic to the meaning of the concepts which are couched in verbal terms. These emotional-feeling aspects of our behavior are not separate and distinct from the ideational, anticipatory features of behavior, but are fundamentally a part of the entire complex process.

2. *Continuity of Emotion and Feeling*.—We have seen above how fear of furry objects carries over to or is transferred from one object to another without additional conditioning. In this way a vast reach of associations is opened up through the emotional-feeling tone in various experiences. Furthermore, the meaning of the original experience persists in the affective experiences rather than in the memory image or idea. Thus dislike for places and persons may be inexplicable in terms of any recallable experience. One is reminded of the old rhyme:

I do not love thee, Dr. Fell,
The reason why I cannot tell;
But this I know and know full well,
I do not love thee, Dr. Fell.

The dislike for Dr. Fell may be traced to some unpleasant experience with him, or with some person who resembles him, or who has a similar name, or in any number of ways. The important thing is that there need be no immediate memory, since feeling and emotion associated with it continue.

In thousands of images and concepts the original basis of the experience may be retained, but the farther these events slip into the past the more oblivious of them we become. Finally their only continuity rests in the affective states which are revived by the words or gestures associated with them. This is well illustrated in the field of intense fears. Few persons know the basis of their fears of insects, of open places, of high places or enclosures, and so on through the entire range of phobias. The literature

of abnormal psychology is full of illustrations of morbid fears where the patient did not know the basis of his anxiety. So, too, anger attitudes and meanings rest on forgotten experiences, but persist in angry dislike of other races, classes, or the opposite sex. Often there is an affective siphoning from the unpleasant object around which the original meaning was built up to a new object. As Wells points out, an individual may arouse in us a violent dislike, but as time passes our memory of the person disintegrates and there is no marked emotional hangover. Then suddenly there appears another person who resembles the first one and sets off an antagonism far greater than is felt for the original or is recalled as ever having been felt for him. Another illustration is that of an unusual and apparently irrational interest of a merchant in one of his women clerks who had at first not influenced him. The facts were that the girl showed certain facial and manual gestures which reminded him, upon association, of a former sweetheart of his who had similar gestures, but who had been completely forgotten. Our likes and dislikes for people and events are thus colored by past associations, the core of which was an emotional-affective toning. The images and ideas may have long since disappeared, but the affect remains. As a German writer puts it, *Objekt vergeht, Affekt besteht*. Those forms of compensation and sublimation, made much of in contemporary psychology, are frequently but efforts to find some objective substitute on which to fasten a deep-lying affective persistence.

The continuity of the affective-emotional core of experience leads directly into the problem of the unconscious. In fact, the problem of the place of affective processes in ideational responses and the matter of continuity of these processes is bound up with the theory of the unconscious which we must now examine.

F. The Place of the Unconscious in Behavior.

No concept in recent times has aroused such violent controversy in psychology as that of the unconscious. One theory is that the unconscious concerns behavior mediated only through the spinal cord and lower brain centers, but such a narrow conception leaves out of account much that must come into the picture. Other theories are concerned with the suppression and forgetting of unpleasant experiences. The interested reader may turn to Northridge and Van der Hoop for technical discussions of the various theories of the unconscious. For our purposes we need only adhere

to the facts and to those simpler interpretations that seem fairly consistent with the naturalistic approach to behavior.

As we noted in an earlier chapter, much of our behavior is integrated together into a whole, especially behavior which involves the entire organism for its consummation. Yet some response systems are antagonistic to others. This is true not only in the case of the antagonistic muscle groups, but also in socially-conditioned response systems, such as love and hatred, loyalty to in-group as against avoidance of out-group contacts, like of some personal qualities of a friend and dislike of others. The process of separating antagonistic trends we call dissociation; and dissociation is as important and fundamental a process as is integration. We may assume for the moment that those activities at any time which fit into the ego or self-satisfactions are integrated together in consciousness. What we consider self-satisfying, as making our ego grow most pleasantly, is determined largely by the social groups in which we participate. Yet, it sometimes happens that some groups, especially secondary in type, demand actions and attitudes which run counter to our prepotent trends, trends which in other groups, like companionships, love groups and congenial groups, may get expression. The Puritan community may have terrific taboos regarding sex expression, but a man may philander surreptitiously and thus escape the taboo. Or what is more likely, he may indulge in dereistic thinking about the tabooed subject. Or again, the whole business of sex may become dissociated and appear in disguised form—in dreams, fantasies, wit, and, in pathological cases, in hysterical or neurotic manifestations.

Dissociation is a common phenomenon of daily life. We are often so absorbed in our work or play as to be oblivious of many things around us, so that only fatigue or the increased intensity or repetition of a new stimulus brings us to a conscious reaction. For instance, one is writing and the telephone rings, but it rings twice before one hears it and gets up in disgust to answer it. Often exasperated mothers have to call their children in from play a great number of times, and unfortunately they sometimes refuse to believe their children when the latter honestly tell them that they did not hear them call at first. There are many sensory dissociations of this sort, leading up to more complete ones, such as one finds in the hysterical patient who can not hear sounds, see visual stimuli, or feel pain on large areas of the body. On the motor side, too, the dissociations reach from the

simple sort of habitual actions performed without reference to consciousness, such as dressing and undressing and performing many features of skilled activity, to habit spasms. At a higher level dissociation is seen in automatic writing, where the person is able to produce material the origin of which he is not aware. Thus, with a planchette board the ignorant hysterical girl produces material which she and her friends may interpret as of divine source. Often this sort of thing is so manipulated in social groups that hosts of persons believe the messages to be supernatural. Upon such belief human conduct may be profoundly affected. This shows again that the culture norms and personal-social experience of the group in which this phenomenon occurs will settle in the end whether the person will be sent to a medical ward or will become the founder of a new sect.

Somnambulism, or sleep-walking, is another form of dissociated behavior in which the activities of the person may be very complex and absolutely outside the range of his waking consciousness. Often the activities of the sleep-walker extend over considerable time and take on complications of action which are baffling to interpret in terms of immediate stimuli and responses.

Other examples of dissociation are seen in various cases of amnesia. This form of forgetting may be merely temporary, as when a person in excitement may even forget his own name or mistake another's name for his own, as in the following episode cited by Gross:

In 1893 at Dietkirchen, Bavaria, a teacher, Herr Brunner, and his two children were murdered and his wife and a servant girl badly wounded. After some time the wife regained consciousness, seemed normal in mind again, but could not tell the authorities anything concerning the event or about the criminal. When the police official had completed his negative protocol, she signed it "Martha Guttenberger" instead of "Martha Brunner," her own name. The official noted this and asked what relation she had to the name Guttenberger. Frau Brunner informed him that a former lover of the servant girl, an evil-mouthed fellow, was called by that name. Guttenberger was traced to Munich and there arrested. He immediately confessed to the crime. Frau Brunner later recognized him as the perpetrator of the crime.¹⁷

More involved amnesia is witnessed in cases where persons forget how to speak, read, or write and have to relearn these functions. Again, amnesia

¹⁷ H. Gross, *Criminal Psychology*, 1915, p. 273-74. Copyrighted by Little, Brown & Company.

may involve the entire personality for a considerable period of time, as in the case of what James called alternate personality:

On January 17, 1887, the Reverend Ansel Bourne withdrew \$551.00 from a bank in Providence, R. I., and got into a horse-car. This is the last thing he recalled. He did not return home and a search for the missing man was unsuccessful. In March at Norristown, Pennsylvania, a man calling himself Mr. Brown, "who had rented a small shop six weeks previously, stocked it with stationery, confectionery, fruit and small articles, and carried on his quiet trade without seeming to any one unnatural or eccentric, woke up in a fright and called in the people of the house to tell him where he was." He said his name was Bourne, that he knew nothing of shop-keeping and that the last thing he remembered was taking the money from the bank at Providence. He returned to Rhode Island and took up his former life but he knew nothing of the Norristown episode.

Three years later James hypnotized Bourne who in the trance recalled in detail his experiences from January to March in Pennsylvania. Under hypnosis he failed to recognize his wife and said he had heard of Ansel Bourne but "didn't know as he had ever met the man." Moreover post-hypnotic suggestion failed to bring about an integration of the two selves.¹⁸

The case described by Coleridge during his travels in the Rhineland is often cited as an example of dissociation. It is further of interest to us as showing how different interpretations of such behavior arise from divergence of culture patterns in the groups who knew about it:

A young woman of four or five and twenty, who could neither write nor read, was seized with nervous fever, during which, according to the statements of all the priests and monks of the neighborhood, she became possessed, and, as it appeared, by a very learned devil. She continued incessantly talking Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, in very pompous tones and with most distinct enunciation. . . . The case had attracted the particular attention of a young physician, and by his statement many eminent physiologists and psychologists had visited the town. . . . Sheets full of her ravings were taken down from her own mouth, and were found to consist of sentences, coherent and intelligible each for itself, but with little or no connection with each other. Of the Hebrew, a small portion only could be traced to the Bible; the remainder seemed to be in "Rabbinical" dialect. All trick or conspiracy was out of the question. Not only had the young woman ever been a harmless, simple creature, but she was evidently laboring under a nervous fever. . . . The young physician determined to trace her past life step by step. . . . He, at length, succeeded in discovering

¹⁸ Adapted from W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. I, pp. 391-92. Courtesy of Henry Holt and Company.

the place where her parents lived . . . and that the patient had been charitably taken by an old Protestant pastor at nine years . . . and had remained with him for some years. . . . Anxious enquiries were then, of course, made concerning the pastor's habits; and the solution of the phenomena was soon obtained. For it appeared it had been the old man's custom for years to walk up and down a passage of his house into which the kitchen-door opened, and to read to himself with a loud voice out of his favorite books. . . . Among the books were found a collection of Rabbinical writings, together with several of the Greek and Latin fathers; and the physician succeeded in identifying so many passages with those taken down at the young woman's bedside, that no doubt could remain in any rational mind concerning the true origin of the impressions made in her nervous system.¹⁹

The case of H  l  ne Smith reported by Flournoy in his book, *From India to the Planet Mars*, is also interesting. The patient claimed to be in communication with inhabitants of Mars while in dissociated states. She produced samples of the Martian language which were later exposed as fragments of contemporary European languages confused together. In this case, as in many others, other persons came to accept her alleged spiritistic productions as genuinely supernatural.

From this we are led to more complex multiple personalities, where within the same organism there appear rather opposite types of personalities which alternate at varying intervals over a long period of time. The famous case of Miss Beauchamp, described by Prince in his *Dissociation of a Personality*, is well known. At one time Miss B. had four, more or less distinct, personalities who even carried on complex acts with reference to one another through such social media as letter writing. One personality even wrote saucy, disturbing messages to another.

It is not necessary to go into further detail in these cases. They simply reveal that there is a vast area of conduct which is unconscious and dissociated from the main trends of the personality. So, too, dreams are cut off from the conscious stream of living. A good deal of fantasy life or day-dreaming is also of this character.

In normal persons we do not see the unconscious so vividly exposed as in the pathological. Still, a large mass of images and attitudes are unconsciously motivated. This brings us to the point of attempting to state how the field of social stimulation affects our attitudes and conduct in unconscious ways, and gives us a social-psychological clue to much of the ma-

¹⁹ S. T. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1847, vol. I, pp. 234-35.

terial on the unconscious functioning which many writers have clothed in mystical terms.

The question of stimulation in reference to unconscious responses is the crux, in a way, of the entire problem. It is held by some that the unconscious responses are the result of actions and attitudes and even images built up in us, but which have since been lost to consciousness, either by lack of repetition of the original stimulus or by means of suppression. Others hold that some if not all unconscious acts arise from stimulations of which we were never conscious. Subliminal stimulation—sounds, sights, olfactory, and tactile sensations—reach our organism and affect our behavior thereafter, but we may never be aware of these stimuli. Probably both sets of factors are in operation, and the possible differences in their effects and methods of working out in conduct we do not clearly know. The following brief analysis is offered as a possible clue to the understanding of these processes.

What the psychoanalysts have called suppression or repression, as the case may be, is simply an instance of inhibition. One trend to behavior is inhibited or blocked by another—a fundamental phase of the whole conditioning process in terms of facilitation and inhibition of the cortex. Now the natural trends, the prepotent reflex patterns of anger, fear, sex, disgust, and so on, may be blocked by conditioned responses made to our social-cultural world. As we know, some of the earliest of such conditionings are those involved in control of the bodily processes of elimination. Others concern the control of the time of feeding in infancy; still others involve blocking of violent fear or anger reactions. The group, moreover, provides us with ready-made substitutions for these in language. Thus, we use sarcasm in place of fists to get back on a brother who is stronger than ourselves, or we employ irony on a person whom we dislike, and society does not punish us. The whole concept of the censor, made so much of by Freud in his early writings, might be adequately described in terms of social frames of behavior, in the form of taboos, which the group put upon the individual. The censor is not some mystic entity within the organism, but is a congeries of conditioned patterns of action and imagery which have been developed in the individual by contact with his fellows, and which inhibit the expression of his more biological and rudimentary patterns of action. Often enough, these rudimentary patterns reappear along the margins of consciousness. They break out especially when there is no

demand in the situation for the continuation of the inhibiting pattern. In day-dreaming the boy who has been punished and shut up alone in his bedroom fancies that he is living with foster parents and that his actual parents, who would not treat him so cruelly, are somewhere else. And in the dream the inhibited trends come into play. The memory processes of transposition, elaboration, condensation, and dramatization usually modify the expression in dreams. Less deeply inhibited persons often easily recognize the genuine meaning of their dreams. Thus, a woman who is unhappily married but unable on account of social pressures to divorce her husband, and who is quite conscious of her problem, dreams not infrequently of his death. In other cases the unhappy wife day-dreams of some accident freeing her from her husband. One woman reports that when her husband is away on a journey she often secretly wishes she might hear of his death by accident, and when a telegram or long-distance phone call comes to her, one of her first wishes is that it may report his death. One does not know how many respectable people might under adequate stimulus admit similar thoughts, but there is no doubt that in all of us there exist impulses and desires which do not come to fruition and which we express in day-dreams, night-dreams, and otherwise. One way out of repressed wishes is through wit, allegory, and story-telling or fiction. Unconscious puns or plays on the double meaning of words are good illustrations of this. The following little incident, which came to the writer's notice recently, illustrates very well an unconscious slip of the tongue:

"Do make yourselves at home, ladies," remarked the hostess affably. "I am at home myself and wish you all were."

Much repressed activity in the field of sex today appears in jokes on the stage, in magazines, and in polite conversation. There is also a whole area of talk among men, for example, or between the sexes, where the ordinary taboos have broken down, of stories of sexual adventures, and stories couched in *double entendre*. It is an interesting comment on our sex mores that such a frank and yet symbolic play as *Maya* should be suppressed by the stage censors, while at the same time we tolerate the broadest of jokes and risqué stories in the burlesques the country over. It is simply a revelation of certain escapes from the direct dealing with matters which are tabooed and which reappear in other garbs. Many people have no consciousness of the source of their interest in these camouflages. This itself

may be well, since if they did they might be embarrassed and might not enjoy themselves so thoroughly.

Other sets of stimuli basic to the unconscious probably never entered into consciousness at all. This is a field but little explored. There seems to be common observational as well as much clinical evidence that we get impressions, hear sounds, see sights, taste and smell, have tactile experiences of which we are not aware but which later affect conduct. Prince cites the case of a girl who under hypnosis reported specifically on the color of a man's suit in great detail, while consciously she was completely unaware of these items. Post-hypnotic suggestion reveals a similar body of confirmatory data. In the literature of hypnosis we have hundreds of cases in which the subject is instructed to do something after he is awakened. He is brought out of the hypnotic state and at the time and place suggested performs the act he was told to perform. Curiously enough, these individuals produce rationalizations of their conduct not unlike those of all of us when we are pressed for the reason for conduct the real motives of which are not clear to us.²⁰

Out of our social experience with others, and in the course of their laying down the social-cultural framework of our behavior, there are doubtless hundreds and thousands of situations presented to us of which we are not aware, but which nevertheless influence our future conduct. Shrugs of shoulders, tones of voice, facial movements—all influence us in ways which we little comprehend. In impressing the young with the proper conduct as laid down by the standards of our society, these marginal stimuli of gesture, tone of voice, and facial expression are perhaps almost as important as the purely verbal stimuli in which most culture norms are carried, and which, of course, we are ordinarily conscious of receiving. Children unconsciously take up the gestures and tones of voice of their parents. We often are hard pressed to tell why we like or dislike this person or that, when perhaps our attitudes depend on subliminal stimulations of which we are not at all aware.

Unconscious stimulation and the loss to consciousness of earlier stimulations, must be reckoned with in describing and interpreting the social behavior of individuals. Especially are the emotional feeling-tones and attitudes carried through life in this non-conscious stream of activity. However we react to the theories of Freud, Jung, Prince, or others, the facts of

²⁰ See case cited p. 141.

dissociated, unconscious attitudes and acts are at hand. There is everywhere evidence of the inhibiting effects of social conditioning. We do not have to escape into the realm of mysticism to understand these mechanisms. We might do away with the term unconscious behavior, but we would simply use another word to point to the same thing. Watson calls it un verbalized behavior, but it seems to be more than that.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapters VIII, pp. 176-91; XII, Section B, pp. 284-85.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 - 1. Discuss questions and exercises in assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter VIII, p. 191.
 - 2. What is the relation between feelings and emotions, on the one hand, and the cyclic activity of the organism, on the other?
 - 3. What are the two types of feeling correlated with completeness or incompleteness of response?
 - 4. Discuss, pro and con, the James-Lange theory of emotion. (See Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*, 2nd edition, 1929, for discussion.)
 - 5. What different types of laughter are there? Illustrate.
 - 6. Is it necessary to take the so-called unconscious mental processes and behavior into account in interpreting conduct? Discuss, pro and con.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
 - 1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter VIII, pp. 191-92.
 - 2. Review Greig, *The Psychology of Laughter and Comedy*, 1923.
 - 3. Review Northridge, *Modern Theories of the Unconscious*.
 - 4. Review Van der Hoop, *Character and the Unconscious*.

CHAPTER IX

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR

A. *Variability in Nature.*

Variation in nature is well recognized. No two organisms look or act exactly alike. Differences are found, upon measurement, to exist in the various single organs of the body—in heart, lungs, size of brain, length of bones, etc. Also, when we measure such total contours as weight or height, we find the same thing to be true.

In line with popular statement people do not seem to be born equal in every respect. Neither do they, in spite of democratic theory, acquire equality. Variability among people in physique, temperament, and intelligence, as well as in wealth and social position, is self-evident.

1. *Measures of Individual Differences.*—When we take any samples to measure people in regard to any given trait or group of traits, we find that these differences may be laid out on the scale of units and be dealt with conveniently by statistical devices. In a great many physical and psychological traits the differences seem to distribute themselves in somewhat the same form that chance throws of dice or coins would, or shots at a bullseye from a rifle or cannon. The form of this distribution is familiar to us as the bell-shaped Gaussian or normal probability curve. We find that the big bulk of individuals cluster around the central tendency of this curve. The measures of central tendency we call averages. The most commonly used of these are the mode, median, and arithmetic mean. The mode is that measure on the scale that contains the most items. The median is the middlemost measure of the entire group considered in terms of distribution from highest to lowest measure. The arithmetic mean is the average determined by taking, mathematically, the total magnitude of the various measures divided by the number of cases or the sample.

We are concerned, however, not with how distributed measures of persons summarize themselves into averages, but rather with the variability of these measures over the scale. We are concerned, in other words, with




FIGURE 4.

Showing Normal Probability Curve.

the spread-out-ness of the differences. There are a number of measures of variability. The crudest way to express variability is to state the total range of cases, that is, the stretch from lowest to highest measure represented in one's sample. Mathematically, more accurate measures are average or mean variation, standard deviation, quartile deviation, and probable error. We shall not discuss here the methods of computing these. We need only point out that the first depends on the straight arithmetic mean of the deviations from the arithmetic mean or median. The second is secured by computing "the square of the arithmetic mean of the squares of the deviations from the average of the distribution." If on a normal probability curve "a distance equal to the *standard deviation* is laid off on each side of the mean, and ordinates are erected from the base line to the curve, that between the curve, the ordinates, and the base line will be included 68.26 per cent of the measures represented by the total area."¹ The quartile deviation when laid off on each side of the central tendency or average includes one half of the measures, in the normal probability curve. The quartile deviation equals the probable error if the curve is "normal." In other words, we are able statistically to secure uniform measures of both central tendency and variability. This enables us to compare groups with groups, as well as to relate the individual or any percentage of individuals to the distribution of

¹ H. O. Rugg, *Statistical Methods Applied to Education*, 1917, p. 168. Used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

the entire group under consideration. It is not our purpose to discuss the statistics of variability, but to expose the existence of individual differences and to indicate rather briefly the place which these differences occupy in social behavior.

It should not be imagined that all forms of variation fall under the Gaussian curve. Distributions of incomes and of wealth certainly do not. Differences in public opinion seem often to be bi-modal or multi-modal, and it is doubtful if even such psychological features as emotional differences easily lend themselves to treatment under the normal probability curve. In all of these various distributions, nevertheless, individual variability shows itself in measurable form.

B. *Deviations in Physical Traits.*

Perhaps the most obvious individual differences exist in matters of physique. If any group of persons is measured for height, some will be short, others tall, and the rest, between these extremes, will range above and below an average figure. So, with weight, this same group will range from persons heavy to light in weight, clustering for the most part around a central tendency. These deviations rest upon heredity, maturity, and environmental conditioning. The law of filial regression enunciated by Galton indicates one set of heredity factors. Children of tall parents tend, on the average, to be shorter than their parents, while children of short parents tend to be taller than their parents. Children of one tall and one short parent fall in the average height between the extremes of parental height. Yet growth factors are partially determined by other than hereditary influences. Nutrition plays a distinct part. Statistics show that the economically depressed classes average shorter in height and lighter in weight than the wealthier classes. A long-time change in height and weight was exposed in a study of Ammon in Germany in which he found that recruits from certain sections tended to be taller and heavier in more recent times, due, apparently, to an improved standard of living.

1. *Growth Rates.*—There have been a great number of studies of rates of growth, in terms not only of height and weight, but of various internal organs as well. Many of the earlier studies are open to criticism because they were made of inadequate samples of the general population. Moreover, many studies have been made, not of the same individuals over long periods of time, but of different age groups, on the assumption that the

norms for any given age remain more or less constant. That is to say, the children now ten years old will, one year hence, be in substantially the same position, as to traits, as are the children eleven years old now. Correlations of various rates of growth have been attempted, but, as Ellis points out, "size and function do not necessarily go together," so that correlations of physique with physiological, psychological, or social functions are open to question.

An examination of the data on rates of growth of various organs, or of height and weight, indicate that rates differ tremendously throughout the period from birth to maturity. During the fetal stage, growth is very rapid indeed. During the first three years of life after birth, this high rate continues at least for some organs. In the first year the weight at birth is trebled. From that point on the rate of increase falls off to zero. Sometimes an actual decrease in weight occurs in old age. On the whole, growth in height is slower and continues at a more uniform rate than does increase in weight. The growth of the brain increases markedly throughout the first five or six years of life, and from that point on shows only a slight increase in gross weight.

Growth processes are by no means symmetrical. There are seasonal variations, and at puberty there are, in some organs at least, decided changes in rate. For instance, at birth the ratio of heart size to size of arteries is 25 to 20, at the beginning of puberty it is 140 to 50, at maturity, 290 to 61. At eight years of age, the muscles make up 27 per cent of the total body weight; at fifteen, 32 per cent, and at sixteen, 44 per cent, which is practically that of the adult. Many of the internal organs show distinct acceleration at adolescence. The most obvious changes occur in the sex organs, but the heart, liver, and kidneys, among others, show distinct spurts in rate of growth. The whole physical change at adolescence illustrates very well the differences in developmental rates. Some boys come into puberty as early as twelve and a half years, others do not reach this stage until seventeen or even eighteen years. Crampton distinguished three stages in the development of puberty. Pre-pubescent, pubescent, when the actual shift to sexual maturity took place, and post-pubescent. The following table covering the ages from twelve and a half to eighteen indicates the differences, in percentages, of development.

2. *Sex Differences in Physical Growth.*—Rates of growth differ also between the sexes. This is true in regard to height, weight, and internal or-

Table 4: Showing Age of Pubescence in Boys ²

<i>Age in Years</i>	<i>Pre-pubescent Per cent</i>	<i>Pubescent Per cent</i>	<i>Post-pubescent Per cent</i>
12.5-13.0	69	25	6
13.0-13.5	55	26	18
13.5-14.0	41	28	31
14.0-14.5	26	34	40
14.5-15.0	16	24	60
15.0-15.5	9	20	70
15.5-16.0	5	10	85
16.0-16.5	2	4	93
16.5-17.0	1	4	95
17.0-17.5	0	2	98
17.5-18.0	0	0	100

gans. The following quotation from Woodrow from the findings of Pryor on the growth of the bones, as measured by carpal ossification, offers an illustration of variability between the sexes:

In round figures, he [Pryor] finds the following differences: From the age of one to the age of two, the difference in anatomical age is about one-half year. Anatomically, the girl of one and a half years is as old as the boy of two. This difference gradually increases. At the age of four the girl is anatomically as old as the boy of five. By the age of seven and a half the girl is as old anatomically as the boy of nine; and by the age of ten and a quarter she is as old as the boy of twelve and three-quarters. This latter difference agrees with that displayed at puberty, with respect to which we may say that the girl of twelve and a half is as old as the boy of fifteen.³

Physical variations exist between the sexes as well as within each group. While there are extreme differences within the sexes and while dietary fads and occupation make for deviations, it would seem that adult males tend to muscularity, women to obesity. Man is inclined to be angular in general bodily form, woman to be more curved in her contours. The bones of men are heavier than those of women. And bodily organs differ in proportion between the sexes.

As we shall observe, these bodily differences are not without importance in social behavior. While psychological differences and social and cultural

² Quoted by H. Woodrow, *Brightness and Dullness in Children*, 1919, p. 100. Courtesy of Lippincott & Company.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

divergences are significant, we can never escape the fact that variations in both size and function of the physical organs are basic to many other differences between persons, and perhaps, also, between the sexes.

C. Variation in Psychological Characteristics.

When we turn to examine the evidence on individual differences in psychological traits, again we find that the factors of heredity, growth, and environmental conditioning all play a part. Just how to untangle from the skein of life the precise threads which determine how much of the variation is due to one set of factors and how much to another, has baffled the best students of psychology and education for at least two generations. If we recall our fundamental standpoint that the forces of heredity and environment seem to interlock and to be, in fact, interdependent, we need not take part in this somewhat fruitless controversy. Often environmental forces determine what seems at first sight to be due to heredity. Boas remarks:

I am convinced that a test, for instance, of our rhythmic sense based on negro music would show a complete lack of rhythmic ability among us. Nevertheless, the rhythm of the music of the sixteenth century shows that at that time the rhythmic sense of the average white person was highly developed. There is little doubt that the loss is due to the rhythmic simplicity which developed with polyphonic singing and accompaniment. It is reviving again under the influence of modern jazz.⁴

We may introduce our discussion of differences in psychological performance by the table from Thorndike on page 181.⁵ It presents data for but three individuals, but it shows variability in differing amounts in a wide range of traits and abilities. In items I, II, III, and XII the measurements are objective and impersonal. Measures VII and XI are based on distinctively subjective or personal judgments. The others range between these extremes. We see at once how difficult it is to be absolutely certain that our measures of some psychological traits are perfectly objective. Certainly social-cultural experience will affect the direction of variability in some of these matters.

⁴ F. Boas, "Growth and Development, Bodily and Mental, as Determined by Heredity and by Social Environment," in the symposium, *The Child, the Clinic and the Court*, 1925, p. 186. Courtesy of New Republic Company.

⁵ Modified slightly from E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, 1914, vol. III, p. 155. Handwriting judgments by examination of samples of writing omitted. Courtesy of Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University.

Table 5: Showing Measurements of Three Individuals, A, B, and C

	A	B	C
I. Stature	160 cm.	140 cm.	130 cm.
II. Simple reaction-time to sound	.175 sec.	.125 sec.	.150 sec.
III. Average error in drawing a line to equal a 100 mm. line	3.2 mm.	2.8 mm.	2.2 mm.
IV. Number of words (of a list of 12, heard at a rate of 1 per second) remembered long enough to write them immediately after the last word was read	6 words	9 words	7 words
V. Number of examples in addition (each of 10 numbers, repeating no number in any one example, taken at random from the numbers 10 to 99) done correctly in 8 minutes	14	12	18
VI. Quality, or merit, or goodness of handwriting	...	...	...
VII. School marks in history	Ex.	Good	Poor
VIII. School marks in spelling ...	82	62	93
IX. Efficiency in perception; the number of A's marked in 60 seconds on a sheet containing 100 A's mixed with 400 other capital letters	48 A's	60 A's	82 A's
X. Criminality: number of times convicted of a penal offense	0	1	0
XI. Degree of interest in music	little	moderate	a great deal
XII. Age in days	5,080 d.	6,150 d.	5,615 d.

1. *Differences in Mental Imagery.*—There are decided differences among people both as to type and as to intensity of images. Our images follow our sensations, which, in turn, rest upon the receptor organs. Our

images, therefore, may be visual, auditory, kinesthetic, tactile, gustatory, or olfactory. Within these different types there are marked variations in intensity and persistence of images. The visual type of imagery is said to be the most common. We see the past and conjure up the future in what we call "the mind's eye." Painters, sculptors, and architects are likely to be good visualizers, but Galton reports in his *Inquiries into Human Faculty* that he found some artists who were not of the visual type. Moreover, persons who have keen visual perception do not necessarily revive their experiences in visual terms. James makes this personal comment in one of his footnotes:

I am myself a good draughtsman, and have a very lively interest in pictures, statues, architecture and decoration, and a keen sensibility to artistic effects. But I am an extremely poor visualizer, and find myself often unable to reproduce in my mind's eye pictures which I have most carefully examined.⁶

Furthermore, it appears that as people shift to more and more abstract types of associative thinking their visual imagery declines. Their imagery appears to change toward the vocal-motor or speech type.

The auditory type is less common than the visual. Still some persons have remarkably keen auditory imagery. These individuals actually hear the sound of the words or tones. This seems particularly true of musicians. Beethoven wrote a number of his best-known symphonies even after he had lost his hearing. With his auditory imagery still intact, he could continue to compose music. The playwright Legouv   remarked to his contemporary and fellow-playwright Scribe:

"When I write a scene, I *hear*, but you *see*. In each phrase which I write, the voice of the person who is speaking strikes my ear. . . ." "Nothing more correct," said Scribe. "Do you know where I am when I write a piece? In the middle of the parterre."⁷

Kinesthetic or motor imagery is made up largely of images of movement. In fact, as Titchener remarks, "kinesthetic images are extremely difficult to distinguish from kinesthetic sensations." Eye and head movements play an important part in the recalling of objects. But for our study the most

⁶ W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. II, p. 53. Courtesy of Henry Holt and Company.

⁷ Cited by A. Binet in *The Psychology of Reasoning*, 1912, p. 22-23. Courtesy of Open Court Company.

common form of kinesthetic imagery is found in the field of verbal imagery, where there is a distinct tendency to form the very words themselves in one's throat. The vocal-motor imagery is particularly important in anticipatory responses.

Other types of imagery—tactile, olfactory, and gustatory—are less common and have a less important place. However, disgust may be roused by olfactory and gustatory images in some people, just as the verbal substitutes (words) for the actual experiences with odors and tastes may arouse either pleasant or unpleasant reactions.

There are probably no pure types of imagery. The content of images is drawn from the various sensory experiences and is recalled in various forms. A person may be a strong visualizer for certain types of experiences and a poor one in others. Again, there are various mixtures of types: visual-motor, visual-auditory, or auditory-motor.

A number of quantitative studies have been made of individual differences in imagery. Cattell and Farrand, using a modification of Galton's questionnaire, found the following differences, among others, in a group of 95 college students:

In answer to the question, "Can you call to mind better the face or the voice of a friend?" 75 per cent answered "face," 14.6 per cent answered voice, 10.4 per cent gave miscellaneous replies. To another question: "When 'violin' is suggested, do you first think of the appearance of the instrument or the sounds made when it is played?" 76.8 per cent answered "appearance," 23.2 per cent, "sounds."⁸

Betts' study of mental imagery showed, however, that:

Ability in voluntary imagery is distributed much more evenly among the different types of images than has been commonly thought. . . . Further, so far as voluntary imagery is concerned, visual images cannot claim the supremacy often ascribed to them.⁹

Although people may be able to call up images in most of the sense departments, it seems clear that most of us use visual, auditory, and vocal-motor imagery, together or separately, in most of our imaginary activities.

Individual deviations in imagery reveal variation in the manner in which

⁸ Cf. J. McK. Cattell and L. Farrand, "Physical and Mental Measurements of the Students of Columbia University," *Psychological Review*, 1896; vol. III, p. 646.

⁹ G. H. Betts, "The Distribution and Functions of Mental Imagery," Teachers College, Columbia University, *Contributions to Education*, No. 26, 1909, p. 45.

people revamp their experiences in recall. Since content of anticipatory behavior is an important concern for the social psychologists, it would be worth while to discover whether content of the anticipatory system of the individual is made up of visual, auditory, or kinesthetic, especially vocal-motor, materials. For example, the appeal of personal leaders and of persuaders, like the printed word, might well be modified in terms of differences in types of imagery and their persistence and accuracy.

2. *Differences in Intelligence.*—There is tremendous individual variation in intelligence as in other traits of personality. It seems clear that intelligence differences rest in part upon hereditary factors. The relative constancy of the intelligence quotient, the existence of dull-mindedness and feeble-mindedness in the same families for generations, the divergences in learning capacity revealed in a number of investigations, all seem to indicate the importance of heredity. On the other hand, lack of opportunity for education and leisure time, emotional conditioning, and other factors also influence intellectual growth and set certain limitations upon it. Laying aside the controversy, over which so much ink has been spilled, as to the relative importance of heredity or environment in producing these variations, let us see how these differences appear in a society such as our own, in terms of standardized intelligence tests.

Kuhlman has shown that there are variations among very young infants in their capacity to follow a light with the eyes and to differentiate between various sensory stimuli. By the time the child reaches the age of two, it is possible for us to carry on rather satisfactory tests of his intellectual capacity. The table on page 185 shows the individual differences of 100 two-year-old children, fifty girls and fifty boys on the Kuhlman-Binet Tests for Children of Pre-School Age.¹⁰

These figures show at once that some children even at two years are distinctly ahead of others. Ten per cent of the children are nine months or more advanced over their chronological age, while 26 per cent are six months or more retarded. Already we note from this that some children have an advantage over others in mastering the habits and skills involving, at least, material similar to that in the test. Like differences are found over and over again in other investigations. Baldwin had extensive tests made on children ranging from two to six years of age, and in every type

¹⁰ From F. L. Goodenough, *The Kuhlman-Binet Tests for Children of Pre-School Age*, 1928, p. 38. Courtesy of University of Minnesota Press.

Table 6: Showing Mental Ages of 100 Two-Year-Old Children

<i>Mental Ages</i> <i>Years and Months</i>	<i>No. of Cases</i>
3-0 — 3-2	1
2-9 — 2-11	9
2-6 — 2-8	9
2-3 — 2-5	15
2-0 — 2-2	26
1-9 — 1-11	14
1-6 — 1-8	23
1-3 — 1-5	3
Total	100

of test, of which there were at least thirty-two, he found marked individual variations. For instance, among forty three-year-olds he found that the average intelligence quotient was 112, but that the range for this group was from 84 to 156; among twenty four-years-olds, the average I. Q. was 114, with a range from 79 to 141; among twenty-eight five-year-olds, the average I. Q. was 120, with a range from 86 to 154.

Another illustration: Figure 5 gives graphically the distribution of in-




FIGURE 5.
Showing Scores on Army Alpha Intelligence Test of 313 Twelve-year Old Boys and Girls.¹¹

¹¹ From K. Young, *Mental Differences in Certain Immigrant Groups*, 1922.

telligence scores on Army Alpha test of over three hundred twelve-year-old children of North European ancestry in one public school system. The differences are significant, because all of the children were, at the most, within less than a year of each other in chronological age, but their intelligence, as measured by the test, spreads from dull-normal to a degree of brightness much better than the median grade for enlisted men in the World War. Some individuals in this group were still in the first and second grade, a considerable number in the third and fourth grades. The majority were in the fifth and sixth grades. There were some in the eighth grade, and among these were a few quite capable of doing high school work of first-rate quality.

During the World War the military administration, in connection with psychologists, worked out a rating scale, based on group intelligence tests, in order to estimate the military fitness of the men in the army. The rating scale consisted of the following letters with accompanying interpretations:

<i>Intelligence Rating</i>	<i>Interpretation</i>
A	Very superior: high officer type.
B	Superior: commissioned officer and splendid sergeant material.
C+	High average: Good non-commissioned officer material.
C	Average: Good private material.
C—	Low average: ordinary private.
D	Inferior: largely illiterate or foreign. Slow learners.
D—	Very inferior: but fit for service.
E	Mental inferiority of such grade as to warrant special service organizations or discharge.

Figure 6 on page 187 shows the distribution of these ratings in typical army groups. It reveals the marked individual differences among men in the army, and in a way it indicates what is largely true of peace-time populations. Other studies have shown a correlation of intelligence variability with differences in occupation. The unskilled and semi-skilled tend to have the lowest scores, the skilled trades and clericals the middle scores, and executives, professional, and other leaders the highest scores. There is no doubt but that individual differences have much to do with social status and success in life adjustments. Figure 7 on page 188 reveals differences and overlapping of scores in various occupations.




FIGURE 6.

Showing Distribution of Men in Various Army Groups as Measured by Intelligence Tests.¹²

3. *Differences in Emotional Reactions.*—There has been little systematic work on individual variability in emotions. Certainly no one has studied child behavior with sufficient thoroughness to be able to describe such differences in adequate statistics. Clinical observations, however, expose the existence of variability even if there are no statistical criteria for determining the amounts of these differences for unselected groups of cases. Differences in endocrine balance, for one thing, make for evident variability in emotional expression. Observations on children show that some respond to loud sounds more quickly than others, some show irritation and rage more easily, and so on. It is evident that social conditioning very soon begins to determine, in part, the direction which emotional expression takes. The following instance from a baby clinic shows such a shift:

In the first day of life this infant cried at every new pronounced stimulus—as soon as he was picked up he cried; he ceased to cry when allowed to lie quiet. In two weeks his social environment induced a complete *reversal* of this relation between stimulus and response. He cried while he was in the crib; he ceased to cry when picked up.¹³

¹² From *Army Mental Tests* (pamphlet), 1918, p. 8.

¹³ A. Gesell, *The Mental Growth of the Pre-School Child*, p. 201. Copyright 1926 by the Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.




FIGURE 7.

Showing Distribution of Intelligence in Relation to Occupation Differences.
Median and Overlapping are shown.¹⁴

If this change can occur in a fortnight, one naturally asks what changes may ensue in emotional expression in a few months, and in subsequent years? Thus we are at once confronted with the whole problem of the social conditioning of emotional reactions. Such conditioning affects variabil-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

ity, which, in turn, must greatly alter social interaction. We shall discuss in the next section the place which individual differences in physique, intellect, and emotion occupy in social behavior. Aside from possible deviations in strength of fear, anger, or love responses at the outset, based on differences in physiological structures and functions, it is clear that by the time children come into contact with other children emotional variations are very evident. The observations of Mary Cover Jones on children's fears indicates individual differences in emotions, dependent largely upon social conditioning:

Case 41: Arthur G. Age 4 years: Arthur was shown the frogs in an aquarium, no other children being present. He cried, and said, "they bite," and ran out of the play-pen. Later, however, he was brought into the room with four other boys; he swaggered up to the aquarium, pressing ahead of the others who were with him. When one of his companions picked up a frog and turned to him with it, he screamed and fled; at this he was chased and made fun of, but with naturally no lessening of the fear on this particular occasion.

Case 8: Bobby G. Age 30 months: Bobby was playing in the pen with Mary and Laurel. The rabbit was introduced in a basket. Bobby cried, "No, no," and motioned for the experimenter to remove it. The two girls, however, ran up readily enough, looked in at the rabbit and talked excitedly. Bobby became promptly interested, said, "What? Me see," and ran forward, his curiosity and assertiveness in the social situation overmastering other impulses.¹⁵

These observations indicate at once that emotional responses are built up around specific situations by the process of conditioning. They show, moreover, that variations in emotions, as in intelligence, depend in part at least upon the nature of the situation and the nature of the responses that have been built up toward it. The presence of other persons makes for divergences in response. A child alone in the presence of a barking dog may show fear. A child in the arms of a mother before a barking dog may show other responses. The situation in one case is certainly not like that in the other. Being in the mother's arms is as much a part of the stimulating situation as the dog itself.

D. Physical Differences and Divergent Personality Traits.

Efforts have long been made to correlate physical variations with mental, emotional, and temperamental deviations. On the basis of common-sense

¹⁵ Mary C. Jones, "The Elimination of Children's Fears," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1924; vol. VIII, pp. 387, 389.

observation people have recognized certain differences in personality trends as correlated with differences in physique. Shakespeare puts into the mouth of Cæsar a remark about Cassius:

Let me have men about me that are fat;
Sleek-headed men, and such as sleep o' nights;
Yon Cassius has a lean and hungry look;
He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.

The slender, sober Cassius represents an intellectual type as against the fat, round, jolly Falstaff sort, who is more concerned with his physical pleasures than with political philosophy and power. It was Lombroso, in modern times, who gave the greatest emphasis to the notion that types of behavior were correlated with physical characteristics. His theory of the causes of crime stated that about 40 per cent of criminals were born such, and that one could recognize them by certain anomalies or marks of degeneration, such as asymmetrical head form, low forehead, projection of the ear, flattened nose, and so on. The brilliant researches of Goring in England proved that criminals possessed no more stigmata of criminality than did the "law-abiding public" at large. Again, there has been considerable popular superstition that low intelligence is accompanied by physical abnormalities of various sorts. Pintner, Anderson, and others have shown that judgments of intelligence, based on photographs, even by persons familiar with the feebleminded, show no correlation with actual measurements of intelligence.

Numerous studies have been made to discover any possible correlation of certain morphologic characteristics and intelligence measurements. Naccart and Guinzberg found some correlation between intelligence and the ratio of height to weight, holding that tall, thin persons were somewhat more likely to rate higher in an intelligence test than short, stout persons. Yet Heidebreder's study of height-weight ratios and scores on intelligence tests among a thousand college students failed to reveal any significant correlation between body build and intelligence. Sheldon found some slight relationship between certain bodily measurements and mental ability, i. e., his statistics indicate that within certain broad limits tall, slender men are slightly superior to short, fat men in intelligence.

Over a generation ago Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist, made a basic differentiation between two types of psychoses: the manic-depressive and

the dementia præcox. The former, which is also called the circular or cyclic type, runs to alternating moods of depression or mania. One finds such patients lapsing into intense depressions to be followed by manic, hyperexcitable states, and various combinations of mania or depression with more normal behavior. With this type there seems to be little permanent mental deterioration, on the whole, but rather fairly temporary periods of disorder, followed by quite normal social reactions. In the dementia præcox or schizophrenic type, to use Bleuler's term, the disorientation of mind and behavior is much more insidious in its inception and much more permanent. The disease is marked by regression from social reality. The individual loses contact with his fellows. At the outset his disorder may become apparent by his development of carelessness in dress, manners, food habits, and bodily care. Mentally there is a distinct tendency toward introspection, to the building up of fantasies of one's own, and finally, in the more extreme cases, rather complete severance of relations with the normal social world.

Subsequent clinical observations and some recent experimentation have led to the belief that these two types of mental disorder represent in more divergent form fundamental differences in human personalities. Kretschmer took up the problem of attempting to discover if there was possibly some physical correlation with these types of personality. Taking his cases among patients largely of Swabian ancestry, he made extensive measurements of physical form. From his investigations he found three more or less distinct types, with certain overlapping among them, as one might expect. The types are not absolutely distinct from each other, but rather approximations to types through statistical averages. The first of these types is the asthenic; the second, the athletic; the third, the pyknic. The first is characterized, as a rule, by the lean, narrowly-built man, with poor blood, poor skin secretion, narrow shoulders, long, thin arms with thin muscles, delicately boned hands, long, narrow chest, thin stomach, and the lower limbs built on lines similar to the upper. The face is of the angular sort. There are some variations, but these are the most noticeable features. The second type is marked by strong development of the skeletal framework and the muscles. The skin is firm and healthy. The shoulders are broad, the chest thick, the abdomen well covered with layers of muscle, the trunk tapers toward the middle region, the pelvis is narrow, and the legs are tapering and shapely. The arms are heavily muscled. The face is firm, the jaw prominent,

the nose tends to be shorter and more snub-like. The third type, which according to Kretschmer reaches its highest development in middle age, is characterized by pronounced development of the rounded figure, fat about the trunk, a deep vaulted chest which broadens out toward the lower part of the body. The limbs are soft and round and display little muscle relief, as do those of the second type. The shoulders are usually rounded and pushed slightly forward.

According to Kretschmer, these types do not appear in pure form, necessarily, but are sometimes mixed with others. So, too, he classifies some of his cases as dysplastic, that is, marked by distinct asymmetry of organs.

On the basis of his measurements of nearly four hundred cases of manic-depressives or cyclothymes and of dementia præcox patients or schizophrenics, he worked out a correlation of the two types of temperament with the three types of physique. On the one hand, he found a correlation between the asthenic and athletic types and schizophrenics and, on the other, between the pyknic types and the manic-depressives.

So far, no thorough check-up of the Kretschmer types has been made upon normal populations. Mohr and Gundlach made a study of American-born prisoners at Joliet, Illinois, in an effort to verify Kretschmer's classification. Using first clinical observations and later exact physical measurements, they attempted to classify the men in terms of Kraepelin's two types of personality on the basis of tests. Instead of two or three sharply-defined types, they found rather a gradation from one group to another in physical make-up. In their conclusions they remark:

Our results support in a general way the Kretschmer theory of physical and temperamental kinds, in that a relationship between physique and character of performance is demonstrated. They tend to modify the theory, however, by breaking down even Kretschmer's loose conception of "types" and insisting on the concept of a general progression both of performance and of physical characteristics.¹⁶

The validity of the concept of "type" is involved in all problems of personality differences. At best, perhaps, these may be thought of as average statistical deviations from measurements, both physical and psychological, which are distributed over a common scale. Therefore we may, with-

¹⁶ G. J. Mohr and R. H. Gundlach, "The Relation Between Physique and Performance," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 1927, vol. X, p. 157.

out accepting as final Kretschmer's correlations, recognize in these studies another feature of individual differences which have a bearing upon social behavior. We may imagine personalities arranged along a scale. At one end are the schizophrenics, who are introverted, tender-minded, romantic, and rather infantile in many characteristics. At the opposite end are the cyclothymes, or manic-depressives, who, in contrast, tend to extroversion, to be tough-minded, non-romantic, and distinctly interested in and controlled by the external material and social reality around them. Perhaps the differences, especially toward the extremes of this scale, are such that we are justified in defining them as "types," doubtless with the bulk of the population lying somewhere in the middle range.

As cyclothymics Kretschmer classified realistic and humorous poets, descriptive experimental scientists, and those executives and leaders whom he called "tough whole-hoggers," "jolly organizers" and "understanding conciliators." As schizophrenics, he put formalistic and romantic poets, exact logicians and systematic metaphysicians, and those executives and leaders whom he termed "pure idealists," "despots and fanatics," and "cold calculators."

Other attempts have been made to link up morphologic traits with social characteristics. Sheldon found slight but positive correlations between certain social traits, determined on a rating scale, and certain physical characteristics. Of the sixty correlations computed, twelve are above 0.10; only two above 0.20; eighteen are negative, but with one exception low. The following quotations from this writer's study give some of the more significant findings:

Sociability shows a negative correlation (-0.217) with morphological index, and a positive one with weight (0.131). This seems to support to some slight extent the popular notion that fat or "heavy-set" men are more sociable than thin men. Yet there is no correlation higher than 0.09 between sociability and any single physical measurement. Whatever relation exists here is certainly not due to the preponderance of any particular part of the anatomy over the rest.

The trait *aggressiveness* shows the greatest number of relatively high correlations with the physical measurements. . . . The correlation of 0.240 between this trait and transverse epigastric diameter is the highest in the entire group. . . . Aggressiveness appears to go with bigness of frame rather than with any special morphologic trait. . . . Weight apparently is less a factor here than general bigness of stature. There seems to be some slight evidence that

macrosplanchnics [related to Kretschmer's pyknic type] are more aggressive than microsplanchnics [like the asthenics].

In the column headed *Leadership* three correlations are over 0.10. . . . The large-bodied fellows (macrosplanchnics) are somewhat higher in both sociability and leadership, apparently to about the same degree that they are lower in scholarship and intelligence. . . .

Emotionality correlates uniformly low with almost all of these measurements. . . . It is of interest to note that the three traits, leadership, aggressiveness, and emotionality show uniformly positive correlations with all the measurements, and all three correlate negatively with the morphologic index. Evidently these traits are associated slightly with general bigness of body, and also to some slight extent with compactness, or preponderance of the torso over the extremities. Perseverance shows almost the opposite tendency.

Eight of the twelve correlations between *Perseverance* and physical measurements are negative, but they are very low.¹⁷

While these figures do not give variability within the group, and while the correlations are low and made on only twenty-eight cases, they do reveal some slight relationship of physique to social traits as measured by ratings of others. In considering leadership, aggressiveness, sociability, emotionality, and perseverance, as rated on a scale at least, one must take into account individual variation in physical characteristics.

E. Social Behavior and Individual Variability.

Again we must emphasize the fact that the variations which we have been noting do not rest upon hereditary bases alone. Nutrition, endocrine balance, practice, and social experience all play a part. We noted that height and weight of populations varied with food supply. There are differences in physical and mental maturation correlated with economic and social status. Certainly cultural deviations and personal-social experiences have much to do with individual differences. On the other hand, in many ways these conditioning factors make for likenesses as well. For instance, violin playing may be engaged in by persons with variations in morphology of hands and arms, and yet the listeners at a concert may not be aware of these differences. So, too, social groups demand conformity to certain codes of behavior, certain definitions of situations, in spite of divergences in physical, mental, and emotional traits. Thus, while individual variability is highly significant, the direction which individual life organization

¹⁷ W. H. Sheldon, "Social Traits and Morphologic Types," *The Personnel Journal*, 1927, vol. VI, pp. 51-53.

takes is largely determined by cultural norms and personal-social experience and not alone by these more strictly biologic factors. To reassert our fundamental standpoint, in unraveling the factors in any individual's behavior we must at all times take into account his biological, psychological, and cultural backgrounds. No one of these alone is sufficient to account for behavior.

In spite of certain behavior patterns common to various groups, cultural and personal-social conditioning produces divergences which we shall have occasion to note further on. Here we shall indicate these influences only in broad outline.

1. *Conditioning and Deviations.*—The new-born child is thrown by circumstances at once into a world in which he is the weakest and most dependent member. The whole period of infancy may be one in which the child takes a position of inferiority. Physically he is at the mercy, more or less, of parents, of older and stronger brothers and sisters, and later of playmates. Then, too, his native talents may be bent into patterns which fit the family code, as when a boy of artistic tastes may have to forego their development in order to help support the family by ordinary labor. Or a boy may be apprenticed to a skilled trade when under other circumstances he might well have become an inventor. Then, too, rivalry in the family may give rise to the development of certain traits, such as aggressiveness or docility, out of the very relationship of a child to his parents and his siblings. For example, the first boy of a family may acquire dominant attitudes because the parents favor the younger brother or sister. His aggression is developed as a means of getting attention. Adler has shown how potent these influences are. Therefore, one raises the question whether dominance or aggressiveness and the degree of its intensity are really matters of inherited differences, as experimental psychologists sometimes assume, or a development based upon social or cultural conditioning.

If the family belongs to a certain social class, the child is compressed into the types of action and attitude of that class, no matter if he may wish otherwise. The boy who might be shy and retiring may assume the position of superiority demanded by the social status of his family. Too frequently writers, past and present, have assumed that attitudes of dominance and the assumption of rôles of social leadership rest really upon innate ability, when actually these may depend in large part upon economic and social status of the class, coupled with the culture pattern of ascend-

ency. It is curious, as Michels, Pareto, and others have pointed out, that the upper classes or the élite everywhere tend to take on certain formal leadership characteristics. This is neatly seen in the rise of the poor immigrant family in our own country to a position of opulence or political power. When a person arrives at these social positions later, he, and especially his children, soon take on the distinctions of their class and before long the marks of peasant and "common" origin are left behind. The *nouveau riche* always assume the *letters patent* of the classes which they aspire to reach.

One of the most profound factors in determining individual differences in society is occupational choice. Further on we shall point out some of the effects of occupation upon social attitudes, but at this point it is sufficient to note that the vocation which a person has to take or which he chooses will make a vast difference in his relations to his fellows. The division of labor in modern society sets up frames of occupation which make for significant divergences in the personality.

At the outset differences in learning capacity will give one boy great advantages over another in mastery of school subjects, in learning to take care of himself in a group and to acquire the social and moral codes which make adjustment to his fellows more easy. By the time they reach adulthood some people are found in highly skilled and technical professions, a mass in the middle range of small business or skilled trades, and the rest at the bottom as semi-skilled and unskilled laborers. The variations are evident to all, and whether the distributions revealed by the paper and pencil tests of the psychologists give the exact picture is beside the point. The significant fact is that individual variability is correlated in the social order with division of labor.

Not only does capacity to learn determine the direction of one's place in this scheme of division of labor, but cultural patterns also play a part. Class lines determine that the sons of professional men shall go, on the whole, into professions. The boys of railroad engineers tend to be apprenticed to their father's work. Not only do differences in learning ability and the cultural norms of the group fix the division of labor, but the personal-social experience of the individual may assist in the process. For instance, the sense of inferiority of the eldest son in a family developed from being given less place than the younger children, may set up in him such negative reactions that the suggestions of his father or mother about a certain

profession or occupation may meet with resistance. In order to offset this authority he may take to some other vocation. In this way he retaliates for the manner in which his parents treated him. Again, a doting mother may project on her son some vocation for which he is not particularly well fitted, and yet by dint of practice he may attain mediocre success. Here the mother-son relation—a socio-personal experience—determines the direction of life organization and the individual's place in the scheme of the division of labor.

A case of the effects of different opportunity in relation to occupation is illustrated in the immigrant family where the older boys, due to economic stress, are forced into common and semi-skilled labor, but when the economic status of the family improves, the younger members of the family get a better education and go into business or the professions. If this is not possible within one generation, something similar takes place in the occupational differences between the first and second generations. If the cultural lag is great, it may require three or more generations for the shift to take place. Throughout all this the opportunity for education, such as schools, general community or group approval of intellectual and vocational betterment, must be considered. Another example of the effect of occupation on individual differences is seen in the generally known fact that a considerable number of European immigrants to our country have to give up their old world occupations, often skilled trades or even technical professions, and take up common or semi-skilled work here in order to make a living. Bloch reports:

Taking these sixteen skilled occupations [given in his tables from U. S. reports], only 23.7 per cent of those who came to the United States and did not return took up their former occupations; 76.3 per cent scrapped their skill and experience and took up some other trade.¹⁸

This would give a re-shifting of individual variability in society which might quite belie the original intellectual capacity of the persons concerned. So, too, financial reverses may reduce a family from one social class to another, producing another realignment of individual functioning in the social group. This is witnessed in class changes which have taken place in post-war Europe, especially in Germany and Austria. Many

¹⁸ L. Bloch, "Occupations of Immigrants Before and After Coming to the United States," *Quarterly Publication of American Statistical Association*, 1920-21, vol. XVII, p. 760.

families formerly of aristocratic or upper middle-class status have been reduced to the lower economic levels. On the other hand, former petty bourgeois families have risen in social rank through financial success.

Similar differences in social function are evident in the religious and political life of individuals. Participation in the church group of one's family may lead to the development of habits of attendance at church or Sunday school, or it may lead one into becoming a Sunday school teacher. In contrast, membership in another church might not lead to a social function of this sort at all. This matter is exactly illustrated in the Mormon church, where there are no paid ministers. Here the differentiation in function in the religious group goes very far, because in terms of capacity, education, interest, and the social prestige of certain prominent families, a man or woman may come to assume a position of leadership which in other church groups the lay member might never gain.

Again, out of religious training, differences in world view and the meaning of life may stretch over wide areas. No matter how alike in physique, in emotional-instinctive tendencies, and in native learning capacity two brothers may be, if one were raised a Catholic and one a Baptist, each would be bound to develop attitudes reflecting his religious training, and the differences in life philosophy could be fully interpreted only in terms of their divergent social and cultural backgrounds. Even identical twins, as Freeman has shown, develop into distinctly different personalities when reared in divergent families and varied cultural milieu. In the larger scope of philosophic viewpoints the Christian might develop notions of freedom of the will, whereas the child raised in the agnostic and scientifically trained family might reasonably be expected to take on a world view of determinism and even a kind of fatalism. The differences in *ethos* rest really upon just these variations in the individuals, which, in turn, go back largely to divergent culture patterns.

Similar comment may be made in regard to political differences in people. These may have little or no relation, for example, to deviations in native learning ability, but rather depend upon similar social-cultural patterns from respective political camps, Democratic, Republican, or Socialist, or in certain European countries, Royalist or Monarchist as against Republican or Communist.

The upshot of the matter is that social-cultural patterns inflict upon us forms of individual differences other than those determined by biological

forces. There is, no doubt, some correlation between intelligence and scholarship, and between intelligence and business success, but the differences are not at all determined by something inherent. In fact, even with the highly unreliable intelligence tests, which rest so much on cultural factors, the positive correlation with occupation is hardly better than 0.30 and usually less. The statistical reliability of these figures is extremely low. Individual variations are everywhere evident in society, and some of these differences rest rather distinctly on biological divergences—divergences in capacity, physical, emotional-instinctive, or intellectual. Other deviations arise out of personal-social experience. Still others are laid down by the cultural patterns. Once more we must be careful not to fall into the particularistic fallacy and try to interpret such phenomena as individual variability in terms of one dimension only, but always recall the three factors: the biological-psychological roots, personal-social experience, and the stimulation through cultural patterns. These factors must be examined before the full picture can be exposed and certainly before one may venture a guess as to which of these produced the difference or which, if all of the factors contributed together, contributed most.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter VI, Section A, pp. 121-39.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises in assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter VI, p. 143, nos. 1-6.
 2. What factors produce individual differences (a) in physical traits, (b) in intellectual traits, (c) in emotional traits?
 3. Discuss, pro and con, the weight to be given "original nature" and "nurture" (personal-social and cultural influences) in producing the personality. Do we gain anything by attempting to fix definitely the weight of each set of influences? (Cf. Child's paper, *Source Book*, no. 55, pp. 194-206, and the discussion above, Chapter III, pp. 35-40.
 4. (a) In which dimensions of adult personality are "original" factors more dominant, (b) in which, factors called "nurture"?
 5. Illustrate how cultural norms may override individual differences.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
 1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter VI, p. 144.
 2. Report on Thomas, *Child in America*, Chapter XI, on recent studies showing relation of physical traits to personality.

PART THREE

Personality and Group Participation

Behold the Child among his new-born blisses,

See, at his feet, some little plan or chart,
Some fragment from his dream of human life,
Shaped by himself with newly-learned art;

A wedding or a festival,

A mourning or a funeral,

And this hath now his heart,

And unto this he frames his song:

Then will he fit his tongue

To dialogues of business, love or strife;

But it will not be long

Ere this be thrown aside,

And with new joy and pride

The little Actor cons another part. . . .

WORDSWORTH

“A man may be one thing as a church member and another thing as a member of the business community.”—DEWEY

In the last section we dealt with the major mechanisms of individual behavior. We now turn to study the rise of the personality out of the social milieu in which the individual lies, moves, and has his being. The personality may be defined as the sum total of images, ideas, attitudes, and habits of the individual organized in terms of his social participation. Personality, therefore, is an outgrowth of the conditioning of the individual to the personal-social and cultural environment. The first chapter in this division deals with the rise of language in the individual. Language, the foundation of communication between persons, makes advanced social participation possible. Subsequent chapters show how the personality grows up in relation to family, play-groups, neighborhood, congenial groups, gangs, comradeships, and the whole range of secondary groups and institutions. The important place of occupational attitudes in the personality receives a separate chapter. The section closes with a discussion of leadership, authority, and prestige as they are related to group backgrounds.

CHAPTER X

LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION

A. *Language in Communication and Culture.*

Language is the carrier of a vast amount of what we call culture. Knowledge of the past, techniques of science and of food-getting, taboos and social rituals, all are carried in language, or at least have language counterparts, as is particularly clear in the case of material culture. From the point of view of social psychology, language is important, first as it relates to communication, and second as it functions in the socialization of the individual, that is, in the development of his personality. Moreover, it carries for the person the social definitions of situations, the world of discourse, and the whole range of culture content which impinges upon him. It is the medium of interaction without which social life could not develop, without which the individual could not become intelligent. It is now our purpose to trace the evolution of speech and to discuss the psychology of speech development. Language, as it relates to social participation and as it reflects the whole social reality in which we live, will be the subject of a later chapter.

1. *Evolution of Language.*

a. *Theories of Origin.*—There are a number of theories of the origin of language, no one of which seems to be adequate. The three classic explanations are the “Bow-wow,” the “Pooh-Pooh,” and the “Ding-Dong” theories. In the first, the word is said to arise from the sound associated with the object. It is a sort of natural “imitation.” Thus, the name “chickadee” arises from the sound made by this bird, or the word “crackle” arises from the sound of a breaking stick. In the second, it is said that words arise from the affective and emotional vocal responses. Thus, “ah,” “oh,” cries and shouts, made as ejaculations in the presence of emotionally exciting situations, give the foundation to words with meanings. The third theory attempts to account for the rise of language from an innate, reflex associa-

tion of vocal response and object. Judd cites the case of a child who referred to the pebbles in his hand as "pocos," and Wells mentions a child who called a buggy whipstock a "conger." This theory seems to imply that if society did not already have terms for objects, a child or adult who thus unconsciously invented a name for an object might project this name upon others. Hence, by acceptance of the word, the symbol for the object would be established. The "yo-he-ho" theory, added by Noire, assumes that language arose from common emotional expressions in group occupations, as illustrated in rhythmic action in a group rowing a boat, pulling on a fishing net, or participating in other social enterprises. Jespersen holds a somewhat analogous theory in his emphasis upon emotional vocal interstimulation in prehuman and early human stages of evolution.

It is likely that language arose from a combination of various factors. Yet no one is able definitely to say just how. Our best inferences may be drawn from observations of infra-human species and from studies of child-learning.

b. *Rise of Gesture.*—It is evident that language has its roots in gestures. Speech is nothing else but a form of vocal gesture or particular sound combination associated with certain meanings; and meanings are part of our anticipatory response system. Thus, language is based on vocalization, which is universal in the entire human race, but it is meaningful only as it occurs in a social-cultural setting. To understand the foundations of language it is necessary to see it in terms of the evolution of the whole gesture system—vocal, manual, and facial.

One of the great turning-points in the evolution of our species was the assumption of an erect posture. This changed the configuration of the environment to which the organism responded. The nature and range of our visual field was altered. Objects, in both vertical and horizontal perspective, took on other forms than had been the case when the animal still ran on all fours. Moreover, the erect posture freed the hands for manipulation of objects—the hands could reach for and tear food instead of playing a part in locomotion. Likewise, the erect posture freed for new purposes the musculature of the snout that had hitherto been occupied with tearing and rending food. The hands, the face, and especially the vocal organs became significant in new relations both to the physical world and to the world of members of one's own or nearly related species. And this significance lay particularly in the field of the gesture.

A gesture is defined as "a motion of the body, head, or limbs, especially a movement or action of the hands or face, expressive of some idea or emotion or illustrative of some utterance." For our purposes we include in gesture the vocal responses as well. A grunt, a sigh, a shout constitute gestures just as much as do movements of the facial muscles or the hands. All of these various types of gestures may be thought of as indicating an action to come. In other words, a gesture bespeaks or denotes an oncoming act. In this sense it assumes the characteristic of an attitude. As Mead puts it, a gesture is "a truncated act." In the evolution of social intercourse the gesture has played an enormously important rôle. Thus the cry of warning of the frightened animal or bird gives a clue to others of its species of incipient danger. So, too, the love-calls of the moose or the bird are indicative of mating acts to follow. In this sense one may speak of communication of the lower animals, for certainly their activities are constantly being modified by the gestures of other animals. The matter is nicely illustrated in the rudimentary stages of a dog fight. There is smelling, growling, baring of teeth, movement toward and away; there is thrusting of ears forward or back, a circling round and round each other, before the actual attack takes place. Thus, the forward thrust of the head and the growl of one dog may lead to a sideward movement of the other dog, or a like forward movement of the second dog, to be followed, in turn, by a sideward movement, or retreat, or further forward movement of the first. In the milling about of the two dogs, as in the sparring for an opening of two boxers, the preliminary activities are largely in the nature of gestures, indicative of oncoming, more complete acts.

Fundamental associations seem to be built up in the higher animals in the field of gesture, particularly in reference to such activities as sex and mating, food-getting, escaping from danger, and fighting. Darwin held that the rudimentary acts or gestures of animals were largely survivals of actual activities once engaged in by the earlier forms, but it is just as likely that in the evolution of the various species, with the recession of the snout, with the assumption of erect posture, with the coming of elementary gregarious activities, the gestures developed as parts of the larger activities mentioned above: mating, food-getting, and rudimentary social intercourse. At any rate, these gestures became important for survival of the higher species. Gestures are related to internal changes in the organism and to external changes in the situation to which it responds. These internal

changes, in their elementary form, consist largely, as we have seen, of physiological tensions which may be called drives. For example, at the mating season the male pigeons take to strutting before the females and to calling them with peculiar vocal gestures. These, in turn, are significant for the female in determining her response to the male. Again, in feeding, the calling of the rooster over the newly found seeds serves as a stimulus to other chickens to come running up to the spot. These gestures are not true language in the human sense of the word. Bird or animal calls do not convey definite concepts, such as the kind of food or the sort of danger sensed by the animal. The sounds merely secure attention of other members of the species and arouse in them attitudes or tendencies to action.

Of most interest to us in the matter of human speech, however, are the observations which have been made of the gestures of the higher apes. Here we have some indication of the possible roots to our own language. Köhler has pointed out that the vocal gestures of the apes are "subjective" and can only express emotions, not designate objects. However, their range of expression by facial and vocal gesture is very rich. They show rage, fear, despair, grief, "pleading desire," playful attitudes, and pleasure.

While the apes have not arrived at true language in the sense in which we define objects and have free verbal images or ideas and concepts, they have advanced considerably in their capacity to indicate situations by gestural pointing and by a wide range of emotional expression. It remained for man, however, to develop true language as it is related to the higher forms of thought, that is, to the most discriminatory phases of anticipatory behavior. This capacity to acquire true speech is correlated with the development of the higher association areas of the cerebral cortex.

2. *Non-Vocal Gestures in Human Communication.*—Even with the development of true vocal language among human beings, there remains a considerable place for manual and facial gesture in communication. In man the expression of feeling and emotion is often carried by these gestures quite as effectively as by vocal speech, if not more so.

The delicate musculature of the human face and neck, as well as the larger muscle groups of the torso and the arms, all serve as stimuli and response organs in social intercourse. There is little doubt that social stimulation by others conditions the forms of these gestures enormously; but the fact remains that the organism is supplied with a set of muscular

mechanisms for showing rage, fear, surprise, laughter, smiling, and pleasurable feelings which are highly significant in the field of social inter-stimulation and response. Allport has ably reviewed the literature on non-vocal gestures and has also presented some of his own findings. He has summarized Rudolph's study of five types of facial expression: pain-grief, surprise-fear, anger, disgust, and pleasure. The following table correlates these facial expressions with each of the five types, of which the first four are unpleasant, the last pleasant:

Table 7: A Synopsis of Facial Expressions and Emotional States¹

	Pain and Grief	Amazement and Fear	Anger	Disgust	Pleasure (Smiling and Laughing)
Brows and Forehead	Raised. Knitted. Oblique out and down. Wrinkles h. v.	Raised. Wrinkles h. (amazement Terror as in Pain)	Lowered. Knitted. Oblique in and down Wrinkles v.	Slightly knitted Wrinkles v.	Smooth (except in violent laughing)
Eyes	Partly or fully closed (Tears)	Wide open	Wide open	Varying. Usually narrow, resembling smiling	Partly shut. Lower lid raised "Crow's-feet"
Nose	Compressed (thinned) Elongated	Alae dilated (in terror)	Alae dilated (in rage)	Raised. Shortened. Wrinkled. Alae raised at sides	Natural
Mouth	Lowered. Open and skewed (in groaning)	Opened. Wide and fixed (in strong fear)	Rectangular rigid opening Exposing lower teeth	Slightly elevated	Raised. Open, upper teeth shown (laugh) Closed (smile)
Lips	Depressed at corners Lower lip trembling	Somewhat depressed at corners	Depressed at corners Lower lip tense	Depressed at corners Lower lip protruding	Corners drawn back and up Upper lip raised, tense
Lower Jaw	Drooping	Immovable	Rigid Protruding	Raised	Dropped and trembling (in laughing)
Head	Sunk forward	Drawn back or averted	Advanced	Sometimes averted	Thrown back (in laughing)

¹ From F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, 1924, p. 209. The abbreviations h. and v. denote horizontal and vertical. Used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

In addition to these gestures of emotional sort some facial reactions indicate intellectual attitudes such as belief, incredulity, helplessness, certainty, and the like. Allport reviews a few samples of these attitudinal gestures as follows:

Admitting a wide range of individual difference in these mannerisms, we may mention a few which are fairly universal. Doubt, or hesitation, is expressed by raising the brows. The eyes, however, are not widely opened as in attention or fear. Incredulous or critical doubt adds also a protruding or pursing of the lips. Raised brows and a wide direct gaze after speaking serve as a facial interrogation point, and demand an answer. Determination, or command, the facial imperative, is shown in the firm closure of the lips and teeth, tense jaw muscles, and wrinkles beneath the lower lip and upon the chin. It is represented in conjunction with hateful distrust.²

It has been shown that among the apes facial grimaces, as well as vocalization, serve as stimuli to other forms of behavior. In human intercourse it is universally accepted that facial gestures are often better clues to a man's attitudes than are his words. Frequently after a person has spoken, the unconscious impression of his facial gestures remains with us as the basis of our like or dislike, our belief or disbelief in what he says. Some persons seem to have a special talent for making judgments of persons largely in terms of their facial gestures.³ And there seems to be evidence that fortune-tellers and would-be personality experts are often gifted with a capacity to catch the trends of thoughts and wishes of their clients in the changes of eye and in the slight gestures and incipient responses of the whole delicate facial musculature which the ordinary observer would overlook. One usually betrays the answers to one's own questions to these people, who give one back, often enough, the answers secretly wished for and indicated in one's face.

Gesture is an important background to the whole matter of communication, because, after all, language rests upon vocal gestures, more significant than manual and facial gestures only because of the wider range of meaningful combinations which vocal sounds permit. If our voices had the restricted range of the facial muscles, our vocabularies would be no larger and no more definite than is the present scope of our words to de-

² F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, 1924, p. 208. Used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

³ Tone and intensity of voice also play a part. These factors will be mentioned below.

fine the meaning of facial gestures. Yet, at the outset, manual, facial, and vocal, but non-verbal, gestures are significant in the evolution of human communication and, *pari passu*, of human intelligence. As Judd remarks:

In human life there is breadth of attention exhibited in gesture. The person who makes a gesture includes in his experience the person with whom he wishes to communicate, plus the idea which is to be communicated. . . . Gesture, or gesture language, as it is called, is thus seen to be not merely a complex form of behavior but one which expresses a new type of relationships between the reactor and his environment. Gesture is a social form of behavior involving attention to persons as well as to objects. Indeed gesture supersedes the more direct forms of attack on objects.⁴

While among animals the expression of feelings and emotions in the presence of situations, material or social, may and does serve as a stimulus for other forms of like species, in man these incipient, truncated, oncoming responses come to have relationships to concepts, and to carry with them definite intention to alter the behavior of the other person who sees or hears the gesture. Doubtless the rudiments of this sort of anticipatory response of one form to another are seen in the apes, but, after all, their gestures are limited to immediate situations and are distinctly restricted in their power to do more than to call the attention of other members of the species to the situation. It remains for man with his gestures and true speech to discriminate and to anticipate overt response by means of language. The following illustration from Dewey reveals the essential function of true language in communication:

A requests B to bring him something, to which A points, say a flower. There is an original mechanism by which B may react to A's movement in pointing. But natively such a reaction is to the movement, not to the *pointing*, not to the object pointed out. But B learns that the movement *is* a pointing; he responds to it not in itself, but as an index of something else. His response is transferred from A's direct movement to the *object* to which A points. Thus he does not merely execute the natural acts of looking or grasping which the movement might instigate on its own account. The motion of A attracts his gaze to the thing pointed to; then, instead of just transferring his response from A's movement to the native reaction he might make to the thing as stimulus, he responds in a way which is a function of A's *relationship*, actual and potential, to the thing. The characteristic thing about B's understanding of A's movement and sounds is that he responds to the thing from the standpoint of A. He per-

⁴ C. H. Judd, *Psychology*, 1917, 2nd. ed., pp. 216, 217. Courtesy of Chas. Scribner's Sons.

ceives the thing as it may function in A's experience, instead of just egocentrically. Similarly, A in making the request conceives the thing not only in its direct relationship to himself, but as a thing capable of being grasped and handled by B. He sees the thing as it may function in B's experience. Such is the essence and import of communication, signs and meaning. Something is literally made common in at least two different centers of behavior. To understand is to anticipate together, it is to make a cross-reference which, when acted upon, brings about a partaking in a common, inclusive, undertaking.

Stated in greater detail; B upon hearing A, makes a preparatory reaction of his eyes, hands and legs in view of the consummatory act of A's possession; he engages in the act of grasping, carrying and tendering the flower to A. At the same time, A makes a preparatory response to B's consummatory act, that of carrying and proffering the flower. Thus neither the sounds uttered by A, his gesture of pointing, nor the sight of the thing pointed to, is the occasion and stimulus of B's act; the stimulus is B's anticipatory share in the consummation of a transaction in which both participate. The heart of language is not "expression" of something antecedent, much less expression of antecedent thought. It is communication; the establishment of coöperation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership. To fail to understand is to fail to come into agreement in action; to misunderstand is to set up action at cross purposes. . . .

A in making the request of B, at the same time makes the incipient and preparatory response of receiving the thing at the hands of B; he performs in readiness the consummatory act. B's understanding of the meaning of what A says, instead of being a mere reaction to sound, is an anticipation of a consequence, while it is also an immediate activity of eyes, legs and hands in getting and giving the flower to A. The flower is the thing which it immediately is, and it also is means of a conclusion. All of this is directly involved in the existence of intelligible speech.⁵

3. *The Language of Primitive Peoples.*—Language is found among all human groups—even those possessing the simplest culture traits. Language, in truth, is bound up with every phase of culture, simple or complex. It has been a common notion that the language of primitives is peculiarly inefficient, that these peoples reveal their mental inferiority in their language. It is held that agglutinative types of language are less capable of expressing abstract thought than our own; and it is further thought that there is some parallel between the language of primitive peoples and that of small children. The speech of the latter runs to gesture, to concrete forms, to simpler grammatical forms than that of adults. This

⁵ Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, 1925, pp. 178–79, 181. Courtesy of the Open Court Publishing Company.

thesis, however, is merely the outcome of an ethnocentric notion of the white race. Particularly it is a cultural hangover from the fact that early students of modern philology tended to assume that the Indo-European languages were superior to all others, and that complex ideas could not be expressed except in terms of our inflecting or isolating types of language. Certainly modern languages of civilized peoples are more complex than those of simpler peoples, in the sense in which the entire culture of the former is richer and more complex than that of the latter. Increases in size of vocabulary do not mean any essential changes in form. As Kroeber puts it:

No clear correspondence has yet been traceable between type or degree of civilization and type of language. Neither the presence nor the absence of particular features of tense, number, case, reduplication, or the like, seems ever to have been of demonstrable advantage toward the attainment of higher culture. . . .

So, from the point of view of civilization, language does not matter. Language will always keep up with whatever pace culture sets it. . . . In general, every language is capable of indefinite modification and expansion and thereby is enabled to meet cultural demands almost at once.⁶

Many modern writers naïvely imagine that language form rather than language content is the significant matter. It is frequently said that native peoples can not express abstract ideas, the implication being that they are incapable of doing so, on the side both of mentality and of language form, but the evidences of careful anthropological research do not bear this out. The terms of relationship alone in many cultures are extremely complex. It is only because we are so prepossessed by our own culture that we ignore the validity and complexity of both mind and language of other peoples. Thus we must not assume that the language of the white race has anything inherently superior in it, except insofar as the culture which is carried through the language is superior. As we shall see, there is a vast amount of our language, as of our culture, that is infantile and autistic, just as is much of the language and culture of primitives. This is not because of language form, but because of the persistence in our own day of culture forms and ideas which bespeak man's emotional, affective, illogical thinking and acting.

⁶ From *Anthropology* by A. L. Kroeber, 1923, pp. 113, 114. By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

4. *Language as Means of Communication and as Carrier of Culture.*—

The social nature of language is obvious at once. Language arises in social situations. Even the rude emotional calls of the lower animals are directed to members of their own species. In the case of the human being he learns his language in reference to others around him. The refinement of language follows, or rather accompanies, the refinement of ideas and thinking. As our thought becomes more precise and exact, our language does also. Hence in more complex culture groups, people are able to communicate the most abstract conceptions of science, art, and philosophy. By rudimentary emotional vocalization the apes are able, in a crude manner, to designate general situations to others. With human beings language permits the recall of past experiences in the form of images and ideas. It is able to refer to the future condition. It permits reference to time and space, to possible or conditional situations, and to a world of relationships in detail, of which the lower animal is incapable.

So long as the language of the race persisted only through the spoken word the transmission of culture from generation to generation was rather limited. With the evolution of written language further advances in complexity of culture were possible. Clodd remarks in his *Story of the Alphabet* that "the invention of writing alone made possible the passage from barbarism to civilization, and secured the continuous progress of the human race." Written language apparently began with the notching of sticks, such as are used by the Australian natives for messages, or with the knotting of rope to number objects, as with the ancient Peruvians. Also early pictographs of objects came to have symbolic meaning. So, in the case of Egypt, the crude sketches on walls or paper gave way to abbreviated picture writing, and thence to hieroglyphics. Finally the Phoenicians, or some other Near Eastern group, invented true phonetic writing, in which man could associate directly his spoken with his written language. With written language at hand, the cultural accumulations of the past could be made more secure for the future. These written symbols, in turn, affected the rate of change in civilization, because written records themselves became a part of the social environment to which the new individual was exposed in the course of his development. Thus, with us, reading, spelling, writing, and arithmetic, which is a related form of written language, become the key school subjects. Through these "tool subjects" the storehouses of the world's literature, science, and philosophy are made available. So much of

modern culture is bound up in books that it would be hard to imagine its continuance if the capacity to write and to read were suddenly to disappear.

Language becomes a most important tool of personal-social communication, on the one hand, and a most important carrier of culture, on the other. We shall later discuss the relation of language to culture and social reality. Let us here examine the acquirement of language in the child, as this will expose the methods by which the medium of human interaction and the transmission of culture operate.

B. Psychology of Language Development.

1. *Stages in Speech Development.*—One of the universal and prepotent tendencies or reflex patterns of the new-born infant is vocalization. From birth the infant possesses the capacity to use his vocal organs, but, at the outset, with no more social significance than the movement of his legs and arms or the use of his excretory organs. As Jespersen puts it: "A child's scream is not uttered primarily as a means of conveying anything to others." It is not true speech, but at best an emotional-instinctive expression of pain or other sensory situation, or an expression of physiological tensions, such as hunger pangs. The mother, the nurse, or some other person may interpret the baby's scream and attend him; but so far as the original stimulus-response of the infant is concerned, the other person has nothing to do with it. Yet, from birth on, the impress of others is apparent. Other persons furnish a conditioned stimulus to the child's cries and screams. If the child remarks, as he soon will, that his cries or screams bring pleasant situations or actions, such as stroking, feeding, or carrying, it will not be long until he will employ these means of securing whatever he wants. We shall review the effects of these influences later. Here we are concerned with the mechanism of speech learning.

The various stages in the evolution of the child's speech are dependent, first of all, on changes in his physical make-up. The development of the jaw-length is itself of some consequence. Jespersen states that at three months the jaw-length of his own child was 60 mm., while that of an adult female is 93 mm. These differences, plus differences in tongue, vocal orifice, and cords make for divergences in speech ability. With maturation additional capacity to utter various sounds arises.

The development of human speech falls into several natural stages dependent on physical maturity and personal-social stimulation.

a. *The Screaming or Pre-linguistic Stage*.—The birth cry is a purely reflex action, concerned, apparently, with supplying the lungs with oxygen. The cry itself is incidental. It arises as the result of the air being drawn rapidly over the vocal cords and setting up a vibration in them. During the first few weeks the vocal sounds are largely in the nature of screams or cries which are connected with purely physiological conditions of hunger, pain, cold, etc. These differ in intensity and extent. Furthermore, children vary among themselves in the intensity and quantity of their cries. Doubtless these variations depend upon differences in vocal and muscular strength and in variety of internal and external stimulation. Allport in his observations of his own son distinguished five different kinds of cries: quick, rapid crying in annoying situations; whining or entreating cries; drawn-out, detached sleepy cry; spasmodic sobbing after hard crying; and harsh crescendo cries of rage. Even in the first month certain definite speech sounds are discernible. Here we get the earliest consonants, principally nasals and gutturals, such as *m*, *n*, *ng*, *h*, *g*, *r*, *y*, the nasal *ai*, and the glottal stop; also certain vowel sounds, such as long *ee* in *see*, short *a* as in *pat*, long *a* as in *father*, short *i* as in *bird*. This period covers, as a rule, the first three or four months of infancy. All of this vocalization is of a random sort, except where it is connected with bodily needs. These vocal responses are no different from his other random movements of hands, legs, torso, head, and face.

b. *The Babbble Stage*.—This, as the Blantons remark, is neither "crying nor speech," but rather a kind of "babble-singing." Often the babble is shrill, loud, and somewhat unpleasant, later giving way to more pleasant sounds which approach true speech. This is the period of cooing or crowing—seemingly a delightful exercise to the child. The following quotation is from a careful observation of one case:

In the girl baby studied, the first sound occurred on the one hundred and fiftieth day—a soft, volumeless, uninflected *a* (as in *father*) which she said after feeding.

By the one hundred and sixty-fifth day, she had developed a wave-like movement of the tongue which resulted in a sort of grouping of undifferentiated vowel sounds—a sort of "variations" of the theme *a* (as in *father*). In addition, she had the shrill pleasure-scream mentioned previously.

By the two hundred and forty-ninth day (approximately eight months), the babble had reached its peak. It did not at this time, or ever, contain all the sounds of English speech, but it did contain sounds not occurring in English,

Spanish, French, Anglo-Saxon, German, and African were represented, and doubtless many others not recognized by the observer. The commonest vowel sounds were *a* (as in *about*) and the vowel diphthong represented by *y* in *my*. The commonest consonant sounds were *m*, *ng* (*sing*), and the French nasal (*Montaigne*), the sounds *b*, *d*, and *g*, and the Spanish *y*, plus the sound represented by *y* in the English word *you* which was very common. The glottal stop was common; *h* was fairly so, and a bird trill sort of an *r*. Ordinary *r* (as in *red*) and *l*, also *f*, *k*, and *t*, were very rare; and the sounds of *th* in *thin* and *than*, the sounds of *s* in *sit* and *is*, and the sounds of *sh* in *shoe* and *pleasure*, and the sounds of *tsh* in *chair* and *jam* did not occur at all.

At the seventh month she gave positive evidence of knowledge of the meaning of the word *milk*, although she did not use it.

By the two hundred and eighty-fourth day (a little over nine months) the babble had changed in character. It was softer, less distinct, and more like speech. She had developed a form of mimicry that often passes for speech. It is called echolalia. To illustrate, if "bye-bye" was said to her, she responded with something similar. But this was true whether suitable things were being said or not, or whether remarks were addressed to her or not.⁷

Not only is the acquirement of new sound combinations, a kind of rudimentary vocabulary, important in this period, but equally significant are the psychological mechanisms involved. It is a period of practice essential to the control through the ear of the muscles of speech. It is in this period that circular responses are established between the sounds uttered and the response itself. The child in babbling first of all receives certain kinesthetic sensations from the muscles of speech. Furthermore, and perhaps more important, he gets auditory sensations from the sounds uttered. Allport advances the following interesting hypothesis as to the learning involved here:

Returning to the brain centers, these afferent impulses are, or tend to be, re-discharged through the same motor pathways as those used in speaking the syllable itself. There are two possible methods of explaining this. We may suppose that the synapses connecting the afferent impulse with the motor outlet of speaking *da*, having been recently used, are in a state of relatively lowered resistance, and are therefore readily put into operation again. Or we may infer that, in some cases at least, the return stimulations are received while the speaking response is still going on (as in a prolonged vowel sound), and the motor synaptic resistances for *da* are completely overcome because discharge through those synapses is actually taking place. We have here the exact situation for the

⁷ S. and M. G. Blanton, *Child Guidance*, 1927, pp. 95-96. Courtesy of the Century Company.

formation of a *conditioned response*. The response *da* becomes circularly conditioned by the sound *da*; and this sound when later heard will tend of itself to evoke the response of speaking it. This latter explanation is probably the true one. While the babe is practicing the syllabic elements of his future vocabulary he is therefore also fixating ear-vocal reflexes through which a spoken sound may directly evoke its enunciation. Articulation has now advanced to a stage where it is capable of being controlled through the auditory receptor.⁸

Throughout this period, aside from increase in jaw-length and development of speech organs, there is a distinctly important maturation of brain centers, making these sound associations more and more permanent and significant for future use. This period shifts gradually over to the next, in which the babbling gives way to fixation of circular sound-ear association by social stimulation of others.

c. The so-called Imitation Stage of Speech.—Along toward the end of the first year the effects of social stimulation on vocalization become more evident. If the child has built up the association of sound and vocal response, it is very easy for the shift to be made to some other person who utters the sound combination. The effect on the child will be the same as if he himself utters the sound. One of the interesting results of Pavlov's studies has been to show that the sound discrimination of the child is not so efficient as that of the lower animals. Thus, when a mother says "doll" to the child, this may be sufficiently closely associated with his own response of "da" so that he confuses the two. So, too, such expressions as "papa," "mama," "bye-bye," or others fit easily into speech combinations already at hand. What may easily be termed imitation is nothing else but a duplication of the child's own speech stimulation by another person. Certain associations, fixed at the outset by random vocalization in the babble stage, become the basis for specific associations later. This period is sometimes called the parrot stage or the period of echolalia. There is here no mystical instinct of imitation at work, or any conscious following of a pattern. Only sounds already acquired by chance association of ear and vocalization can be used. Allport relates an observation on his own son at about the "last half of the second year."

The spoken word "pencil" was repeated . . . as *punka* (*c* and *l* sounds not yet acquired). The phrase "What is that?" involving difficult consonants, was reproduced as *uh i a*. The words "down," "doll," and "clock" when spoken to

⁸ F. L. Allport, *Social Psychology*, 1924, pp. 182-83. Used by permission of, and by arrangement with, Houghton Mifflin Company.

him, were all repeated as *da. Ba*, similarly, was his reproduction of "box," "bath," "bottle," "block," and "bye."⁹

This parrot stage gives way, in turn, to one in which true speech begins to appear. Here there is the association of sound with object, person, and situation.

d. *Acquirement of True Speech by Association of Sound and Situation*.—This stage usually begins in the second year. With girls it occurs usually in the period from nine to eighteen months; with boys, from a year to a year and a half. For instance, saying "bye-bye" may be associated with going out of the house in the mother's arms, or the word "doll" spoken by an adult is supplemented by producing the doll itself as a visual stimulus, which, in turn, is associated with the spoken word of the adult and the somewhat similar spoken sound of the child. So, too, "Up, Baby" is associated with picking up the baby, and "ball" with that object. Simultaneously with this conditioning goes the conditioning of the object itself and the child's own response without the intervention of the adult's spoken word. Thus the child says *ba* when he sees the ball before him.

From this point the acquirement of a vocabulary goes on rapidly. The child learns the names of hundreds of objects and situations. Not only are nouns learned, but movements are associated with words such as "come," "go," and finally qualifying words of all sorts are acquired. At the outset there is not the discrimination in the use of words which comes later. A few words may serve a very wide range of purposes. Carl Sandburg has put this fact neatly in the following stanzas:

Seventeen Months¹⁰

This girl child speaks five words.

No for no and no for yes, "no" for either
no or yes.

"Teewee" for wheat or oats or corn or barley
or any food taken with a spoon.

"Go way" as an edict to keep your distance
and let her determinations operate.

"Spoon" for spoon or cup or anything to be handled,
all instruments, tools, paraphernalia of
utility and convenience are spoons.

Mama is her only epithet and synonym for God and

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

¹⁰ From *Good Morning America*, 1928, p. 198. By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

the Government and the one force of majesty
and intelligence obeying the call of pity,
hunger, pain, cold, dark—MAMA, MAMA, MAMA.

2. *Stages in Acquirement of Vocabulary.*—Numerous studies have been made of the development of the vocabulary of children. These investigations give a clue to the child's growing acquaintance with the world around him. Naturally he acquires from those around him the word-symbols for objects, persons, and situations. Vocabulary reflects the personal-social and cultural situations to which the child is exposed. Unfortunately the published observations are almost entirely from families of high cultural and professional status. There seem to be no adequate reports on the growth of vocabulary in the early years of children from the lower social-economic levels. Only in the school are the differences in opportunity exposed. It is further evident that not only vocabulary but inflection, enunciation, and timbre of voice will be acquired from the parents and others close to the child.

The child learns to respond to words and sentences spoken by others before he learns to use words himself. One child observed by the writer at thirteen months knew but a few nouns, but responded to such expressions: "Go get music" by going to the phonograph; "Come to papa" by running to the father, and so on. Here we have a sound combination as a total stimulation, without awareness, necessarily, of the specific meaning of the words. Children have been known to use a few words as early as the ninth month. The child observed by Boyd uttered his first words—"dog" and "dada"—in the first week of the eleventh month. In the first few months of true speech the expressions are largely individual words designating objects or action. Bohn reports, for the child he observed, the first sentence "Beatrice all gone" in the middle of the fifteenth month. In the child reported by Boyd the first true sentence, "Bell rings," was noted in the middle of the seventeenth month, and about the same time a three-word sentence, "I'sa do it." Bohn remarks that inflection appeared in the seventeenth month in the sentence, "Daddie shoes wet." In the eighteenth month the same child gave the first clearly correct sentence as to form and implication, "Daddie gave R new shoes." He says that the idea of the possessive appeared early but not in correct form until the twentieth month. In this same month the infinitive and the participle were correctly used. Abstract ideas came much later, but just when is not stated. This child's

parents are highly educated persons who deliberately set out to give their daughter only the best of learning opportunities. Baby-talk was avoided, corrections of pronunciation were stimulated, and altogether the child had an excellent social environment in which to develop language habits.

Table 8: Showing Vocabulary of One Child from 18 Months to 4th Year¹¹

Age in Years	Number of Words			Per cent			Per cent Increase
	1½	3	4	1½	3	4	3-4
Nouns	114	691	1,080	78.6	57.2	57.6	56.3
Verbs	10	246	380	6.8	20.5	20.4	54.4
Pronouns	0	30	32	0	2.5	1.3	6.7
Adjectives	10	139	232	6.8	11.6	12.9	66.9
Adverbs	6	62	102	5.4	5.1	5.4	64.5
Prepositions	0	21	23	0	1.7	1.3	9.5
Conjunctions	0	7	8	0	0.6	0.4	14.3
Interjections	5	9	13	3.4	0.8	0.7	44.4
Total	145	1,205	1,870	100.0	100.0	100.0	55.2

Table 9: Showing Vocabulary of One Child in 3rd and 4th Years¹²

Year	Number		Percentage	
	III	IV	III	IV
Nouns	918	1,441	55.4	55.5
Pronouns	30	38	1.8	1.5
Adjectives				
Qualitative	165	294	10.0	11.3
Others	35	70	2.1	2.7
Verbs	344	541	20.8	20.8
Adverbs	109	140	6.6	5.4
Conjunctions	21	31	1.3	1.2
Prepositions	29	33	1.8	1.3
Interjections	6	10	.3	.4
Total	1,657	1,598	100.1	100.1

¹¹ M. M. Nice, "Development of a Child's Vocabulary in Relation to Environment," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1915, vol. XXII, p. 54.

¹² W. Boyd, "Development of a Child's Vocabulary," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1914, vol. XXI, p. 124.

As to extent of vocabulary, nouns early outnumber all other parts of speech. Boyd reports for his case, for the first fortnight of the seventeenth month: 109 nouns, 30 verbs, 1 pronoun, 8 adjectives, and 8 adverbs. As to growth of vocabulary, the tables on page 219, one from Nice, the other from Boyd, give an idea of the various parts of speech employed in the early years.

The Brandenburgs report a comparative study of vocabulary development between forty months and fifty-two months. Some of their most interesting observations are as follows:¹³

At forty months the sentences averaged 6.6 words per sentence. The total vocabulary was 2500 words, and in a sample day the child used 859 words or 34 per cent of the total vocabulary. In contrast, at fifty-two months the sentences averaged 7.5 words, the total vocabulary was 4200 words, of which 1000 or 24 per cent of total vocabulary were used on a sample day. The following table gives the percentage of the various parts of speech in use by this child at fifty-two months:

Table 10: Showing Number and Percentage Distribution of Parts of Speech Used in One Day at 52 Months.

<i>Parts of Speech</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Nouns	402	42.3
Verbs	292	30.7
Adjectives	113	11.9
Adverbs	72	7.6
Pronouns	31	3.3
Prepositions	20	2.1
Interjections	11	1.1
Conjunctions	9	1.0
Total	950	100.0

If one compares these figures for the fourth year with those given by Nice in Table 8, one discovers some variability in the two cases in the percentages of parts of speech. The principal differences are in the proportion of nouns and verbs.

In her study of the development of a child's vocabulary Nice calculated the rate of learning new words from the beginning of speech to the sixth year.

¹³ G. C. & J. Brandenburg, "Language Development in the Fourth Year," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1919, vol. XXVI, p. 34.

Table 11: Showing Rate of Learning Words ¹⁴

14th month.....	3	words
15th "	1	word
16th "	1	word each 3 days
17th "	1½	words a day
18th "	3	" " "
From 18 months to 3rd year	2.1	" " "
3-4 years	1.7	" " "
4-5 "	2	" " "
5-6 "	1.6	" " "

An interesting feature of the relation of language to the rise of personality is shown in the development of the use of "I" and "Me." Many children—but apparently not all—do not learn the correct use of the first pronoun singular until quite late. At the outset they employ the form "Me" or else refer to themselves by their given names, as "Helen wants spoon," or some such remark. It seems logical to suppose that the child comes to refer to himself at the outset in the forms in which others refer to him. Not until later does the conception of himself in the first person arise. This is not to imply that the child does not react in a self-assertive or egoistic way. It seems to mean only that he does not, in the early stages of his language communication to others, employ the form which we have developed in our more adult experience.

The acquiring of vocabulary goes hand in hand with increased facility in handling symbolic processes. As discriminatory habits are built up, the variation in word symbols to correspond with this increases. Indicative of this is the striking difference between the vocabulary of the second year and the succeeding years in the preponderance of nouns and in a deficiency in relational and qualifying words. In later life this process of increased use of relational, qualifying, and attributive words reaches into all dimensions of verbal behavior. As abstract words and meanings arise, these relational, qualifying, and attributive words come to be a mark of advanced, mature thinking.

It is evident, too, that the type of environment to which the child is exposed will make much difference in his vocabulary. Miss Stoner's mother taught her the scientific names for plants and animals from the outset. An-

¹⁴ Summarized from M. M. Nice, "The Speech Development of a Child from Eighteen Months to Six Years," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1917, vol. XXIV, p. 227.

other child, not given any opportunity to learn about natural phenomena, might never acquire adequate symbols in regard to such material. A child reared with adults, away from other children, is not likely to learn many terms which children playing together may. A city child, without special opportunities, can not be expected to learn about objects and situations familiar to a child on the farm. *Vice versa*, the rural child is at a loss to name and thus to identify objects and situations perfectly familiar to an urban youngster. Nice's study of her own daughter showed definitely how effective varying environments were in the growth of the vocabulary. The child was brought up first in the country, then for some time she lived in Boston and later in Norman, Oklahoma. In each of these places she developed her knowledge and vocabulary in terms of her environment.

3. *Language and Social Stimulation.*—Along with this process of learning the names of objects goes the increased conditioning to other persons. Thus when the object is in sight but not obtainable, as a ball or doll, the child substitutes finally, perhaps at first inadvertently, the verbal sound for his useless efforts in trying to reach the object. Some other person, hearing him, may then procure the ball or doll for the child. In this way the child is quickly conditioned to the process of using his verbal sounds as substitutes for securing the ball himself or the more unpleasant state of going without it. The child soon learns to employ real language in the control of others, just as earlier he used cries to get parents to pick him up, feed him, rock him, or otherwise make him the object of pleasant attention. This substitutive use of language indicates one of the most remarkable and highly important steps in the development of personality. So, too, all sorts of movements of the child playing with his toys, ball, or doll—dressing it, putting it to bed, and so on, become associated with verbal reactions. From this it is an easy step, with the now matured fore-brain, to recall the object when not seen or heard. Therefore, with the rise of imagery—visual, proprioceptive, and verbal—the child comes to a further stage in the control of his environment. He sees the doll in his mind, we say, and asks for it. For example, the child has been allowed to go to sleep with his baby doll in his arms. On one occasion the doll is not at hand. There is a gap in the total situation of going to bed and to sleep; hence the child demands his usual doll. The habitual configuration of bed and sleeping is not complete without this object, and his speech reactions bring about the restora-

tion of the habitual situation. The whole problem of child training in reference to dressing, feeding, playing, sleeping, and hundreds of other situations is soon encased in verbal definitions of the total situation made up of objects and relationships.

Out of this matrix of experience the child comes to talk about his objects, toys, food, and social activities. This verbal rehearsing of the day's experiences further fixes the language mechanisms and, in turn, may give rise to pleasures when the objects and situations themselves are not at hand. We shall discuss this point more fully in another section.

While at the outset the language of the child rests upon the motor-perceptual level, it gradually moves over to that of abstraction and concept. The child gradually learns the relations and attributes of objects. This begins, in fact, early in the process of conditioning. As we saw in Chapter V, Watson demonstrated that the conditioning to fear of a furry object, whether a rabbit or some other animal, carries over to other furry objects, such as a muff or a teddy bear. The conditioning is not to the specific object so much as it is to the furriness—the sensory stimulations to the hands or face. So, too, fear reactions to loud sounds appear to be independent of the objective source of the sound. To take another instance, although a large dog and a shaggy shetland pony might be confused, the child comes to discriminate between them in terms of movements of the two animals and the more minute examination of their contours. With each of these discriminative responses society, in the form of parents, siblings, relatives, teachers, and friends, furnishes a name as a symbol or substitute verbal response. From this beginning the abstract attributes of objects are learned. The process is not a mysterious or sudden one, but like other learning rests upon conditioning and integration. A part of this is the conditioning to the internal reactions, which we call images and concepts. Thus a recalled face of a mother associated with some unpleasant act on one's own part or that of another may be the basis of an association never to be shaken off. So, too, one image may condition another, as when two names appear successively, or when a name and an object appear together in a new context.

In the matter of social participation and language Piaget, a Swiss psychologist, has shown that the early language of the child is largely egocentric and self-assertive, rather than "socialized," that is, socially oriented in the sense of ejective awareness of the other person. In his early years the

child has not developed very successfully the capacity to imagine himself in the other person's behavior system. Although we may criticize Piaget for his narrow use of the term "socialized," because he would doubtless be one of the first to admit that children learn language from social interaction with others, still his evidence points rather conclusively to the fact that in the first seven years or so, language is directed by self-expressive, egoistic interests and not by desire to place oneself in the position of the other person to whom one is talking. He observed the language of two boys over a considerable period of time. In one case 47 per cent of the child's spontaneous conversation was distinctly egocentric; of the other, 43 per cent. It is only after the age of seven that genuine social collaboration in thought, through "true" conversation, begins to appear. This applies to conversation among children under this age, as well as between children and adults. Words spoken are not used from the point of view of the person addressed, but from the speaker's angle only. In the growth toward Piaget's "socialized" or what the writer calls ejective communication—that is, conversation which takes the point of view of the other into account—conversation bearing on mechanical, non-personal items of interest runs ahead of talk concerned with human behavior. For example, in telling stories, it was found that narratives about mechanical matters were more ejective than those about persons. The egocentrism of conversation breaks down in material, mechanical situations before it does in situations involving persons and their conduct. This fact may have some bearing on the development of thought in relation to social experience. Certainly it is evident that even among adults there is a great deal of conversation which is not ejective, not built out of an interest in understanding the addressee, but largely concerned with expression of egocentric beliefs and attitudes.

In his early years, and certainly after the age of six or seven, the child is brought more and more into contact with moral concepts in the form of words. Perhaps these concepts mean little to the child in the sense of sympathetic understanding and ejective anticipatory response, or consciousness, but nevertheless the family, the play and school groups, are preparing the child for future social contacts by giving him these verbal forms. Schwesinger has made a study of the socio-ethical vocabulary of children which furnishes a sort of measure of the growth in children of these moral ideas, and perhaps indirectly of moral attitudes—although this is not so certain. The following is a summary of her investigation:

The Knowledge Test.—The Social Ethical Vocabulary, was compiled from Thorndike's General Word Test and from other sources. The subject is given a key word with five multiple choices among which is one word synonymous with the key word, another which has a plausible sound-sense relationship and the three other unrelated words. The subject is asked to underline the word which approaches the key word in meaning. The type of word used is thus explained: "The designation 'social ethical' is sufficiently vague to require, if not a definition, at least a statement as to what sort of terms are included in this category. Such a specialized field would comprise words which are commonly used to describe situations involving human relations (as joke, company), terms used in deciding moral issues (illegal, villain), adjectives which denote modifications of character (bashful, recalcitrant), abstract nouns indicative of states of mind and character traits (uncertainty, snobbishness), verbs indicating behavior of human beings toward each other (scoffing, pitying). An attempt was made to include a few 'shady' words, consisting of slang and professional crook terms."

By statistical treatment various forms were constructed and some eliminations were made on the basis of symptomatic validity. Correlations were made with intelligence tests, with Hartshorne and May's moral knowledge test, with a good manners test and with home background ratings. The following table gives the principal correlations:

Table 12: Showing Correlations of Social Ethical Vocabulary (S.E.V.) with Various Other Measures of Personality

	r.
S.E.V. Test with Intelligence	.880
S.E.V. Test with Moral Knowledge	.626
S.E.V. Test with Good Manners	.720
Moral Knowledge with Intelligence	.623
Moral Knowledge with Good Manners	.560
Good Manners with Intelligence	.583
S.E.V. Test with Home Background Ratings	.540
S.E.V. Test with General Word Knowledge	.858
S.E.V. with Good Manners (Intelligence Partialled Out)	.540
Moral Knowledge with Good Manners (Intelligence Partialled Out)	.300

It would appear from this that both S. E. V. and Moral Knowledge tests measure something which is not intelligence. Whatever this is, the Social Ethical Vocabulary appears to measure it better than the Moral Knowledge test. Doubtless this quality is closely related to home training. Since language is the better indicator of both home background and intelligence, failure on a test question from lack of language facility shows a deficiency in both intelligence and background. Although social experience is largely incorporated in general experience, increased ability in verbal expression of such experience may be regarded

as a function of training apart from intelligence. The S. E. V. score correlated neither with school conduct rating nor with honesty, but the median S. E. V. scores of groups rated A in conduct, that is, groups rated honest, are higher than those for groups rated below A or dishonest in conduct. If, however, the groups are matched for grade the S. E. V. differentiation between honest and dishonest is wiped out, but not intelligence differences. The median intelligence score for the honest group was found to be 117; for the dishonest group, 107. The Social Ethical Vocabulary was found to increase from grade to grade.¹⁵

This study of Schwesinger's, like similar studies, reveals a growing interest in statistical analyses of moral knowledge and moral conduct. Certainly language usage has some bearing on the subject. While these moral concepts, as we noted, are given to the child from the outset, it is not until during and after adolescence that the moralization of the person is complete. Yet with all this, one may raise some doubt as to just what relationship exists between word knowledge, moral attitudes, and actual moral conduct. This is a problem, on the side of practical improvement, for social ethics. For social psychology it is interesting to observe how social pressures from home and school furnish the child with the symbols or word-counters for his getting about in those dimensions of conduct which his society terms moral or ethical.

4. *Speech and Non-Verbal Stimulation*.—Not only is the development of vocabulary significant as a measure of social participation, but in another way speech remains a revealer of personality. We all know that domestic animals, especially pets, react to commands and other verbal statements; that is, they become conditioned to human vocal sounds as well as to other forms of human gesture. No sensible person assumes that the animals comprehend, in the sense of human meaning, what the words symbolize. Rather, it is to pitch, intensity, and quality of voice in certain standardized, habitual contexts that they respond. In other words, these vocal differences are to be considered as non-language gestures, as are incipient movements of face, arm, or leg. But in human communication these strictly non-language vocal features are often as significant as are the stereotyped words which are employed, if not more so. That is to say, attitudes and ideas are communicated, not alone in words, but in what may

¹⁵ Summarized from G. C. Schwesinger, "Social-Ethical Significance of Vocabulary," *Columbia University, Contributions to Education, Teachers College Series*, no. 211, 1926. Quotation from p. 18. The intelligence test used was the one devised by the Institute of Educational Research and includes arithmetic, word knowledge, information, and language completion. Courtesy of Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University.

be called vocal postures or vocal tensions. Just as facial, manual, and bodily postures or tensions are significant in communication, so likewise, are these subtler features of voice. Sapir has made some suggestive comments on this rather undeveloped phase of social communication:

If we were to make a critical survey of how people react to voice and what the voice carries, we should find them relatively naïve about the different elements involved in speech. A man talks and makes certain impressions, but we are not clear as to whether it is his voice which most powerfully contributes to the impression, or the ideas which are conveyed. There are several distinct levels in speech behavior which to linguists and psychologists are, each of them, sets of real phenomena, and we must now look at these in order to obtain some idea of the complexity of normal human speech.

The basic or most fundamental speech level is the voice. It is closest to the heredity endowment of the individual, considered out of relation to society. The voice is a complicated bundle of reactions and, so far as the writer knows, no one has succeeded in giving a comprehensive account of what the voice is and what changes it may undergo. . . . And yet it is by delicate nuances of voice quality that we are so often confirmed in our judgment of people. From a more general point of view, voice may be considered a form of gesture. If we are swayed by a certain thought or emotion, we may express ourselves with our hands or some other type of gesturing, and the voice takes part in the total play of gesture. From our present point of view, however, it is possible to isolate the voice as a functional unit.

Voice is generally thought of as a purely individual matter, yet is it quite correct to say that the voice is given us at birth and maintained unmodified throughout life? Or has the voice a social [cultural] quality as well as an individual one? I think we all feel, as a matter of fact, that we imitate each other's voices to a not inconsiderable extent. We know very well that if, for some reason or other, the timbre of the voice that we are heir to has been criticized, we try to modify it, so that it may not be a socially unpleasant instrument of speech. There is always something about the voice that must be ascribed to the social [cultural] background, precisely as in the case of gesture. Gestures are not the simple, individual things they seem to be. They are largely peculiar to this or that society. In the same way, in spite of the personal and relatively fixed character of the voice, we make involuntary adjustments in the larynx that bring about significant modifications in the voice. Therefore, in deducing fundamental traits of personality from the voice we must try to disentangle the social [cultural] element from the purely personal one. If we are not careful to do this, we may make a serious error of judgment. A man has a strained or raucous voice, let us say, and we might infer that he is basically "coarse-grained." Such a judgment might be entirely wide of the mark if the particular society in which he lives is an out-of-doors society that indulges in a good deal of swearing and

rather rough handling of the voice. He may have had a very soft voice to begin with, symptomatic of a delicate psychic organization, which gradually toughened under the influence of social suggestion.

The essential quality of the voice is an amazingly interesting thing to puzzle over. Unfortunately we have no adequate vocabulary for its endless varieties. We speak of a high-pitched voice. We say a voice is "thick," or it is "thin"; we say it is "nasal" if there is something wrong with the nasal part of the breathing apparatus. If we were to make an inventory of voices, we should find that no two of them are quite alike. And all the time we feel that there is something about the individual's voice that is indicative of his personality. . . . We do not know what it is precisely that makes the voice sound "thick," or "vibrant," or "flat," or what not. What is it that arouses us in one man's voice, when another's stirs us not at all? I remember listening many years ago to an address by a college president and deciding on the spur of the moment that what he said could be of no interest to me. What I meant was that no matter how interesting or pertinent his remarks were in themselves, his personality could not touch mine because there was something about his voice that did not appeal to me, something revealing as to personality. There was indicated—so one gathered intuitively—a certain quality of personality, a certain force, that I knew could not easily integrate with my own apprehension of things. I did not listen to what he said; I listened only to the quality of his voice.

We have seen that the voice is a social [cultural] as well as an individual phenomenon. One finds people, for example, who have very pleasant voices, but it is society that has made them pleasant. One may then try to go back to what the voice would have been without its specific social development. This nuclear or primary quality of voice has in many, perhaps in all, cases a symbolic value. The unconscious symbolisms are of course not limited to the voice. If you wrinkle your brow, that is a symbol of a certain attitude. If you act expansively by stretching out your arms, that is a symbol of a changed attitude of your immediate environment. In the same manner the voice is to a large extent an unconscious symbolization of one's general attitude.

What is the next level of speech? What we ordinarily call voice is voice proper plus a great many variations of behavior that are intertwined with voice and give it its dynamic quality. This is the level of voice dynamics. Two speakers may have very much the same basic quality of voice, yet their "voices," as that term is ordinarily understood, may be very different. In ordinary usage we are not always careful to distinguish the voice proper from voice dynamics. One of the most important aspects of voice dynamics is intonation. . . . Intonation is a much more complicated matter than is generally believed. It may be divided into three distinct levels, which intertwine into the unit pattern of behavior which we may call "individual intonation." In the first place, there is a very important social [cultural] element in intonation which has to be kept apart from the individual variation; in the second place, this social [cultural] element of intonation has a twofold determination. We have certain intonations

which are a necessary part of our speech. If I may say, for example, "Is he coming?" I raise the pitch of the voice on the last word. There is no sufficient reason in nature why I should have an upward inflection of the voice in sentences of this type. We are apt to assume that this habit is natural, even self-evident, but a comparative study of the dynamic habits of many diverse languages convinces one that this assumption is on the whole unwarranted. The interrogative attitude may be expressed in other ways, such as the use of particular interrogative words or specific grammatical forms. It is one of the significant patterns of our English language to elevate the voice in interrogative sentences of a certain type, hence such elevation is not expressive in the properly individual sense of the word, though we sometimes feel it to be so.

But more than that, there is a second level of socially [culturally] determined variation in intonation, the musical handling of the voice generally, quite aside from the properly linguistic patterns of intonation. It is understood in a given society that we are not to have too great an individual range of intonation. We are not to raise it to too great a height in our cadences; we are to pitch the voice at such and such an average height. In other words, society tells us to limit ourselves to a certain range of intonation and to certain characteristic cadences, that is, to adopt certain melody patterns peculiar to itself. . . . The southerner, the New Englander, the middle-westerner—each has a characteristic intonation. But we are interested in the individual as an individual when he is merged in, and is a representative of, our own group. If we are dealing with people who have the same social [cultural] habits, we are interested in the slight intonational differences which the individuals exhibit, for we know enough of their common social [cultural] background to evaluate these slight differences. We are wrong to make any inferences about personality on the basis of intonation without considering the intonational habit of one's speech community or that carried over from foreign language. We do not really know what a man's speech is until we have evaluated his social [cultural] background. If a Japanese talks in a monotonous voice, we have not the right to assume that he is illustrating the same type of personality that one of us would be if we talked with his sentence melody. Furthermore, if we hear an Italian running through his whole possible gamut of tone we are apt to say that he is temperamental or that he has an interesting personality. Yet we do not know whether he is in the least temperamental until we know what are the normal Italian habits of speech, what Italian society allows its members in the way of melodic play. Hence a major intonation curve, objectively considered, may be of but minor importance from the standpoint of individual expressiveness.

Intonation is only one of the many phases of voice dynamics. Rhythm, too, has to be considered. Here again there are several layers that are to be distinguished. First of all, the primary rhythms of speech are furnished by the language one is brought up in, and are not due to our individual personality. We have certain very definite peculiarities of rhythm in English. Thus, we tend

to accent certain syllables strongly and to minimize others. That is not due to the fact that we wish to be emphatic. It is merely that our language is so constructed that we must follow its characteristic rhythm, accenting one syllable in a word or phrase at the expense of the others. There are languages that do not follow this habit.

There are still other dynamic factors than intonation and rhythm. There is the relative continuity of speech. A great many people speak brokenly, in uneasy splashes of word groups; others speak continuously, whether they have anything to say or not. With the latter type it is not a question of having the necessary words at one's disposal; it is a question of mere continuity of linguistic expression. There are social [cultural] speeds and continuities. We can be said to be slow or rapid in our utterances only in the sense that we speak above or below certain socialized [culturized] speeds. Here again, in the matter of speed, the individual habit and its diagnostic value for the study of personality can be measured only against accepted social [cultural] norms. . . .

The third level of speech analysis is pronunciation. Here again one often speaks of the "voice" when what is really meant is an individually nuanced pronunciation. A man pronounces certain consonants or vowels, say, with a distinctive timbre or in an otherwise peculiar manner, and we tend to ascribe such variations of pronunciation to his voice; yet they may have nothing at all to do with the quality of his voice. In pronunciation we again have to distinguish the social [cultural] from the individual patterns. Society decrees that we pronounce certain selected consonants and vowels, which have been set aside as the bricks and mortar, as it were, for the construction of a given language. We cannot depart very widely from this decree.

The fourth speech level, that of vocabulary, is a very important one. We do not all speak alike. There are certain words which some of us never use. There are other, favorite words which we are always using. Personality is largely reflected in the choice of words; but here too we must distinguish carefully the social [cultural] vocabulary norm from the more significantly personal choice of words. Certain words and locutions are not used in certain circles; others are the hall-mark of locale, status, or occupation. . . . Individual variation exists, but it can properly be appraised only with reference to the social [cultural] norm. Sometimes we choose words because we like them; sometimes we slight words because they bore or annoy or terrify us. We are not going to be caught by them.

Finally, we have style as a fifth speech level. Many people have an illusion that style is something that belongs to literature. Style is an everyday facet of speech that characterizes both the social group and the individual. We all have our individual styles in both conversation and considered address, and they are never the arbitrary and casual things we think them to be. There is always an individual method, however poorly developed, of arranging words into groups and of working these up into larger units. It would be a very complicated prob-

lem to disentangle the social [cultural] and individual determinants of style, but it is a theoretically possible one. . . .¹⁶

Speech, in short, comprises spoken words, and the voice, in its various features, organized into a response. Through this complex of response, communication between persons who have a common universe of discourse or a common set of meanings may take place. Speech, moreover, is addressed to ourselves as well as to others. It is also both a stimulus and a response. Its significance for ourselves and for others depends upon a common conditioning, and this, in turn, reflects the social reality of which we are a part.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapters XIII, pp. 328-46; II, no. 2, pp. 10-17, and re-read no. 5, pp. 25-27.

B. Questions and Exercises.

1. Discuss questions and exercises in assignment, *Source Book*, Chapter XIII, p. 347, nos. 20-25.
2. Why is it that any one of the various theories of the origin of language is inadequate?
3. What does Mead mean by saying that a gesture is a "truncated act"? Illustrate.
4. What was the significance of erect posture, free hands and higher brain development in the evolution of man's higher mental functions, including language?
5. Make observations on infants to verify the so-called "stages" of speech development.
6. Count the words used by a child during one day (at various ages) to discover the percentage of the total made up of nouns, verbs, and other parts of speech. Also what does the vocabulary show as to the child's social-cultural experience?
7. How important is it to condition a child with the moral-ethical words before he has to meet the situations which they define? Is it sound psychology to do so?
8. What other factors than the expression of words themselves come into play in human communication?

¹⁶ E. Sapir, "Speech as a Personality Trait," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1927, vol. XXXII, pp. 894-901, 903-904. Sapir uses "social" as this writer has used "cultural." The word "cultural" is inserted in brackets to conform to the usage in this volume. What Sapir refers to as personal or individual in speech may be the outcome either of biological differences or what are here termed "personal-social" influences.

C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.

1. See in assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter XIII, p. 347.
2. Report on Allport, *Social Psychology*, Chapters VIII and IX on language and gesture.
3. Report on Piaget, *The Language and Thought of the Child*, on language development.
4. Report on Faris, "The Mental Capacity of Savages," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1918, vol. XXIII, pp. 603-19 for discussion of language and thought of primitives.
5. Report on Hocart, "The 'Psychological Interpretation of Language,'" *British Journal of Psychology*, 1912, vol. V, pp. 272-77 on language among primitives.
6. Review of recent analyses of psychology of language. (Cf. W. B. Pillsbury and C. L. Meader, *The Psychology of Language*, 1928, Chapters V-X; G. de Laguna, *Speech; Its Function and Development*, 1927; Frank Lorimer, *The Growth of Reason*, 1929; J. F. Markey, *The Symbolic Process*, 1928. The last two contain excellent bibliographies.)

CHAPTER XI

PERSONALITY AND EARLY SOCIAL CONDITIONING

A. Personality and Social Participation.

1. *Individual and Person.*—It was once customary to describe the personality of an individual as if he lived in a vacuum and were made up only of biological characteristics and mental processes. The personality is more than a mere biological organism which comes into being through procreation and carries with it certain fundamental biological traits. True enough, the biological characteristics form the bases upon which the personality is predicated. The organism at the outset consists, as we have seen, of physical structures and functions operating at a biological level. The content of one's reactions, the meaning of these for oneself and for others, grows up with one's participation in social life. That is to say, there is no really human and social behavior without interaction of members of various groups. This participation begins at birth and continues till death. Participation means the constant conditioning to other persons, and through them, in addition, the conditioning to standard ways of acting which we know as culture patterns. This interplay of organism and other social beings with their culture fashions the personality. In other words, the biological organism possesses from birth and maturation the mechanisms of behavior. This is the *how*, the manner, the means of our activities. What we do, the direction of our behavior, the content, the meaning, is determined by personal-social and cultural influences. From the angle of a cross-sectional analysis we may say that the individual's personality is made up of physical traits, mentality, emotional attitudes in reference to or in orientation to social beings around him and in reference to his rôle with these people as he conceives it. The organism from the side of mechanism is the subject-matter of biology and psychology. The organism as it is affected by social and cultural conditionings is the subject-matter of social psychology. Too frequently, in the past, the psychologist has neglected the fact that the personality must be regarded in reference to its social envi-

ronment. Park and Burgess have recognized this important fact in their differentiation of individual and person. The former is the object of study by psychology. Measures of the individual concern his physique, mentality, emotions, feelings, volitions, and temperament. The person, on the other hand, is the individual with social status, that is, with a position or series of positions in reference to a group or a number of groups. As Park puts it:

The person is an individual who has status. We come into the world as individuals. We acquire status, and become persons. Status means position in society. The individual inevitably has some status in every social group of which he is a member. In a given group the status of every member is determined by his relation to every other member of that group. The individual's self-consciousness—his conception of his rôle in society, his "self," is based on his status in the social group or groups of which he is a member.¹

Now one's status is determined very largely by the reactions of other persons to oneself, and the manner in which these affect one's conduct. James remarks that a man has as many selves as there are persons who recognize him and carry an image of him in their minds. This is another way of stating the same thing. In more behavioristic terms we might say that the person possesses as many varying habit systems as there are people, in group relations, who have distinctive response systems, covert and overt, toward him. The manner of statement is not perhaps so important as the fact that the person, as over against the mere individual organism, is a combination of relationships to others, in terms of his images, ideas, habits, and attitudes.

2. *Motivation and Participation.*—It would be a mistake to think of personality only in terms of the social and cultural environment. It is true, as Child has lucidly pointed out, that all organisms, not excepting man, can be understood only in terms of their adjustments to the environment, both internal and external. Hence in the study of man's behavior we must take into account his internal as well as his external stimuli. As we have noted above, the beginning of much of our behavior rests upon internal changes connected with food, drink, bodily care, and sexual activities. After all the conditioning which the world outside can give, there still remain the internal drives to be taken into account.

¹ Reprinted by permission from R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, 1921, p. 55. Copyright by the University of Chicago.

In Chapters VI and VII we discussed the modification in the internal factors which determined attention and overt action. In fact, in some circles there has been a distinct swing away from undue concern with the external environment. This has become apparent in much modern biographical writing following the rise of psychoanalytic methods. Ludwig states in these words:

After a period which attempted to define man in terms of descent and breeding, we enter upon an era totally alien to the Darwinian mentality; once again we turn our attention to the personality *per se*, the personality almost devoid of temporal coördinates, considering the volume, intensity, and resistance of its vital forces, the restless fluid of its emotional configuration, and the balance between its impulse towards action and its repression through precept. Whereas our fathers asked, "How did the individual harmonize with his world?" our first question is, "Does he harmonize with himself?" Questions of success and responsibility have been shifted from the environment back to the individual, so that the analysis which was formerly expended upon the milieu now seeks to penetrate within.²

The modern behavioristic movement in psychology and the so-called objective methods of the social sciences, with their emphasis upon measurable quantities, still puts much weight upon the environment. Psychoanalysis, in spite of its misleading concepts, has doubtless been of value in revealing to us more clearly the place of the internal factors. Social psychology has not been unaffected by the work of Freud, Jung, and Adler. Thomas, in his analysis of his rich collection of human documents, was probably somewhat influenced by his early contact with Freud's work, although he did not accept the Freudian single-track explanations of behavior. Rather he developed his schema of wishes as basic motives to conduct from analysis of his own data. These wishes are: (1) The desire for security and safety exemplified in habits of maintaining the social *status quo*, of not changing the ways of living, in seeking shelter, physically and socially, in not leaving home, in voting the conservative ticket, in looking back upon the past as the good old days which should continue. (2) The opposite of this, the desire for new experience or adventure, which is shown in habits of migration, of seeking new lands to conquer, in reaching new areas of invention or scientific discovery, or in exploiting the emotions and feelings

² From *Genius and Character* by E. Ludwig, 1927, p. 4. By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

for the sake of thrill in romanticism and day-dreaming. (3) The desire for intimate response, in which the person builds up habits of comradeship, of seeking close face-to-face relations, perhaps with just one other person or, at best, with but few persons. This is basic to love-making, but has wider reaches in intimate companionships of all sorts. (4) The desire for prestige or social power, in which habits of domination, of success, of exhibition of prowess before others are indulged in for the social approval they give.

Now in all of these four desires Thomas makes clear that certain internal factors of the person are involved. In spite of the fact that other persons come distinctly to affect all of the desires, the foundations lie inside rather than outside the individual organism. It should not be imagined that these desires or wishes are innate. They are conceptual formulations based on observation of more mature behavior. These wishes arise by conditioning from social participation. They find expression in various forms of social intercourse. Thus desire for security finds its consummation in activity in stable and tried frames of behavior. The wish for new adventure, in contrast, finds its outlet in participation with strangers, or with acquaintances in new social configurations. The desire for intimate response has a narrow but familiar congenial and uninhibited outlet in close contact, while the wish for prestige is conditioned to a public or larger less intimate group. Dunlap has also tried to formulate desire as the basis for interpreting personality and social behavior. He lists nine desires, three of them distinctly physiological—"alimentary" and "excretory" desires, and desire for rest; three partially physiological but doubtless much conditioned—viz., desire for activity, amatory desire, and desire for shelter; the balance largely socially produced: desire for preëminence, desire for conformity, and parental desire.³

In short, it is absolutely necessary to take these internal factors into account. There we find the whole range of values and meanings which constitute the *sine qua non* of social behavior. Yet the full picture is not given by this alone. To the present writer it seems that the individual and his internal drives or desires must be correlated at all times with the situational complexes outside him toward which he responds. Thus the Thomas or Dunlap lists of wishes, or the arrangement of personalities in terms of schizophrenic, of cyclic or manic-depressive, and of epileptoid patterns,

³ Other schemes of personality organization are cited in Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter XV.

or as introverts and extroverts, or as syntropes or idiotropes, means little without the corresponding categories of environment: other persons in group configurations involving both cultural and non-cultural influences. Thomas' schema, which reveals great insight, might be recast to cover the personality in terms of wishes in reference to certain social situations.⁴ Certainly we must at all times recognize the objects or situations toward which the person is oriented.

B. *Early Development of the Personality.*

We may view personality, then, as a compound emergent product made up of psycho-biological tensions and mechanisms, involving both the central and the autonomic nervous systems, modified and elaborated by personal-social experience and by culture norms so as to permit one to live with one's fellows. The most important conditionings are those produced in infancy and early childhood. These early experiences predetermine everything else that follows upon them. It is now generally recognized that one's major characteristics of personality are usually determined before one is five years old, and some writers say as early as two or three. The child begins in the first year, no doubt, to form rudimentary habits, and certainly in the second year the mechanism of conditioned response is well under way. The acquisition of new stimuli-response associations goes on with great rapidity.

1. *Influence of Family on Personality.*—At the outset the infant is thrown upon the care of his family. The family is the basic social group. In it the biological, psychological, and sociological forces meet in giving the individual his start in life. The family is more than a legal formulation. Functionally considered, it is "a unity of interacting personalities." As Burgess remarks:

The actual unity of family life has its existence, not in any legal conception, nor in any formal contract, *but in the interaction of its members*. For the family does not depend for its survival on the harmonious relations of its members, nor does it necessarily disintegrate as a result of conflicts between its members.

⁴ In fact, Thomas seems to have shifted his ground rather markedly over to the environmental, situational analysis. See his recent writings: *The Child in America*, 1929, and his "Configurations of Personality" in *The Unconscious*, 1927, and his presidential address before the American Sociological Society, "Behavior Patterns and the Situation," in *Publications of American Sociological Society*, 1928, vol. XXII, pp. 1-13.

The family lives as long as interaction is taking place and only dies when it ceases.⁵

The relations of members of the family, therefore, may be described in terms of habits, attitudes, values, and various reorganizations of these into wishes or desires. Now the values and conceptions of the rôle of members in the family differ with variations in culture standards and personal-social experience. Because of chaotic cultural norms as to the place and function of the family today, doubtless the personality organization differs from what it was in other societies. Under polyandry or polygyny, under the patriarchal or matriarchal forms of the family, personality inevitably differed from that found under present-day monogamy:

The family, moreover, does not exist independently of other group arrangements. As Mowrer puts it:

The family also exists in interaction with the larger society of which the family and its members are component parts. The status of the family in the neighborhood, its rôle as defined in the mores, in public opinion and by law, the changes in the family which result from the play of social forces in the community, are all illustrations of the significance for the family and its members of interaction with society.⁶

The family, then, is the first social group to which the infant is exposed. His very helplessness and his readiness for learning are significant. He brings with him a huge congeries of reflex patterns, some of which are potentially organized into larger patterns dependent on physiological tensions such as hunger, thirst, rage, fear, withdrawal, sensitive zone reactions, and the rudimentary sex reactions. But the direction which the development of his reflexes shall take is determined in large measure by the nature of the stimulating situations which he meets.

At the outset the whole world revolves around the infant. He arrives out of a physiological state of more or less complete dependence. In early infancy he is carried along in much this same state of dependence. The infant is dominated by what Freud calls, "the pleasure principle," that is, by the biological needs of his body which seek pleasurable reactions and avoid painful ones. The child, in time, must acquire independence and re-

⁵ E. W. Burgess, "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *The Family*, 1926, vol. VII, p. 5.

⁶ Quoted by E. W. Burgess, *Ibid.*

sponsibility, but he can not do so without the stimulation of his mother, father, brothers and sisters, relatives, and other persons with whom he later comes in contact. It is interesting to note that in the first weeks "the reaction of the new-born baby to noises is far more positive than the reaction to the voice." Yet within a few months responses to various voices are definitely established.

The first object of attachment for the infant is the mother. His reactions to her begin with nursing and with maternal care. Regularity of feeding may cut across the physiological demands of the infant, but this framework of habit is laid down for the child by the stronger and more capable adult in whose power he rests. The fixation on the mother's breast is one of the first forms of conditioning. The Freudian psychologists have made a good deal of this early habit as the basis of sexual attachment and later sexual activity. There is much clinical evidence to connect the sucking and nursing act with later conditionings toward the sexual organs. Yet, at the beginning, the fixation appears dependent upon hunger and thirst more than upon sexual demands. Probably the tactile sensations of the lips upon the breast and the sucking response itself are pleasurable, but that they are, for the child, sexual in any narrow sense is doubtful. On the other hand, so far as the mother is concerned there may be a distinct erotic sensation from nursing the child. This, in turn, may lead the mother to fondle or pet the child while nursing and set up in him secondary reactions to sensitive and erogenous zone stimulations that will later become associated with his sexual activities.

The child's feeding habits, like his other bodily responses, are always conditioned by the mother's ideas, attitudes, and habits. These, in turn, will reflect the culture norms of her society and her own personal-social experience. For example, if the mother is high-strung and easily affected by the whimperings or crying of the baby, she may nurse him at irregular intervals. This may produce difficulties in digestion, but equally as significant may be his conditioning to the mother as the object which satisfies his merest whim. The mother, in addition to nursing him whenever he fusses the least bit, may also walk the floor with him, swinging him gently to and fro in her arms. This pleasurable sensation is associated with the new stimulus and before long the child is crying to be carried and petted rather than because he is hungry. The rapidity with which conditioning to social care arises is illustrated in the case cited by Gesell above (page 187).

Another step in the process of conditioning and re-conditioning which goes on in the family is seen in the relationships of older to younger children. The state of dependence and full attention from the mother may shift considerably when a second child appears. The first child in a family is usually the object of much attention. The parents concentrate their affection upon him. He is the first-born. He is the outcome of a great love and thus stands as a symbol for the deeper affections of the parents. The mother often is unduly solicitous for the child's welfare and gives him unlimited attention. Then the relatives may come into the picture. The grandmother dotes on her grandson or granddaughter. The aunts and uncles all make a great fuss over the baby. Thus to the mother's care and affection of the child is added that of father and relatives. The child may easily grow up to one or two years of age with habits and attitudes of importance and domination which make it difficult for him to adjust himself to the arrival of a second child. The following is typical of many family situations:

Jane B., a bright and attractive child of three, will have nothing whatever to do with her mother or little brother if she can avoid it. When Jane was 26 months old her mother went to the hospital to have her second child. Jane had seen the mother sewing baby clothes and had been told, in answer to questions, that the family was hoping for another child. But, Jane, having had no experience, naturally could not know just what it meant to hear her mother say she might have a little baby sister or brother. A day or so after the birth of the second child, a boy, Jane was taken by the father to the hospital to see the new baby. Jane showed considerable interest in the new member of the family and was affectionate toward the mother. During the ten days that the mother was in the hospital, the father and Jane became really acquainted for the first time. The father was called upon for many things that formerly had been done by the mother. Jane saw the baby frequently at the hospital and apparently was not emotionally disturbed in the least. Neither did she seem anything but affectionate toward the mother, who told her that she would soon be home again.

At the end of the ten days, Jane was considerably taken aback to find not only the mother at home, but the baby as well. Jane within a few days realized that a new life had opened for her. The mother gave so much of her time to the baby and so little to her, compared to the past! Jane asked why the baby was not left at the hospital and was told that he would always be with them at home. The older child was upset and became antagonistic to both mother and baby. She turned more and more toward her father. When the baby was a few weeks old, Jane one day discovered him lying on the davenport wrapped up ready to be taken out and she unceremoniously pushed him onto the floor. The

mother rushed in at the first cry of the infant, who was not injured, to find Jane standing over him in a somewhat deliberate manner, and saying "Don't like baby."

As time went on the dislike for the child and the avoidance of the mother grew. The father became more and more the center of Jane's affection. She waited for the father to come home at night to show him things she had made during the day. On one occasion she had a serious temper tantrum when her mother unwittingly showed the father some little crude drawing Jane had made and saved, before the child herself had had the opportunity to display her accomplishment.

When the mother came to consult the writer, Jane had become quite a serious disciplinary problem in the home. She avoided relations with the baby brother and took a distinctly negativistic attitude toward the mother. Toward the father she was deeply affectionate and obedient. The situation was one which tended to condition the child toward the mother, father, and brother in a form upon which the whole subsequent structure of family relations might be built. Unless the child was handled wisely, the resistance to the mother might in time carry over to other women who might serve as surrogate mothers. Dislike and jealousy are not uncommon in families. Sometimes the hatred and avoidance become extreme. Often maturity corrects some of the infantile conditionings, or it may at least offer sublimated forms of reconditioning.

Many mothers are so emotionally conditioned to their babies that they produce in the latter a host of habits which determine the direction of life organization and point of view ever afterward. The sense of dependence on the mother, commencing with feeding and bodily care, spreads, as the child grows, to nearly every relationship which involves him and his social world. The child, toddling about, bumps his head against the table, and the doting mother rushes in at the child's screams to remark: "Did baby get hurt? Naughty table to bump my baby," and so on. She kisses the child, soothes its feelings, and often as not continues scolding the table, even going so far as to strike it with her hand as she blames it for injuring her darling. We wonder where children and even adults pick up their animistic notions about physical objects. The basis is found in just such simple incidents. The mother's blaming the table, striking it and reacting to it as if it were human and personal, puts on the child the pattern for a like response toward inanimate objects. So, too, we often wonder why grown men and women have such curiously infantile reactions to their

parents, because we do not know the history of their early conditioning.

Sometimes psychologists have distinguished between the individual consciousness and reaction to material objects and the social consciousness and reactions to persons, as if these two types of response were fundamentally different. As a matter of fact, our reactions even to the material world around us are conditioned, in part, by the place which other persons have had in this. (Even our concepts of time, space, force, mass, and motion are colored by the cultural patterns which are brought to us from other persons, and in this very teaching often a social quality is added to the entire picture.) So, in this case, the child has both received a fundamental conditioning toward the mother and acquired from her a certain tendency to project blame outward on physical objects. Later the child will be the same in reference to other persons. This dual conditioning—first, the dependence on the parent, and second, the projection of blame and cause of trouble on the outside world—is a combination which may mark a personality for life. The following case summary brings some aspects of this before us:

Julia X is the youngest of five children, three boys and two girls. The father is a self-made man. Having begun business with a popcorn stand and a bushel of popcorn, he is now worth a quarter of a million dollars. The mother is a sweet, lovable and rather efficient woman. The children have had a good deal of leisure and freedom. The lives of the younger ones have been very easy. Not only has the father provided well, but a wealthy uncle left each of the five children an endowment, in trust, which gives each one about one hundred dollars a month.

As a child, Julia was a great favorite. Her mother waited on her at every turn. She was pretty and much spoiled by her family and relatives. Her every wish was satisfied. She never had any little household duties. She slept as long as she wanted. Her mother often brought her breakfast to her bedroom, even when she was twenty-five years of age. In fact, if Julia felt like staying in bed, which she often did, she even had her luncheon in bed as well. Both her father and mother have waited on her since infancy. If she is in bed and wakes at eleven or twelve p. m. and asks for a drink, a sandwich or other favor, she calls out to father or mother who promptly waits on her.

Today Julia, at twenty-six, has been married for six months. Her husband's mother, who was widowed when Julia's husband was nine years of age, is a delightful and efficient woman who kept her family of three boys together until they were grown. Julia's husband began at nine years of age to earn his own living and has always been a steady worker. Julia still sleeps from ten to twelve hours a day. She does not get up to prepare her husband's breakfast and he

frequently finds her still in bed at noon. She has no sense of money values. She has always spent her stipends, from her own family and from her uncle's estate, on her clothes without any regard to need or future. Mere whim determines her actions. She once spent twenty dollars for cold creams and cosmetics and eighty-six dollars for a couple of dresses when she had a wardrobe full of clothes, some of which had not even been worn. Her reaction to responsibilities is distinctly childish. She can not stand any sort of physical discomfort or the slightest pain. She whines at any inconvenience while traveling. And yet she is negative and stubborn where her own wishes are involved. She is quite lacking in mutuality even with her own family. She never gives any of her clothes away, even when she does not want them. For example, she recently had three pairs of white silk hose which she had worn but little, and she did not care for them, but her sister did. She sold them to her for the price she paid for them.

Her husband is working at a moderate salary and wishes to advance in his firm. She offers him no coöperation and has no interest or concern with house-keeping. She will do nothing which she does not want to do. The young man so far has been patient, but has attempted to get her to change her habits. There is no evidence that she has any insight into her personality and without insight there seems no likelihood of alteration. Just recently she has felt so miserable that she has gone to a general practitioner who has told her that she must rest because she has nervous exhaustion. But she even refuses to take the tonic he prescribed because it "tastes nasty."

This is not an altogether unusual picture of people born into these circumstances. The father has risen from poverty and has no desire to see his children suffer. All three of Julia's brothers are irresponsible young married men, with little or no sense of money, essentially infantile in many of their traits. Her divorced sister, whose former husband is recently deceased, has had nothing to do with the rearing of her two children. She has left it all to her mother, who has borne the burden gladly. The mother, on her part, loves her children and grandchildren and likes "to sacrifice" and "do" for them. The full background of the mother's own history is not at hand. Her reactions to her children can be understood only in terms of her own personal-social and cultural conditioning. Julia is a grown-up baby and her marriage to a man of different economic status, with some business ambitions, is fraught with great uncertainty. It is decidedly questionable whether their marriage will be successful.

The following case illustrates a very different parent-child relationship. Here there is revolt from the parent—a rebellion determined, in part, by a sense of inferiority.

In the N. family are two girls and three boys. The daughters are twenty months apart in age; the boys are much younger. The mother is a dominating type of woman. The father is relatively indifferent to the more intimate relations of the children to one another. Z., the older girl, made a very brilliant record in high school and college. Her mother talked a great deal about this, both in the home and out. She spoke of her professional promise, of how proud they all were of her. It was "Z did this," and "Look at your sister, Z." She identified herself very distinctly with her older daughter. A., the younger girl, who was two years behind her sister in school, was a mediocre student. She was not interested in books. Her mother was constantly comparing her unfavorably with her abler sister.

The older girl was rather well integrated to the family life. She got along well with the neighbors, and was generally popular. The younger daughter, in contrast, developed into a quick-tempered, rebellious person. She defied her mother about hours of recreation. She sulked at home or was sharp-tongued when she did talk. She could not be aroused to do better work by being compared with her brighter sister. In fact, this unfavorable comparison only made her angry.

Both girls graduated from college. A. conformed outwardly to the family scheme so long as she was in school. Soon after she completed her course, she left home. She married after a few months in a large city where she went to work. She says she will absolutely have nothing more to do with her family in any intimate way.

Throughout the complex of early habits run the strands of social influences. Other persons form definite configurations to which one responds. The demands or concessions of others are the matrix of socialization. Identification and projection may produce dependence or its opposite. Harsh treatment affects one child in one way, another differently. Sayles cites the case of the five Osborn brothers who responded very differently to their parental influences, particularly to severe treatment from a father:

We have here, in one family, clear-cut illustrations of the leading types of reaction to the domineering father: where one child is able to withstand the pressure and hold his own, learning self-command and attaining a degree of maturity in the process, another may be terrorized into submission and dependence, and a third driven to rebellion and lawlessness.⁷

The following case of two brothers illustrates this same principle:

We have been interested in the study of two brothers. One, at two years, is vivacious, active, and pugnacious, striking and slapping his brother or play-

⁷ M. B. Sayles, *The Problem Child at Home*, 1928, p. 60. Courtesy of Commonwealth Fund Publications.

mates to gain his ends and domineering over his brother two years older. He is responsive and friendly, readily drawing adults to him because of his cheeriness and air of bravado. The other, at four years, is quiet and retiring. He gives way at once to his little brother's demands, making no effort to assert his rights, is shy and unresponsive and inclined to be fretful.

The marriage of the parents has proved fundamentally unhappy. When the older boy was a year old, the parents separated, but after several months, the mother allowed her husband to return because of her anxiety over the youngster, who had been devoted to his father and was apparently grieving for him. The children's earliest recollections must have been of constant quarreling. The family was lined up, with the mother and younger boy opposed to the father and older boy, each parent defending the special favorite against punishment and discipline by the other. This continued until the father left home for good about a year ago. His going did away with much of the friction, but left the older lad without his champion. After a few attempts to assert himself, he sank to his present state of letting things go without a struggle. He lives in an atmosphere of discouragement and discontent. He is the object of fault-finding, scolding, and blame, and he feels inadequate and discriminated against.

The younger one, on the other hand, receives praise and kindly interest and is buoyant and aggressive. He has the backing of his mother, who turned her affections to him when unhappy with her husband. The mother and her relatives are unconsciously but steadily exaggerating and making permanent the markedly different personality traits of these two boys, who are living in the same physical surroundings.⁸

Again, in sleeping arrangements, frequently habits of dependence are built up. For example, stories of fearsome animals lead a child to demand that the door into the hallway where a light burns be kept open. Moreover, the unfortunate habit of a parent or an older person sleeping with a child may so condition him that he is ever uncomfortable without some sleeping companion. At times even more serious personal consequences follow this sort of thing.

The mother, a highly emotional, badly organized person herself, sleeps with her fifteen year old son. The father and mother are divorced, but the wife is well-provided for. She still gives the boy his bath every day, rubbing him and drying him as might a professional masseuse, but with additional motherly affection. A doctor friend of the family not long since attempted, in a gentle, kindly way, to suggest that this sort of thing ought not to be done "now that George was growing up." The mother sensed at once that any such change would cut across her own emotional balance and resented it fearfully. The boy

⁸ S. Foster, "Personality Deviations and the Home," *Mental Hygiene*, 1925, vol. IX, pp. 741-42.

is selfish, spoiled, and distinctly infantile. The mother is very evidently getting considerable substitute emotional satisfaction from this in view of her failure as a wife. From what we know of similar cases, one does not predict a very satisfactory life for this boy and for those women who come into his life.

These overdependent personalities never completely separate themselves from parental influences. They may be called the tied-to-mother's-apron-strings type. It must be noted that the father as well as the mother may be the object of the undue fixation. Clearly the desire for security may have its roots in these infantile fixations of dependence upon parents and other members of intimate groups. Later this sense of dependence may spread to other groups. Sometimes these dependent persons are petty and spoiled in all of their reactions. They always want their own way. And if it is not forthcoming they resort to whining, crying, temper tantrums, or other symptomatic actions to gain attention. Later their technique for securing attention may change, but the sense of dependence remains unaltered.

Another personality organization of opposite sort may arise from family conditioning. The efforts to impress authority and regularity upon the child may result in negative responses on his part toward the mother and the regimen. This may happen in nursing, but at the outset its more common locus is in the excretory functions, and, after the period of nursing has passed, in eating. The extremes of behavior of this sort come to be called negativism. It furnishes the foundation for the revolt-from-authority sort of personality. The following case illustrates the method by which negative responses are set up in children:

Mrs. V. is a highly efficient, executive type of woman. She is large in stature, aggressive in manner, with a fine, stately carriage. She is well read in the physiology of child training and is over-anxious for the health of her family, which has in spite of her concern been given to ill-health. The second child, a boy of three and a half, was bothered by constipation at the time the observation was made. He was also developing a good deal of fussiness about his meals. At meal-time his mother stood over him literally morning after morning until he ate his cereal. Then promptly at 8:30 every morning he was taken to the toilet to stool. "And I make him do it," she remarked proudly to a friend. "Why just yesterday I made him sit there until 9:30 but I'll tell you I did not let him get up until he had finished."

The boy is intelligent, alert to the world around him, but developing a whole set of escapes from the mother's severity and one negativism piled on another. He is still too weak and young to use physical force in resistance, but one won-

ders what lies ahead of him. As he grows older the mother's domination, in which both the grandmother who lives there and the father, often conspire with the mother, will probably spread from one activity to another.

One does not mean to discount the very important matter of proper bodily habits. The technique of habit formation is not the simple matter which parents imagine. As one is training the child in regularity, one is also training him in patterns of response to other persons in authority. As he grows up and this authority spreads from one situation to another, there gradually arises a general attitude of resistance to all forms of authority.

There is a very brilliant but erratic man whose attitudes of criticism of the present social, political and economic order seem distinctly conditioned by his early childhood experiences. His mother was an efficient, fanatically religious woman, full of the notions of sin so dominant in the older generations. The boy was brought up under the most rigid discipline. His curiosity about sex, for example, was completely squelched by his horrified mother. As he lived on a farm he learned a great deal by observation and was colossally misinformed and given a highly colored picture of sex from the vile mouths of hired men. He was forced to attend Sunday school and church every Sunday. Any infractions of the Puritan code about Sunday amusements were punished. He could not go walking in the woods nearby. He could not go swimming, hunting, or fishing. Later, in adolescence, he had above all else to keep away from girls. The domination of his moral attitudes by his mother, without any opportunity to learn of life and make some of his own judgments, the discipline of his conduct within such strict Puritan rules, the gradual growth of perception and idea based on observation of others and contact with groups outside the family, led in the end, to a tremendous revolt. With his study in college it took on particular violence in reference to all forms of organized religion. From this it spread later to radicalism in the field of politics and economics. And the critical ability of this man has kept pace with this development. Yet in spite of this intellectualization of the process, the man has retained a good many rather childish traits.

The revolt-from-authority pattern is seen at various levels. It doubtless exists in the ne'er-do-well and hobo, in many criminals, in radicals of all sorts, of both the emotional and the intellectual kind, to use Root's differentiation. There is some reason to believe that the wish for new adventure is often correlated with negativism and revolt from authority. The seeking of new stimulation in drink, drugs, travel, artistic, scientific or philosophic activities, may be an expression of distaste for and disgust with

authoritarian forms. Avoidance of, or escape from, culturally determined responsibilities is merely another aspect of the same thing. Thus, the desertion of a family by the husband may be rooted in negativistic attitudes built up toward financial and emotional responses expected of one by the culture standards of the community.

Another familiar sort of personality development which begins at home is found in the show-off child. As a rule the undue attention to the young child by his parents gives rise to attitudes and habits on the child's part that carry over into all sorts of social situations. The repeated telling of girls that they are pretty and sweet, or of boys or girls that they are smart and clever, the parading of the child's foibles and abilities before adults—all are methods by which the exhibitionism of the child is built up. Ever in the eye of parents, brothers and sisters, relatives and friends, the child comes to believe that he is unsurpassable.

The case of James A. illustrates the exhibitionist. This child, who is in the third grade, must take the lead in everything. If he is not first in line of march, not first in some little school performance, if he does not have a part on every room program, he has an emotional storm. He talks about it to the teacher, his fellow pupils, and to all who will listen to him. He has been made so much of at home that as a psychologist remarked, he imagines he should be "head man in every show." Because of lack of parental coöperation he is proving a very difficult school problem.

The writer has seen some insufferable children develop from being informed by teachers and parents that they had very superior mental ability as determined by intelligence tests. Some families produce in their children attitudes of superior performance, so that later the children meet competition very emotionally and ineffectively, as happened in the case just cited. Not infrequently one sees the results of such early training in college students. A girl or boy has been made so much of by the family, neighbors, and school authorities in a small town that in college the orientation to a new world of competition without parental and other support produces maladjustment.

Closely correlated with the exhibitionist child is the dominating, aggressive sort. Certain children by virtue of physical, mental, and emotional maturity, coupled with early personal-social training, lead in all sorts of social situations. This commanding behavior may be observed in the very earliest activities of children. Some children dominate others at home. In

fact, from the outset children sometimes dominate even their parents rather completely. The following report of an experiment carried on at the Minnesota Institute of Child Welfare illustrates how divergent the behavior of young children of the same age may be in their relations with their fellows. Fourteen children, seven girls and seven boys, were observed.

The children were taken to the room, two at a time, and told that there would be some particularly exciting toy there. Everything was done to arouse their anticipation, and great efforts made to have this anticipation realized through having the toys of an interesting and unusual sort. The two children were left alone with one toy in the room. This situation, two children and one toy, no adults around, was designed to produce conflict. The unseen observer recorded the behavior, in specified categories, every five seconds during a six-minute period. A record was made for each child in terms of his behavior as directed toward securing the toy—whether he screamed, pleaded, bargained, threatened, pulled it away deliberately, slapped, pinched or pulled the other child, or relinquished the toy passively; in terms of the type of domination of the successful child, after the outcome of the conflict, i. e., whether he played with the toy alone, controlled it but let the other child participate, or controlled it but let the other child have his turn or share it, and in terms of the unsuccessful child's reactions; in terms of the subsequent behavior of both children—whether the dominant child relinquished the toy, and, if so, whether he still directed the activity, whether either child made a suggestion, and whether it was accepted or rejected by the other child. . . .

In two behavior charts it is shown that one of these children used pleading as behavior directed towards securing the toy over two hundred times, the other child not ten times, but the latter child used commanding about as often as the former used pleading. When we consider the great number of combinations from which these computations came, the consistency of behavior is amazing. The pleading child pleaded consistently, whatever other child he happened to be with; the commanding child commanded all other children.⁹

Later, on the playground, in the classroom, and so on throughout life, some children will step forward to perform the social functions which the situation seems to call for. Others, in contrast, will hold back and follow the lead of others. The aggressive type secure their wishes by commanding and in a sense remaking the situation, or at least by getting it in their own hands. The docile type may employ pleading or other techniques to secure what they want, or they may passively accept the situations which develop around them. Adler has shown how the kinds of social reactions of chil-

⁹ W. I. and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America*, p. 520. Published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

dren of different ages in the family make for differences in aggressiveness. He believes that the second child replaces the first in parental affection. This produces in the first child a feeling of inferiority which may lead to aggressiveness and revolt or to undue docility. Goodenough and Leahy have made some enlightening observations on this point:

It has been shown that in the kindergarten group, those children who were the oldest in their families showed a significant tendency toward lack of aggressiveness, and that in at least one case out of every five, this lack of aggression was manifested to a rather extreme degree. These children are also rated low in self-confidence; they are lacking in qualities of leadership, are easily modified by suggestion, and very gullible. They are somewhat more likely to be seclusive, and their attention is likely to be of the introverted type.

The "middle" child also shows some tendency toward lack of aggression, but this characteristic is far less marked than in the case of the oldest child. He is rather easily influenced by suggestion, and is likely to display more than the usual craving for physical demonstration of affection. He is, as a rule, gregarious in his social attitudes, but individuals showing marked divergence toward the opposite extreme are also common among the group. Instances of extreme unpopularity with other children are more frequent in this group than in any other. His attention is likely to be flighty and easily distracted from the thing at hand.

The kindergarten children who are the youngest in their families show no really outstanding characteristics in their ratings. In general they scatter quite symmetrically on either side of the ideal norm, without marked tendencies toward either extreme. In total proportion of extreme ratings they rank the lowest of the four groups.

The only children in the kindergarten group are rated as more aggressive and more self-confident than any of the other groups. They show the greatest proportion of cases of extreme fondness for physical demonstration of affection and are highly gregarious in their social interests. They are more than ordinarily likely to show some instability of mood, are easily excited, and their attention tends to be flighty and distractible.

In our present state of ignorance with regard to the etiological basis for behavior, attempts to account for differences such as have been described can be but little better than pure conjecture. It has been shown that in the group of kindergarten children studied, those children who were the oldest in families of more than one showed the greatest proportion of extreme deviations from the ideal norm, and this finding is in accordance with the data which have been reported for delinquent groups and for the habit clinic children. At least three possible causative factors suggest themselves: the comparative inexperience of the parents in the case of the first born child, possible over-strain as a result of the many small tasks, including care of the younger children, which often

fall to the lot of the oldest child in a rapidly growing family, and more especially the difficult adjustment which is involved in the change from the "only child" to the "not only child" situation. One might also speculate as to a possible connection between the slightly greater tendency toward over-demonstrativeness found among the "middle" group of kindergarten children and the greater frequency of sex offenses in the corresponding group of clinic cases, raising the question of a possible association with unsatisfied desire for attention from parents who are preoccupied with the more immediately pressing demands of the younger and older children. Such speculation is a useful starting point for further investigation; it cannot take the place of objective evidence.

Nevertheless the data which have been presented appear to justify certain practical, if tentative, conclusions. It is not simply the only child who, by reason of the family relationships most frequently existent under those circumstances, is in danger of developing undesirable personality traits. There is probably no position in the family circle which does not involve, as a consequence of its own peculiar nature, certain special problems of adjustment. It is our task to study these problems, to ascertain the nature of the conditions under which each is likely to develop, and to find means for modifying these conditions in accordance with individual needs. That under circumstances commonly prevailing, the oldest child in the family is likely to be subjected to conditions which render satisfactory adjustment particularly difficult is strongly indicated by the facts which have been presented herein, and the need for special study with view to modification of these conditions through suitable parental education is suggested.¹⁰

To discover the social interactions among children, Anderson observed carefully the relationships of each child to the other children in the spontaneously formed nursery school play-groups. He writes:

The most significant fact which comes out of these observations is the fact that if we take a particular child and record his relationship to the group, we find that in 95 per cent of the situations with which he is presented in the play situation, he is the dominating or the leading individual, whereas another child under the same conditions is found to be in the dominating or leading position only 5 per cent of the time.¹¹

The significance of these differences in practice in situations of domination and submission is obvious. If such differences are found at two, three, and four years, imagine what five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years of additional practice may mean in the development of these patterns.

¹⁰ F. L. Goodenough and A. M. Leahy, "The Effect of Certain Family Relationships Upon the Development of Personality," *Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1927, vol. XXXIV, pp. 69-71.

¹¹ J. E. Anderson, "The Genesis of Social Reactions in the Young Child," *The Unconscious; A Symposium*, 1927, p. 81. Published by F. S. Crofts & Co.

Not only are personal life-organizations built up on the basis of early practice in dominance or subordination, but these patterns of behavior may come to be a part of the cultural framework of a given class or society. The Oriental ethos is marked in part by a certain passivity and submissiveness which strikes the Occidentalist with some amazement. The blind acceptance of class or caste, of disease, of hardship or luxury, the belief in the inevitability of social environment, all seem to the aggressive Westerner not a little strange. In our American life we have coined such phrases as "Go-getter," "He-man," "Never say die," and the like, as evidence of our complete belief in the social importance of aggressiveness. Sherwood Anderson makes the following comment on the attitudes which he found prevalent in his home community. They indicate how the rather indolent, passive behavior of the father and sons was looked upon by the "up and coming" town in which they lived:

A new kind of hero, tarnished somewhat later, filled the popular eye. As we boys went about in the main street of our town, citizens, feeling a kindly interest in the motherless sons, continually stopped us. Everyone was singing a new little song;

"Get on. Make money. Get to the top. A penny saved is a penny earned. Money makes the Mare go." . . .

One went into a factory, did his work with care and skill, became a foreman, superintendent, part owner, married the banker's daughter, got rich and went off to Paris to sin the sins neglected during so busy a youth and early manhood.

It sounded reasonable and possible. Learning a craft was slow business and one was in a hurry, "Hurry" was the battle cry of the day.¹²

These attitudes, being a part of our culture, are projected upon children from the earliest age. Masterful success is held up as an ideal. Our magazines herald it. Preachers, public speakers, and teachers proclaim the necessity of aggressive success. The families and individuals who do not conform to pattern are looked upon askance. Frequently as a part of this desire for dominance and prestige, one finds that the parents project upon their children their own thwarted and secret ambitions which they have themselves not been able to fulfil.

Both the exhibitionist and the dominating types very likely find their

¹² From pp. 84-85. *A Story Teller's Story* by Sherwood Anderson, copyright 1922, by B. W. Huebsch, Inc., New York, The Viking Press.

satisfaction in public notice. These personalities may, in fact, be rather consistently controlled by the desire for public recognition or power. There are persons who never forego an opportunity to lead a movement, no matter how insignificant, if it will but lead to notice in the press or other medium of communication. There are men in business and the professions who are constantly seeking group recognition. The *nouveau riche* may wish a place on the social register. The writer or artist may enjoy favorable reviews of his work. The business man craves prestige in his community. Other men may simply wish to be known as "jolly goodfellows," and so on, through the range of prestige-giving situations. The inception of this sense of power or control of attention frequently goes back to the home and other elementary group experiences.

As we noted above, the effects of other people upon the child are of two sorts. First there is direct personal-social contact in which culture norms or folkways play little part, comprising such things as sheer domination of strength, temperamental reactions of mother to child, and so on. Then there are those contacts which are particularly colored by the culture patterns of the group or community into which the child is born. Naturally, it is not easy to segregate from one another the two sorts of environmental influences. Both must be recognized. The whole process of socialization, as it is called, begins in these early contacts with other people. Anderson's comments, based on his observations of nursery school children, are interesting:

The following principles have come out of our study so far: In the first place, the individual is presented with a continuous series of situations involving persons to whom he must make reactions. Intrinsically, persons have greater value as stimulus objects than do inanimate things. He reacts to these persons in terms of his inherited makeup and his acquired equipment. He has the benefit of having before him during his early years demonstrations of the manner in which other persons react to one another and to him. He is presented with an inconstant and shifting social environment to which he reacts with variable behavior, the nature of which is determined partially by his equipment, partially by the examples set before him, and partially by the fact that some of his responses to persons are rewarded and hence facilitated and other of his responses to persons are punished and hence inhibited. With all, he gets a tremendous amount of practice in concrete situations in dealing with his fellowmen. Because of the inconstant and variable nature of the stimulation given him by other persons, there is apt not to be a cleancut elimination of certain types of response. Through random acts, he may fix upon particular modes of response which are not desirable from the standpoint of adjustment and which persist

and become written into his behavior system through much practice. Likewise, he may hit upon very desirable modes of adjustment in the same fashion. . . . By virtue of the organization of certain types of behavior, the individual is blocked off from organizing other types of behavior; in other words, the development of particular modes of response in social situations, while advantageous in certain respects, is attained at the price of versatility and variable reaction. This is analogous to what occurs biologically in the phylogenetic series.¹³

Finally, two features seem to be evident. First, the interaction of the child and other persons—parents, siblings, relatives, and others—directs the modification and elaboration of behavior trends which exist at birth and which arise with maturity. Out of these develop certain internal sets of behavior—anticipatory mechanisms—which come to characterize the personality. Associated with these are typical, somewhat stereotyped, forms of behavior. True enough, these internal sets or motives and the corresponding habit systems vary with social situations. Still we must remember that in any situation the person is attempting to move toward a complete or consummatory reaction which will be satisfying and pleasant to the organism as a whole. Failure to attain this goal is perhaps the major cause of personal-social maladjustment. The various types of life-organization and the forms of wishes connected with them indicate the person's efforts to balance internal and external adjustments in his group relations.

The second interesting feature of early social conditioning is the fact that as adults we fail to realize how deeply imbedded in us are our infantile experiences. So much of our behavior is motivated by earlier habits quite outside our consciousness that we fail to understand rationally either ourselves or others. Again we quote from Anderson:

One final question concerns itself with the manner in which the social reactions of the young child condition the later behavior of the human being. Long before the child enters school, long before we ordinarily think of the social behavior of the child, we find that he has been meeting numerous specific social situations and has been developing modes of reaction to them. Starting at a variable level, under the influence of external stimulation, driven internally with much perturbation on the part of the individual, these modes of reaction reduce themselves in the course of time by virtue of much practice to a semi-automatic partially conscious level and become in a true sense unconscious determiners of conduct. The advance of psychology in the last two generations

¹³ J. E. Anderson, "The Genesis of Social Reactions in the Young Child," *The Unconscious; A Symposium*, 1927, pp. 85-86. Published by F. S. Crofts & Co.

has demonstrated quite clearly the irrationality of much of our conduct, previously looked upon as rational. Conduct, however inexplicable in its final stages, is from the standpoint of its development both explicable and logical.¹⁴

C. Play Life and Socialization.

The family furnishes naturally the first group to which the child is exposed in his adventure into the social world. Soon, however, he comes into contact with other children more or less of his own age, and a new set of experiences is in store for him. The relation of parent to child may be described as a vertical one, in which the mother or father, or both, stand above the child in the position of omnipotence and omniscience—they have the authority of force and the authority of knowledge. The parent-child relation is a correlation of domination and submission. The relation of older to younger children in a family, moreover, tends to take on this same pattern—the older children dominating the younger in a kind of miniature parent-child relationship. Older sisters or brothers may scold the younger children not only in the words but in the very tones of the mother. The telling of tales on one another to parents by children is simply another phase of identification in which they invoke the authority of adults to accomplish certain social ends for themselves. In child play the contacts are more nearly spontaneous unless, as is too frequently the case, the adults interfere. The whole relation of personality to personality, in play, may be described as a horizontal one, so far as age, knowledge, and authority go. In some instances, of course, even in the play of children the vertical relations of domination and submission appear. One possesses more insight, knowledge, or intelligence than another, and may become an authority. But by and large the play-group is important in giving a new configuration to the social stimuli in essentially a horizontal form. Even the vertical relations which ensue are more spontaneous, although the parental treatment of children does carry over into the treatment which children accord to each other. On the whole, the play relations of children to one another tend to be determined by more natural relations than by highly-developed cultural norms. While the particular games and types of play are culturally determined, the spontaneous personal-social relations are relatively dominant.

Philosophers and educators have attempted many analyses of the play

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

impulses. In modern times whole theories of education have rested upon assumptions about play. The current insistence on following the child's own interest in education is rooted essentially in a belief that the spontaneous play-life of the child gives the best clue to his later development. Only brief reference need be made here to the theories of play. More important is the recognition that play gives a picture of the natural socialization of the individual.

Schiller first and later Herbert Spencer maintained that play arose as the expression of excess energy in the growing child. While it seems to the casual observer that children have superabundant energy and, moreover, that spontaneous play bespeaks excessive activity, there is the counter fact that children often play when fatigued and that much play does not serve any such purpose as the discharge of marked energy.

Groos held that play was a kind of preparatory training for the serious business of life. Thus the play of animals takes on the nature of hunting food, fighting, and the gestures of mating. It is true, of course, that play serves as a valuable training-ground in socialization. Children learn the give-and-take of life; they acquire attitudes of fair play, of rivalry and emulation, of group loyalty and group antagonism. They identify themselves with adult behavior in play. They act out first one rôle and then another as their interest fluctuates. This identification process is highly important because it means that new patterns other than those of the family come into the child's life and serve to widen the range of his attention and thus of his activities. But play is only preparatory for later life just as the activities of today prepare for those of tomorrow. There is much misunderstanding of the play-life of children on the part of adults, because with adults playtime is rather distinctly separated from the business of the day. With adults much ritual must be indulged in, in getting ready to play: arrangements for a foursome or tennis match are made days in advance; there are special clothes, times and places, fees, memberships, and training. It is highly self-conscious in its determination. It is deliberately cut off from other aspects of living. With children, so far as adults do not interfere, play is all of life. It is preparation in a sense, but more than that it is child life. Furthermore, the alleged playfulness of play in children is somewhat mistaken. A child's play is not nearly so consciously make-believe as many adults imagine. Some play is make-believe, but most children are quite serious about it.

Another familiar theory of play was given much currency in this country by G. Stanley Hall, who connected play with his theory of recapitulation. He thought that children in play repeated the evolutionary history of the race. Today no one believes that the activities of an individual rehearse any stage or level of behavior of past generations. The unhampered play-life of children does reveal much of the natural reactions of immature individuals to one another; but it is hard to believe that it exposes the nature of primitive man's actions. Primitive peoples can scarcely be called *child* or *adolescent* races, as Hall maintained.

Play may be considered a general descriptive term for the more or less natural unhampered life of children when thrown into contact with objects or other children. It is not uninfluenced by older persons—parents, teachers, and older children who teach younger ones “how to play.” Certainly it could not be described as an instinct, in the same sense in which hunger reactions might be. Nothing is gained by attempting to explain play in terms of instincts. Yet it is a natural aspect of growth in children. It is to be thought of as rooted in biological urges of the maturing child. Certainly social suggestion of others is a factor in the direction which it takes; truly what the child plays is even set down by culture patterns. Still, no one would deny that there are biological roots to play activities. Rather than attempt to explain play by recourse to theory, let us note some facts in the play-life of children.

At the outset the play of the child is individualistic. Here we have the baby in his crib playing with the toy:

John is lying on his back. In front of him is a brightly colored celluloid rattle swinging off a string tied across the crib. He strikes this over and over again with his hand or foot and as it swings, it makes a noise and the ball glitters in the bright sunshine. Head and eyes keep a crude rhythm with the swinging noisy object. Later as John graduates from crib to floor he tosses the toys about, he pounds them on the table or floor. He is interested in noises, tactile sensations and color. Another child may play with toys nearby and so long as the second child does not interfere—reach for or take his own toy—John is relatively indifferent.

This individualistic play continues until the children begin to play in groups, but still as individuals. A group of small boys are playing in a nursery school. Each imagines that he is a steam-engine. Each goes scuffing his feet across the floor, tooting away, and having a jolly time as a loco-

motive. There are no rules here, no coöperation, no group unity, but merely a congeries of individuals who are doing similar things because someone suggested it. And yet there is the beginning of some social stimulation: not only may a dominant boy start the particular kind of play, but the children watch each other and tend to follow each other in making certain kinds of noises, manual and facial gestures, and general bodily reactions. At this early stage of play we already see sex differences arising both in capacity to follow social suggestion and in time given to particular activities. The following note from an observational study of three-year-old children indicates this:

The results of this brief study of the occupational interests of ten three-year-old children indicate the strong appeal of the Montessori cylinders, color matching and building with large bricks to this aged child. A slight sex difference in choice of occupation is also demonstrated. The boys apparently prefer an active occupation requiring movement of the larger arm, leg and trunk muscles, while the girls prefer an occupation for which they can sit at the table and one involving finger manipulation rather than larger body movements. The boys, moreover, prefer an occupation calling for invention, one allowing freedom of expression such as building with large bricks, while the girls follow instructions more readily and prefer routine activity such as fitting cylinders and pairing colors. Their interests, however, are somewhat more diverse than the boys.

The length of time a three-year-old's interest in an occupation usually lasts is about eight minutes, though it may last on occasion for half an hour to an hour. The boys in this study stayed at one occupation about seven minutes, while the girls stayed usually about nine minutes. The girls showed slightly more variation in the amount of time they gave to their work than did the boys.¹⁵

Marked sex differences in types of play interest appear later, as we shall see.

This type of play gives way to other types in which there is rudimentary coöperation and with it some division of function. One group of boys may construct a boat or an airplane, or play at teaming. Some boys, in the latter, may be the horses, others the teamsters; and if there is not some joint arrangement of activity, the whole play breaks up. Often at this age, after four or five, and on for some years, one gets games of playing house involving child's duplication of family life. Some children play the rôles of

¹⁵ K. M. Banham-Bridges, "Occupational Interests of Three-Year-Old Children," *Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1927, vol. XXXIV, pp. 422-23.

parents, others are aunts, uncles, children, nurses, hired men, or serving maids. What the child imagines rests, finally, upon what he has experienced. In all this there is a great deal of identification, dramatization, and much compensatory make-believe. If dishes are not forthcoming, paper will serve as a satisfactory substitute. In place of real but miniature houses, spaces are marked off on the lawn or playground. But the play is serious and heartily indulged in by most children. They are not disturbed by the creations of their own fancy, but play through the various parts for hours with no apparent sense of any conflict with reality, until the interference of older persons or fatigue cuts across the day-dream.

As the child matures, his social contacts, and hence his social consciousness, widen. He begins to be aware of himself as part of a group. Thus begins group rivalry in which one group is pitted against another. Such games as "cat and mouse," "drop the handkerchief," "run sheep run," and "pomp pomp pullaway" occupy his attention. This type of game or play is called the double group, and is preliminary to the development of rivalry in formalized athletic games. Often in these early forms of group rivalries, the individual, rather than his coöperation, is still important. For example, in pitching quoits, each person on a "side" matches his prowess against his opponent, and true teamwork is hardly possible.

Real team games come later with pre-adolescence and especially with adolescence. These team games are coincident with the further development of social (ejective) consciousness. Here the numbers on each side are limited, the rules of play are definite, the success of the team depends on division of labor and coöperation with the team as a unit.

It should not be imagined for a moment that the lines between these types of play are sharp, or that one type does not carry over to another. There are many adult games, such as chess and golf, in which individual skill is pitted against individual skill, and there are games like quoits or cards in which the individuals playing are merely added to one another as partners. But in "doubles" in tennis, in football, basketball, and baseball, the coöperation of all for a common purpose is absolutely essential.

The congeniality group, which we shall discuss in a subsequent chapter, comes into the play-life of children after the sixth or eighth year of life, and later, especially with boys, these congenial groups often develop into gangs or athletic clubs. Play-life is principally tied to the group participation of the individual, and is not to be understood without reference to it.

Before leaving the discussion of play-life, we shall review some recent work on the types of play activities.

Perhaps the most extensive survey of types of play, and of sex, community, and racial differences in play, was made in 1926 by Lehman and Witty. More than ten thousand children above the age of eight and a half were given a test in which approximately two hundred kinds of play were listed. The children were asked to check the kinds of play which they enjoyed and to furnish other data. Two important facts were brought out: the continuity of play from early childhood on; and the fact that there are no sharply divided periods in types of play, but rather an enormous overlapping. While there were great individual differences, on the whole the younger children indulged in about twice as many kinds of play as the older. Certain children were markedly deficient in play experience—the marginal children whose socialization is much restricted. The older children tended to be slightly less social than the eight-year-olds in their play. Lehman and Witty, in fact, believe that no age can be designated as particularly social or individualistic. Among the younger children especially, two items stand out: first, the drive to participate in adult social life, helping parents or older persons to “do things”; and second, the frequent evidence of play as an expression of the desire for new experience.

Some writers have made a good deal of sex differences in play, but Lehman and Witty found them less significant than is ordinarily imagined. Boys' games were a bit more vigorous, a bit more competitive and usually better organized, while those of the girls were more restricted in range and more sedentary. Community differences appeared: rural children, while less repressed in play, are less sophisticated and less well organized than city children. Especially is this the case with the older groups. Environmental determinants are evidently the bases of these divergences.

Negro children appear to be more social in their play than the white, but the possible cultural differences between negro and white have not been studied as a background for differences in types of play. Children retarded in school indulge in more social types of play than do those of average or superior ability. On the other hand, there is no evidence that children of superior mentality lack versatility or sociability in their play. The survey revealed seasonal fluctuations in some types of play. The play of boys seems to be more seasonal than that of girls,

Play is a most valuable feature of social participation. It affords a method outside the home for the child to come into contact with his social universe. Some children indulge much more readily than others in their opportunities for this participation. A preliminary survey made of certain public school play-groups in a city of 50,000 in 1927-1928 showed that there were five to ten per cent of children who stood about and did not play or played only when constantly urged by adults. These marginal children are inclined to be negativistic and evasive in their social activities. They are missing their opportunity to learn the manner of social participation which will enable them to get through life. Many find their play-life in day-dreaming. It would be interesting to know what percentage of these children run to introverted types of mind and how many of them already display early anti-social trends in their conduct. Practice in social interaction is of great importance in the play-group just as it is in the home and elsewhere. Children who play get enormously greater facility in meeting social situations, in accommodating themselves to other children, than do others who do not or will not play.

D. Differentials in Personality.

The differences of behavior are related to class and home influences throughout play and school and in later group contacts. Gesell and Lord studied two groups of children in a nursery school with a view to determining differences, if any, in a number of dimensions of behavior. The following selections from their report are significant:

Nursery School A was attended almost exclusively by children from well-to-do families, whose fathers were occupationally at the professional level. The children of Nursery School B were recruited from homes of poorly favored economic status, in which the mother was usually obliged to work during the day while the child was cared for at the nursery. . . . Physically, the homes of the children in Group A were private residences, or apartments. The homes of the children in Group B were of tenement type. All the children came from English-speaking, "American" homes.

[The children were observed in the Nursery school and then were examined individually, both as to intelligence and as to social traits and interests. There were fifteen items altogether. Age norms were employed but the estimates were expressed in terms of Average (A); High (H); Superior (S); and Low (L)]. The following table gives the summary of the findings:

Table 13: Showing Differences in Behavior of Two Groups of Children of Divergent Economic Status

<i>Items</i>	ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR		<i>Ratings</i>			
	Group	L	A	H	S	
1. Block Construction	A	0	6	5	0	
	B	5	1	4	1	
2. Form Matching	A	0	5	3	3	
	B	2	6	3	0	
3. Drawing	A	2	5	1	3	
	B	4	4	3	0	
4. Comprehension	A	0	5	1	5	
	B	4	4	1	2	
Total	A	2	21	10	11	
	B	15	15	11	3	
LANGUAGE						
5. Vocabulary	A	0	4	5	2	
	B	4	5	2	0	
6. Conversation	A	0	3	8	0	
	B	4	3	1	3	
7. Information	A	0	2	6	3	
	B	1	6	3	1	
Total	A	0	9	19	5	
	B	9	14	6	4	
PERSONAL-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR						
8. Spontaneity of Speech	A	0	2	7	2	
	B	4	1	3	3	
9. Spontaneity in Drawing	A	0	8	2	1	
	B	4	3	4	0	
10. Play Initiative	A	0	5	3	3	
	B	3	5	3	0	
11. Persistence	A	3	2	4	2	
	B	7	2	2	0	
12. Coöperativeness	A	0	2	6	3	
	B	4	3	3	1	
13. Poise	A	0	2	6	3	
	B	4	3	0	4	
14. Eating and Sleeping Habits	A	2	8	1	0	
	B	7	3	1	0	
15. Self Care	A	1	8	2	0	
	B	0	5	5	1	
Total	A	6	37	31	14	
	B	33	25	21	9	
Grand Total	A	8	67	60	30	
	B	57	54	38	16	
General Developmental Level	A	0	4	5	2	
	B	6	2	3	0	

(General Development Level refers to the rating made up from the total clinical picture. Emphasis is on general intelligence, however.)

The chief purpose of this study was descriptive and exploratory. We were interested to characterize early individual differences. The problem of psycho-

logical individual differences has been chiefly studied in relation to adults and children of school age. There is still an impression that young children, and surely babies, are very much alike. The corollary is sometimes uncritically drawn that human differences must be largely due to training and to education.

Nursery schools A and B offered without invidiousness an opportunity to make a psycho-clinical comparison of characteristics and capacities present at ages ranging from 30 months to 52 months.

Although sweeping conclusions must be carefully avoided, the clinical estimates and measurements show a definite tendency toward superior mental equipment in Group A. This is surely the statistical drift of the findings. The variation of the individual from this tendency is sufficiently recognized in the individual psychographs. The reader will therefore not draw unqualified generalizations.

In what respects do these two contrasted groups differ? Inspection of the summary table will show that in virtually every field the advantage seems to be with the favored group, whether verbal, practical, or emotional abilities are considered. There is one interesting exception. In Item 15, viz. self care, as shown in washing face and hands, combing hair, brushing teeth, buttoning clothes, lacing and tying shoes, the advantage is evidently with the B Group. With regard to habits of eating and sleeping and adjustment to the nursery school regime in these matters, the A Group makes the better showing. It is possible that self care depends much upon instruction, social suggestion, and motivation. Here the environmental stimulus may be greater in the B homes.

In the remaining personal-social qualities which involve attitudes, emotional vitality and drive, the ratings are rather consistently and, we think, significantly in favor of the A Group. Here we deal with factors which are not so exclusively bound up with training.

In the A Group all the children almost immediately after entrance to the examining room showed by exclamations and comments that they were not inhibited in speech. Restraint and inhibition were more prevalent in the B Group. In the drawing situations there was a similar difference, illustrated by the following comparison of Pair No. 3—(Girl A, Age 35 months, and Girl B, Age 36 months). Girl A drew a scribble, but with definite effort at control and said, "What a funny fellow!", looked at it, added a few more lines, and said again, "Oh, what a funny fellow!" Girl B, her comparison partner, made no spontaneous remark and evinced no pleasure or satisfaction in her work. This kind of gravity was interpreted as meaning a lower degree of "spontaneity." A similar group difference was observed in the reaction to the free construction play material. It obtained with regard to such qualities as friendliness, cheerfulness, poise.

Giving due recognition to individual exceptions, the difference in spontaneity and expressiveness was one of the most salient discovered. That this difference is relatively fundamental, or pervasive, was brought out by many incidental

observations made on the two groups as a whole. Three days were spent in each school, so that the children were observed in similar and accustomed situations. The most outstanding net disparity between the two groups consisted in the very noticeable difference in the amount of conversation. For example: at the opening of school, in the A Group there were heard innumerable conversational bits with regard to experiences the children had had (or had not had!) at home. One boy said he was "Tinkle Bell"; a girl brought a crown from home to be King at her birthday; another boy related something very funny,—he had nearly fallen off the seat of the taxi. This funny experience was repeated for the benefit of listeners among the other children. Usually the remarks brought remarks in turn from companions. Contrast the B Group. There were laughter and shouting in the free play period, but only twice were comments comparable in spontaneity, if not in content, heard in the B Group. One boy told his neighbor that his father had given him no supper the night before. Another used his wash basin as a steering wheel and directed himself back to the basin hooks, and explained his dramatization as he went. These very two boys were conspicuously the most spontaneous in the B Group in the examinations, and were given high ratings in the spontaneity items.

It should be added that the atmosphere of Nursery School B is delightful and that there is nothing in the immediate environment to impose restraints on expressiveness, initiative, imagination.

It is idle to ask with regard to these traits to what extent are they hereditarily determined, to what extent are they conditioned? At least our data are not competent to give a quantitative or analytic answer to the question. The data do suggest, however, that the basic factors which will psychologically differentiate these twenty-two children in adult years are already in operation. The winnowing has begun.¹⁶

Differential social experience in home and elsewhere is of great importance for the later life of the individual. A person who as a child has much practice in performing any particular act, may later in life step automatically into new situations with an assurance and capacity which the doubtful, retiring, and negative persons do not have. People say of the first sort that he is a "born" leader or of the second that he is a "born" follower, but how much is innate at the outset it is hard to say. Just what is innate and what is acquired, even in the actions of small children, is a question, because social-cultural stimulation is omnipresent from birth. And the particular sort of behavior which the young child takes up will serve as a determinant for most subsequent behavior. Certainly hundreds of op-

¹⁶ A. Gesell and E. E. Lord, "A Psychological Comparison of Nursery School Children from Homes of Low and High Economic Status," *Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1927, vol. XXXIV, pp. 554-57.

portunities for domination have made one a more resourceful and leading type of person than another. Even in play the parental influence is seen. If the mother or father is a dominating type, this sort of reaction may become the child's when he is in the presence of other children; or the docile child may have been conditioned to such reactions by virtue of home influences.

1. *Introversion*.— The participation of children in family life and in play gives a clue to the development of many dominant features which may mark a personality throughout life. These negative marginal children who do not play with others often show introverted, substitutive reactions very early. Other children may be much more objective and extroverted almost from the outset of social contact. The introvert is one who cannot make a satisfactory adaptation to his family and others. He develops habits of substituting fantasies or day-dreams for direct social interaction. Instead of making adjustments to his fellows, he compensates in day-dreaming about himself. Woolley describes introverted pupils in a Nursery School:

Of course an introvert does not like a nursery school, that is to be expected. One of them, when he first came in, was very indignant about being there. I happened to be sitting at the table with him the first day he was in the school. He had gotten along very well, ate a fairly good dinner, but taking an afternoon nap with this "gang" was more than he could stand, so when dinner was over he was going home. I tried to persuade him that this was the program and that after his nap he was to go home, and finally said, "When school is out, that will be the time to go home." He looked at me and said, "School is never out. Church is out sometimes, but school is never out."

Now, that child adjusted himself finally. I would say, however, he never became a real good mixer, but he did get to the point where he seemed to enjoy the school moderately and got on much better with the children.

The other child is a more outstanding case and I cannot say we have succeeded. He is even more superior mentally. His grandfather was a man of the world, his father is something of a recluse, so you can take your choice as far as heredity is concerned. This child came to us at less than three. He simply could not endure the presence of the other children. The first day he hit some of them when they approached him. That proved to be very unpopular socially. He also ran away, I think the only child we ever had who ran away. He never really joined in with the group last winter on the playground. He used to wear a rather broad brimmed hat and strut around the outskirts and look unhappy. We called him Napoleon because of his stride and attitude, viewing the scene instead of becoming any part of it.

But here are some interesting things about that youngster. There is a little

mental difficulty in the family. His father is something of a recluse, as I said, an unsuccessful man who has rather fallen back on the members of his family for partial support, this little boy's mother also working. I think the rest of the family felt rather impatient with the father. Both mother and father are devoted to this little boy, the only child, the mother peculiarly so. She is not a woman who makes a mistake in that she does a lot of coddling, but there is a tense emotional substratum and she rather lives for the hours that she will spend with that child. One thing behind his attitude seems to be his resentment at being a little boy. He does not want to be a little boy; he does not care for four-year-olds; he wishes to be an adult. For a while he kept objecting to going to school and wished to go to Sunday-school—Sunday-school was a place where his grown uncle went, that was what he really meant, an adult school, not a baby school. His mother said one day he was sitting in a grown-up's chair and his feet of course did not reach the floor. He tried to stretch down and make his feet reach the floor and slipped off the chair. He kept getting madder and madder about it. Finally his mother suggested that if he would sit in a chair of his own size he could sit back. He utterly refused to accept that solution. He insisted that he must sit in a grown-up's chair, and his feet must touch the floor and nothing else would do and he had a tantrum about it.

On another occasion they were playing "Virginia Reel" and he was his mother's partner. At the place where two people take hold of hands and form an arch to let the rest go under, the mother, of course, stooped down to take his hands. That made him very indignant; he was satisfied with no other solution; he stopped the whole game and had a tantrum because he could not have his hand on a level with his mother's and stand on the floor at the same time.

Now, that child carries out projects; he does excellent buildings with his blocks; he is a very happy child at home; talks a great deal. At school he is silent and worried in expression and usually fails to join in with the other children. The only time at school that I have seen him look very happy and animated was when his mother came and he said good-by. We have had him nearly three years and we have succeeded no better in changing his characteristics and we have made a very great effort to do it. However, as I say, he is the only one in which there has ever been such an outstanding situation and one can see several factors in his background that might account for it.¹⁷

The desire for new adventure is perhaps associated with day-dreaming at the outset. The present social contacts are unsatisfactory; hence one imagines something better elsewhere. The romantic carrying-out of such day-dreams may be seen in boyhood pranks or truancy from home or school, or in the seeking of fame or fortune in pioneering, soldiering, discovery of new lands, people, or new facts, or the seeking of new experience

¹⁷ H. T. Woolley, "Personality Trends in Children," *The Child, The Clinic and the Court*, 1925, pp. 59-62. Courtesy of the New Republic Company.

in artistic creation, or the expression of novel ideas in a new philosophy.

Carrying of fantasies into action is one method, obviously, of keeping within some framework of social participation. If the action is too remote from cultural norms or common personal-social experience, it is labeled pathological or insane and may lead to some form of group control. Otherwise it may be thought queer or divergent, or else may be ignored or tacitly accepted by the group. If the group turns away from the introvert in his fantasies, he may be driven to even more psychological-social isolation, until in catatonia we find him ordinarily quite out of contact with human affairs.

2. *Extroversion*.—The extrovert in his capacity to deal with concrete things and social situations may be easier to socialize than is the introvert, whose values lie more within his own imagination and who gets on in his world often by avoidance of social contacts. It is difficult to predict exactly, but there is good reason to believe that the child who shows introverted trends will carry these into adulthood unless some effort is made to direct his attention outward. Yet it is not to be gainsaid that the introvert has a valuable place in society. He is the subjective poet, philosopher, or inventor. It is a question of balancing his trends, and early childhood is a period in which this balance can best be produced. The fantasy life of the introvert to be effective must have some relation to social and material reality, for otherwise it will lead over into schizophrenic or *præcox* formulations which are so distinctly subjective and personal as to make little or no contact with the social and material universe. Even in childhood these differences in values and attitudes are discernible.

The extrovert is usually sociable. He makes friends easily. He approaches people without embarrassment or self-consciousness. His activities are determined largely by external social stimulation. He is not introspective like the introvert. His interests tend to arise from the environment outside himself. He usually delights in fashionable clothes, is appreciative of externalized art and natural beauty. On the whole, the extrovert, as McDougall remarks, "takes life as it comes" and is not particularly metaphysical about it.

Nevertheless, the extrovert may manifest adjustment problems. He may be rather too completely dominated by the external situations to appreciate the finer sensibilities of other persons. If the introvert tends to flight *from* external reality, the extrovert inclines to undue flight *into* the outside en-

vironment. Yet, today, the extrovert fits better than the introvert into most social situations in our Occidental world because our whole culture seems to be obsessed with material, objective mechanisms and behavior. Introverted, subjective values appear to be outworn and useless. In fact, the craze for external stimulation in travel, jazz dancing, and constant personal contact in our modern urban civilization arises partly from an over-attention to extroverted values.

3. *Ambiversion*.—Most people present a certain mixture of both extroverted and introverted attitudes and habits. These persons may be called ambiverted. In some interests they are introverted, as in the matter of recreation; in others they may be extroverted, as in habits of business. Then, too, in some periods of life, such as late adolescence, a person may be full of romantic day-dreams of all sorts, and later in life he may become pretty definitely objectified about love and business. There is a certain amount of substitution or compensation at work in many people. If a dominant culture value leads to extroverted activity, many persons who might otherwise incline to introversion may move in the opposite direction. In this way they may gain wealth and social prestige, and in the leisure secured for them by their extrovert activities, they may even gain the opportunity to indulge their more basic introverted interests.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapters XIII, Section A, pp. 299-328; XIV, pp. 349-78, and XV, pp. 388-413, only.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises from assignment in *Source Book*, Chapters XIII, nos. 1-19, pp. 346-47; XIV, p. 379; XV, nos. 9-20, pp. 413-14.
 2. Cite cases of personalities which illustrate, (a) undue mother-attachment; (b) the exhibitionist type; (c) the dominant, aggressive type; (d) inferiority, retiring sort.
 3. Cite cases of projection of ambitions of parents on their children.
 4. Distinguish between the play-group and the family as it influences the development of the personality.
 5. What function has play-life in the process of socialization? Illustrate.
 6. Criticize pro and con the classification of personality into introverts, extroverts and ambiverts.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
 1. See appropriate assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapters XIII, p. 347; XIV, p. 379; XV, p. 414.

2. Report on Van Waters, *Parents on Probation*, Chapters II, IV, VII, VIII.
3. Report on *Concerning Parents: A Symposium* (edited by Gans), Papers by Woolley, Hollingworth, Thom, Kenworthy, Williams, and Root.
4. Report on Sayles, *The Problem Child in the Home*. (Selected cases.)
5. Recent Studies in Relation of Home and Family on the Behavior of Children (including performance on intelligence tests, school grades, psychopathic traits, delinquency, etc.). (Consult Thomas, *Child in America*, 1929; Weill, *The Behavior of Young Children of the Same Family*, 1928; Foster and Anderson, *The Young Child and His Parents*, 1928; Sayles, *The Problem Child at Home*, 1928; Hart, *The Science of Social Relations*, 1927, Chapter XVIII; Blatz and Bott, *The Parent and the Pre-School Child*, 1929; and bibliographies in *Source Book*, Chapter XIV, pp. 379-81; Young, "The Field of Social Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1927, vol. XXIV, especially pp. 672-74 and references, and current files of *Psychological Abstracts* and *Social Science Abstracts*.)
6. The Development of the Nursery School. (Consult pertinent references cited for no. 5 and current literature.)

CHAPTER XII

PERSONALITY AND FURTHER PRIMARY GROUP CONTACTS

In Chapter II we described the sociological features of primary and secondary groups and the differences between in-groups and out-groups, and in Chapter XI we treated the relation of the family and the play-group to the rise of the personality. We shall now discuss the effects on the person of further primary group participation.

A. The Neighborhood.

Aside from the family and play-group the neighborhood is one of the first groups to which the child is oriented. In the family the stimulus-response relations are largely those of linear kind—the father or mother commanding and the child obeying or revolting from authority. In the play-group, on the other hand, the child meets those more or less of his own age and comes to develop certain types of circular response in which he meets his fellows on a much more natural, spontaneous level. It is in the neighborhood, however, that the child first comes into contact with adults outside his own family. Often one of the first contacts of the child with the neighborhood is made through his playmates. Mary is playing with Jean in the latter's yard. A slight difference of opinion arises between them when Mary attempts to recover a toy which she considers her own. To this Jean objects and there is vigorous talk and even some physical mauling back and forth. At this juncture Jean's mother appears at the window and tells Jean to give up the toy, or possibly scolds Mary for hitting at Jean. The adult thus injects herself into the social interaction of Mary and Jean, producing effects on both children. To Jean, supposing the second case, the mother now stands as her protector against other children, and when dealing with other children she may quickly develop a habit of dependency on her mother. Thereafter on the slightest provocation when her own wishes are thwarted, she has recourse to her mother to get what she can not

secure herself. This merely enhances and extends the range of manipulating other adults, especially of her own family, for the satisfaction of her ego or self-assertive trends toward persons not of her family. The method of meeting a crisis by invoking the aid of stronger persons in authority, not only in family situations, but in all life situations, may thus become deep-seated in the child. In turn, this furnishes a basis for other habits superimposed on that of crying out for authority to secure what are considered one's rights, often without reference to the merits of the situation as such. In Mary's case, Jean's mother becomes an object of dislike. She may discontinue playing with Jean. She may devise indirect ways to offset Jean's ally, or she may, in fact, appeal to her own mother for support, in which case a fourth member is added to the social configuration. This will again change the whole situation. The two mothers may discuss, sometimes in the very presence of the two children, the respective merits of the two families. Differences may be removed or enlarged as the two adults come into social contact.

This interference of adults in children's lives suggests another aspect of the child's induction into the neighborhood. This is the preparation through family gossip of the child's attitudes and ideas about neighbors before the child has had any or but slight contact with them. Mrs. Smith does not wear her clothes just right. She permits her children too much liberty and has no control over them. She really does not fit into our social circle so well. Through the expression of prejudices of the parents or other members of the family, the child is given a direction to his own contact with the outsiders. The in-group versus out-group relations are already laid down for the child, and he has little opportunity to work out his social interrelations with the neighbors apart from this pattern. In particular societies a definite technique of handling relations with neighbors and acquaintances may grow up.

Alice J. was brought up in a New England town in which the custom of entertainment was built upon a pattern of one social obligation neatly balanced against another. If Mrs. X invited the family of Alice to tea, then the J family must reciprocate with some such social invitation. There were never any spontaneous relations of young people which were not constantly being interfered with by older people in terms of the conventions of this balanced sort. This carried over until Alice was grown and had been away to college. On one occasion a young man was passing through the town when Alice and a college friend were spending a vacation there. Alice invited this young man to

tea and the first question the mother asked her twenty-five year old daughter was, "Have his people had you to their house?" When informed that the girl knew the boy in college and had never seen his people, the mother was pretty dubious as to whether her daughter should have him in to tea or not.

Again, neighbors show a certain social solidarity which the child picks up. This is seen when neighborhoods begin to alter their social complexion. The arrival of a strange family in a neighborhood may be the occasion for a good deal of comment by the other families. The children pick up the attitudes of their parents. Where do the new arrivals come from? What are their social antecedents? Are they nice people? The older residents feel keenly the effects of this on property values, on social prestige, and on their children:

Old Mrs. Garfinckle complains that the foreign servants one gets nowadays don't know how to keep their place. . . . On another porch, Mrs. Moller and Mrs. Sullivan exchange confidences about their children. "I don't know what I am going to do about George," says Mrs. Moller. "I had no idea we had so many niggers in this part of the town until the other day I saw them all trooping out of the high school. And as for Mr. Hall's Academy, they say that he has more Jews than Christians!" Mrs. Sullivan's problem is even more acute; here she had got herself a nice home in one of the best streets, and her boys run down to the Old Town playground almost every afternoon to play with their "hunky" and "dago" schoolmates. "You should hear the language they bring home!"¹

The development of restricted residential areas in terms of kind of house, amount of ground, and the like, common in our growing cities, is a reflection of the attempt to retain the social solidarity of the older neighborhood. Neighbors, then, furnish a group toward which the growing child orients himself and the effects of this contact upon personality may be difficult to measure, but certainly must be considered among the formative factors in the life history of the individual.

Today the neighborhood in the sense of a primary group is breaking down. People live in apartment houses where the only thing they have in common with other tenants is the capacity to pay rent. Naturally the child in such circumstances gets an entirely different notion of people living about him than does the child in the village or town neighborhood where people in one's vicinity have all sorts of congenial relations with

¹ From *Who Is My Neighbor?*, 1924, p. v. Courtesy of *The Inquiry*.

one another. This change in its most extreme form is seen in the occupants of apartment hotels. Here the contacts are superficial and temporary. A certain aloofness to others develops. Moreover, the fact that one may be waited on by willing bellboys and chamber maids and that all these relations depend largely on money makes for a different life-organization. A young woman who was brought up in a hotel tells of the lack of intimate friendships in her mobile existence. Even when she became acquainted with other children, the companionships were brief.

So, even from the time I was a very little child, I had a certain attitude of aloofness toward my fellow beings. Human relations in my world were so impermanent; one made a friendship for a day or two and it was over. The obvious moral of this was, what was the use of making friendships at all?

As I look back over my life, it seems to me like a checkerboard—little patches, definitely divided from other patches, and having no relation to each other except as they filled up the larger square on which the game of my life was played. . . .

This being so, it is not strange that my childhood is not peopled with definite memories as other people's lives seem to be. There was such a kaleidoscopic combination of faces that very few stand out. I remember places and conditions and sometimes even servants more definitely than most people I met.

This writer points to the lack of sense of personal responsibility which hotel life develops. Moreover, there are no roots in group life. Hotel contacts are of the touch-and-go variety, but never eventuate in any permanence. The deep desire for participation in group activity is evident when she remarks:

The hotel, after all, is no integral part of the life of any community. It is a more or less convenient place for strangers to live in. . . .

If I ever marry, which I doubt I shall do, I shall never live again in a hotel. I would rather live in a home of my own, in any little, tiny country village, and be part of the community, have my little mite in the general life and have my children have theirs, than live in the most splendid hotel that was ever built.²

This statement represents in a way what the complete breakdown of a neighborhood and a home life may mean to a person. There is a kind of sophistication, a manner of social interaction which stands in marked contrast with the free and easy association of children and adults in the old-fashioned, but now rather dispersed neighborhood of the village and town.

² From "The True Story of a Hotel Child—An Autobiography," *The Designer*, 1922, vol. LV, pp. 58, 61. Courtesy of The Delineator Company.

Above all else there is little continuity to this type of life. Thus modern division of labor and rapid communication have produced changes in the situations to which children are exposed, and these situations, in turn, determine largely the direction of life-organization. What this may mean ultimately when the older type of neighborhood disappears, it is difficult to say. Certainly where the child has no intimate neighborhood contacts his relations with other people may be very different from those of a child who has been conditioned to the give-and-take relations of neighborliness.

B. Other Primary Group Contacts.

Growing out of the playtime activities of children, there arise two groups which must be considered in some detail. One of these is what we shall call the congeniality group, and the other is the gang. The latter has received a good deal of recent attention in sociological and psychological literature, but not much systematic work has been done with the former. Both of these groups, it may be said, represent somewhat transitional stages between the primary and the secondary group organizations, and are of definite importance in the child's development.

1. *The Congeniality Group.*—This term refers to those face-to-face associations which are built upon common interest and similarity in disposition, certain kindred tastes, and an agreeable and harmonious reaction to common purposes. They are determined in large measure by contiguity in play or work. These groups are marked by a minimum of formal organization, and although they may persist over a relatively long period, their continuity is largely affected by the proximity of individuals and the persistence of these common interests among the members. The dominant concern seems to be that of recreation and play rather than economic, political, or religious practices, although these may in some cases cut across the congenial group. Often membership in some more formalized organization gives the setting for the formation of the smaller face-to-face clique within this larger matrix. Congeniality groups usually arise from the playground, or from school or church affiliations of more formal nature, but there is more or less unconscious banding together of children of similar age and social status. These groups also run over into adolescence. They certainly appear in adulthood where relative age fades into inconsequence as compared with congeniality in point of view and desire for intimate face-to-face contact. The congeniality group, however, should be distin-

guished from the companionship of two individuals, which also appears early in the play period and runs on through life. These closer friendships are important too, but we are here considering groups involving three or more members. On the other hand, membership in the congeniality group naturally limits itself to close face-to-face associations. It is the sort of association in which all can foregather around a table at a meal, or sit about in such proximity that the shift of conversation can be made rapidly from person to person, or in which the entire group can participate in a conversation or task more or less at the same time.

The congeniality group should be sharply distinguished from the institutionalized groups sponsored by the Y.M.C.A. or Y.W.C.A., Boy Scouts, Campfire Girls, and like organizations. The congenial grouping, true enough, often arises within these larger associations. It gives evidence of the spontaneity of this type of relationship within many larger organized bodies. A good number of examples of congenial groups reported by students mention the fact that they began in dormitories, in various young people's organizations, or even in college fraternities.

The following example from adult life reveals the social function of such association even where varied social contacts of other sorts are at hand:

Three members of a college faculty of a mid-western institution were lunching together. Their conversation drifted to a discussion of the lack of opportunity to talk and discuss matters which were near their interests but outside the scope of the usual college club or student-faculty organization. "Some place where you can say what you well please and not be bothered," as one put it. A few other congenial persons were suggested and talked to and shortly afterward a group of seven met for an evening. The members were from the fields of journalism, history, economics, advertising, English and psychology. Because of a certain full routine, meetings were predetermined for every fortnight. There was usually something in the way of a talk or paper by one member which was closely related to his work. This paper, however, was not the most important part of the meetings by any means. Usually the group foregathered around eight o'clock and there was always at least an hour of gossip about university affairs, interspersed now and then with amusing and occasionally Rabelaisian stories. There was much banter and often everyone was talking and laughing at once. Smoke grew every hour bluer and bluer. There was a sense of comfort and security. Everyone said what he wished about persons ranging from the janitors and the heads of departments to the blasé daughters of prominent bankers and members of the board of regents. Even the president at times came in for consideration,

After the saturation point of gossip had been reached, the paper was called for by someone or other. While the other members settled back in comfort, one member delivered himself on any topic from one end of the humanities and social sciences to the other. At the end of the talk, discussion broke loose. There was much debate, much mild chaffing, but all in good humor. One man once remarked that he had never seen any group so divergent in point of view and habits, and yet so congenial and able "to stand punishment from one another."

Talk from this point on drifted everywhere and nowhere. Finally about eleven, refreshments were served. There were no women allowed at any time. If the host were married, the maid or dutiful housewife prepared luncheon and left the apartment to the men for the evening. The whole tone was distinctly unrestrained, masculine and one of good fellowship. Matters of intimate professional experience were unburdened with no fear that the tale would be carried further. Radical views on all sorts of topics might be expressed with no apprehension that they might be heralded next morning in the college newspaper. No name was attached to the group at first although an abbreviation was given it later—growing out of a chance witty remark by one of the members—and the abbreviation stuck. There was no president because no one presided, no treasurer for they were no dues, no secretary because there were no minutes. Someone was more or less spontaneously designated by the others to make a note of order of meeting places and topics, but on several occasions debate ensued because two or even three had made notes of the matter to find themselves in slight disagreement—disagreements always settled in good humor.

New members were added as two of the original group left the institution. Later others left and after five years the group has become much tamer in spirit and much less ribald in speech, but it still offers to its seven or eight members a place where they can feel free and easy in the presence of their fellows and thus escape the felt pressure of the conventions of a small town and of a mid-western university.

The congeniality group thus furnishes an intimate face-to-face association not based on kinship as with a family, or on geographical contiguity as the playground, neighborhood, or village. It is related to common interest, but usually has a distinctly recreational aspect. It often arises quite spontaneously as its members discover common bonds of sympathy, ideas, and attitude. Psychologically it is important in furnishing release from inhibitions produced by the folkways and conventions of the groups out of which it arises. It thus cuts across the institutionalized patterns of behavior and throws one back upon his freer more spontaneous self. It is matched only by the companionship or comradeship groups of two persons to be noted below.

2. *The Gang*.—A second group which appears on the horizon during pre-adolescence and adolescence is the gang. At least in origin the gang has much in common with the congeniality group, but the two are easily to be distinguished. The gang becomes more formalized; it is likely to construct and perpetuate legends and codes, and in most cases it bespeaks much more distinctly a conflict type of behavior as seen in the in-group versus out-group relations, which arises out of crises. Unlike the congeniality group, the literature on the gang is extensive. The books of Puffer, Furfey, and Thrasher, as well as the more popular accounts such as Asbury's *The Gangs of New York*, are well-known. An attempt even to summarize this extensive literature would carry us beyond our purpose. We need only indicate some of the more outstanding aspects of gang life as it affects the personality of the growing boy or girl. The more strictly sociological aspects of the matter must be sought elsewhere. Nowhere is the close correlation between culture pattern, social interaction, and individual shown more clearly than in the life of the gang. The gang really represents an important step in socialization, even though, as in the case of criminal gangs, some of its results may be disastrous from the angle of the larger community.

The gang age according to Puffer, ranges from ten to sixteen, though one will find both younger and older boys in gangs. The exact functional delimitation of the gang is difficult at present, for many gangs operate athletic clubs composed of the boys themselves, while others, in contrast tend to criminal purposes. Moreover, the gang must be thought of as different from the carefully organized boys' clubs sponsored by adults. Thrasher defines the gang as follows:

The gang is an interstitial group originally formed spontaneously, and then integrated through conflict. It is characterized by the following types of behavior: meeting face to face, milling, movement through space as a unit, conflict and planning. The result of this collective behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective internal structure, *esprit de corps*, solidarity, morale, group awareness, and attachment to a local territory.³

³ From *The Gang*, by F. M. Thrasher, p. 57. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1927. By "interstitial" the author means that the gang tends to develop in urban regions (or rural for that matter) which are interstitial—which intervene between the "more settled, more stable and better organized portions" of the community. It is usually along the railroad tracks, canals, waterfronts, and in disintegrating neighborhoods like the slums that the gang finds its beginning. These are areas of shifting populations, mobility and lack of moral standards found in better organized residential sections. The gangland, then, is an area on the "economic, moral, and cultural frontier" of our communities.

The following narrative presents correctly certain gang activities:

The neighborhood was A Street, between B and C Avenues. The street itself was a little better than the average street in that neighborhood. Down below by the river the "goopher gang" operated. A few blocks running from D Street to E Street was the region then known as "Hell's Kitchen." Several other gangs, with less euphonious names but equally active, also operated. The kids in the street naturally enough formed gangs or groups and played marbles together, during most of our public school days. There were some attempts at ball playing, most of a "hit or miss" character, with little organization. On Hallowe'en and Election nights, however, the youngsters of the Street usually assembled in full force and raised as much Hell as they possibly could. On those nights, particularly on Election Night, it was the custom of the street gangs to descend on other street gangs and swipe their kindling for the Election Night bonfire, and anything else that was movable was also brought along more or less incidentally. The raiding parties, however, were quite an accepted, open and above-board custom in which each kid participated if he could get away from his mother's apron strings. Needless to say in these raids fist fights ensued and fists were very frequently reinforced with sticks and stones and bottles. The police occasionally landed in on the middle of one of these fights—unfortunately. Unfortunately I say because I am quite convinced that the slight punishment meted out in some cases produced a contempt for the police that did more harm than good and in other cases where the youngsters were sent to reform schools, they were reformed into a pretty hard-boiled bunch.

This custom of Election Day was occasionally repeated throughout the year, particularly in the winter time when the snow was on the ground and snow fights inevitably ensued in the course of which windows were broken and the good people of the neighborhood complained to the police, with the result that the police once again became active and again did more harm than good.

The one fight that might very easily have had very serious consequences, was a little different from either of these others. It was in the spring. I remember that the marble season was on and that one of the gangs from the streets below C Avenue, came up on a raiding expedition. Just what precipitated this I hardly know. They marched up the block announcing their coming. Nobody paid very much attention to them until they got to a marble game which was in session with eight or ten kids playing. There was a dive for the marbles on the ground and an attempt to take from those who had been participating in the game the marbles that were in their possession. A slight fight ensued in which most of the A Street kids broke loose and ran up the block with the gang in pursuit. The result was that the gang was soon on another marble game and stopped long enough to clean it up. By that time the three or four other games in the street down the block had been warned and there was a general retreat down the block to B Avenue until A Street had assembled at least 20 or 25 youngsters, most of them 10 to 14 years of age.

Then, a stand was made at a grocery store about half way down the block, potatoes being the chief weapons, with the result that the grocer and his assistant rushed out and fortunately for us were thoroughly "rocked" by the opposing gang. The result was that the grocer and his assistant picked up clubs and were after the gang and with the aid of our kids were highly successful. In the meantime scouts were dispatched along G, H, and I Streets, B and C Avenues, issuing warnings that the X Avenues were on a rampage. The final result was that somewhere between 75 and 100 kids were assembled, the age now ranging up to 16, and with these reinforcements we proceeded to invade the territory below C Avenue, partially to recuperate our marbles but more to show off. We marched gaily through the streets, the other gang having withdrawn entirely, then came back again. The G and I Street gangs then dispersed and A Street and B and C Avenue groups returned to their normal condition with the exception that some of the older boys of the block came drifting along and having heard what had happened began to plan revenge.

Their chance came sooner than was expected. The X gang had been assembling allies and came marching up the street 100 to 150 strong. There was no question about it but that we were licked from the very beginning. The only question was whether we would just run or whether we would fight at all. The older boys decided to fight; half a dozen were sent to the roofs with bottles and bricks to heave off. There was no intention of killing anybody. In fact, there was no thought what would happen if a bottle happened to land on somebody's head. The only idea was that a barrage from the roofs would be very effective in scaring the invaders away. In the meantime the 15 or 20 youngsters that were left on the street began to put up some sort of a fight with bricks, ashes, coal and whatever they could lay their hands on, but were soon retreating—in fact except for the barrage from the roof we would have been cleaned out before we could have retreated but fortunately or unfortunately, there must have been a good many milk bottles on the roofs of the tenement houses on each side of the street for a rather heavy barrage of bottles protected us. To make a long story short, there was a rush from the X gang and we scattered like wind. I can still remember diving down the cellar at 415 A Street with four or five of the big fellows from the block with me, that is, the 15 or 16 year olds. We had expected to get the door of the cellar shut before anybody could get in. As I recall it we did get it shut but the other gang kicked it open before we got it locked, and then the fight began, because the dumb-waiters all came down the cellar at 415 and there were plenty of milk bottles. A few milk bottles heaved through the door soon cleared the doorway. Fortunately or unfortunately, the whole gang decided to pick on us and broke into the cellar from a side door which we had not anticipated being opened. The result was that a beautiful cellar fight began in which bottles and coal sailed around rather promiscuously and then just at the time when the cops were coming and when according to the law of the gangs we ought all to have dispersed and assumed our most cherublike innocence, one of the fellows in the

A Street gang emptied a revolver. Whether it had any bullets in it or not I do not know. He afterwards said it did have. He emptied it at the ceiling, however, with no intention of hitting anybody, and fortunately didn't. After that we escaped out the windows and over fences. The cops, however, got some of the other gang and as they had been engaged in a gang fight in which there was gun play, some of them went to jail or to reform school. I have just a faint suspicion that had I been caught and sent to a reform school, I wouldn't at the present moment be engaged in writing this letter to you. Just what I would be doing I haven't the faintest idea, but I am willing to bet that it would not be as socially desirable an occupation, either from my point of view, or the point of view of the state, for a good many of the fellows who I know were caught in gang fights at various times are now engaged in bootlegging or other occupations of a like nature.

The point that I intended to make in this connection is merely that most of those fellows were pretty good fellows at heart. There was nothing particularly vicious about them. I later played ball on the docks with members of the "goopher gang" many of whom had been to prison and most of these were as decent fellows as I have met anywhere—probably more decent than some members of the profession that I could name. I am convinced that by far the greater portion of the so-called viciousness that landed them in jail was entirely due to environmental surroundings, lack of parks, proper recreational facilities, etc. However I don't want to overstate this because there is no question but that home environment and particularly the misuse of liquor was a very considerable factor in the final toboggan slide of a good many.

There are various types of gangs. Some are diffuse and loosely organized, others are more solidified and conventional in form. Their activities run from athletics, roving over wide territories in search of exciting experience, to actually criminal operation. The organizations are of the "he-man" sort for the most part, and they cut across racial and nationality barriers in a way which adult groups might not easily do. Some gangs follow nationality lines, and in Chicago, according to Thrasher, there is usually a barrier set up against negroes and in some cases against Jews. The areas of activity are the slum, the railroad tracks, the canals and waterfronts, the busy streets of trade, or wherever there is excitement and movement. The behavior of the boys seems largely motivated by a deep desire for new adventure, with which is associated the romantic imagination of youth. Their conduct is still marked by distinctly infantile and childhood outgrowths of fantasy life—a life which runs to day-dreaming and action dominated by day-dreams. In short, it is an escape from the humdrum existence laid down by adult preoccupations. The dime novel, the moving

picture, the tales of older boys and men, pictures and magazines—all may serve as effective stimuli to conduct which is essentially an outcome of fantasy thinking. The following excerpts from Thrasher illustrate this:

Play-groups often imitate some gang which they have read about, and become pseudo-gangs. In one case a boy calling himself "Scarfinger Ted" confessed to a dozen crimes which he had not committed, but of which he had read accounts, and was sentenced to twenty-five years in an Iowa penitentiary.⁴

And in another case:

My pal and I belonged to the Silent Three. The third member, who made us a gang, was a very terrible and mysterious personage. He was really the dominant figure in our triumvirate, although he was entirely imaginary. We had a cave in which solemn conclave was held. Secret ceremonies of the most diabolical character took place there, including cursing and spitting on the American flag. We were at odds with the world, to which we felt ourselves superior. To protect our secrets we developed a series of symbols and writings which nobody else could possibly fathom. We also had hidden places where we buried our treasures with the utmost solemnity.⁵

The desire for new adventure sets the pattern of behavior for the gang boy, but the development of the intimate in-group attitudes is determined by the conflicts into which the gang gets with other gangs, as in athletics, or in dispute over territory with the police, with attendance officers from the schools, and with merchants and pedlars. This finally sets the seal on the development of loyalty, organization, hierarchy of officers, determination of plans of action, and the whole range of attitudes which mark the conflict group in general. Within the group certain definite divisions of labor arise. Leadership becomes important, as also do the code of honor and action, the traditions and subordination to purposes of the gang, and the set of distinctly antagonistic attitudes toward outsiders. Among the interesting and significant features of the gang which reveal this social structure and function and, in turn, affect the personality, are the very names of the gangs: "Dirty Dozen," "The Killers," "The Gypsies," "The Bloods," "The Young Iroquois," "The Wolves," "The Bushwhackers," etc. A distinct language is often built up, and sometimes a definite secret vocabulary is developed. Words that most people know only through the news-

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

papers and moving pictures, such as "rod," "hot stuff," "jack rolling," "dick," "jiggers," "frisk," "stool pigeon," and the like, arose from criminal gangs and have passed on to boy gangs everywhere. So, too, members carry all sorts of nicknames which often define personal status in the group. Such are "Fat," "Stiffy," "Toughy," "Slicker," "Sheik." There are also unwritten poems, songs, jokes, and legends which pass from generation to generation among gangs. As Thrasher puts it:

The unity of the group is further aided by the individual slogans, words, traditions, and so on, which are developed by the gang and which symbolize in common terms its objectives. . . . The name of the gang is of particular significance as a means of social control. It affords a common stimulus or value to which all members of the gang may respond with common sentiments. It is the rallying and unifying stimulus in a conflict situation. Since each member of the group is more or less identified with the group name, it becomes a matter of common pride to defend and exalt it.⁶

Codes are more or less formal, depending on the type of group. Puffer notes that disloyalty was one of the most frequent causes for banishment from the group, and that in sixty-six gangs the majority of the rules had to do with giving away secrets or information about the gang, lying, and the necessity of sticking together in case of trouble. One gang, the "Kluck Klan," informed Thrasher regarding their code:

We have fifteen or twenty written rules. Some of them are: (1) We are not allowed to fight among ourselves or razz each other. (2) When you go out, do as you are told. (3) If you get caught, don't squeal on the other guys. (4) Be loyal to the officers. (5) Always defend ladies and girls in trouble. (6) If you get anything, always bring it in and see if it can be useful. (7) Do not lie to each other.⁷

As in other groups, a struggle for status arises. No group is completely homogeneous in functions or in the capacities of members. Individual differences come into play here as elsewhere. Physical prowess marks one boy off from another. In another case superiority in planning expeditions or criminal activities is rewarded with increased prestige. Sometimes the gang has its stupid member—the butt of jokes and the runner of simple errands who hangs on because his membership, inferior as it is, affords

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 287.

him a sense of security; and in any case he can vicariously participate in the more violent and exciting escapades of his group.

Thus within the gang we have a picture of the same sort of differences in function, the same desire for prestige, the same development of codes and universes of discourse which are to be found in other groups. For the growing boy this may mark the whole course of his future career. The work of Thrasher, Shaw, and others in analyzing the relation of gang life to delinquency and to membership in adult criminal groups shows definitely that in many cases the gang is the training-ground for adult crime. This, however, is not true in hundreds of gangs. Many members of gangs leave them to take up adult occupations. They marry, settle down to other interests, or move away. In our urban centers, especially, there is much evidence that the more overtly criminal gangs of boys become tools in the hands of older gangs or even of politicians for furthering their own interests. This, in turn, indicates a linkage between the boy groupings and later life.

It has been said that gang life is altogether a socially wholesome experience for the boy, but the evidence does not bear this out in every case. While loyalty and mutual aid are built up, and social solidarity is fostered, it does not follow that these attitudes carry over to participation in the ethical interests of the larger community, any more than it follows that because certain favorable attitudes are built up in a family, such as sympathy and self-sacrifice, these attitudes must carry over to self-sacrifice for the welfare of a larger group, say a church, school, or the political state. The whole question of the transfer of training applies here. It would seem that shifts in attitudes and habits take place in the social world, just as they do in learning school subjects, in terms of specific elements in similar situations plus a more or less conscious identification of the two situations. It is doubtful if the former gang member, now an adult, necessarily feels toward the more intangible civic community the same bonds of responsibility and loyalty that he felt for the closely-knit in-group of his adolescence. He may and he may not. There is certainly no inevitable tendency to make the shift of loyalty to the larger group.

This problem aside, the gang experience marks the boy for the future just as certainly as do the family and the playground associations; and because the gang is welded in conflict and the desire for new adventure, in some ways its influence is even more lasting and significant.

3. *The Comrade Group*.—Another type of association which partakes of many of the characteristics of the primary group is the comradeship. Like the congeniality group and the gang, it grows out of common interests which arise outside the family. It also probably runs back to the spontaneous play-group. Like the congeniality group, the comradeship may exist at almost any level from middle childhood to old age.

The comrade group is limited to the intimate face-to-face relationship of two people to each other. The pairing-off may be among members of the same sex or it may cut across sex lines. It was a recognition of the place of this sort of association in human life which doubtless led Thomas to list the need for intimacy with others in his schema of wishes. If the gang is much concerned with the desire for new experience, the comrade group arises out of the desire for intimate response. Comradeship or companionship (we shall use the terms synonymously) may develop when two children begin walking home from school together, or it may be the outcome of playing together, or it may arise from the discovery of any common interest. Its greatest enhancement seems to come with adolescence and adulthood. The following narrative gives a clue to the sort of thing which frequently occurs:

I have always wanted to have a close intimate friend and in my entire life I have nearly always had some one person near me. B. and I went around with a number of other boys in our neighborhood, but between us there was a bond of friendship nearer than was our relation to any other boy in the neighborhood. We often went on hikes together. We went fishing in June and hunting in October. He taught me the rudiments of swimming in the creeks near our town. I never realized until later how he stood up for me around other fellows who sometimes ridiculed my family when I was not present. He gave me more self-confidence and was a source of comfort in trials. We walked back and forth to school together and later went around with girls in a foursome.

After we graduated from the elementary school we went to high school together, but after a few months B. dropped out. From that point on our relations began to change. Although for a year or so we traveled about in the same congenial crowd, we gradually drifted out of the more intimate companionship which had been ours.

In the last year of high school I became attached to L. whom I had known years before as a child, but he had in the meantime lived out of our town and had now come back to finish his high school work. L. and I became bosom friends. We were much together, especially at his home where I was always welcome and treated almost as a son. Our common interests ran now more to intellectual matters than to the outdoor life which had been so much in the

earlier relation with B. We formed a small (congeniality) group which used to meet at L.'s house for discussions on Sunday afternoons. We treated everything from women to politics, economics, and religion. In our Freshman year in college we were introduced into the theories of modern biology and the literary and scientific criticism of the Bible. Our small sectarian college was alive with discussions of what would now be termed fundamentalism versus modernism. But throughout all these discussions with other boys, there always remained the undertone of a more intimate friendship with L. We were often together for hours at a time talking, occasionally riding around in a buggy, and sometimes going out with a couple of girls. This comradeship lasted until L. was married and I had moved away from town.

The next companionship was one developed at the university where I did my first graduate work. In the year and a half there, I had two different men toward whom I developed the comradeship relationship. The first one was a law student who roomed with me, and we were friendly for six months, but he left for home in the spring quarter and I have never heard from him since. The second was a young chap whom I had known as an acquaintance since childhood, but with whom I became friendly for the first time in the months we lived together at graduate school. We ate together, went swimming together, told each other our love affairs, read to each other and carried on hours of talk.

After a year of teaching I went to another university to complete my work for my doctorate. Here I met W. with whom I developed a firm and lasting friendship. The story repeats itself. Both of us were married, but our friendship existed outside any relations of our wives to each other although they were friendly enough too. But again it was the desire for someone to "spill over" to in talk, to tell one's real thoughts, to explain what one thought was the matter with the major professor, with the economic and moral order or what not. It afforded one a chance to express ideas which did not seem to be understood by women, to be a bit Rabelaisian if one wished, but above all to be unrestrained and confidential without any fear of exposure or misunderstanding.

The unrestricted, untrammelled expression of ideas and the feeling of ease are perhaps of greatest importance in comradeship. They give one a chance to share one's innermost thoughts, one's impulses which might otherwise be repressed into the so-called unconscious, but which here have pretty full swing. Doubtless even the mere verbal response is more valuable than the unexpressed impulses themselves when thrown back on the system.

Rolland in *Jean Christophe* put the value of friendship in these words:

I have a friend! . . . Oh! the delight of having found a kindred soul to which to cling in the midst of torment. . . . No longer to be alone, no longer never

to unarm, no longer to stay on guard with straining, burning eyes, until from sheer fatigue he should fall into the hands of his enemies!⁸

Another phase of companionship is that which exists between the sexes and leads, as a rule, to sexual relations in or out of the legal marriage code. In *The Unadjusted Girl*, Thomas has cited the frequent instance of girls indulging in sexual relations merely as a follow-up of a deeper desire for companionship. A young woman goes to work in one of our cities. She has few or no friends there. She wishes to have someone to go about with. She likes to go to "picture shows," to eat in fashionable restaurants, and to attend dances. She meets some young chap who takes her out, who talks to her, who offers her company. Sooner or later in instance after instance—what percentage no one knows—the young man proposes sexual relations with the girl outside wedlock, and again, in case after case, the girl submits rather than give up the other things. Of course, she may be in love with the young man, but even so, there is often a realization that marriage is out of the question. This sort of relationship is so common in our larger cities that every social worker, every juvenile judge, every probation officer, could cite dozens of such examples. Such a desire for companionship, with its almost inevitable result, is the motive of many stories, and one of the recent best-sellers, *Bad Girl*, revolves around such a theme. The following extract from the diary of a girl in a middle-western city illustrates the point:

I had been working as a waitress of late, . . . and I kept on with it. But the days and nights were empty now—and at last I knew to the full what loneliness could be. One night a nice boy came into the restaurant—it was one of the larger downtown restaurants—and sat down at my table. . . .

There is no use in making a story of it. He had an engaging smile, and was in search of adventure. I was unutterably lonely—and tired. He said that he loved me, and I was willing not to question too closely. I left the rooming-house, and we took a little flat out near Rogers Park. For a month I played at being respectable, got acquainted with young wives in other apartments, had lovely clothes, lazy hours, ate at the best restaurants, saw the best shows, shopped in smart shops, drove my own car. Then, one day, B. came home and told me he was going back to Oklahoma, and that I wasn't going with him. I said little; I had known it must come, of course, though I had hoped it wouldn't come

⁸ Rolland, *Jean Christophe in Paris*, 1911, p. 30. Courtesy of Henry Holt and Company.

so soon. There was a generous check. And I moved back into the rooming-house.⁹

Here we have a craving for attention, for comradeship, and for social status which was not obtainable for this girl in the ordinary course of life. Her compromise was an effort to escape the horrors of loneliness. A sense of isolation, even when surrounded by other people, restricts the expansion of the personality and may produce morbid introspection and sense of failure.

Companionship between a young man and a young woman is frequent in college, but how often these intimate comradeships lead to premarital sexual relation no one knows. Among the better economic classes, who send their children to college, the bourgeois moral code still persists, although there seems to be some evidence that this code is breaking down. Sometimes comradeship leads to marriage, sometimes not. A desire for intimate stimulus and response, for sympathy, for amusements enjoyed with others, plays a prominent part in the lives of those in late adolescence and early adulthood. In some instances the companionship exists pretty much on the level of amusements of the lighter sort. In others it exists at a distinctly esthetic and intellectual level, where the couple find their satisfactions in reading and talking together on rather advanced subjects. As in all other types of group relations, there are various levels of life organization, but the motivation for them remains about the same.

The companionship grouping easily leads to marriage in our society, in which the romantic love-pattern is linked to the Christian monogamous marriage system. In some societies sexual love may exist outside the marriage bond without infraction of the moral code. Just as many footloose persons in our mobile urban life seek companionship out of loneliness and from that drift into extra-marital sexual relation, so, too, the desire for comradeship is often the impetus to marriage.

A young woman, five years out of college and unmarried, remarked that she did not like the general idea of matrimony. She said she would probably get married in the end, but merely out of the desire to have someone with whom to share one's advancing years. Her old college girl friends were already marrying off. Within ten years she estimated she would be completely out of touch with all of them. She was in no hurry to reach the matrimonial state,

⁹ From *Gold Coast and Slum*, by H. W. Zorbaugh, p. 81. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1929.

but felt it was an inevitable prevention of the *ennui* and loneliness in middle and old age.

Marriage, interestingly enough, often breaks up companionships between members of the same sex, as it more naturally does those which cut across sex lines. Married men often find that their intimate camaraderie with male friends is sacrificed on the altar of domestic peace. The companionship of a married man and a woman whether married or single, is distinctly frowned upon in our society. Such relations may not involve sexual intercourse at all, but nevertheless they are discountenanced. The offended wife or husband, as the case may be, easily finds support from the community in putting pressure on the mate to prevent or stop such friendships. Psychologically this means, of course, that the framework of intimate comradeship is different before and after marriage. It means that the inter-stimulation which may come from such intimate conversations and common activities may be decidedly restricted. In certain circles, in art groups more than among scientists, one finds exceptions, and the trend in cosmopolitan centers is away from the rigidity of the pre-industrial, Puritan sexual codes.

Curiously enough, in spite of all that we have said of group contacts, there are occasionally persons who never have any contacts with a congeniality group or a gang. They may even be restricted in the range of their experience in comradeship. These are those hermit-like persons who avoid others, who live in the world of their ideas and fancies and, perhaps, if not caught up in some sort of professional contact and intellectual, artistic, or scientific interest, develop dementia præcox. The following document from a very able young woman in her middle twenties reveals the lack of congeniality relations and yet at the end there is an expression of deep-seated desire for this very thing:

I have never been affiliated with any organization or group, either in a formal or more intimate sense, no school societies, no circle of "girl friends," and since my people died before I could remember, not even a member of a family group. As I have been roving about constantly since I was five, I haven't any sense of local pride for any town or state—perhaps a feeling or place-distinction for certain localities, Alaska, the Philippines, various parts of the United States, but that is all, not even much national patriotism. I had private tutoring all my life and hardly knew what it meant to be in a class group until the first year in the University. I never had an intimate girl friend (can't abide them with

their habits of nestling close to one and talking about appallingly personal things) and but one man friend, a gifted student on this campus.

The result was that when I first came to college, I was astonished and then bored to death with the atmosphere of close organization that I found here. I couldn't understand it and scarcely do yet. Now I am merely utterly indifferent—it means nothing to me. I know if I were a man I should never become a member of a fraternal organization. Nor could I belong to a sorority or fraternity and call those about me, for whom I would have small liking or admiration, "brother" or "sister."

This is the way groups and individuals affect me, usually. Their humanity, that is, their natural kindness and sympathy, has always had a tendency to weaken my natural strength. I immediately want to lean upon them, which produces a sort of disintegration of my morale. I think I am really happier with occasional misfortune because of the tremendous "kick" of getting from under. I am not particularly anxious to have a group back of me—too easy to accept defeat by smothering one's self-critical sense in the soft folds of their condoling sympathy. The most complete alien in the world to me is not the Chinese, the Hottentot, or the African negro, but the "Babbitts" of this world.

The kind of group with which I should like to be affiliated would be a semi-formal literary and scientific group with slight class distinctions, if such a thing is possible. I realize the tremendous advantage such contact means to the individual and it's a matter of regret to me that I don't seem to fit in.

This young woman informed the writer that her only friendship of the year she was in X college was with a young man with whom she occasionally went for a walk. She found him rather stimulating at times, but was not deeply interested in him and when she left the institution she never saw or heard from him again. Though an early marriage had proved a failure, she was not bitter, but simply disappointed with her unsuccessful social contacts. She has taken to literature and shows a considerable promise here which may serve as a partial substitute for her lack of intimate group contacts.¹⁰

In concluding this chapter on the effects of primary and near-primary groups upon the personality, we may well repeat that it is in the family, the neighborhood, the congeniality group, the gang, and in the comradeship that the fundamental attitudes and habits of the person are built up. Docility or leadership, ease of manner or confusion in the presence of others, sense of inferiority or superiority, class feelings, prejudices, and the whole

¹⁰ Since this was written, this girl has committed suicide. On her bed, where she had been reading, was found an anthology of verse opened to Alan Seeger's, "I Have A Rendezvous With Death."

world of fundamental notions about morals and manners are definitely laid down in ideas, habits, and attitudes before the individual reaches out in adolescence and adulthood for the secondary contacts of which we have yet to speak. Nevertheless the elementary school and the church, which are secondary groups, really take much of their color from family, neighborhood, and community conditions. These two, which we shall discuss next, serve as a bridge to the other secondary group relations which loom so large on the horizon of modern life.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter IV, nos. 15, 16, pp. 65-72.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 - 1. Discuss questions and exercises from assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter IV, nos. 8-10, pp. 75-76.
 - 2. Distinguish between the effects of the neighborhood and the family on the child.
 - 3. Distinguish between the effects of the gang and the family on the child.
 - 4. Distinguish between the gang and the congeniality group.
 - 5. Write out cases of comradeship grouping which you know.
 - 6. What are the advantages of comradeship to the person?
- C. Topics for Reports and Longer Written Papers.
 - 1. Report on Thrasher, *The Gang*, to show how the gang influences personality.
 - 2. Report on Zorbaugh, *Gold Coast and Slum*, as a picture of disintegrated neighborhoods and personality.
 - 3. Study of Congeniality groups.
 - 4. Effects of Psychological Isolation on the Personality. (Consult bibliography in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to Science of Sociology*, Chapter IV, pp. 272-76.)

CHAPTER XIII

PERSONALITY AND SECONDARY GROUPS

A. Nature of Institutions.

In contrast with primary groups, secondary associations are marked by lack of spontaneous formation. They are more formalized, self-conscious organizations. In many aspects of interrelation such groups are in no way dependent upon face-to-face contacts. The more distinctly organized secondary group relations, we denote as institutions. Before we take up specific types of such groups, it will be well for us to note briefly the nature of institutions. Park and Burgess describe it admirably:

An institution, according to Sumner, consists of a concept and a structure. The concept defines the purpose, interest, or function of the institution. The structure embodies the idea of the institution and furnishes the instrumentalities through which the idea is put into action. The process by which purposes, whether they are individual or collective, are embodied in structures is a continuous one. But the structures thus formed are not physical, at least not entirely so. Structure, in the sense that Sumner uses the term, belongs, as he says, to a category of its own. "It is a category in which custom produces continuity, coherence, and consistency, so that the word 'structure' may properly be applied to the fabric of relations and prescribed positions with which functions are permanently connected." Just as every individual member of a community participates in the process by which custom and public opinion are made, so also he participates in the creation of the structure, that "cake of custom" which, when it embodies a definite social function, we call an institution.¹

From a slightly different standpoint Cooley remarks:

An institution is simply a definite and established phase of the public mind, not different in its ultimate nature from public opinion, though often seeming, on account of its permanence and the visible customs and symbols in which it is clothed, to have a somewhat distinct and independent existence. Thus the

¹ From *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, by R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, pp. 796-97. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1921,

political state and the church, with their venerable associations, their vast and ancient power, their literature, buildings and offices, hardly appear even to a democratic people as the mere products of human invention which, of course, they are.

The great institutions are the outcome of that organization which human thought naturally takes on when it is directed for age after age upon a particular subject, and so gradually crystallizes in definite forms—enduring sentiments, beliefs, customs and symbols. And this is the case when there is some deep and abiding interest to hold the attention of men. Language, government, the church, laws and customs of property, and of the family, systems of industry and education, are institutions because they are the working out of permanent needs of human nature.²

Institutions may be looked upon as cultural structures which are laid down about us from the past, or they may be viewed from the angle of their inception and function in social psychological terms. It is from a repetition of crises that groups come to develop certain standardized methods of performance. Any recurrent performance, associated with images, ideas, and attitudes, and organized around fundamental life situations, may be considered as institutional behavior. From the side of group relations institutions are the subject-matter of sociology and anthropology. Family and marriage systems, kinship groupings, church and religious organizations, the political state, the economic order, educational schemes, are illustrative of major institutions. On the side of the influence of these institutions on the personality, they become of interest to the social psychologist. As we shall see, these regularized aspects of life profoundly affect the ideas, attitudes, and habits of the individual.

There are other groups which are not especially institutional in form, and which do not fit into the category of primary associations. These are temporary contact groups, such as mobs or street crowds, or the non-contiguous crowds, such as we have in the various publics. In the final section of this volume we shall examine the effects of these groups upon the personality. At present we are concerned only with the more stabilized secondary groups.

While the school and the church, which we shall discuss first, grew out of neighborhood and village relations, today they represent a formalization of procedure and a more deliberate determination of purpose than mark the primary groups of the family, playground, or neighborhood.

² C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 1909, p. 313-14. Courtesy of Chas. Scribner's Sons.

Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that in some aspects of function, the secondary groups carry over much the same sort of activity that is found in the strictly primary group.

B. *The School and the Personality.*

1. *Social Functions of Education.*—As an institution the school is concerned with two major functions: first, the carrying over to the child and youth of the tools, techniques, and information necessary for his adjustment to the world around him, and second, the carrying over of the social and moral codes of conduct which the group holds to be essential to its survival.

Education is transferring to him (the child) the mores. He learns what conduct is approved and what disapproved; what kind of man is admired most; how he ought to behave in all kinds of cases; what he ought to believe and reject.³

Genuine progress in the informational and technical fields has brought the schools in line with current practices in the industrial-commercial world around us. On the side of the second item in the school's program, the transmitting of the mores, the institutional lag⁴ is very evident. The school originated in the village primary group and has never lost the hand-marks of its origin. The educational system tends to perpetuate these primary group ideals, although the individual today must modify these and in increasing measure organize his life around secondary contacts. This divergence between ancient norms and modern needs has a marked effect upon the child's personal development.

Space does not permit here an extended discussion of the effects of the school as an institution upon the child. For our purposes we may discuss the subject in terms of the intellectual training and the effects on socialization, especially on the side of docility or revolt from authority.

Our schools have come down to us bearing the stamp of medieval scholasticism. In the Middle Ages education was restricted to selected classes, but with the rise of democracy there has been a consequent tendency to apply the intellectualistic curriculum to all classes. Eighteenth and nineteenth century social and political theory gave us the notion of the

³ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, 1906, p. 628. Courtesy of Ginn and Company.

⁴ By lag we mean the inertia shown by institutions to move up into new realms of reality. Cf. Ogburn, *Social Change*, 1922, pp. 200 ff. on cultural lag.

equality of native ability in all classes, and also produced the rationalization that education could wipe out any differences of information, skill, or talent that might exist in the general population.

Popular education and certain faith about popular education are in the mores of our time. We regard illiteracy as an abomination. We ascribe to book learning power to form character, make good citizens, keep family mores pure, elevate morals, establish individual character, civilize barbarians, and cure social vice and disease.⁵

As a result of the assumption of equal abilities and equal interests, all children were put through the same intellectual exercises without regard to variability in learning ability and differences in interest. It will not be necessary for us to review in detail the gradual changes which have taken place in our conceptions of individual differences and their effects on child training and on the forms of social organization. Yet in spite of the brilliant efforts that have been made in some cities, and in certain rural communities also, to reorganize the curriculum and to re-align the pupils according to intelligence and interests, in the country as a whole the old assumptions and practices remain. The dull boy or girl who is passed along in the grades from year to year is a familiar picture to all of us. We fail to understand that often the inertia of the school system has disastrous effects on the boy or girl. Sometimes these dullards remain merely docile pupils until they become old enough to escape from school and enter some unskilled occupation. Frequently the dull boy may be a real social problem both inside and outside the classroom. Especially under the stimulation of brighter boys, the dullard may become a delinquent.

Jim H. was a docile but stupid boy with an intelligence quotient in the high sixties. He had had trouble with his school work since the third grade, but had always been rather well behaved and had escaped the teachers' attention. When Jim was about twelve, he began running around with a group of boys who soon found him a convenient tool for exploitation. He indulged in a series of minor thieveries and finally under the suggestion of another boy made off with a hundred dollars in bills from a fraternity house where he delivered the college paper.

The school had some responsibility for Jim. It offered him no opportunity for training in handicrafts, his failure to do fractions was not compensated

⁵ W. G. Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 628,

by any success in simpler and, for him, more valuable occupations with his hands. Jim's attitude toward the social order is not yet a bitter one, but a continuation of the present policy of pushing him through a system where he does not fit may in time produce in him such a discouragement, on the one hand, and such a sense of revolt, on the other, that his whole life course may be swung into an anti-social career.

Again, take the case of Sarah N., who is apparently utterly unable to learn anything in the fifth grade:

Investigation showed that the girl had borderline intelligence and failing to handle arithmetic, spelling and reading, she was rapidly becoming introverted in thought and imagination. She spent her time day-dreaming of movie stars, of beautiful costumes and luxurious living. It was found that she had not only much interest in making clothes and hats, but considerable talent. A shift to a vocational school where she no longer had to struggle with fractions and geographical names, but could use her hands and eyes in dressmaking and in millinery work made a profound difference in this child's personal relations to her home and her teachers. More important still, the change of curriculum altered her image of herself and gave her a degree of self-confidence and a feeling of participation in social life which she had never had before.

Like instances might be multiplied, but the point is already evident. The lock-step system of education often fails to take account of individual differences in intelligence and in interest, and disregards some special talents which offset, in part, lack of traditional intellectual ability. The problem is equally serious for the child of superior ability who is held to the curriculum of the average child. As the classroom procedure is usually reduced to the level of the duller pupils, it may actually discourage the bright child in his delight in learning. Frequently the lack of something to do leaves him bored or open to activities which are unsocial or even pathological. Sometimes the bright child acquires a distinct antagonism to authority and conformity, or, in contrast, he learns that docility is rewarded with praise and social status, and his sense of independence is lost in the maze of useless scholastic ritualism.

2. *Indirect Moral Training in School.*—It is clear that intellectual training is not segregated from moral and social training. There has been much discussion of moral training for children in the elementary schools: most of it has concerned the question whether there should be some sort of formal curricular lay-out, some preceptual instruction dealing with morals in

the abstract. The ardent people who are at work on this problem often forget that, willy nilly, moral training is going on at all times in the schoolroom. In fact, the second function of the school is carried along with the first, often in unconscious but most effective ways. Observe the daily school procedure:

The little child is inducted into the schoolroom with its straight seats fastened solid to the floor, arranged in rows with the teacher's desk at the front. Often even with boasted "activity" teaching and learning, where the pupils sing, work, and play according, in theory, to their own desires, the whole matter degenerates quickly into nothing but ready compliance with the energetic suggestions of the teacher.

Throughout the elementary school period, the straight rows of seats, the formalism of teacher-pupil relationship persists. The teacher to this day carries with her the medieval notion of preacher and moral preceptor. The very arrangement of desks and seats of the pupils is borrowed from the church with its rows on rows of pews, just as the method of teaching continues in the mold of the church catechism or preaching.

Docility of attitude, quietness, and the like are in the scheme of the classroom. Noise is taboo. Silence broken only by consent of the teacher is insisted upon. The somewhat noisy hum of children working at separate projects, as seen in the experimental schools, is often misunderstood by parents and traditional teachers. Teachers are hard to convert to new points of view and new methods. It is so much easier and simpler to impose on the docility of the pupils and to produce obedience and quiet than it is to enlist the active interest of the children. The writer recently heard a first grade teacher remark: "Now, children, we'll have a story. But I won't read until you are all nice. You can't hear the story if you're not *good* boys and girls." The emphasis was nowhere upon positive evocation of interest but attention was purchased at the price of conformity to social standards of "nice" and "good."

Insistence on daily attendance is in the mores. Attendance officers enforce the legalized mores (the law). Tardiness, while not so serious as absences, is still frowned upon. It is against the folkways. The tardy pupil is made to feel the pressure of the docile pupils who arrived in time. "Talks" are still given by teachers and principals on the "bad habit" of unpunctuality. Stories are still told of how men failed in later life "because they did not hurry to school" when they were children. And curiously associated with this is the magic of the written excuse. By the use of a few words, the stigma of tardiness and absence, too, are wiped out. The percentages of excuses which are sheer rationalizations must run high indeed. But excuses are accepted in the mores.

In the learning process itself, ignorance is taboo. Just as universal education, as a method, is part and parcel of our democratic mores, so within the educational machine proper, to show ignorance is severely frowned upon. The child

reads or is told facts and instructed as to conduct and belief. Thereafter to profess "not to know" these matters is indeed serious. This produces in children, adolescents, and in adult college students, alike, certain methods of covering up any lack of knowledge through protective devices of various sorts.⁶

Thus docility and conformity to social standards are impressed upon the growing boy or girl, and this same attitude is easily transferred to other forms of authority—the state, the economic organization, and the church. Furthermore, in teaching the duties and privileges of citizenship in our schools, the emphasis is rarely laid upon an examination of the facts and situations, but upon the creation of emotional attitudes of reverence for the state and the economic order. The teaching of history and civics, the instruction in obedience to law, in respect for the Constitution—these are valuable in settling upon the child the standards of his adult society before he himself has actually come into contact with the situations.

Occasionally the inflexibility of the school produces an outright revolt against learning and authority which may affect the child throughout life. Often enough, investigation discloses that the revolt goes back in its roots to rebellion against parent. Certainly in these cases the school does nothing to re-orient the boy or girl in the way of more adequate social adaptation. Likewise in its more purely intellectual aspects the lock-step arrangement of the school may destroy the creativeness of the child and produce in him attitudes of conformity and passivity which will color his whole reaction both to people and to problems throughout life.

Too frequently in the past the school has been dominated by the home and neighborhood. As Williams puts it:

If the child learns ideas in school that contradict the cherished beliefs and ways of doing, parents are incensed against the school, and there develops a feeling in the neighborhood against the teacher. Teachers are therefore apt to take the parental attitude instead of attempting a thorough training.⁷

From the outset the teachers are compressed into the frames of behavior in teaching laid down by the community. As a rule the teachers unconsciously follow the negative methods which the ordinary child has known at home. This simply means that the school takes over the function of the

⁶ K. Young, "Primitive Social Norms in Present-day Education" *Social Forces*, 1926-27, vol. V, pp. 574-75.

⁷ J. M. Williams, *Principles of Social Psychology*, 1922, pp. 75-76. Published by F. S. Crofts & Co.

home in a wider sphere, and the child remains in a negative, repressive atmosphere where he is inducted into the culture of the past, especially in those phases which involve social-moral conduct. In the acquirement of skills and information of a practical sort there is much more freedom than there is in matters touching conduct. Yet, in both, the negativist pedagogy continues. The usual means used to incite the child to master his materials are punishment, ridicule, blame, sarcasm, encouragement, or praise from the teacher, and ridicule, praise, and rivalry from the other pupils.

The formalized procedure of the past continues because the public consciousness is not yet prepared to give up the old methods and to reorganize the school in terms of present-day social, economic, and political reality. In many sections, the school has become one of our most conservative institutions. In the contest of progressive change against conservative tradition, the school is usually on the side of tradition. Williams is of the opinion that, on the whole, "the educational system is, in every civilized nation, a reactionary influence" as a consequence "of the repressive influence of the family, the church, the influential economic classes and the state" which predetermine its course. He remarks further:

There is the surviving attitude of autocracy, under which the educational system aims to inculcate throughout the state an attitude of obedience. As in an autocracy, so in the paternalistic family, the learning of facts was felt to be incidental to "discipline," that is, the inculcation of a law-abiding, custom-observing, submissive attitude to the powers that be. This attitude survives in public education today.⁸

3. *Formal Moral Education.*—With increased awareness of changes in moral experiences, a distinct effort has been made in recent years to bring formalized moral education into the school curriculum. Even though the home and the church have failed, in part, to maintain their control of our official morals, faith in moral education by the preceptorial method still persists. It is a nice illustration of the continuity of certain features of our culture. In the face of the breakdown of former institutions as functionaries in bringing these moral culture patterns to the new generation, a shift is made from home and church to the school to carry on the same activity.

In some programs for character education great stress is laid on codes of virtues. The moral attitudes are believed to touch every phase of learning

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

and life: health, arithmetic, literature, art, science, and all. Thomas remarks on this point:

The direct teaching programs usually begin with a code of virtues in some form which is developed by the addition of materials in the way of bits of poetry, slogans, proverbs, designated reading, etc., and indications to the teachers of the concrete procedure by which the same moral precepts and social virtues may be exemplified and made attractive in connection with the various subjects of instruction in the successive grades. The attempt is to give a social and moral meaning to all the subjects of the curriculum.⁹

In other schemes there is much exhortatory teaching, often in the method of the revivalist. Still common to many high school and college audiences are lurid lectures on sexual abuses. In other schools are developed projects of virtuous activities, leading to badges, insignia, and other devices of securing social status. Some of these programs call for daily records of moral conduct to be kept by the child. In some schools there is group discussion of moral problems such as honesty, virtue and sex morality, in which the teacher raises questions to be discussed by the pupils.

In regard to all such educational devices, Thomas comments:

The process of character education by means of a code . . . depends on the assumption that it is possible to superimpose a code—an assumption on which behavior materials would throw some doubt. The child's code tends to be developed in connection with the standards and behavior of his group. The superimposition of a code of moral phrases, slogans and rules of conduct will probably be effective to the degree that the child's own conception of what is admirable is utilized. . . . In many of the programs there is an anxiety to associate a moral lesson with all the subjects taught, as if the materials of study were designed to substantiate the virtues of the moral code.¹⁰

Two questions are raised by all these studies of moral education. One concerns the specificity of moral attitudes and activities; the other has to do with the relation of training in verbal codes to overt behavior. The evidence from sociological research and from the recent work with problem children by the visiting teacher and juvenile probation departments show that codes of conduct are the results of certain group affiliations, and that they are directed to certain specific situations. The home, the playground group, and the gang may have codes quite different from those

⁹ W. I. and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America*, 1928, p. 274. Published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 290, 291.

given in the lesson plans of the school. Unless the content of the latter touch the former—and often if they do in theory, there is a failure to bring about a transfer of training from instruction to the practical field—moral teaching is trivial if not altogether futile. One of the patent errors of most teachers of morals is the notion that there exists an entity called “honesty,” “thrift,” “chastity,” or “virtue,” which, once injected into the child, may be produced in every situation and serve as a guide to conduct. Such a notion smacks of our traditional theology and its concept of inborn conscience. At any rate the schools continue to teach virtues in this traditional manner, both directly and indirectly.

Hartshorne and May’s study of the knowledge of right and wrong among children indicates how the child gets his verbal knowledge of morality, and of the specificity of group standards of conduct:

Though not extremely high, the home reveals by far the highest relationship between children’s knowledge of right and wrong and that of major influence groups, *viz.*, parents, friends, club leaders, public school teachers and Sunday-school teachers, the degree of relationship ranging from an r of .545 between children and parents to an r of .002 between children and Sunday-school teachers. The means of the scores of the various groups seem to have little to do with the relationship. Public school teachers have a mean score of 80.42 as compared with the pupil’s mean score of 62.57 with an r between them of only .03; while friends have a mean of 64.79 as compared with 64.49, and an r between friends of .35.

The two more natural groups of home and friends are the most significant though neither is high enough to warrant being called the predominant influence.

Within the home situation the mother’s influence is considerably greater than that of the father while the children seem to influence the parent-child relationship very little.

The evidence from this study seems to suggest that in the field of moral knowledge greater results will be obtained by emphasis on education in the home and among friends than in the other groups. Undoubtedly other factors exist that influence children in this regard which need to be discovered before we can determine what the most significant influences really are. The lack of relationship between leader and led in the formal groups where moral teaching is attempted directly, especially in the club and Sunday school, indicates that the leader’s ideas at least are not getting across to the children. . . .

The wide differences in means and the relatively low correlations between the scores of the same children in the different situations indicate quite clearly that a child does not have a uniform generalized code of morals but varies

according to the situations in which he finds himself. In other words, he has a Home code, a School code, a Sunday-school code, etc., or else adopts a code fundamentally his own to meet the more insistent demands of the occasion. Knowledge of right and wrong is a specific matter to be applied to specific situations which the child encounters in his daily living. Perchance this lack of a fixed general code is due to the secularized life with which we surround our children. We may have to get more of a moral unity in the individual child.¹¹

This study simply confirms in a more objective way the contentions of students of behavior that the family has profounder effect on knowledge of moral codes than secondary groups such as church or school. Likewise it throws additional light on the particularistic nature of our moral behavior. In no case is moral activity understandable outside its social-cultural frame of reference.

The other question of interest bears on the relation of verbal instruction and of verbal response to actual conduct. If it is a problem to discover whether teaching the child codes and giving him projects influences his conduct, it is still more difficult to determine whether his verbal responses mean anything as a measure of his actual conduct in any particular situation. The validity of most questionnaire studies and the various standardized verbal tests of social and moral conduct is therefore questionable. If a boy "knows" verbally what is right or wrong, does it follow that he will act one way or another? Moreover, suppose he does act in accordance with the code in some particulars, will he do so in others? The whole relation of verbal conditioning to overt conditioning is here involved. Mary Cover Jones showed that verbal conditioning might have a place but not an important one in the elimination of fears in children. It probably has a place in much positive learning, but we may doubt if the effects are very significant unless the verbal responses are in line with deeper organic trends in behavior, such as arise from desires that have strong feeling-emotional accompaniments.

Nevertheless the school continues to teach morals in an intellectualistic manner. Only in few places have we developed the situational approach to such teaching, but there are indications that alterations in method are in prospect. The picture of the school is not altogether bad. There are many indications that the institution is changing as we are becoming aware of

¹¹ H. Hartshorne and M. A. May, "Testing the Knowledge of Right and Wrong," *Religious Education Association Monograph*, No. I, 1927, pp. 50-51.

the importance of individual differences and especially of emotional variability, and as we realize the importance of social and moral experience in the schoolroom, on the playground, and elsewhere as it affects the behavior trends of the child. The school, like the church, takes the young child from the home at an increasingly early age, and although the major lines of reaction are laid down in the home, the school can either enhance or modify the effectual or ineffectual aspects of home training. Visiting teacher and child guidance programs may effect a correlation of home and school which in time will change the patterns of education for child, parent, and teacher.¹²

C. Religious and Fraternal Institutions.

1. *The Church and Personality.*—The organized religious life of the community takes the child in hand very early and begins to impress upon him certain fundamental beliefs and attitudes which will color ever afterwards his view of life and manner of behavior. It is true, of course, that the church attitudes originate in the home itself. The parents instruct the small child in fear of evil beings. There is talk of sin and wickedness, usually before the child has any concept of these matters clearly in mind. Though the family begins the instruction in morality and gives the basic information and habits, the church strengthens and extends this training.

No one would deny that the religious institutions with which a child or youth comes into contact profoundly influence his future attitudes and habits. In the majority of Christian churches, he is filled with the stereotypes and legends of Biblical and Church history. These create a mental content for him which he may later have considerable difficulty in unloading. A good instance is the orthodox, fundamentalist view of creation. In late adolescence or in adulthood a person brought up with a profound faith in the Hebraic story of creation may encounter severe difficulties in adjusting himself to the ideas brought to him by modern geology, biology and anthropology. The change involves no mere shift in ideational content; around these stories told to children are hung all sorts of emotional reactions and feelings of finality of things in this world and the next. High school and college teachers everywhere have seen the sad effects on personality in young men and women brought up in very primitive ideas re-

¹² Cf. W. I. and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America*, 1928, for a critical survey of present-day schemes of child education and child welfare.

garding biological creation, the nature of God and sin, who find themselves in terrific emotional conflict over the whole meaning of life. There is the simple case of the moral taboos on women smoking or on the use of alcoholic beverages. Here the church may have spoken with an authority all-sufficient for the early years of the boy or girl living in a settled, isolated village. Such absolute codes may later run counter to others, and the person is drawn between two fires. As the great teachers of ethics point out, there is in these cases no preparation for the self-discovery of a philosophy which grows out of inner trends and is synchronized with one's intellectual ideas, one's artistic sensibilities and one's emotional values. Instead, we have with the breakdown of the older, more rigid code, a throw-back to the more primitive, untrained emotions of the individual. The result may be personal disintegration. There may be undue indulgence in the use of narcotics or alcohol; these over-indulgences may lead to excesses in other fields. The whole inflexible code, once it begins to go to pieces, is likely to break down everywhere. There often accompanies this a distinct feeling of opposition to the older authorities of family and church, and this rebellion against authority may, in fact, carry over into all sorts of situations. The writer knows a number of men who form a rather radical wing of social science and psychology, and whose fundamental antagonism to older philosophy, psychology, and social science is probably an outcome of their profound revolt from the narrow limitations which their family and church training put upon them.

This conflict of ideas and this resistance constitute one type of outcome for the personality from his contact with the specially primitive types of church organizations. There remains, however, a great mass of persons for whom the church offers just the solace, just the outlet in times of crises, which preserves one's emotional balance. If it is true, as it seems to the writer to be, that the emotions and feelings are more powerful than the intellectual ideas and habits which man has built up, then the place of churches in organizing the religious life of man can not be underestimated. The symbolic nature of the ritual, the appeal to infantile and childhood impulses in adult, socially-accepted terms, is of great importance. At present, the appeal of the symbolic, dereistic formulas, the organization of thought and conduct along socially acceptable, but nevertheless emotional lines, is of great significance for the personality in offsetting the materialistic, objective, scientific world of every-day affairs. In religion we replace the

world of predictability of behavior with a world of indeterminate satisfactions—wish fulfilments without work, joys contemplated from infancy but denied us by the exigencies of earning a living, in short, of comforts without pain or hardship. One is reminded of the following epitaph found on a tombstone in the Chiswick churchyard in England:

Her last words on earth were, Dear friends, I am going
Where washing ain't done, neither sweeping nor sewing:
But everything there is exact to my wishes,
For where they don't eat there's no washing of dishes.
I'll be where loud anthems will always be ringing.
But having no voice, I'll be out of the singing.
Don't mourn for me now; don't mourn for me never;
I'm going to do nothing for ever and ever.

The following comment on the function of religion is in point:

The writer believes that religion furnishes, as do art and invention, for that matter, opportunity for integration of personality trends: emotions and prepotent drives, which might otherwise be left ragged and loose in one's development. This is what F. L. Wells means apparently by calling religion a "balancing factor" in personality. That is to say, religion affords one a means of taking up much emotional slack which otherwise might find its outlet in anti-social conduct or perhaps in a neurosis.

Social pressures in the form of negative attitudes surround us from infancy. These attitudes are what the psychoanalysts call the "censor." They leave very much in the way of infantile and primitive impulses in the backwaters of the behavior patterns. Often these impulses and habit trends take on the form of vague wishes and attitudes which come only to the margin of consciousness, but which continue to affect the personality in its choices and conscious behavior much more than is obvious at first sight. Thus, while the socially-induced negative attitudes repress overt responses, the emotionally-toned attitudes of the infantile mind do not so easily disappear. They may lie dormant for years to appear in some adult crisis such as produces a neurosis. Or if they come to the surface in normal living it is in the form of dreams, daydreams, witticisms, in fanatical social reform programs or emotional social conservatism as the case may be. Hates, antagonisms, childish egocentrisms, sadistic impulses, desires for superiority, wishes to "get something for nothing"—these and many other trends are held in check by social-cultural pressures. If, therefore, these are not rather fully worked over into adult substitutions and sublimations, they may result in complexes or emotionally-toned groups of attitudes which may become more or less dissociated from the main course of the personality and lead to inefficiency in living or to actual disease.

The meaning factor in religion is highly symbolic. Although the basic emotional-instinctive appeal of these symbols is usually lost on the naïve worshipper, this fact does not make the functions of the symbols any the less significant. It is the present contention that religious rituals and ceremonials function do give an outlet for many of these crude and selfish impulses upon a rather socially-acceptable level and thus feed the individual with a substitute experience which removes the emotional surcharge that might otherwise damage his social responses to his fellows. And certainly in Christian communities, as elsewhere, song has played an important part in religious ceremonialism.¹³

In analyzing the content of nearly three thousand Protestant hymns as one clue to the function of religion in personality, the writer found that the dominant appeal was some form of infantile return to the father or mother situation, that is, back to the home and family circle. One-third of the total had this as the most striking motive. In nearly 25 per cent of the hymns the appeal was to some form of future reward, another distinctly childlike fantasy. The future-reward motif is doubtless related to the forward projection of the wish. In brief, infantile return to parents and the desire for future reward together constituted the central theme of nearly 58 per cent of the total number of hymns studied. Sinfulness, inferiority feelings, masochistic and sadistic projection and purification, while present, did not make up altogether so large a bulk as the two first noted. As the writer summarized the matter:

Psychologically the persistent motif of symbolic coördination of unrequited infantile wishes with adult living is noticeable. The simple themes, their constant repetition, the use of stereotyped phrases and, in practice, the use of musical accompaniment, all make for a ceremonial usage of first-rate significance in stabilizing the personality. While the student of social ethics may maintain that the highest form of individual and social living is not attained by the continuation of these infantile symbolizations and their expression under social approval, the fact remains that by this very method human nature has found a socially-acceptable means of ridding itself of the otherwise burdensome weight of unrequited infantilisms. The present author can not fully agree with E. D. Martin that in the future we must more or less consciously set out to determine our religious ideals and symbolisms and thus outgrow by conscious control the appeal of the more puerile and primitive in our natures. It seems to him that while we may hope for a development in our symbols and religious formulations generally, these improvements will grow out of the more adequate unconscious

¹³ K. Young, "The Psychology of Hymns," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1926, vol. XX, pp. 391-92.

adjustment of our physiological needs, emotions, and intellect to the world of reality which surrounds us. This is the only adequate method by which art develops. How can we hope to better or improve on that method in the case of religion? ¹⁴

The range of emotional appeal through the church varies from the rather primitive untrained emotionalism and dereistic forms found in more divergent sects, like the various groups looking for a sudden cataclysmic end of the world, to those which depend upon a more controlled emotional or intellectual appeal. Some churches run to elaborate ritualism, while others permit the emotions rather full sway without establishing any framework in which the emotionalism is to operate. Various religious activities correspond to these cultural forms. The individual divergences in emotional tone and in personal-social conditioning represent the different levels at which people find themselves in regard to the institutionalized patterns of religion. The range from the crude emotionalism of an old-time revival to the highly esthetic sensibilities of a Cardinal Newman in the presence of the ritual of his church is enormous. Yet in this way, at every level, personalities find balance and comfort in a world which otherwise is too much with them. To attempt a judgment on the absolute values of different types of religious experience is to miss the whole point of social psychology. We are concerned with the various ways in which the personality develops upon the background of social interaction and culture. What is superior or inferior in any ultimate sense we leave to the ethical philosophers!

2. *The Lodge*.—One of the most interesting developments in our own country has been the rise of secret fraternities in great abundance. The secret society is a pretty common type of institution in many cultures. Its distribution among primitive and ancient peoples is sometimes looked upon as evidence of their intellectual inferiority as compared with modern man. As we shall note in Chapter XVI, autistic thinking and acting is a common phase of all life. We have it current today in religion and secret orders just as it exists among native peoples and as it existed among the classic civilizations from which so much of our culture comes.

The lodges of today, like any other institutions, can not be understood alone in terms of the psychology of their members. There is a long history back of them which reaches at least into the Middle Ages. The Masons, for example, have a kind of guild background and in the political history of

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 405-6.

some European countries they have played a considerable rôle. The interesting thing to consider, however, is that with the development of religious sects in this country which did not emphasize ritualism and ceremonial costumes, there gradually arose numbers of secret orders. As Protestantism, especially, has tended to give up its emotionalism and has steadily opposed the growth of ritualism and formalism, there has been an increasing spread of lodges of all sorts. It is not only the organized religious depreciation of ritualism which has been a factor in this growth; perhaps more important has been the fact that with modern engineering, there has been such a standardization of life and habits, such a loss of romance and adventure, that the American populace has turned to the secret society for compensation through its colorful ritualism, as a means of securing mystical status and affording substitute stimuli and responses denied by the ordinary humdrum life.

The upshot of the matter is that men of business acumen, who make the greatest practical application of science through engineering, indulge in the hocus-pocus of secret ritualism with the enthusiasm of native peoples or of boys in a gang. In truth, primitive peoples are often no more taken in by their ceremonials than are the members of the Rotary Club, the Elks, Moose, Redmen, or Owls. Just as organized religion affords group-approved, infantile patterns of behavior, so in Protestant America, which prides itself on its practicality, men parade in curious garbs resembling Arabs, Knights of Invisible Empires, or the native tribesmen of their own land.

These puerile antics amuse the cynical critics, but the solid psychological fact remains that this is human nature at a certain stage of life organization and culture. For our purposes the point is that the lodge is an institution which affords the ego an expansion which is denied it in other realms. We wonder, for example, why the American is so standardized, so commonplace, so lacking in color in much of his every-day life. We forget that to offset this drabness we have the mystic, fantastic rites of initiation in dozens of orders. We have, in addition, the Ku Klux Klan, The American Protective Society, and other organizations which afford adventure and escape. As some religious institutions are rather stabilized and esthetic in character, and others are cruder and more primitive in appeal, so secret societies differ. Some are really constructed upon intellectual and artistic bases which catch the finer feelings and the more socialized sentiments of

men. Others are primitive and more infantile organizations designed to regulate the morals and manners of people, without individual responsibility for any corporate action. As in some religions, the psychology of mob action is apparent. Under the guise of secret organizations, men may let loose their most violent emotions against those whom they both hate and fear. As the levels of secret societies differ, the personalities in them take on much the standpoint and pattern of belief and action which the orders prescribe. Here again phases of personality represent or reflect the various groups to which one belongs. In some group relations the individual is one type of person, in another a different one. Man is chameleon-like as he moves from one group to another. As James succinctly put it:

A man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind. . . . Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents and teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among his "tough" young friends. We do not show ourselves to our children as to our club-companions, to our customers as to the laborers we employ, to our own masters and employers as to our intimate friends.¹⁵

Therefore, we reveal a side of our personality in our lodge membership as truly as we do in our family, our church, our business organization, or in the political state. The identification of ourselves with mystical and secret things is extremely pleasant, and any intellectual pooh-poohing of this pleasure is not likely to offset or gainsay its importance for thousands of persons who do not find other ways to take up their emotional slack. Like organized religious activity, such behavior is to be interpreted as a socially-accepted and culturally-determined form of adult-child day-dream or fantasy life.

D. The Community and Political Institutions.

The political organization of the community constitutes another framework toward which the person comes to take certain attitudes and around which he normally builds up certain values. Division of labor, development of capitalistic enterprise, urbanization and mobility of population, made possible by changes in transportation and communication, and the whole breakdown of the primary group organization of life have produced a marked strain in our political institutions. On the side of personality,

¹⁵ W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. I, p. 294. Courtesy of Henry Holt and Company.

this stress is reflected in divergent attitudes and habits built up around these institutions. We cannot discuss the whole field of political psychology, but we may mention some features of present-day political behavior.

1. *Old Frameworks and Modern Life.*—Under the influence of the dogma of political and economic equality which was especially dominant in the eighteenth century, and which rested on the more homogeneous life of pre-industrialism, arose the theory of individual responsibility for political government. As the last vestiges of the medieval order disappeared, class and property qualifications for active citizenship were abandoned. Constitutional equality of citizens was established. The town meeting and personal participation in political life in the community became the rule. Here the individual was aware of the needs of his village. He knew his neighbors well. He had a common interest in schools, roads, fire and police protection, and moral control. It was assumed that the person could make adequate judgments on political questions and decide issues through voting directly on them or by choosing representatives to settle these matters for him and his fellow-citizen. The basic interest was the immediate locality. People in a certain area had common concerns. Our present-day precinct and ward organization for voting grew out of the geographic unit of government in the neighborhood and village. Out of these early practices arose two basic ideas: equality of ability in citizenship, and locality (not class, property, or intelligence) as the basis for expression of political judgments.

The modern complex community life has destroyed the economic and social foundations of this old order, but the form continues. Biological differences in ability which are not wiped out by education and social-cultural experience, but are merely conditioned by them, are not yet provided for in our antiquated system. The intelligent citizen often grows indifferent to his public duties when he comes to believe that his vote may be offset by that of any moron who votes with the same "right" as he does.

Perhaps more serious than the question of divergence in ability and training is the fact that the modern citizen is confronted with questions in his political activity which never faced man in the simpler, pre-industrial past. In contrast with the immediate perceptible items in the every-day world around him which occupied his attention as a member of a village and neighborhood, the present citizen is affected by the behavior of men far removed from him in space. The regulation of public utilities, deter-

mination of tariff problems, questions of social legislation, like child labor, public health, and prohibition of liquor and drug traffic, and the whole relation of government to business, both nationally and internationally, are of profound importance for the common man. Yet he has little or no means of knowing intimately about any of these problems. He may be lacking in technical skill to learn about them, or his sources of information may be so distorted that he can make at best inadequate if not quite faulty judgments on men and policies. Post-war agriculture in America is a gigantic instance of just this kind of thing. Over-production, poor marketing, and the general business relations of the farm population with national and especially international readjustments are complex problems not understood by the usual run of farmers. Some of these matters are best left to the expert in economics and law. Other matters of general political policy are difficult to grasp because they are badly phrased or confused with older ideologies. A persistent faith in the power of a legal fiat to change more basic foundations of life is very strong in the mass of the people. Politicians play upon this faith and by myth-making and other propaganda often promise some political legerdemain which can end only in magical word formulas and final disappointment to the citizens. We all know the various political utopias which are constantly dangled before the voters. The same applies equally well to all phases of problems with a wide reach of social-political-economic implications. In the end, many intelligent persons grow indifferent to participation in political life. Others become the pawns of propaganda for special vested interests. Our older theory of the common man deciding deliberately and rationally how he shall vote disappears when we see how emotionally-toned prejudices control our attitudes and direct our actions, though we are without any genuine understanding of the larger public problems.

2. *Political Parties and Political Machines.*—Our Constitution does not provide for political parties or political machines. Yet both have become definitely associated with democratic political practice. In an earlier day distinctly divergent interests were represented by major political parties. In our own country we still retain the dual-party system. At the outset the Federalists and the Jeffersonian Republicans represented different views and varied local and financial interests. Later the Whig and Democratic parties represented these divergences, and still later the Republican and Democratic parties. Part of the divergence was one of political philosophy.

More fundamentally, the deviations rested on rural-urban conflicts, and on local versus centralized government, and on differences of viewpoint in regard to monopolies, free trade, and competition.

Under these earlier conditions men aligned themselves with parties which represented their interests and life organization. The Republican had certain attitudes toward a protective tariff, toward business, toward the centralization of government. The Democrat had other notions about the same things. Today, while the old ideologies persist, the real differences between our two major parties have virtually disappeared. As witness of this is the development of extra-political, extra-legal forces in our modern political and community life. The very complexity of life has led to political indifference because of our inability to cope with the technical problems of government in a satisfactory way.

Within the political parties a certain professionalism and institutional form of control known as the "machine" has developed. The machine is a kind of feudal organization inside the larger political party. It is a form of in-group within a more amorphous in-group. The machine has many of the characteristics of the gang. Like the gang, it is integrated through conflict. This conflict is of three sorts: conflict between rival factions within the machine itself, such as existed between Boies Penrose and the Vare brothers for the control of Philadelphia politics; conflict between two local machines for control of the state party; conflict of one party with another in a political campaign.

The forms of political machines differ somewhat. On the whole they tend to produce a hierarchy of dominant officials. This insures a continuity of operations for years, as with Tammany Hall. Usually there is one man or a close-knit clique which controls the operation of the group. The leading figure in the organization is called the "Boss." Mark Hanna of Ohio, W. M. Tweed and Richard Croker of New York City, Senator Platt of New York State, Matthew S. Quay and Boies Penrose of Philadelphia, Tom L. Johnson of Cleveland, "Big Bill" Thompson of Chicago—all are names familiar in the history of machine politics. Not only do leaders arise, but there develops a code of conduct within the group and a method of conflict with the outsiders. Sometimes the organization has certain autistic trappings of a fraternal order, as in Tammany Hall. In other cases, the machine is free from these formal rituals, but has, nevertheless, distinctive codes and techniques of social control.

It is sometimes naïvely assumed that boss control and machine politics exist only in urban centers. While permanence of organization may be more easily maintained there, rural counties and even states come to have bosses and machine organizations. The following paragraph describes a fairly typical situation in a village of 1200:

A. J., who is one of the wealthiest citizens, an elder in the dominant church, a member of the county school board, is the political "boss" of Y. He has a group of close friends in the Republican party who always choose his delegates to the county convention, who support his ticket for local elections and who follow his lead in voting on various issues in referenda elections. By persuasion, by the use of his church affiliations, by promises of contracts on school buildings or the roads, he is able to retain his power. Some of his intimate friends had property which they wished to sell for the building site of a new elementary school. The town is dependent upon artesian or surface wells for water for culinary purposes. On the proposed site the obtainable water was not good for drinking, as it contained a marked percentage of distasteful minerals in solution. A good deal of agitation arose to place the school in another section of the town where the water was good, yet within a convenient distance. A. J. marshalled his clique to thwart the opposition. His position on the county school board gave him a distinct advantage. By threatening to block the construction of the building, by cajolery and promise, he obtained the community's support for the original site. His opponents say that he was financially interested in disposing of the site first suggested. At any rate certain of his close political henchmen were.

Within the machine itself and within the larger political parties a certain type of professional grouping occurs. The men who work in these organizations are called politicians. Through the spoils system many of them are supported by political appointment or they may actually be elected to public office. These are the individuals who actually control, in large part, the direction of political activity. Through the press, public assemblies, and other devices they secure the support of the voters.

Certainly the political reality of democratic control is not that pictured in the traditional accounts of political science. While we have an institutional framework of three major branches of government with functions of various sorts, the actualities of political behavior are frequently those of closely formed in-groups within the larger structure which dominate the political attitudes and activities of the citizens.

3. *Political Indifferentism.*—Dewey remarks in his incisive analysis,

The Public and Its Problems (1927): "Political apathy, which is a natural product of the discrepancies between actual practice and traditional machinery, ensues from inability to identify oneself with definite issues." Merriam and Gosnell have made a systematic study of the "reasons" for non-voting in one of our largest urban communities, Chicago. While doubtless the causes for not exercising the political franchise given by the persons interviewed may be largely rationalizations, this investigation throws light on the political opinions of large numbers of people. The following summary presents the principal facts:

Method.—The opinions of 250 party experts on the reasons for non-voting were secured. Then nearly 6,000 non-voters were interviewed in person following the municipal election of April 3, 1923. Certain data were secured from control groups made up of registered voters and adult citizens who lived in the same neighborhoods as the non-voters who were studied. Statistical data were taken from registration books and the census figures.

Results.—Sex and registration status were closely correlated with non-voting. Twice as many women as men failed to vote. Three times as many adult citizens could not vote from failure to register as "there were registered voters who had failed to vote in the particular election." It was also evident that this local election lacked the dramatic aspects apparent in the previous presidential election. "The most striking decreases in the proportions of adult citizens registered and of registered voters taking part in the local election were found in the most prosperous neighborhoods where those of native American parentage predominated."

Certain social data showed that old age or youthfulness kept many from voting. Other factors were newness to the city and unfamiliarity with local political affairs. Foreign birth or foreign language kept many women who had citizenship from registering. Illness or absence accounted for one-fourth of the cases. Disbelief in woman's voting was found both among men and among the women themselves. "Mrs. Rathke, a young woman of German parentage, thought women should not stick their noses in politics." Mrs. Sobozak, a middle-aged Hungarian woman, greeted the interviewer with this tirade: "Was better times when women did not vote. As soon as women started to vote, things went sky high, even in the old country when women started to mix in the affairs of men folks there was a change for the worse. If it was not for the women here, it would not be dry here. They spoiled the men's liberty." Not only foreign-born women or women of foreign parentage or negro women are opposed to woman's voting. "In the Hyde Park district Mrs. Harris, a young wife living in a \$65-a-month apartment, said that her husband's vote was sufficient for the family. Mrs. Spalding, living in a \$90-a-month apartment just outside a very wealthy section, said emphatically: 'I'm a lady and I do not want

to be anything else but a lady. I was raised in Virginia and promised mother not to break any of my promises. Mama always thought politics was men's business." Husbands also objected to their wives' voting, especially in Italian, German, Slavic and negro groups. Husbands of native American stock and of the better neighborhoods also objected to their wives' participation in politics. However, no such cases were found in the wealthiest sections of the city.

Disgust with politics arose from a wide variety of "reasons." Some were offended at prohibition enforcement, one way or another; others were disgusted with the schools, the police, and the courts. Others were angry over taxation, or believed all candidates to be equally corrupt, or were disgusted with their own party. Some said "one vote counts for nothing, so why vote?" Still others thought the ballot box corrupt. And some had developed a disbelief in all political action: A young Italian woman from the Ghetto district said, "Taxes and rents are high. The alley has not been cleaned twice in the summer and the children have no place to play but in the streets and alleys. It does no good to vote. You are always told to see somebody else and nothing is done." A colored junk-man 36 years old, born in Tennessee, who had been in Chicago six years, said, "Day by day the world is getting worse and worse. Down South you can't vote and you haven't got anything; up here you can vote but still you haven't got anything. What's the use?" Mr. A., an elderly native American who lived in an apartment renting for \$60 per month or more, did not vote, though he was registered, because he believed in "occupational rather than political representation" and hence had no use for the present kind of political action.

Other forms of indifference and inertia restrained both men and women from voting.

Certain sex differences were revealed upon analysis of the "reasons" for non-voting. "Only one-third of the male non-voters as compared with one-half of the female non-voters were indifferent to elections." In contrast, three-fifths of the men and only three-tenths of the women who failed to vote said they were kept from the polls by physical or administrative obstacles. One-eighth of the women non-voters were anti-suffragists.

Other differences were found among registered voters who failed to exercise their franchise and those who had not even registered. Nationality backgrounds, legal obstacles and illness all weighed differently in these two groups. Illness and absence were three times as important with registered as with non-registered, while indifference and inertia were significant in the non-registered non-voters. Table 14 on page 315 summarizes their statistical findings.¹⁶

This summary of one fairly objective study of political attitudes and behavior presents some of the reasons which men and women give for non-

¹⁶ Summarized from *Non-Voting; Causes and Methods of Control* by C. E. Merriam and H. F. Gosnell. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1924.

Table 14: Summary of Findings of Study of Non-Voting in Chicago: 1923

<i>Reasons for Not Voting</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per Cent of Total Non-Voters Interviewed</i>
Physical Difficulties		
Illness	647	12.1
Absence	589	11.1
Detained by helpless member of family	115	2.2
Total	1,351	25.4
Legal and Administrative Obstacles		
Insufficient legal residence	274	5.2
Fear of loss of business or wages	289	5.5
Congestion at polls	44	0.8
Poor location of polling booth	45	0.8
Fear of disclosure of age	14	0.3
Total	666	12.6
Disbelief in Woman's Voting		
Anti-suffragist	414	7.8
Objections of husband	54	1.0
Total	468	8.8
Disgust with Politics, Voting, etc.		
Disgust with politics	230	4.3
Disgust with own party	105	2.0
Belief that one vote counts for nothing	79	1.5
Belief that ballot box is corrupted	40	0.7
Disbelief in all political action	22	0.4
Total	476	8.9
General Indifference or Inertia		
General indifference	1,347	25.4
Indifference to particular election	129	2.5
Neglect—intended to vote but failed	448	8.4
Ignorance or timidity about elections	378	7.1
Failure of party leaders	47	0.9
Total	2,349	44.3
Grand Total	5,310	100.0

participation in political life. Other worth-while studies might be made of why people vote. Detailed analyses of the degrees of political participation might be worked out in reference to ecological factors and personal-social and cultural conditioning. Certainly the investigation of Merriam and Gosnell indicates the wide variety of factors which determine opinions and action in this one form of social action. Any mere psychological analysis in terms of instincts, wishes, or even habits which ignores the conditioning forces is bound to be faulty and particularistic.

It is increasingly evident that the cultural frameworks of political activity are no longer accommodated to the other features of the total social life. Modern division of labor, urbanization and mobility of population, easy means of communication, and shifting of interests point to the crisis which we face in the political sphere. Whether or not we wish it, changes in the framework are bound to take place at points where the strain and dislocation between present needs and old practices are most evident. Graham Wallas, Charles H. Cooley, John Dewey, Walter Lippmann, Arland D. Weeks, and others have touched on various wider sociological and ethical implications of these changes.

4. *Other Aspects of Community Life.*—Aside from political participation, the modern community gives a situational clue to other changes in the personality. Urbanization furnishes mobility, fosters diffusion of ideas, affords increased stimulation, and tends to destroy the neighborhood and village form of communal existence. Even family life is profoundly altered. These changes are rapidly reaching the rural population also with the spread of newspapers, magazines, cheap books, the motion picture, the radio, and easy transportation. We have already discussed various aspects of these changes in the present chapter. The industrial, occupational aspects will be dealt with in the following chapter. While our material culture has been modified most profoundly, these changes ultimately reverberate upon all other aspects of life. As Thomas puts it:

As the result of rapid communication in space, movements of population (concentration in cities, immigration), changes in the industrial order, the decline of community and family life, the weakening of religion, the universality of reading, the commercialization of pleasure, and for whatever other reasons there may be, we are now witnessing a far-reaching modification of the moral norms and behavior practices of all classes of society. *Activities have evolved more rapidly than social structures, personalities more rapidly than social norms.* This unstabilization of society and of behavior is probably no more than a stage of disorganization preceding a modified type of reorganization. When old habits break down, when they are no longer adequate, there is always a period of confusion until new habits are established; and this is true of both the individual and society.¹⁷

This change is apparent in the personalities of rural persons who move to an industrial or business city, or, more so, in the changes brought about

¹⁷ W. I. and D. S. Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. xiii.

in immigrants and their children upon their settling in our urban centers. The animation, the liveliness, the breakdown of primary group controls, and the lack of standardization of personal conduct all make for a new form of individualization which the rural or immigrant person finds it difficult to acquire. Sophistication, extroverted forms of life organization, commercialized leisure, the impersonal money nexus in all sorts of human relations that formerly were based on more personal, sympathetic contacts in small groups—all these play a part. Park has shown that out of this shift, for one thing, arises what he terms “the marginal man,” who, freed from the culture norms of older group relations, may go off into disintegrated attitudes and behavior, or may, in turn, develop new attitudes and action patterns which enhance and modify the forms of social relations. The Lynds in their book, *Middletown* (1928), make mention of this fact in various dimensions of behavior: sexual, recreational, and otherwise. The casualness, the “touch and go” contacts, the instability of personal relations may produce superficiality, but they also encourage versatility and cosmopolitanism.

Much of the hue and cry raised by conservative members of the church and political parties is directed against these new tendencies. People with conservative attitudes and values feel that something especially important is being lost to our civilization in these new ways of life. Through persuasive propaganda, through the fiat of law, through education, and by other means, they attempt either to stop these changes or at least to confine them and direct them in predetermined channels. Only the future can decide whether or not they can accomplish this. Certainly the apparent increase of mental disorders, the demoralization of young people, as measured by the older standards, crime, juvenile delinquency, poverty, the decay of religious beliefs, the increase of community and especially political indifference, betray the violent conflict of one set of attitudes, habits, and values with another.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: Re-read *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter IV, no. 17, pp. 72-75.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 - 1. What makes an institution?
 - 2. Distinguish between institutions and crowds. Illustrate.

3. What are the functions of the school aside from strictly intellectual training?
 4. Show how religion furnishes a balancing factor for the personality.
 5. Indicate how culture patterns formalize the dereistic features of religious and lodge life.
 6. Show how the political machine takes on many of the features of primary groups.
 7. What factors account for the growth of political indifferentism in our modern society?
 8. It has been said that democratic political organization is so bound up with primary group life that as the neighborhood and village or town life disappear our democratic political order will also go out of existence. Discuss this problem.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
1. Report on Riordan, *Senator Plunkett of Tammany Hall*, for a frank realistic picture of our modern political life.
 2. Report on modern religious problems. (Cf. Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*; Martin, *The Mystery of Religion*; Whitehead, *Religion and Modern World*; Barnes, *The Twilight of Christianity*.)
 3. Report on effects of modern urban life on personality. (Cf. Park, Burgess, *et al.*, *The City*; Thomas, "The Problem of Personality in the Urban Environment," *Publications American Sociological Society*, 1926, vol. XX, pp. 30-39.)
 4. Report on the present tendencies in education: Washburne, *Better Schools*; Rugg and Shumaker, *Child Centered Schools*; Thomas and Thomas, *The Child in America* (especially Chapters V, VI, VII).
 5. Report on some definite aspect of contemporary American life. (Cf. Merz, *The Great American Bandwagon*; Siegfried, *America Comes of Age*.)
 6. Recent Changes in Community Life in America. (Cf. Steiner, *The American Community in Action*; publications of *The Inquiry* (New York), e. g., *Community Conflicts*; Lynd, *Middletown*.)
 7. Changes in Political Life in Modern World. (Cf. Wallas, *The Great Society*; Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*; Lippmann, *The Phantom Public* and other writings.)

CHAPTER XIV

PERSONALITY AND OCCUPATIONAL ATTITUDES

A. Economic Groups.

1. *Occupational Status.*—No one would deny that hunger and the sex urge are the two dominant physiological drives in human behavior. The sex urge, as we know, may be sublimated and shifted about to all kinds of objects and situations which may, practically, leave the original impulses out of the picture. Although desire for food and drink may be put off for some hours or even days, it ultimately overpowers us if we do not satisfy it in a direct physiological manner. The appetite for food and drink underlies survival. The potency and urgency of these needs lead to a routine manner of satisfying them which we call the economic order. However, the form in which the economic system has developed is the result of historical accidents and causes rather than of the original appetites on which it is based. There is no point in involving ourselves in any controversy about the original appetites and the institutions of communism, private property, or the development of thrift and profit-seeking. Our concern is to note some of the effects of occupations upon social attitudes and social conduct.

At the outset the occupational attitudes of the child arise from the home. They may be favorable or unfavorable to the occupation of the parent. Where class lines are rigidly drawn, the sons naturally continue with the vocation of the father, and in the caste systems the shift from one occupation to another is, according the code, impossible. In our country, however, we find a great shifting from one economic class to another. There is often a tendency for parents to project upon their children the desire to rise in the social-economic scale by taking up occupations above those of the parents. This is seen both in immigrant families and in our older American stock when it is thrown against urban civilization. The shift may not always occur, but the trend is very apparent. Not only the parents but the schools encourage advancement in status. In truth, the ordinary boy or

girl at home and in school is so inculcated with the notion of progress that he feels disgraced if he has not some definite vocational goal in mind. In the main he must look to one which will net him wealth and, therefore, prestige. Occasionally we do find cases where the parents discourage their sons or daughters from trying to rise in the social scale, but in our society such instances are rare.

As an example of change in occupational status the following case of a Freshman who, as an advisee, came to the writer in college is interesting:

Paul is the son of Polish parents but he was born in this country. His father is a stationary engineer, one of his brothers is a mechanic in a factory, and an unmarried sister is a stenographer. He is in college to educate himself to be an engineer. His high school grades are very poor and he has come to college against the recommendation of the high school principal. But the family, especially the brother, is much interested in his educational advancement and the family is proud to have a son in a state university. The boy is determined to make good in spite of the evidence of mediocre ability given by his high school grades.

It remains to be seen if his emotional drive can compensate for what appears to be a lack of ability to do college work. But he is typical of thousands of boys from immigrant families who are attending college in the interest of improving their economic and social status, but at the cost of enormous sacrifices at home.

To illustrate a very common phenomenon of the influence of family life on vocational choice, we may consider three cases from the writer's own files:

(i) The Y. family is made up of five boys and two girls. The father is an expert cabinet maker. His children all seem to have a bent for mechanical work. One of his sons followed his own trade, one is a master plumber and another a journeyman plumber. The fourth boy is a painter. Only the youngest son has failed to take up some trade seriously. The eldest daughter married early, but the second girl works in an office. Although the parents were economically handicapped in their efforts to provide further education for their children, they lived in a community where high school and college education was inexpensive and easily available. In fact, the home was across the street from the campus of a good college. Yet none of the children attempted to attend the college. Here is an instance of family stimulation plus a desire to make money early in life.

(ii) The G. family is made up of two children, a girl and boy. The father

is an attorney for several corporations in which his wife's family and he himself are financially interested. The family conversations revolve very much around making money, business deals, losses and profits and prospects for the future. While the father is well educated his whole life is bound up in money-making. The small boy very early began picking up the attitudes of his father. He would invite visitors to play simple card or other games with him for money. He soon became quite a trader among the boys of his neighborhood and at an early age began soliciting for newspapers and magazines. As he has grown up this trait has not changed except in the extent of his money-making activities.

(iii) The H. family is made up of five daughters and two sons. The father is a retired farmer and *rentier*. He never made any money, but after inheriting a modest patrimony he retired to read and think over the world's problems. The eldest son left home early and entered a trade. The girls all took to business or teaching, but the youngest child, the second son, was brought up under the influence of his father's leisurely habits. The father although a man of slight formal education was widely and profoundly read. He and an old retired physician of the town would sit for hours discussing philosophy, economics, biological problems and contemporary civilization. Although the youngster frequently did not understand what it was all about, he did acquire a certain method of attacking problems and an attitude toward alleged facts and loose statements which he carried over both to the grammar school and especially to the Sunday school with distinctly disastrous effects for the teachers. In the home were books of good literature, the works of Tom Paine, Robert G. Ingersoll, Thomas Huxley, Charles Darwin, and much of Herbert Spencer. The father leaning heavily to individualism found *Man versus the State* by Spencer valuable reading. Schopenhauer curiously enough was the most common philosopher at hand. The boy showed the effects of his fixation on his father in his reading interests.

The father was not altogether an introvert, but spent much of his time out of doors hunting and fishing. The boy accompanied him on these expeditions. In coming and going the father and son talked for hours on all sorts of things, from a description of the geological formations of the mountains in which they lived to problems of international politics, such as the United States and the Philippines. The boy was keenly absorbed in geography and history and really knew more of these subjects than his high school teachers. At the age of thirteen he had read Tylor's *Anthropology* and in his high school he came into contact with men in the social sciences and psychology who doubtless stimulated in him a definite interest toward these fields.

In this family there was little talk of money, except that one had to be careful about expenditures, as there was not enough in the family exchequer for any extravagances. But there was no talk of the art of making money and the few adolescent attempts of the boy to sell things ended disastrously for want of self-confidence and a good technique. While the father had once learned and

practiced a good trade, the boy never learned more than the rudiments of carpentry during one summer vacation. Although he lived much out of doors during the summers until he was in college, his fundamental interests tended more and more toward those of a scholar. He loved books although he confesses that as a youth he did not read many novels or find time for all the books he would have liked. But he retained what he did read and this coupled with his father's stimulation, gave him a distinct bias toward the teaching profession. He has now no keen interest in money-making and although he can on occasion do such things with his hands as making a table or putting up a shelf, or attending to simple repairs on his automobile, he really has no interest in handicrafts. The only muscular habits which he retains are those found in games which he plays, but even here his interest is one of health and not genuine concern in the things for themselves. His whole world of values is found in research, writing, and teaching.

While all of the factors involved in the determination of occupational interest are not here exposed, it is clear that the framework of one's vocation is the result not alone of economic opportunity but of values laid down for the child in the family and neighborhood. Both cultural and personal-social conditioning assist in determining which occupation one will take up.

- 2. *Personality and Machine Production.*—Occupational status in the pre-industrial age was very different than it is at present. Profound changes have been brought about in our methods of manufacture by the introduction of specialized power machinery. The social and personal effects of these alterations have been ably discussed by Hobson, Veblen, Tead, Mecklin, and others. Where the handicrafts thrived and men took to the making of a pot, the weaving of a rug, or the tillage of the soil as a more or less unified activity, the effects of these habits on personality organization were doubtless different from those of present-day machine production. Under the old handicraft system a man's tools were a part of himself. Moreover, the product of a man's labors was a unified, complete object. Its inception and finish constituted a whole consummatory act involving the entire personality. Today men operate machines making only a small part of the manufactured article. There is little or no conception of the finished object as the outcome of one man's skill. There is decidedly little feeling of one's self being put into the product. Pride in workmanship and sense of personal possession do not develop in a factory where a workman goes on hour after hour, day after day, in the following fashion:

Up one line and down another goes a continual stream of motor parts in the process of assembling. One man fits the parts together so that the bolt holes come right. The next man slips the bolts in place. The next has a pan of nuts before him and all day long he scoops them up and with his fingers starts them on the thread of the bolts. The next man has a wrench and he gives them the final twist that makes them tight.¹

The artistry of the product is transferred from the man to the machine. Furthermore, routine factory production has a distinct effect upon the man's ideas, attitudes, and habits. As Veblen puts it:

There results a standardization of the workman's intellectual life in terms of mechanical process, which is more unmitigated and precise, the more comprehensive and consummate the industrial process in which he plays a part. . . . A habit of thinking in other than quantitative terms blurs the workman's quantitative apprehension of the facts with which he has to do. . . . The machine process compels a more or less unremitting attention to phenomena of an impersonal character and to sequences and correlations not dependent for their force upon human predilection nor created by habit and custom. The machine throws out anthropomorphic habits of thought. *It compels the adaptation of the workman to his work, rather than the adaptation of the work to the workman.* The machine technology rests on a knowledge of impersonal, material cause and effect, not on the dexterity, diligence, or personal force of the workman, still less on the habits and propensities of the workman's superiors. Within the range of the machine-guided work, and within the range of modern life so far as it is guided by the machine process, *the course of things is given mechanically, impersonally, and the resultant discipline is a discipline in the handling of impersonal facts for mechanical effect.* It inculcates thinking in terms of opaque, impersonal cause and effect, to the neglect of those forms of validity that rest on usage and on the conventional standards handed down by usage.²

The machine has changed the situations toward which a man must orient himself in his material adjustments, and thus it has affected his life organization. The machine is impersonal and inhuman. It is external to the worker in a way that hand tools were not. Where every movement of wrist, arm, deft fingers played a part, along with the mental picture of the carving or the rug to be made, the individual in a sense injected or wove his personality into the object. When the mechanical turning of a

¹ Quoted from J. A. Fitch's description in F. S. Chapin, *Introduction to Social Economy*, 1917, p. 195. Courtesy of The Century Company.

² T. Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, 1920, pp. 308, 309, 310. Courtesy of Chas. Scribner's Sons. (Italics not Veblen's.)

crank, the throwing of a gear, or the release of a stamp machine with the foot is all that is needed through a repetitious system all day along, the workman develops a different organization of both covert and overt behavior patterns. His chief concern is not the standardized product, but his money wages and what they will buy. The only nexus between a man and his product is money. Mecklin remarks:

Machine production tends to obscure the joy of creative effort and to fix the attention upon the possibilities for possession. . . . The result is that the intention of worker as well as of business man is not so much the creation as the exploitation of wealth. To get something CHEAP, that is, with as little expenditure of time, energy or money as possible, comes very near being the dominating MOTIF in the industrial world.³

It has often been said that the machine process dissipates creativeness. Miss Marot remarks:

The tenure of each man employed in production is finally determined not by any creative interest of his own or by his employer, but by whether in the last analysis, *he conforms better than another man to the exigencies of profits.* . . . A factory employee is required to do a piece of work; and he does it, not because he is interested in the process or the object, but because his employer wants it done.⁴

What stimulation is there for millions of workers to feel an urge for inventiveness, for alteration of pattern in terms of individual wishes or novel conceptions, when work comes to them already laid out, and when usually their part in the process is only one two-hundredth of the whole anyway? Under such conditions it is hard to be inventive.

On the other hand, the wealth of incentive to improve processes was never greater than it is today, but the single, hermit-like workman-inventor is giving way to the trained expert who, with all of the facilities of modern science at hand, deliberately sets out to improve some industrial or commercial process. Thus motivation to invention in the mass of workers tends to be suppressed, while creativeness becomes the special province of trained experts and engineers. This segregation of impulse in terms of education and opportunity probably means that in the masses there is actu-

³ From *Introduction to Social Ethics*, by J. M. Mecklin, p. 354. Copyright, 1920, by Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc.

⁴ H. Marot, *Creative Impulse in Industry*, 1918, p. 7-8. Courtesy of E. P. Dutton Company.

ally a considerable loss of creativeness in their culture pattern and a substitution of vicarious experiences to offset the dull work of factory or office.

The machine is not an unmitigated evil by any means. Higher standards of living and more leisure have had amazing effects upon millions of people. In other words, the personality of the common laborer is greatly expanded on the side of contacts with the outside through newspaper, radio, moving picture, and automobile, made possible by money wages. But his interest in creation of material objects on his own initiative is quite lost. This means a remarkable recasting of personal values in terms of occupations. Values tend to be less in the occupation itself and more in the expenditures which the wages make possible. This psychological separation of the workman from his work is one of the most striking features of modern machine production.

Machine production in many instances frees the worker from close attention to every movement in his work so common in the case of the skilled handicrafts. This condition leaves the individual free to give attention to subjective matters. Elton Mayo has shown how important day-dreaming may become in the worker's life. Reveries take on various contents and offer a means of taking up the emotional slack produced by machine control of overt activity. These fantasies may be of antagonistic sort in regard to the management, towards the man's family situation, etc., or of more pleasant sort. It is evident that mechanization of industrial processes does not alter the place of introverted, fantastic associations although it may shift their nature and direction.

Another effect of the machine upon the personality is the frequent induction of fear. The tools of the handicrafts are rarely dangerous. While a man may occasionally cut himself with a sharp-edged knife or other tool, on the whole there is nothing in the working situation to set up fear responses. Power-driven machinery is different. There is always danger of becoming entangled with belts, pulleys, and other mechanisms. Here we find, as Veblen says, that the workman is the slave of the machine, not its master. In the early days of factory production there occurred frequent and often tragic accidents to life and limb. Protective devices have been installed, both through legal enforcement and through the desire of employers to safeguard their workmen. Yet, in spite of these efforts at protection, there is no doubt that anxieties may be built up in workers through sec-

ing accidents to others and through experiencing them personally. Fatigue, loss of attention through monotonous repetition of acts, and lack of interest in the production may lead to greater frequency of accidents. The following narrative from a young worker in a grinding works is instructive:

I had been warned of the dangers and for several weeks as I went in and out of the different departments, I feared nothing. Oftentimes I stood and watched these men work. One day though, as I was going through the "siding" department in search of special hard wheels which are used for forming the designs on cut glassware I heard a slight cracking noise which was followed by a loud crash. A wheel some thirty inches in diameter and four or five inches in thickness had ripped the guard off, breaking into three chunks. The wheel had been traveling at a rate of eight hundred revolutions per minute. One of the pieces flew up into the ceiling but on its way glanced off the poor workman's head. The man was immediately rushed to the shop hospital and thence to the city hospital. He did recover after some time but was never able to return to work. After that I seldom went through that department and when I did pass through there I did so with great care.

The following year I was offered a job running one of those siding machines, but of a smaller type. I was to receive good money and I knew two other fellows who were to accept similar jobs. I did not want to show my fear, so I accepted the job. I worked the whole summer without a single accident while at the machine. However, one afternoon a severe thunderstorm broke loose. The power went off and the lights went. There was nothing to do but hang around for awhile. My machine was situated close to a steel support and the wiring to my light ran through a jointed steel tubing which, I noticed later, had been pushed up against the steel support. I was leaning back on my stool against the girder when suddenly the lights flickered and the belts jerked simultaneously with a crash of lightning. In an instant I was thrown to the floor but received no injury.

Later I was put to work on a "Norton Grinder." This kind of machine grinds the external surfaces of cylindrical pieces of steel. The machine is regulated so as to take or rather grind off any amount from a half-thousandth up to fifteen thousandths at a single chip. Four days I had been manipulating this machine with great success. On the fifth day just before closing time I had a piece all ground, but to waste a couple of minutes I let the wheel run, which by the way travels at four or five thousand revolutions per minute. From some undetermined reason the wheel seemed to "purr" and so I stepped over to see what the trouble was. Before I had time to wink, the piece of steel was forced out at a terrific speed, striking me just over the right eye. I saw "stars" all right but did not faint. A fellow-worker had shut the power off as my mind was a blank. I

"came to" and picked the piece of steel up from the floor and threw it nervously on the bench. The blood was streaming down my face, still I could not feel it. The "boss" arrived and inquired what had happened. He shouted in a fashion that did not suit me (I found out later that he was more excited than I) and my fear seemed to change to anger. I felt strong and I felt that I wanted to smash the machine and the boss and then "throw up" my job. Yet my actions were inhibited and I was nervous. I was sweating coldly and words failed me. My cousin, a toolmaker, happened to come along and brought me immediately over to the nurse. I was bandaged up and after soothing the gash, I still had a headache which I attribute to my nerves which were shattered. The next day I went to work with a greater courage but was very careful how I inserted each piece into the machine. That day a piece shot out and struck me just below the shoulder. I had now learned to stand to one side while the machine was in operation. I felt now that I was overcoming my fear of this machine. Three days later I again heard a whirring noise and I stepped to one side just in time to get a glimpse of the piece of steel, driven by the great speed of the grinding wheel, shoot over a fellow-worker's head, and then smash through a window to land on the other side of the road which passed by the shop. That was enough for me. The "boss" again came over, this time questioning me as to what I was trying to do. Again my fear changed to anger and I walked away without saying a word. I spoke to the superintendent about my troubles, whereupon he transferred me to the assembling department which was connected with the tool-room. The superintendent got into connection with the Norton Company, the makers of the grinding machine. The following day two experts arrived. I was questioned and the machine was carefully scrutinized. I was freed from any blame whatever and the fault was attributed to the fact that the wheel was of the wrong grade and size for the job. Although I was asked to do some small, odd job on the grinder I would never do it. Something seemed to haunt me.

The following summer I took a job in another tool-room. I had a feeling when I first entered the shop that if the foreman asked me to run an external grinder he was going to be "out of luck" so far as I was concerned. I was given several jobs for that machine but through a petty boss I managed to avoid them and get other things to do. I have a slight suspicion that if I really had been forced to work on the machine I would have done it.

The results of fear are painful for the time being, and forgetfulness follows. I remember distinctly that about two nights after my accident on the machine I had a dream. This dream brought me through my experience again, giving clear-cut pictures of the machine, the boss, my fellow workmen, and the nurse. A cold sweat came over me and I remember waking up, my mouth being very dry and I was trembling all over. Fear is a complex of bodily sensations.

In my experiences I could not feel a good result with the exception of the

warning to be more careful. It kept me on my nerve all the time so that whenever I tended to feel sleepy I immediately "snapped out of it" for fear of having another accident.

Another factor of importance in modern machine production is fear of losing one's job, fear of ill health, of over-aggressive bosses and employers. And of course on the side of the employers there is fear of "soldiering," sabotage, strikes, and discontent of workmen. As MacKenzie King remarks: "Now the peculiar thing about fear is that fear begets fear. Thus a vicious circle is produced: labor fears capital, which makes capital fear labor, and so on *ad infinitum*."⁵ This is merely an instance of social interstimulation and response. And when associated with decided in-group—out-group values and attitudes these fears become distinctive factors in restlessness, anxiety and antagonism between employers and employees.

3. *Class Consciousness and Occupation*.—That a certain class consciousness arises from occupational developments is self-evident. We witness here the same features as in other social groupings welded into common interest out of conflict and competition. We have at present, roughly, three groupings: the capitalist employers, including business men; the laborers; and the professional classes, which stand between the other two.

a. *The Employer Class*.—The employers develop a class consciousness when it becomes necessary for them to give up strictly individualistic competition for coöperation in the presence of outside competition, or to develop a control of the labor supply or to enhance their prestige with the public that uses their goods. Under the guidance of the ideology of the competitive profit-seeking system, the employers develop a set of attitudes of domination, of self-interest, and of business success which they rationalize in terms of public good. These they project on other groups, especially the church and school, as socially worth while. Babson's *Religion and Business* is an illustration of the close linking of Puritan thrift, acumen, and temperance with the ethic of business. He remarks:

Statistics lead me to believe that the faith, industry, thrift, and enterprise in people is largely due to religion. . . . Where people are religious, there are found enterprise, industry and thrift. Where people are irreligious, are found indifference, wastefulness, and extravagance. . . . Ninety-five per cent of the

⁵ Cf. W. L. MacKenzie King, *Industry and Humanity*, 1918, for a treatment of the place of fear in industrial relations.

people who do not get along well materially owe their misfortune to lack of these religious qualities of faith, industry, courage, imagination and thrift. This means that the real great work of the church today lies in reviving these great productive qualities in the souls of the masses.⁶

Such a view should not surprise us when we realize that Puritanism and Capitalism have grown up hand in hand in our society. The psychology of modern employers and business men can not be understood without reference to this fact. One should read Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1926) for details of the intimate relation of modern business enterprise to religious-moral attitudes in our society.

Employers have a sense of superiority, of self-importance, and an egocentrism to be found in all organized in-groups. The attitudes are not different from what they are in a primitive tribe or a self-righteous religious body; only the objects of attention and action are different. Employers regard themselves as representatives of sound social and economic progress. They rationalize the profit-seeking motive in terms of material and moral advancement. They use the school, the church, the press, and the political state in indirect but effective manner to enhance their importance and to secure popular approval. Toward their enemies, business competitors and the laboring classes, they have antagonistic attitudes just as any in-group has toward an out-group. They blame the laboring groups for obstructing natural competition in the labor market with their unions, rules of work, and fixed wages. To defeat their business opponents they attempt to secure monopolies which will destroy competition in the market. Havemeyer once remarked that it was his ambition to refine all the sugar of the American people, and Gates of the American Steel and Wire Company announced that his corporation aspired to control the wire output of the world.

The development of the business-industrial corporation has been an important factor affecting the growth of these attitudes of dominance. As Williams puts it:

Once the trend toward monopoly is started under the impulsion of the rivalrous and dominating dispositions of masterful personalities, other psychological conditions tend to accentuate it. The big concern and the names of successful organizers associated with it exercise a suggestive control over the public.

⁶ R. W. Babson, *Religion and Business*, pp. 97, 99. Copyright 1921 by The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

It can afford to advertise extensively. Even an enterprise that is not economically monopolistic may acquire a prestige over rivals, through advertising and otherwise, that makes it what we might call a psychological monopoly, "a monopoly of custom and prestige. This form of monopoly is sometimes of great value, and is frequently sold under the name goodwill, trade marks, brands." . . . When a corporation is also economically monopolistic, this adds many new ways of advertising and perfecting the psychological monopoly. Its mere bigness and importance in the industrial world causes it and its officials to be frequently referred to in the papers, and its products and name are distributed everywhere among the people. Thus it builds up a reputation in the community until people come to react to their attitude to the establishment, without considering whether or not its goods are superior. When a number of great corporations have attained this psychological advantage, popular sentiment for breaking up monopolies begins to weaken, and courts begin to find reasons for justifying their existence. The monopoly has acquired a social-psychological foundation and courts attempt to give it a legal foundation.⁷

This is precisely what has happened in this country in the last fifty years. The trend toward monopolies has caused a shift in the popular rationalization of their existence. The social psychologist is further interested to note that the older individual bargaining, the *laissez-faire* philosophy, in regard to the relations of employers to laborers continues. No shift in popular rationalization about monopolies in the control of the labor supply has occurred to correspond with the shift in attitude toward industrial monopolies.

The corporation has another interesting aspect psychologically. It is an impersonal, legal fiction, but with powers of contract and bargaining. It can be sued and can sue, as can a person. It is a part of the objective, materialistic mechanization of the economic order. The corporation is the final form of institutionalization of the present-day economic system. While it is controlled by human beings, its organization and profit-making purposes set the framework, in large measure, in which habits and attitudes are built up. The economic-legalistic ritual of corporation relationships is definitely a part of our whole culture schema.

The boy or girl brought up in the employer class takes on the attitudes of domination, importance, and superiority which go with this setting. He must conform to the mores of corporation finance, corporation management, and corporation purposes of profit-making. Attempts to do other-

⁷ J. M. Williams, *Principles of Social Psychology*, 1923, p. 367. Published by F. S. Crofts & Co.

wise lead to reactions against the management or owners by other corporations and owners. Any breaks in the solid wall of self-protection, in relations with the public, in the field of selling, or in relations with workmen, beyond what is demanded by the power of these other groups, are plain treason. "A business man must conform. If he does not, he is guilty of the worst crime in the catalogue of business." One recalls the subtle but effective pressure put upon George F. Babbitt in Sinclair Lewis' novel by his fellow business men when Babbitt attempted to be kindly and open-minded about his former friend who had turned radical. Save in rare instances one can not at once belong to the employing class and have any attitudes toward organized labor except those of antagonism and avoidance.

b. *The Working Classes*.—The laboring groups tend, under stress, to develop antagonistic attitudes toward the employer groups. The earlier relation of employer to his workman, such as existed in the medieval guilds or in the domestic manufacturing period, has disappeared with machine production and with capitalistic financial and corporate organization of business and industry. Class consciousness among the workers developed from the stress of long hours, low wages, unemployment, and bad working conditions. In the first half of the nineteenth century there arose in England and on the Continent a number of social-economic movements aimed at betterment of the conditions of the laboring classes. Various utopian socialistic schemes were advanced. It was the period of Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, and Ferdinand Lassalle. There was in England, especially, important factory legislation in which the political state cut across the conflict between labor and capital. In the latter half of the nineteenth century there arose strong labor unions both inside and outside the socialistic-anarchistic philosophical systems. Organized labor became a definite aspect of the economic culture pattern of our time, especially in the skilled trades.

The union, like the gang, is integrated through conflict with the outside. It develops the marks of an intense in-group toward various out-groups. There arises a code of conduct, regulating the actions of members toward each other, toward non-members among the laboring classes, as well as toward employers. In fact, unionists look down with more disdain on the unorganized, unskilled laboring men than they do on their employers. The former are outside the pale. They are inferior and weak, and deserve what they get because of their ignorance and folly. Toward powerful em-

ployer organizations the unionist may feel bitterness and fear. But contempt is about all he has for his unorganized non-union co-laborers.

The trade union is frankly an organization developed to retain some control over the productivity of labor. As the capitalist has absorbed the instruments of production, he has a distinct advantage over his employees. The union bargains collectively, that is, as a group, with the employer for conditions of labor—hours, wages, sanitation, apprenticeship, and the like. These agreements mean a standardization of working conditions without reference to individual differences among the workmen. This formalization is protective. It produces a sense of social solidarity against the out-group, the employers. To admit variability in ability or skill would be to admit the falseness of the standard wage per hour, the regular hours, the routine of apprenticeship. It would open the gates to a breakdown of union strength. It might encourage pace-setting, piecework, and other alleged evils in which the abler workman is set against his duller and weaker brother.

Other devices of protection are restriction of output and insistence on the closed shop. As Carleton puts it:

The anti-social practices of labor organization such as restrictions of output and the insistence upon the closed shop with the closed union, are rooted in no small measure in two circumstances:—(i) Bitter opposition to labor organization on the part of employers and employers' associations, and (ii) the lack of regularity in industry leading periodically to temporary closing of plants and to unemployment. . . . The demand of the unions for a closed shop is the natural sequel to the employers' discrimination against the man who carried a union card.⁸

It is one closed corporate body against another. Loyalty, obedience, and conformity to rules with no individual bargaining are emphasized in the union. During a strike the workman must follow the decision of his group, or run the risk of punishment and banishment from the union.

It is in the strike that the attitudes and habits of the two groups become most apparent. As the employers rationalize their standpoint in terms of classical laissez-faire economics, that is, individual bargaining and purchase of labor as a commodity without reference to group organizations, so the unions develop their *defenses* in terms of collective responsibility, the larger social ethics, "rights" to some regulation of their working con-

⁸ F. T. Carlton, "The Industrial Crisis," *New Republic*, 1921, vol. XXV, p. 287.

ditions and wages, and, above all, the protection of the individual workman against the overpowering odds which they believe the employer to possess. One of the most powerful employers' organizations thus states its case against the unions:

The National Association of Manufacturers believe in the principle of the open shop—the right of a man to work where he pleases, without dictation, without molestation and certainly safe from murder, whether a man belongs to a labor union or does not belong to a labor union.⁹

The employers throw blame for union organization and strike fomentation upon labor agitators. They often attempt to separate the attitudes of their workmen from those who would lead them into union affiliations. The following quotation is selected from a three-page pamphlet circulated in New England by a large employers' organization in 1924:

You know that *nine out of ten* industrial disturbances are caused by professional agitators—brewers of disturbance who make their living in that particular way! They rely on lack of knowledge on the part of the rank and file to make it possible for agitation to mislead them. Men who lack knowledge and sound leadership are easy prey for the agitator. They do not know that his promises are sometimes absolutely impossible to fulfill. And they fall for alluring prospects and *much talk*. When men follow such destructive leadership the very fact that they have deliberately chosen the foolish way proves that they do not understand the situation with which they are dealing. Men do not make fools of themselves intentionally. That is why the one opponent, the agitator, fears more than anything else is—facts. [Then follows a narration of "facts" unknown to the average worker—"raw material," "plant," "equipment," "transportation and financing problems," questions of selling, distribution, collection, the relation of one industry to another and other matters of management.]

Do you wonder that they do not know wages have such relation to cost of living, that unfair increase in wages may react to their disadvantage? That they do not understand limiting their production also inevitably limits the possibility of what they receive— That they do not know wages come out of production, and are not paid out of profits! . . . They are told they can double or treble their wages, cut down hours and production, and somebody else will pay for it. They are told that bankers own all wealth and are starving and maltreating them. They are told that Wall Street owns everything in the United States and is robbing a hundred million of us. They are told that they can get anything they want without working for it if they will make the demand strong

⁹ From a statement made during a labor crisis by President J. E. Edgerton of The National Association of Manufacturers. Quoted in the Portland (Ore.) *Telegram*, Jan. 19, 1923.

enough. They are told that the employer who furnishes their jobs is their worst enemy. *And all these dangerous and destructive fallacies they believe, because they are without the simple facts. Everywhere, in every industry, the rank and file direly need facts. They need facts on which to base sound judgment, and avoid misdirection.*

In contrast, the following statement made by President Slesinger of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union at the time of their strike against a return to the piecework system is typical of the union standpoint:

The action of the employers in assuming to determine for themselves, without consultation with their employees or their organization, the conditions under which such employees shall work and live, and to "promulgate" their decision by an "order," indicates the thoroughly *unprogressive* and *unenlightened psychology of our employers*, who would not even recognize the right of the workers to have a say in the disposition of their own labor.

The employers characterize the proposed changes as a "radical readjustment of industrial standards." They are more than that. They mean a total destruction of all humane labor standards in the industry, a return to the "sweat shop."¹⁰

In an effort to enlist the public's sympathy and to counteract the union, the employers replied to President Slesinger as follows:

The idea of "sweatshop" is preposterous because there is no "sweatshop" to return to. President Slesinger knows, too, that the majority of workers look upon the piecework system as their only salvation. It has proved a success for over thirty years.¹¹

Beside strike tactics, the union builds up other habits—"soldiering," boycotting unfair employers, and even sabotage in the attempt to restrain the power of the employer. How soldiering may even become a "right" and a tradition in a well-organized industry is shown in this story:

A certain anthracite miner was telling how he had given a lesson in the ways of the mines to the newly-landed "hunky" who was working as his laborer. "Come here, Frank, says I. Here's the boss. Don't work. Always sit down when the boss is around."¹²

¹⁰ Quoted in *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, vol. CXIII, Nov. 19, 1921, p. 2151.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2151.

¹² From C. Goodrich, *The Miner's Freedom*, 1925, p. 56. Courtesy of Marshall Jones Company.

During the post-war controversies between labor and capital on the Pacific coast the I. W. W., one of the more radical organizations, circulated among all classes of workers in the state of Oregon the following dodger:

BOYCOTT

— ALL —

CALIFORNIA PRODUCTS

Oranges, lemons, raisins, all canned fruit,
the motion pictures, etc.

In that State they send men to jail because of membership in Labor Unions and for the Expression of Opinions.

Industrial Workers of the World

EAT OREGON PRUNES

Picketing unfair merchants and factories is another method of counter-acting employer opposition. In retail business, picketing is directed toward the buying public as well as toward the non-union workers. In the factories it attempts directly to prevent the employment of non-union men.

The final recourse in the struggle between these groups is the strike. Here the antagonistic attitudes and habits gain full sway. There is appeal to the most elemental motive—physical dominance. The employers use spies, company guards, the police of the political state (under the legal pretext of protecting private property), and even the violent tactics of the gunman and slugger. The unions, on occasion, resort to equally violent methods. As a result we have little wars going on between these conflict groups within the larger community. In times of acute labor needs, the unions often win. When there is an over-supply of labor, they tend to lose. It is during these periods of active fighting that the conflict attitudes are built up on both sides. These attitudes persist for years among the members of both groups. The workmen repeat to each other and to their friends their stories of hardship, unemployment, and fighting. The em-

ployers relate and remember the destruction of property, the interference with non-union labor, and the general dislocation of industry which resulted from these periods of strife. They call the strikers "Bolsheviks," "radicals," "Reds," "traitors" and "madmen." The workmen, in turn, refer to the strike-breakers as "scabs," "bums," and "traitors to labor," and call the employers "cruel" and "inhuman." In this way the attitudes and opinions of one group about the other are created and nourished in preparation for the next open conflict.

The more radical labor groups, such as the I. W. W., look to one big union of all workers as a means of coercing the employers to relinquish their power over production and distribution. To these radical groups, milder trade unionism is of little consequence. The conflict attitudes of the I. W. W. are revealed in the Preamble to their Constitution:

The working class and the employing class have nothing in common. There can be no peace as long as hunger and want are found among millions of working people and the few who make up the employing class, have all the good things in life.

Between these two classes a struggle must go on until the workers of the world organize as a class, take possession of the earth and the machinery of production, and abolish the wage system.

We find that the centering of the management of industry into fewer and fewer hands makes the trade unions unable to cope with the ever growing power of the employing class. The trade unions foster a state of affairs which allows one set of workers to be pitted against another set of workers in the same industry, thereby helping to defeat one another in wage wars. Moreover, the trade unions aid the employing class to mislead the workers into the belief that the working class have interests in common with their employers.

These conditions can be changed and the interest of the working class upheld only by an organization formed in such a way that all its members in any one industry, or in all industries, if necessary, cease work whenever a strike or lockout is on in any department thereof, thus making an injury to one an injury to all.

Instead of the conservative motto, "A fair day's wage for a fair day's work," we must inscribe on our banner the revolutionary watchword, "Abolition of the Wage System."

It is the historic mission of the working class to do away with capitalism. The army of production must be organized not only for the every-day struggle with capitalism, but also to carry on production when capitalism shall have been overthrown. By organizing industrially we are forming the structure of the new society within the shell of the old.

Here is a perfect example of the extreme attitudes of a violent in-group against an out-group. This is not unlike similar attitudes in fanatical religious organizations or among the ardent citizens of a nation in time of international war. Revolt from the authority of any other groups is evident, and the fantastic romanticism of a utopian future is also clearly apparent. This is the ideology behind the communist movement the world over. It colors the thinking and the attitudes of great numbers of working people and brings forcefully to mind the fact that in-group—out-group relationships exist in the economic order as well as in religious systems or political states.

In the heat of open conflict with labor the employers use the lockout and other devices to block the unionists. But in a great many industries milder methods of offsetting antagonism, disloyalty, and poor quality of work are being developed. These methods are known as "education of workers," "welfare capitalism," and "company union" schemes. One method is to furnish the employees with "facts" about raw materials, production, and distribution which the ordinary workman does not comprehend. The example cited above (p. 333) in another connection illustrates the faith in furnishing facts to employees. Another is the use of slogans and rewards calculated to instil in the men a feeling of being a part of the great productive establishment in which they work. One manager reported a scheme of plant education to assist promising youngsters to advance more rapidly than usual:

We give credits also for conduct, effort, personal appearance, punctuality, and regularity. We believe that by appealing to the play instincts of our students we awaken their minds for work in the best possible way. . . . It is impossible to calculate in dollars and cents the profits the school has brought us. . . . Naturally when they return to their places (in the factory) they are so enthusiastic that they work with a vengeance.¹³

Other managers attempt to stimulate loyalty. Some play upon the sense of rivalry. One large employer, writing on "Putting 'Pep' into Production," told how contests were staged between various departments:

With us a contest may mean either work or play. Each gives us better production with invaluable by-products such as contentment and tolerance and better understanding.¹⁴

¹³ H. R. Baldwin in *System*, 1921, vol. XL, p. 176.

¹⁴ J. P. Brunt in *Factory*, 1921, vol. XXVII, p. 36.

Another device was that of using slogans and mottoes to stimulate good workmanship and loyalty and to promote production. A manager writes:

In working up this keep-your-promise campaign the means employed to stimulate interest and endeavor were of four kinds—talks, letters, pay-envelope slips, and cartoon posters. . . . Letters which bore some message intended to stimulate loyalty and endeavor were sent to each employee.¹⁵

Some employers make use of joint meetings of the workers and the managerial and sales forces. Here the business end of the factory is explained. As one man put it, "the secret lies in getting the men to look at the situation from your point of view." Another reported:

Thanks to the mutual understanding built up in the meetings, the factory men listened and saw what was in the salesmen's minds. . . . Coöperation has become typical, largely as a result of the meetings.¹⁶

In some plants lecturers explain the operation of the entire factory, and instructive talks are given on the care and use of machinery, in the hope of stimulating personal interest in productivity and of cutting down "soldiering." Some employers stimulate sociability among the men by annual banquets, social gatherings in clubhouses, and recreational opportunities.

Still other methods aim to alleviate antagonism between foremen, inspectors, and the workmen. Care in selecting the minor executives is stressed, as some petty officials rub the common employee the wrong way; others may be skilful enough in handling men actually to avoid much labor trouble.

Bonus schemes, profit-sharing plans, special rewards, commissions, and the like are also in favor in many plants. Since the fear of unemployment looms large in the minds of workers, some firms, notably the Dennison Manufacturing Company, have attempted to integrate production to other seasonal work so that at certain slack periods in the factory the employees may find work outside. The company assists its men in securing this outside employment.

In some sections of the country decentralization of industry has been in progress. Plants have been moved from large industrial cities into the

¹⁵ D. M. Perrill in *Factory*, 1921, vol. XXVII, p. 616.

¹⁶ C. L. Pool in *System*, vol. XL, Aug., 1921.

country and the management has attempted to "humanize" the organization by breaking down class lines between management and men.

Out here in the country we rub shoulders daily. There is absolutely no class distinction, no chasm between employer and employee. We are working as a unit. . . . [The men] talk about "our plant." When a worker's heart and soul is in his work, it makes nimble fingers, it quickens the step and sharpens the intellect (sic). . . . One of our workers said to a visitor who went through the plant: "In Chicago I was nobody, but in Elkhorn I am one of its citizens—everybody knows me and speaks to me as I pass them on the street. It is nice to feel that you are some one after all."¹⁷

It is obvious that with some laborers, at least, such schemes work out very well. Perhaps the in-group spirit of the close-knit union is lost, but many of these plans seem successful in producing industrial peace. Much depends on tradition. Where there has been no union, these devices operate fairly well. Antagonistic attitudes, or at least attitudes of indifference, may arise, but they seldom become articulate because they are amorphous and lack group sanction.

In a number of industries various technical time studies have been made in an effort to cut down waste motion in production. There is often an effort to interest the men personally in these plans. Following a six-weeks time-study program in which every job in a ship-building concern was analyzed, the management reported:

The benefits manifested themselves in an increased satisfaction among the workmen, more company loyalty, less destructive criticism and more constructive thought along lines of improvement, a slowly increasing spirit of co-operation between men and departments and a general uplifting of morale throughout the plant.¹⁸

The introduction of labor-saving devices is a frequent means of cutting down production costs. By simplification of work the Firestone Rubber Company eliminated great waste, cut labor costs 20 per cent, and improved the quality of the product. The following quotation from Mr. Firestone is indicative of one employer's attitude toward these methods:

Simplification is largely a matter of education. Constant repetition of a com-

¹⁷ F. Holton, "Why We're Glad We Moved to the Country," *Factory*, vol. XXVII, 1921, pp. 49-51.

¹⁸ C. B. Tyson in *Factory*, vol. XXVII, 1921, pp. 47-48.

paratively simple and easy task soon makes the workman highly skillful and enables him to increase the productivity and quality of his work. . . . A manufacturing plant is more than buildings and equipment—it requires human beings to plan and carry out the operations of the plant. The human element is extremely important—perhaps the most important element—and where the energies of this human equipment are all devoted to the accomplishment of a single purpose, the unity of purpose brings results which cannot be attained in any other way. . . .

The orderliness of method and operation, in the company's experience, gradually imbues the workers with a spirit of orderliness which results in better attendance, greater promptness, more attention to work, better workmanship, and less spoilage. The spirit of work is better when everything about the workman is orderly and running smoothly, according to a well-planned schedule.¹⁵

Labor-saving machinery may make for better pay for the workers who remain, but there is much evidence that the continued introduction of industrial devices to replace human labor has caused a great deal of unemployment and with it a train of unfortunate effects on the attitudes of the unemployed.²⁰ In the unskilled and semi-skilled trades, these changes have been most interesting. The development of dredgers and loaders, for instance, has replaced the unskilled ditch-diggers by a few skilled workers, truck drivers, and much machinery, and has thrown thousands of common laborers out of work. In certain long-established skilled trades where there have been strong unions, the opposition to labor-saving devices has become acute. Goodrich's study, *The Miner's Freedom* (1925), is an excellent picture of what is happening in certain areas of the soft-coal industry. He points out that the shift of labor-saving machinery is an inevitable outcome of modern engineering linked with capitalistic profit-seeking motives, but he reveals also that changes are made gradually and despite long-standing miners' traditions (culture patterns). The union opposition to such short-cuts to production arises out of the inertia of habit, the feeling of "rights" to certain methods of production, and the whole in-group attitude of the miners toward their work.

Nevertheless these alterations are taking place in many once well-unionized industries. Whether this will ultimately weaken the labor organizations and lead to their replacement by individual bargaining or some

¹⁹ H. S. Firestone, "Why We Invested \$7,000,000 in Simplification," *Factory*, 1921, vol. XXVII, 739-43.

²⁰ Cf. *Survey Graphic*, April 1, 1929, for series of articles on unemployment in America brought on by changes in industrial technology.

form of company union, no one knows. The changes are going on with little clear thought of modifications in the life organization and attitudes of workers. The new devices have been adopted to a large extent in non-union fields. Where strong unions have existed, old practices will die hard and new ones be introduced slowly. Without doubt the mechanization of labor is going on at a tremendous rate and with consequences of importance in the final disintegration of skilled trades and a further disappearance of age-long handicraft techniques. As the spinning jenny, power loom and steam-engine changed spinning and weaving, so finally industrial mechanization has reached into the last reserves of personal skill. Only in certain types of work still dependent on personal control, such as railroading and the building trades, do unions remain strong and effective. Wherever machine process can replace human skill, it is bound to do so. Human beings will have to accommodate themselves to these changes.

"A hopeful characteristic of the unskilled miner is his ready surrender to discipline," remarked one coal operator. This is the typical viewpoint of the employing class concerned with profit-making. And the various devices mentioned above—rewards, posters, pace-setting, time studies, bonuses, and simplification processes—put a premium upon docility and obedience to superiors in management. What this will mean ultimately to possible labor organizations or to the personality of the workers, no one can predict.

Along with labor-saving devices, and all the psychological tricks of the personnel managers to secure more production and more contentment from laborers, the company union has been one way to cut under the traditions and controls of the trade union proper. By organizing the workers in factories into groups with representatives who meet the management, with schemes of profit-sharing, grievance committees, and the like, employers hope to improve labor conditions, avoid strikes, and increase production. We have no satisfactory data on the behavior changes which accompany these organizations. But likely enough the contention is sound that foreign-born and ignorant rural laborers who seek factory employment take to this arrangement better than the skilled groups who have trade-union traditions. The trade unions have opposed company unions whenever their own territory has been threatened, but they seem little concerned with their development in fields of labor which are unskilled or semi-skilled and which were never the object of trade-union organizers. More rabid in attitude

than the American Federation of Labor toward company unions, are the communistic labor organizations. An I. W. W. paper made this comment about the Standard Oil Company's plan of company organization:

Standard Oil has inaugurated in these plants what it is pleased to call "The Republic of Labor." This is supposed to give the employees some say in matters of wages through shop representatives. . . . These two [wage] cuts, in addition to the hiring of new men, has caused the delegates to say, "The 'Republic' is a joke." . . . This is the way of Capitalism generally. Whenever it appropriates the ideals of democracy, it makes a joke of them.²¹

The trend toward mechanization still continues, and without reference to personality changes in laborers or managers. Face to face with the crisis of continuation of profits, the employers through their control of the engineering technology are continuing to improve production. What this means for the workers is indicated by the disappearance of skilled trades, the fact that fewer workers are needed in many industries, and a consequent loss of morale on the part of those out of work. Ultimately these changes may bring changes in the birth-rate of the laboring classes. If cheap labor is no longer necessary, there may result a definite practice of limiting the population among the laboring classes as there already has been among the capitalist employers, the managerial forces, and the technical professions. But such alterations depend, in turn, upon new alterations in the social attitudes of large numbers of less intelligent groups of workers toward birth control, toward marriage, and toward religion.

The whole labor situation illustrates very neatly the effect of cultural factors, crises, and personal-social conditioning upon the development of new behavior patterns in individuals. Machine production is definitely a part of our culture, but so are trade unions in many fields of labor. These inevitably come into sharp conflict in the problem of union contracts on working conditions, hours and wages; and these, in turn, reflect back upon the individual worker. Moreover, machine production implies steadiness in work, docility, loss of independence. On the other hand, it means money wages, freedom from considerable responsibility, and in many industries, doubtless, a considerable regularization of employment. While the worker is stripped of his personal relations to his product, he is also freed from obligations of many sorts, and left with more leisure than ever before in

²¹ From *Industrial Unionist*, vol. I, Oct. 25, 1921.

the history of mankind. Automobiles, newspapers, magazines, cheap books, radios, commercialized recreation, even additional educational opportunities for those who wish them, are at hand to make up the emotional balance lost with the disappearance of personal interest in one's product and pride in one's personal skill in production. The whole mechanization of life has made man more objective, more punctual, more thrifty, more externalized; it has put a premium on extroverted activities and considerably affected art and recreation. On the other hand, it has not freed men from day-dreaming, or from other associations and behavior of autistic nature. Religion, both formal and informal, continues to affect a balance. And the mystery of "BIG BUSINESS," "BIG CITIES," "BIG NATIONS," "UNIVERSAL EDUCATION" always intrigues our imagination. Fashions, fads, crowd behavior, and other forms of collectivism are perhaps an offset to a certain earlier individualism in the worker whose life was once integrated around his family, his neighborhood, and a skilled occupation.

—c. *The Professional Classes.*—In economic status the professional groups stand between the laboring classes and the employers. These groups comprise doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, research scientists, and ministers. As a rule these groups feel themselves more akin to the capitalist group than to the laborers. Their previous training and occupations throw them into more intimate contact with the capitalist class. Consequently they tend to accept the standards of the latter in preference to the ideology of the labor groups, especially those which have radical economic-political implications. Some of the professions have much more class consciousness than others. Certain ones have very definite codes of behavior, some of which are actually embodied in law. Others are loosely organized and, while they possess traditions of sorts, they are not highly institutionalized.

(i) *The Medical Profession.*—The doctor belongs to the most definitely institutionalized professional group of all. He must undergo, first of all, a very rigid and extended technical preparation, which is highly standardized the country over. Secondly, the American Medical Association, with which are affiliated various state and local associations, constitutes a type of professional union or guild. This organization has a definite code of ethics and rigid rules which it attempts to enforce. The association is a completely closed corporation. Members are admitted only upon completion of standard medical courses and the procurement of a license to practice granted by the various states. The association fosters legislation favor-

able to itself. By influencing public opinion and legal measures it attempts to drive out quackery, pseudo-medicine, and the sale of nostrums. All healing arts not within the limits of medicine and surgery are taboo.

On the economic side the theory of individual competition is in vogue. To enforce this competition, there exist definite folkways. Open advertising for practice is opposed, as are assisting in illegal operations or giving advice which is legally or even socially taboo. In recent years efforts have been made to break down the individualistic attitudes among doctors and to "socialize" the profession. But the development of demonstration and free clinics by such organizations as the Milbank and Rosenwald Foundations are frowned upon and openly opposed by the profession. So, too, the spread of further functions of public health medicine meets vigorous resistance. Most members of the association do not seem particularly enthusiastic over these newer developments. Subsidized medicine and "State Medicine" are attacked as paternalistic or socialistic. Such activities threaten prevalent vested interests in medicine and surgery. Public clinics and public health organizations produce competition where it is least wanted. The whole issue was clearly focused in the case of Dr. Louis E. Schmidt, who as head of the Public Health Institute in Cook County, Illinois, had given medical service at about one-third less than customary cost to considerable numbers of people of the lower income groups. Dr. Schmidt was ousted from the Chicago Medical Society and was about to be dropped from the American Medical Association. He thus defended his activities:

We cannot make all doctors rich by forming a trade union. . . . Ours is a profession, not a trade. . . . The time will come when both the profession and the public will be better served. If we organize to bring the cost of hospital, laboratory, and medical care within the purse of all that great majority of our people known as the middle classes, all reputable, capable physicians will prosper greatly. Such a plan will take the business of meeting the health problems of these people with small incomes away from the quacks, charlatans, and patent-medicine vendors, who now prey upon a public which has no other place to turn. The millions of dollars now given to these disreputable quacks will then be given to medical men. Honest, ethical physicians will be treating these thousands of sick people, because the cost of that treatment will be lowered, and because we shall find the means, by ethical advertising, to lead them away from the quacks and to our profession.

He pointed out that the Illinois Social Hygiene League, of which he is president and chief medical officer, is a charitable institution which gives

free treatments to the poor. But the Society opposed his connection with an organization offering service at low costs to people of small incomes. He continued:

Through our connections with the Public Health Institute we have been able to increase our efficiency many-fold. . . . Must I stop work because the Public Health Institution, through its lay trustees, advertises the perils of venereal disease? I cannot do it. I ask that you councilors of the Chicago Medical Society recognize my position as ethical and that you here and now launch the movement which will bring the great art of medicine within the reach of the masses.²²

The militant attitude of the Chicago Medical Society was displayed when it dropped Dr. Schmidt without permitting him a full trial before the whole organization. This particular episode illustrates both conflict within a closed corporation itself in an effort to maintain or to alter ancient formulas, and the relation of such an organization to other groups in the community. But such controversies are bound to arouse public opinion. If community opinion insists upon alterations in practice, ultimately new attitudes will ensue, just as, by analogy, public opinion about capitalist monopolies has changed in the last half-century. Modifications in institutional form bring changes in the habits and attitudes of persons working within the framework. In the medical profession particularly, the force of tradition remains very strong, yet the individualistic values, if opinion continues to insist, will finally give way.

(ii) *The Legal Profession.* The lawyers also have their associations. These attempt to set up standards of preparation, to establish codes of professional conduct, and to influence the laws which control these codes. To-day the lawyer must pass a state bar examination before he can practice, but the law, for the most part, has little else to say about his preparation. Possible disbarment for illegal practice is a threat against malpractice. The present efforts to purge the legal profession of the "shyster" who chases after ambulances illustrate the professional pressure exerted on certain members of the group by fellow-members.

As the doctor out of his training develops a particular manner of viewing human life and disease, so the legal practitioner takes on the manners of

²² Quoted by F. Babcock, "Shall Doctors' Fees be Lowered?" *Nation*, vol. CXXVIII, 1929, p. 502. The Public Health Institute, operated as a corporation without profits, treats cases of venereal disease. The lay board is made up of men of wealth and prestige in Chicago.

his profession. His mind tends to run to the forms and practices of the law of the past. He views the universe through his particular set of ideas, attitudes, and occupational habits. The judge on the bench, moreover, often develops views distinctly different from those of the corporation or criminal lawyer who pleads a case before him. This is abundantly illustrated by the criticisms of criminal lawyers found in Judge Kavanagh's book, *The Criminal and His Allies*. Judge Kavanagh lays upon the practicing lawyers in our courts much blame for delays and evasions in criminal justice.

The legal profession has played a distinctive rôle in our political life. Doctors or ministers seldom get into our legislative halls. The lawyer is directly concerned with the legal formulations which make up so much of present social control, and inevitably he comes closer to many other phases of our group life today than do doctors or engineers. Customarily he soon develops attitudes of superiority and importance that affect the direction his personality takes. To him the law seems the bulwark of the political state, the economic order, and the public morals. The legally-trained person inclines toward conservatism and caution. He is suspicious of rapid change and tends to rest his thinking rather upon precedent than upon promises of future improvement.

(iii) *The Engineering Profession*.—The engineers lack the social solidarity of the doctors and lawyers. The type of their work is more diffuse, and newer upon the economic horizon. They are much more directly dependent upon the captains of industry for their support. Yet both the state and the economic needs demand of the engineers certain professional codes and practices. For instance, building codes, laws providing for safety-devices in industry, and the economic demands for suitable materials and construction, all force standardized forms upon the engineers, aside from the merely technical problems involved.

Like the members of other groups, the engineer, with his severe training in the material sciences, develops distinctive attitudes toward his work. He is inclined to be mechanistic, analytical, and extremely objective. But more interesting than this is the fact that his close connection with the capitalist system gives him distinctly the employers' views toward labor, wealth, and the profit-seeking motivation. He leans toward conservatism in economic and political theory. He is apt to look upon common labor as he does upon the material used in construction. In his incisive analysis, *The Engineers and the Price System* (1921), Veblen gives an intensely

interesting account of the attitudes customarily found in the engineer.

(iv) *The Teaching Profession*.—Teachers are not so well organized as are the doctors, lawyers, and engineers. From kindergarten through university they are, in large part, employees of the state and are subject to regulations of a somewhat different sort than are other groups. Even teachers connected with privately endowed institutions cannot escape from the folkways laid down about their work. If formerly teachers constituted a guild not only for instruction but for determination of policy and for general administrative control, this power has now been lost, at least in the United States. The teacher today, whether of university, college, high school, or elementary school, has no such independent status in the community as has the doctor, lawyer, or engineer.

It is true that there exist organizations such as the National Educational Association and the affiliated state associations, which try to foster a spirit of professionalism among teachers, but they have never become a serious threat to the general system of control. The American Association of University Professors, quite restricted in its membership and function, has had but little direct effect upon administrative policies. Only in rare cases has it influenced public opinion and, through this means, the administration of colleges and universities. With few exceptions the more purely labor organizations, like teachers' unions, are not regarded favorably by the teachers themselves. The teachers of this country have developed little class consciousness. As J. E. Kirkpatrick remarked in *The American College and Its Rulers* (1927), "American teachers are more like a mass of unorganized laborers than a self-respecting and responsible guild or profession." They develop no attitudes of the superiority of their calling as a profession. The public confirms their low opinion of themselves by continuing to regard the teacher as an inferior person. The teacher is not so important in the economic-political life of our time as the successful business man, lawyer, doctor, or engineer. Most teachers feel a sense of inferiority in the presence of a man successful in business or in one of the professions. This may not be true of men famous for research or writing or in educational administration, but it is not to be denied that the usual run of teachers from elementary school to university develop a sense of inferiority in the face of culture standards which emphasize monetary success, business acumen, and "go-getting" attitudes and habits. Some, it is true, may compensate by flight into the alleged superiorities of learning,

but at heart most of these persons feel themselves a little outside the pale of the primarily successful of this world.

The situation is at its worst among the elementary school teachers. Here the rather inadequate training and the rapid turnover in positions due to marriage and mobility make it difficult for the teachers to develop any common attitudes looking toward professional organization. Either by the direct pressure of quasi-legal rulings, or by direct or indirect dismissal, attempts of teachers to affiliate with the American Federation of Labor are blocked. In the end this simply means that the teacher is considered an unorganized laborer working in a system of individual bargaining. Whereas in medicine, law, and engineering, the members of the profession determine in large measure their own standards of fitness, the community or the legal authorities—boards of trustees and superintendents, for the most part—determine the standards of teaching proficiency. There are certain minima set down in law as preparation for elementary and high school teachers, and other essentials are established by custom and precedent in colleges and universities. But aside from these few social controls, the economic security of teachers rests absolutely with the employers.

All school authorities demand that their teachers conform to the manners and mores of the community. Communities under the political domination of Protestant churches pay much attention to the religious affiliations of prospective teachers. Where the Catholics have considerable influence, they demand that teachers of their faith be given places in the school system. In many communities Jews are tacitly denied places as teachers.

C. A., who had already made a good reputation as a scientist, at the completion of his doctorate was under consideration by a department chairman for a good position in a large middle-western university. When it was discovered that C. A. was Jewish, he was immediately denied further consideration. The department chairman had no prejudice against Jews, but he had learned that he could never get any Jew, no matter how able, accepted by the dean, president, and board of regents. After a few years teaching in mediocre institutions, C. A. went into administrative work for a Jewish social agency.

Such cases could be multiplied by the hundreds. Not only religious but political affiliations are taken into account. Socialists are not successful in breaking into our higher educational institutions, and if they get into

elementary or high school work and are discovered, they are usually removed. The taboo against socialists in educational institutions is universal in this country—a fact which educated Europeans are often at a loss to understand.

In the absence of any effective organization of teachers to secure for themselves a voice in determining the conditions of their employment, community taboos of various kinds are enforced by the school authorities. Where dancing is forbidden by community standards, teachers are not permitted to dance. Of course this is also true of smoking, bobbing hair, wearing short skirts, and the like. In a small village along the seacoast of North Carolina, in addition to the usual stipulations about certification, etc., the teacher must agree to the following:

I promise to take a vital interest in all phases of Sunday-school work, donating of my time, service, and money without stint for the uplift and benefit of the community.

I promise to abstain from all dancing, immodest dressing, and any other conduct unbecoming a teacher and a lady.

I promise not to go out with any young men except in so far as it may be necessary to stimulate Sunday-school work.

I promise not to fall in love, to become engaged or secretly married.

I promise not to encourage or tolerate the least familiarity on the part of any of my boy pupils.

I promise to sleep at least eight hours a night, to eat carefully, and to take every precaution to keep in the best of health and spirits, in order that I may be better able to render efficient service to my pupils.

I promise to remember that I owe a duty to the townspeople who are paying me my wages, that I owe respect to the school board and the superintendent that hired me, and that I shall consider myself at all times the willing servant of the school board and the townspeople.²³

While this is perhaps an extreme case, there are hundreds of places where identical restrictions are insisted upon even though they are not fixed in the written contract. There is throughout a great hangover of the theological tradition of the past. The teacher is to be the repressive moral and religious caretaker of the children under his care. This attitude is as prevalent in higher as in elementary education. The writer knows of a number of cases where by supervised dances, parties, and other extra-

²³ Quoted by T. Minehan, "The Teacher Goes Job-Hunting," *Nation*, 1927, vol. CXXIV, p. 606.

curricular activities, high school teachers and principals have attempted to inject some positive devices into socially and morally disintegrated schools, only to be stopped by the entrenched school boards backed up by conservative public opinion. The high school students of a certain small town often escaped into larger nearby towns for public dances, and in general there was notoriously a good deal of loose conduct among them. The principal attempted to convince the school board of the need for some supervised recreation for the high school boys and girls to offset these practices. The leading school trustee was obdurate. "I danced when I was young and I know how bad it is. So long as I am president of this school board I am against dancing in this community," was his only comment.

This community control reaches into the very subject matter of teaching. The taboo on the teaching of biological evolution is still prevalent in large areas of our country. Not many centuries ago a leading church put pressure upon men of science for teaching what was considered "false doctrine" concerning the planets. Today some communities repeat the process of repression. Now they wish to repress the teaching of the natural history of man. The following quotations show how a shift of content may occur with no essential alteration in the standpoint of the conservative elements in control of education. The first section quotes part of the charge against Galileo in 1633; the second is a part of the indictment against Scopes in 1925.

Whereas, you, Galileo, son of the late Vincenzo Galileo of Florence, aged seventy years, were denounced in 1615 to the Holy Office for holding as true the false doctrine taught by many—namely, that the sun is immovable in the centre of the world and that the earth moves and also with a diurnal motion; also for having pupils whom you instructed in the same opinions; also for maintaining a correspondence with some German mathematicians; also for publishing certain letters on the solar spots in which you developed the same doctrine as truth; also for answering the objections which were continually produced from the Holy Scriptures by glozing the said Scriptures according to your own meaning; and whereas thereupon was produced a copy of a writing in form of a letter confessedly written by you to a person formerly your pupil, in which, following the hypothesis of Copernicus, you include several propositions contrary to the true sense and authority of the Holy Scripture.

Therefore, this holy tribunal, being desirous of providing against the disorder and mischief thence proceeding and increasing to the detriment of the holy faith, etc., etc.

The proposition that the sun is the centre of the world and immovable from

its place is absurd philosophically, false and formally heretical because it is expressly contrary to the Holy Scriptures.

The proposition that the earth is not the centre of the world nor immovable but that it moves also with a diurnal motion is also absurd philosophically considered, at least, erroneous in faith.

That John Thomas Scopes, heretofore on the 24th day of April, 1925, did unlawfully teach in the public schools of Rhea County, Tennessee, which said public schools are supported in part and in whole by public school fund of the state, certain theory and theories that deny the story of the Divine Creation of Man as taught in the Bible, and did teach instead thereof that man has descended from a lower order of animals, he, the said John Thomas Scopes being at the time, and prior thereto, a teacher in the public schools of Rhea County, Tennessee, aforesaid, against the peace and dignity of the state.

Both of these quotations reveal, on the part of the dominant authorities, fear of the change in the ideas and mores which may result from the alleged heretical teachings.

No subject is more taboo in this country than that of sex. Not only is the personal conduct of teachers and students carefully guarded by authorities, but the discussion of sex problems as a part of the curriculum is frowned upon or else definitely tabooed. Cases of this are apparent everywhere. A short time ago a middle-western university dismissed several professors because they attempted to make a study of current sex practices and of opinions on changing sex mores among the students.

Similar inhibitions exist to prevent discussion of economic and political problems. Instances might be cited where pressure has been brought upon professors for too frank discussion of taxation of corporations powerful in particular states, or for attempting to treat objectively current political problems. Wherever there is crisis or conflict of opinion, there are difficulties for the teacher if he essays to treat these matters frankly and scientifically. It is quite proper for students of economics to write theses exposing the inner workings of the financial system of the Fuggers in the sixteenth century, but to treat problems of contemporary life may lead to external pressure. There is no doubt, as Sumner once wrote, that if physics or chemistry came into conflict with present-day mores, we would develop an orthodoxy about them as truly as we have about matters of politics or economics.

The situation is such that only those teachers succeed who conform to the community or institutional folkways. Teachers almost universally are docile, timid, and conservative; and comply readily with their employers' wishes. It is not surprising that teachers feel inferior, and that they are recruited from persons lacking in forcefulness and courage. The situation is changing in the more alert communities and institutions of higher learning, but for the country as a whole the teaching profession reflects rather than leads the community standards. The conservative theological and economic-political forces dominate the school organization and the teachers remain for the most part without any significant group organization or class consciousness.

The picture, however, is not altogether a dark one. With the development of newer techniques of teaching, with the rise of faith in a possible contribution of the social sciences and the humanities to contemporary life, there will develop a greater degree of tolerance. Whether we shall arrive at the universal faith of those who hope that the school, through its teachers, may come to lead the way in social change, it is impossible to say. Certainly if this day comes, the personality of the instructors will be profoundly altered. If social engineering should take a place with material engineering, a distinct alteration in the life organization of teachers will be in evidence.

v. *The Ministerial Profession.*—Theoretically, the Christian point of view is that of submissiveness, altruism and social service. Like all religions, Christianity makes an appeal on the autistic emotional side of personality. It has always tended to deal in absolutes. The result was that the ministers, in spite of their officially submissive attitudes, actually developed attitudes of superiority and authority. Since they represented "The Truth," they might speak with authority on questions of religious belief and of private and public morals. Attitudes of dominance inevitably became prominent in their patterns of conduct. When interdenominational rivalry was more common than it is now, when churches struggled among themselves for converts and disputed fiercely about doctrinal differences, the attitudes of superiority and authority found expression in these controversies. Today, when aside from the more divergent Protestant sects, there is little such rivalry, these attitudes are directed toward other objects.

Absolutism, the sense of superiority, even conscious submission to authoritarian dogmas of any group, tend to breed a kind of fanaticism.

There seems to be an over-emphasis on certain values. Now all occupational egocentrism runs to exactly this sort of thing, but in religion it looms very large since religious belief occupies such a distinctive place in the formation of human personality. Among the distinctive values of religion is the linking of moral conduct with religious faith. "The New Life" is put on, as the "Old Life" of sin is cast off. Formerly this fanaticism of values found its expression in interchurch rivalry, when each church imagined its set of ethico-religious values to be supreme. Today this naïve vanity has virtually disappeared.

At the present time the sense of solidarity among the churches, especially the Protestant organizations, is stronger than it was formerly. It finds expression in ministerial associations, in various *rapprochements* among the major church institutions which look to concerted action on social-moral issues, such as the suppression of prostitution, dancing, the use of tobacco and drugs, and prohibition of the liquor traffic. Where once the energies of the churches and their leaders were consumed in theological disputations, today there is considerable unification against alleged social evils of all sorts. There is a drive against sin in general and against the "ignorance" and paganism in attitude and habit displayed by non-believers. In some parts of the country there is a concerted effort to control the teaching of science, especially the theories of biological evolution. Elsewhere the church opposes new views on marriage, divorce, and industry, and everywhere it has sought to dominate the schools in these controversies.

As a result of these new directions of attention the ministers of our country have assumed a type of leadership which has done much to enhance their own sense of importance in the communities in which they live. While economically they are much underpaid, partly because of the continuity of Christian notions of the virtues of poverty, their authoritarian position in the field of private and public morals has greatly strengthened their egocentric attitudes. Their concern with contemporary life depends on various factors—traditions of liberalism or conservatism in the church institutions themselves, development of independence of thought on the part of leaders, and differences in the stress laid upon emotional and intellectual attitudes as factors in control of social life, including religious behavior.

The liberal-conservative conflict among ecclesiastics has wide implica-

tions for social values and for individual development. Nearly every major church today has a modernist-fundamentalist split of some sort. With the decay of interdenominational rivalry noted above, the liberals of all churches—Catholic, Protestant and Jewish—are in many respects more closely allied to one another in attitudes and ideas than they are to the conservatives of their own particular organizations. Similarly the conservative members of these various churches have more in common with one another than they have with the modernistic members of their own faiths.

The first of these controversies has to do with matters of theology. To the liberals dogma reflects the cultural changes which are going on outside and inside the church. The coming of higher criticism of the Scriptures, the development of modern science, the rise of capitalistic industry, stimulate a critical examination of dogma, and an attempt is made to recast the theology of the church into new frameworks to fit the changed life and newer points of view. Liberal pastors develop a tolerance of new ideas and institutions. They attempt to interest their congregations in modern social problems. Conservatives, on the other hand, fall back upon authority of scripture and earlier theologians. They fear the new, and build up antagonistic attitudes toward anything which threatens the *status quo*. Not only in dogma, but in attitudes toward present social maladjustments, the liberals attempt to recast the church. Some conservatives insist that the church has no concern with this world. Others attempt to attack social problems, but only through the fiat of repressive laws and precepts. The liberals may join in this attempt, but many of them feel that education, rather than repression, is a more satisfactory means of accomplishing purposeful change. On the whole, the church has been conservative in its attitudes toward industrial problems. A few ministers such as Walter Raushenbush, Harry F. Ward, and John Paul Jones have been semi-socialistic. Others, less radical, have yet emphasized the need of church action to alleviate poverty and to overcome the industrial maladjustments which affect the great mass of workers.

Thus in the ministerial groups we find sharp individual differences in attitudes and habits. It is true that medical men differ in their opinions as to the place of general practitioners and specialists, in regard to public health programs, and so on. Likewise engineers and teachers have varying standards and divergent viewpoints among themselves. But among all of

the professional groups, the ministers undoubtedly differ most markedly among themselves concerning the place of emotional and intellectual attitudes and concerning the direction in which the church should move in the modern world. A part of the present disintegration of the church is thus accounted for. In the present complex world, with its rapidity of change, it is difficult for an institution which deals in supernatural values and in essentially emotional attitudes toward ethical conduct, to find a satisfactory common point of departure. In spite of these divergences, however, so far as the ministers themselves are concerned, they develop a certain *esprit de corps*. They take on certain professional attitudes common to all of them, just as do other occupational groups.

B. *Nature of Occupational Egocentrism.*

We have now reviewed the major economic groupings and noted some of the effects of these groupings upon personality. Occupations set up certain standard ways of behavior which affect the entire life organization of the individual. The workman, the doctor, the lawyer, the employer, the engineer, the teacher, and the minister—each develops certain egocentric notions about the importance of his occupation. Definite attitudes and habits are laid down from which they can not escape.

Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and the deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing. Already at the age of twenty-five you see the professional mannerism settling down on the young commercial traveller, on the young doctor, on the young minister, on the counsellor-at-law. You see the little lines of cleavage running through the character, the tricks of thought, the prejudices, the ways of the "shop," in a word, from which the man can by-and-by no more escape than his coat-sleeve can suddenly fall into a new set of folds. On the whole, it is best he should not escape. It is well for the world that

in most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again.²⁴

These lines of cleavage between the occupations we may designate, following Bogardus, as forms of "occupational distance." This means "the degree of sympathetic understanding existing between the members of any two occupations." There are two kinds of occupational distance: vertical and horizontal. The former indicates the differences in prestige accorded by cultural norms to members of various occupations; the latter indicates the lack of sympathetic understanding between occupations of similar or near-similar status because of the differences in background and training of the members of the two occupations. Bogardus devised a scoring scheme for measuring in terms of social distance the reactions of people to various occupations. In one study among 861 college students, it was found that persons preparing for teaching and the ministry "reacted against motion picture actors, vaudeville actors and jazz musicians, on the ground that these occupations were socially detrimental." In contrast, commerce and dentistry students reacted to these same occupations favorably because they "add zest to life." Thus, vertical distances between occupations are related to the prestige and social status which occupations possess among persons outside the particular groups. As Bogardus points out, there is a kind of occupational mobility which affects the status of occupations. For example, aviation seems to be rising, whereas it may be true that acting is declining slightly in the scale of prestige.

Differences in training, in knowledge, in methods of work, produce horizontal occupational distance. Thus doctors and lawyers are horizontally separated.

Their [doctors'] professional bearing notably is quiet and thoughtful. . . . Their patients are not ordinarily in a mood or attitude to be able to weigh properly a doctor's words. Speech is therefore dangerous, and the doctor discreetly abstains from talk or uses it quite sparingly. A grave manner is almost as essential to a physician as to an undertaker. People do not like to have their ills dealt with lightly. The doctor therefore gains prestige by the mysteriousness of his silent gravity. Lawyers, to the contrary, live their lives in words.

It is only when lawyers and doctors get into the same social circles that this difference in their arts creates conflict between them. . . . As professions they

²⁴ W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. I, p. 121. Courtesy of Henry Holt and Company.

have little contact. As human beings in society they meet and because their professions have become their very natures, and are such different natures, they understand each other with difficulty. The doctor is incensed by the noisy manners of the lawyer; this is most trying to the physician's reserved dignity. If he cannot maintain silent contempt, he may with cynical disgust bestow the appellation of "windbag" upon the verbose advocate, of which the latter, if not unaware of the owlish fluff of the medical man, is self-satisfiedly tolerant.

For geniality also the doctor is more agreeably known. His profession idealizes gentle, kindly demeanor. He soothes his patients. All the arts of pleasantness are appurtenant to the practice of his skills. . . . It is not by these wiles that the lawyer gains his professional ends. His truer part is mandatory, aggressive, disputative.²⁵

Mr. Briggs goes on to say that lawyers tend to be conventional in their maintenance of legal and customary morality. Doctors, in contrast, are likely to be more tolerant of persons whose moral conduct differs from the cultural norms.

The lawyer's work touches public life at many points. His occupation leads him into many divergent phases of economic, political, and social activities. He has contacts with business men, engineers, lawmakers, and the organized community life. He is more closely affiliated with particular groups than is the physician or surgeon. There are labor union attorneys, corporation lawyers, criminal lawyers, and so on. The doctor, for the most part, inclines to be individualistic. He works largely alone. He seldom attaches himself directly to any single economic group.

It is thus apparent that horizontal distance is made by the relations of occupations to other groups as well as by the relations of the group members with each other. Vertical distance is created by the wider, cultural-social scale of occupations considered in themselves. Horizontal distance is made by contacts of similar or near-similar occupations with each other outside their specialties and by their social relations with still other groups.

Occupational distance, both vertical and horizontal, is partly explained by culture differences. A profession and an unskilled occupation are especially different in preparatory requirements, in educational standards, in vocabulary, and in mental vision. The occupations can be arranged on a scale of increasing complexity of culture traits. *Occupational distance varies directly with the com-*

²⁵ A. E. Briggs, "Social Distance Between Lawyers and Doctors," *Sociology and Social Research*, 1928 vol. XIII, pp. 160-61. The writer of the article is an attorney. He describes general differences. Individual doctors and lawyers vary among themselves in many of the traits.

plexity of the culture traits of the respective occupations. The more complex the culture traits of an occupation the greater the vertical distance between itself and the occupations with less complex cultures.

Occupational distance partially depends on the differences in the *functional* activity of the respective occupations. The dentist, for example, is engaged in a more individualistic occupation than is the minister. He is dealing with individual welfare chiefly, and only indirectly with public affairs. The minister has a larger percentage of public welfare contacts daily. Each develops a unique set of *occupational attitudes and values. Occupational distance varies according to the differences between the sets of occupational attitudes of the given occupations.*²⁸

Definite intra-occupational distances also are noticeable. The skilled workman looks down upon the semi-skilled or unskilled. The college professor tends to be superior to the high school instructor, who, in turn, looks with some disdain upon the elementary school teacher. The corporation lawyer despises the labor union attorney. And so it is in every occupational grouping.

The existence of a scale of occupational social prestige often produces restlessness and uneasiness. A man unsuccessful in one vocation may seek another, in order to improve both his economic and his social status. Thus the shift in occupations from one generation to another, particularly in the attempt to win a better economic status, is clear evidence of the influence of vertical occupational distance in determining our vocational choices.

We have examined in this and the previous chapter certain aspects of secondary group contacts as they affect personality. In the modern world of rapid travel and communication, of increased division of labor, of ever-expanding machine techniques, of universal education and increased leisure, new culture patterns of all sorts are being constructed. We are too much within this process itself to understand fully what is happening. It is doubtful if any of us in the midst of it can view it with complete objectivity; it is all too much a part of us. Yet, without doubt, marked modifications in personality organization are going on under these situations. In fact, such alterations are the psychological counterpart of these very social-cultural changes. New definitions of person-to-person relations are arising. New codes of group interaction are appearing. There is a distinct shift away from primary groups and their standards of social control. These imply

²⁸ E. S. Bogardus, "Occupational Distance," *Sociology and Social Research*, 1928, vol. XIII, pp. 77, 78.

for the individual the existence of new attitudes, habits, and values. Just what these are in all detail we can not say, but in our discussions of leadership, myth-making, prejudice, crowd behavior, and public opinion we shall examine some of these new formulations as they are exposed in personality.

We must again emphasize, however, that it is our group contacts that largely determine the direction of our personality development. Founded upon biological mechanisms reaching back for their beginnings and form into animal ancestry, our life organization is largely fixed for us, in content and direction, by the nature and function of the primary and secondary groups with which we come into contact. Granted that we begin as mechanisms with physiological needs and bodily tensions, these mechanisms are conditional by our personal-social and cultural fields. And with changes in the form and content of our cultural fields, the directions of these physiological processes are necessarily modified.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter XV, nos. 98, 99, pp. 384-87.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises for assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter XV, nos. 1-8, p. 413.
 2. What changes in personality have been produced in the workman by the introduction of machine production?
 3. Are such changes all bad? Discuss.
 4. How do conflicts between employers and laborers reveal the nature of in-group out-group relations? Cite illustrations.
 5. Why have the teachers such a poor sense of social solidarity?
 6. What is occupational distance? Illustrate.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
 1. Report on relation of capitalism to religious formulations. (Cf. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*; Babson, *Religion and Business*; and Siegfried, *America Comes of Age*.)
 2. Study of current business ethics. (Cf. Calkins, *Business the Civilizer*; Williams, *Principles of Social Psychology*; Veblen, *Theory of Business Enterprise*; Sombart, *Quintessence of Capitalism*.)
 3. Relation of engineers and technicians to capitalistic economic order. (Cf. Veblen, *Engineers and the Price System*.)
 4. The rise of sex antagonism in occupations and professions. (Cf. *Survey*

Graphic, Dec. 1926; Pruette, *Women and Leisure*; Goodsell, *Problems of the Family*, Chapter XVII.)

5. Study of influence of occupation on social attitudes in case of farmers. (Cf. Smith, "The Rural Mind: A Study in Occupational Attitude," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1927, vol. XXXII, p. 771-86; Zimmerman and Black, "The Marketing Attitudes of Minnesota Farmers," *University of Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station, Technical Bulletin*, no. 45, December, 1926; Zimmerman, "Types of Farmers' Attitudes," *Social Forces*, 1927, vol. V, pp. 591-96.)
6. Report on Howard, *The Labor Spy*, for techniques to control laborers at work.
7. Report on Taussig, *Inventors and Money Makers*, for the relation of inventors to business men.
8. The Attitudes of the Medical Profession Toward Campaigns for Public Health and Reduced Cost of Medical Care.
9. Report on Chase, *Men and Machines*, for discussion of effects of machine production on modern life.
10. Report on Williams, *What's On the Workers' Mind*, as a study of laborer psychology.
11. Report on Tead, *Human Nature and Management*, for study of interrelations of psychology and industrial leadership.

CHAPTER XV

LEADERSHIP, AUTHORITY, AND PRESTIGE

This chapter deals with the place of dominant personalities in social behavior. The rôle of leaders in society has always provoked argument. "Do Great Men Make History, or Does History Make Great Men?" In the past this question has been endlessly discussed by preparatory school orators, debaters, and serious-minded historians and statesmen. A shift from one view to another often depends upon the popular psychology at the moment. We shall not attempt to solve this real puzzle, but we must expose some of the factors in the interplay of the leader and his followers.

A. Domination and Submission.

1. *The Nature of Leadership.*—Leadership depends on attitudes and habits of domination in a few people and submissive behavior in others. Even in a spontaneous play-group some children tend to dominate the others in regard to what shall be done and how. Of course, we need not imagine that these aggressive traits are necessarily innate. They are frequently the results of conditioning in the family group. However, the fact remains that in every group situation where control is not already standardized in codes and a hierarchy of officers, men and women differ in their tendencies to step forward and "take a lead." It is also evident that although the institutionally-determined superior person may also be a leader, the mere prestige attached to a dominant office in any hierarchy does not necessarily constitute leadership. The boss of a prison chain-gang is not, strictly speaking, a leader, nor is the president of a corporation, the head of a church, or even an elected political officer. To attain true leadership, men of institutional position must be able to enlist interest and to get themselves voluntarily accepted as pace-setters. There have always been outstanding personalities in almost all groups, even in those of the small congenial sort. Among the higher mammals there appear rudimentary

forms of domination, as among wild horses where one stallion will surround himself with a number of mares and colts and will fight off all other stallions. Köhler has shown that some apes seem to dominate others.

Leadership implies definite relations with the masses of persons who are under control. Distinctive leadership often arises out of crises. When people are confronted with a difficult problem involving either the community as a whole or some special group, they always display diverging responses. Among these divergent responses, some will prevail over others as seemingly the wisest and soundest adjustments to the situation. That is, if A expresses one view, B another, and C a third, clusters of people may surround each one. If the group welfare is involved, after discussion, the notions of B, let us say, are agreed upon and followed by all the rest. Those of A and C are suppressed. A crisis, moreover, throws out of gear older methods of meeting problems. In following customary or habitual ways, leadership of a sort may have been firmly established. In the face of new problems this leadership may completely break down. Thus Napoleon appeared apparently at a time when the military leaders of France had failed to meet situations to which they were not accustomed. He succeeded because he could meet difficulties in which other army men had failed. Again, in a pioneer community people find themselves in situations which their older action patterns can not meet, and a new type of leader may arise to organize their impulses into some new and effective group action. It is apparent that the rise of great men in history occurs frequently if not always during crises of some sort—economic, political, social, or religious. For example, religious leaders often obtain large followings in times when the old frameworks of theology and ecclesiasticism seem to be breaking apart. They give direction and form to novel movements and thus re-establish the social equilibrium.

Leadership can never be understood, then, without reference to the social situations in which it arises. Any psychologists who attempt to unravel general traits of leadership without considering the social and cultural circumstances in which leadership arises are guilty of the common and usually fatal error of particularism. Both common sense and experimental observation confirm this. In his study of student leaders in college Cowley has set forth this very point admirably. While he showed that he could by various tests differentiate between leaders and followers, he remarked in summarizing his findings:

The experimentation with these four groups of leaders and followers has proved two things: First, that leaders possess different traits from their followers, and, second, that leaders in these four different situations do not possess even a single trait in common. This amounts briefly to a demonstration of the fact that leadership is a function of a definite situation and that we cannot talk about leadership traits in general but that instead we must talk about leadership traits in particular situations. We must talk about the traits of army leaders, the traits of student leaders, the traits of criminal leaders, the traits of political leaders, and so on always designating the leadership situation. . . . Different situations require different types of leaders with different leadership traits. . . . Endowment and training are but half the story. The other half is the situation. When a well-equipped man meets the proper situation, a leader is produced.¹

2. *Formalization of Authority.*—When leadership is once established, it follows the course of other forms of social conduct and soon begins to crystallize. The rituals of leadership are as well established in fixed societies as are those of other social relations. What the leader may or may not do is determined by all sorts of formalistic arrangements. Thus institutionalized headship, or organized authority, is not a free, easy, and unlicensed control over other persons, but is limited and conditioned by surrounding and contributing forces. Even in the despotisms of ancient history the prime authority was frequently held in check by superstitions, religious practices, and priestly classes, which were sometimes more powerful than the official authority itself. The power of old beliefs and practices is readily illustrated. In the XVIII Dynasty in Egypt Ak-Nahton attempted to inaugurate an ethical monotheism far in advance of his time. In spite of his position as Pharaoh, he could not overcome the power of custom operated through the priestcraft, and upon his early death his efforts failed completely. In truth so completely was his work undone by his opponents that only modern archeological discoveries have made us aware of his noble ambition.

Nevertheless organized authority, though limited, becomes an important part of the life of organized groups. Institutional leaders are often the carriers and enforcers both of the mores and of the non-moral folkways of the group. Around them prestige grows up.

Authority has a part even in those fashions and conventions which do not involve moral censure. Certain individuals become the arbiters of

¹ W. H. Cowley, "Three Distinctions in the Study of Leaders," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1928, vol. XXIII, pp. 151, 153.

fashion and are looked up to and expected to fulfil their allotted and prescribed functions. Even here, however, a leader can not without cost overstep the bounds set by the culture patterns. Peter the Great once ordered all his male subjects to shave off their beards. Although he imposed fines and inflicted punishments, the notion of wearing beards was so deeply embedded in the conventions of the Russians that his edict only aroused resentment in the masses and it was soon forgotten as unenforceable. Compliance under duress did not alter the fundamental *rationale* in any way whatsoever. Many men of authority have run against the stone wall of custom in the same manner. Sometimes shifts in authority take place because attempts are made to alter conditions too rapidly. The inertia of the folkways makes rapid change difficult.

There is specialization in authority. This is true even in relatively primitive groups. Wherever there is but rudimentary division of social functions there is likely to be also the beginning, at least, of division of headship. Spencer attributed the origin of the professions among the primitive peoples to the medicine man. The warrior-chieftain, the early scientist, the teacher, the philosopher, the musician, the judge, and the historian, he thought were merely off-shoots of this original authority. This thesis is implicitly related to Spencer's theory of the ghost origin of worship, a theory open to considerable criticism. Granting that religious organization and the existence of a political-military organization may have played some part in the entire process of leadership, Thomas makes the following pertinent criticism of Spencer:

With the division of labor incident to a growing society, and the consequent increasing irksomeness of labor, particularly of "hard labor," there are always at hand a large number of men to do the less irksome work. . . . But their development must be regarded as a phase of the division of labor, dependent on economic conditions rather than on the presence in society of any particular set of individuals or any peculiar psychic attitude of this set.²

As our social structure becomes more and more complex, specialization of authority increases. Today the authorities about us—political, military, economic, religious, artistic, and scientific—are anything but "Jacks-of-All-

² W. I. Thomas, *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, First Series, vol. IV. Reprinted in *Source Book for Social Origins*, 1909, pp. 302-03. Courtesy of R. G. Badger Company.

Trades." As certain types of human functioning diverge from others, new types of authority over these particular areas of function arise.

Yet in spite of specialization in many fields, at least in social relations authority tends to carry over from one position to another. This is apparently due to two factors. First, because of tradition we tend to attribute general power to a man aside from his own specialty. For example, in the post-war days of 1918-1920 Russia was an object of much curiosity and interest in Western Europe and America. The whole Communist Revolution was something of a puzzle to the rest of the world. Naturally all sorts of questions arose about Russia and her future, and the answers to these questions nicely illustrate our principle of the carry-over of authority. Men who had been collectors of folk-lore in Russia descanted on her economic problems. Engineers who had made casual visits there explained away the Marxian ideology. Artists and travelers over night became experts in her political organization. Prominent bankers, who had never been near Russia, discoursed at length upon her economic and political fallacies. But we need not go so far from home. Every engineer, doctor, professor, or business man tends to be regarded as an expert in the whole field of human relations.

In the relation of the scientist and the community the powerful factor of prestige comes into play. Men recognized in their own fields are under the constant temptation to offer their advice on the world in general. This arises primarily from the psychological effects of felt-recognition. The seeds grow rapidly in every one to speak as one having authority. Secondly, the populace, encouraged by the press, looks upon the man of science as a present-day miracle and magic worker. A headline reporting the lecture of a psychologist on abnormal behavior is likely to phrase it in terms of the occult and the mysterious. Sumner pointed out how quickly the masses retouch the scientific notions to suit their own mental set. In view of this the newspapers and their clientele are apt to turn to the men of science in a given community for opinions, not only in their own fields, which are often too remote or abstruse for the ordinary person to grasp, but frequently on matters of the day. Some men of reputation unfortunately take the slight place of newspaper notice too gravely. It means recognition in one's own neighborhood, a thing few scientists have or should much concern themselves with. The social pressure is effective. As a consequence we find Professor X, a specialist in a remote branch of natural science, quoted in the papers for opinions on prohibition, Bolshevism, and Margaret Sanger.

Examples could be multiplied. In the social sciences the danger is peculiarly

present, since every citizen, in this country, at least, considers it almost a duty, if not a right, to speak on every conceivable subject which touches the body politic. Hence a natural scientist or an engineer may regale a business men's club with a discussion on rural economics, on the errors of proportional representation or in defense of the Open-Shop. Some wonder when a professional politician makes an unscientific analysis of an international banking situation, but they marvel more when a natural scientist, say, speaks with arrogant authority on social questions.

In short, there is a common tendency to universalize authority, both among the followers and by the assumption of authority by experts, executives, religious, political and military leaders. The mass of mankind desires an element of omniscience in its authorities. The populace demands an "all or none" principle. It protects them from doing any thinking for themselves. All that is needed is reference to authority to settle doubtful questions.³

3. *The Overlapping of Authority and Leadership.*—It appears from actual experience that leadership or authority does transfer itself from one set of group relations to another. Chapin points out that community leaders, say, in education, are inclined to be leaders in religious groups and in social reform movements. We see this sort of thing everywhere. It is often said that if we wish to start a program or new movement, we do not go to people who have nothing to do. We turn to busy executives in other fields who have the drive and technique to handle people and situations. If we canvass our more prominent friends, we often find them occupied with movements of all sorts aside from their own specialties.

Under the direction of the writer a study of the overlapping of leadership was made in a city of 50,000 inhabitants. Seventy prominent business and professional men were interviewed in an effort to discover the spread of their activities outside their own specialties. There were thirty-six business men and thirty-four professional men in all. In the business group were insurance men, bankers, merchants, contractors, real estate operators, automobile dealers, and a small miscellaneous group. The professional group included ministers, lawyers, doctors, and professors in a well-known university. The results indicated clearly that among these groups there was a considerable spread of leadership into groups other than those to which they were attached by their major vocation. The extra-occupational leadership of both business and professional men ran largely to civic and social clubs. Moreover, in both groups a number of men were working in nearly

³ K. Young, "The Need of Integration of Attitudes Among Scientists," *Scientific Monthly*, 1924, vol. XVIII, pp. 299-300.

related fields. This is less frequent among professional people, since their major calling is much more definitely and narrowly specialized. While the results are tentative we may quote from the summary of this study:

The business men have an average of about one other business interest beside their main one; they hold nearly one office each, and they spend two and two-thirds hours a month in this way. They average one and one-third organizations, hold one and one-half offices, and average three and a third hours in these organizations. The business men are actively interested in two and a half civic activities, hold two and a fourth offices, and spend slightly over seven hours a month with them. They belong to two and a half clubs and lodges, average one office each, and spend over nine and a fourth hours a month with them.

The professional men are interested in slightly less than one outside business, average two-thirds of an office, and spend four and a fourth hours a month with these businesses. They average three and one-tenth societies and associations, hold somewhat less than one office apiece, and spend three and one-tenth hours with them. They participate in one and three-fourths civic activities, hold one and one-fourth offices and give four and one-fourth hours a month to them. The professional men average one and one-half social activities, hold less than one office each and spend slightly over four hours a month with them.

The business men are engaged in a slightly higher per cent of outside businesses than the professional men. The same statement is true as to the offices held, but the professional men seem to spend over two hours a month more with their outside businesses than the business men. This last statement cannot be taken as entirely true because of the absence of some of the data. The professional men belong to nearly two more organizations than the business men. They do not, however, hold as many offices. Both groups spend about an equal amount of time with their organizations. That the business men contribute somewhat more to civic activities is shown by their average of two and a half activities as against the professional men's one and three-quarters. Both groups hold a slightly smaller ratio of offices. While the business men spend nearly eight hours a month with civic activities, the professional men spend a little over four. The professional men average only one and a half social activities to the business men's two and a half. While they hold only slightly less offices than the business men, the latter spend over twice as much time a month with their social activities.

It is a rather significant fact that the business men studied are spending one day a month on civic activities, exclusive of all campaigns and irregular meetings which unfortunately could not be measured. They are likewise spending somewhat over a day a month with their social activities. The professional men are spending about a day a month on these two combined activities. As we have no definite standard, we cannot say how these figures compare with those for other men, but they would seem to show rather conclusively that the most suc-

cessful men of these two groups are contributing a great deal to the social and civic life of the community. This statement is further borne out by the close correlation of their activities and the number of offices held in these same activities.

When we compare the individual histories of the various men, we can see what a range of influence there is within the group. There are some men like B2 who believe that one of the glaring faults of our civilization is over-organization and consequently have kept themselves aloof from all entanglements. There are others like B4 who spends thirty-seven hours a month on civic activities alone.⁴

The subject of the overlapping of leadership in group activities needs further investigation. It may be that a spread of leadership occurs only in certain situations.

B. *The Psychology of Leadership.*

Though the psychology of domination and submission has not yet been adequately studied, we may profitably examine some of its aspects.

1. *Individual Differences and Leadership.*—At the outset we must recognize the importance of individual variation, not merely in native or acquired intelligence, but in the whole range of physical, emotional, and social variability. Often a prevailing social status may afford opportunity for leadership not otherwise at hand. In situations involving the solution of intellectual problems doubtless formal intelligence is correlated with leadership. In other situations another type of intelligence and a different organization of attitudes and habits are necessary. In his *Inventors and Money Makers* (1915), Taussig points out that though inventors furnish new ideas, business men seem necessary to market them and put them to practical use in our industrial society. Occasionally an inventor is also clever at marketing his wares. As a rule, however, it seems that they lack ability, training, or the necessary interest to correlate their inventiveness with the business principle of profit-making.

In another social dimension, physical force may be important. This is evident where physical strength is essential as in construction work, timbering, and much common labor. The control of men in these occupations demands some brute power. This strength of physique appears also in executive control in police work and fire protection. Gowin has shown

⁴ Olive Hoyt Smith, *A Study of Overlapping of Leadership in Business and Professional Groups*, B.A. thesis, 1929, University of Wisconsin Library.

that police and fire chiefs rank higher than the average man in weight and height.

In other occupations such physical differences probably count for much less. Where men have to impress other men in face-to-face contact, size and strength are factors of importance in producing prestige and control. Other qualities, of course, are necessary in all of these cases, because mere brute strength without intelligence would soon fail.

Emotion and feeling may be distinctly important in the development of leadership in the arts. But emotional drive seems to be significant in executive leadership, too, though perhaps it is of a somewhat different sort. Often mere intellectual cleverness does not succeed in competition with less intellectual ability supported by emotional forcefulness.

Evidently it is not only difficult but unwise to try to bring within absolute categories common mental or personality traits for all leaders. With the division of labor and individual divergences in life organization, the personality of leaders must vary as the situations in which they find themselves differ. In view of the conditioning which circumstances always put upon traits of leadership, our generalization is at best tentative. However, various writers have dealt with the problem, and their reflections deserve some attention. Certainly even a casual study of leadership leads almost inevitably to some rudimentary generalizations.

Leadership, in whatever field, is marked by what we may call positive characteristics, that is, strength and forwardness. Personal leadership means firm and even aggressive reactions toward other persons. Leadership is also found in the inventor, artist, scientist, or philosopher who deals with materials, physical forces, or abstract ideas in a constructive manner. In any case there is the sense of power in the leader, arising from his awareness of capacity and his being constantly bolstered up by his audience.

2. *Social-Culture Conditioning in Leadership.*—Leadership is not static. Its traits are not fixed: they change as the confronting situation changes. Even where it has become formalized, leadership is essentially dynamic. It rests, for the person, fundamentally on the expansion of the self-assertive or ego trends. It is difficult to determine the factors which lie at the basis of ego-expansion or self-assertion. Leadership is more or less a phase of the organization of the entire personality as a unity; it is not to be thought of, as so often it has been, as simply one of a series of instincts or special talents. Rather it is a phase of the whole life organization. At the outset there

are no doubt hunger, thirst, and sex elements in its synthesis. There are also anger and fear, which make the organism so distinctly aware of itself in crises. Stekel has indicated the place of anger in the ego formation. As we noted in discussing the formation of personality, the direction which ego organization takes is determined both by internal factors and by personal-social and cultural conditioning. Certainly family influences of domination or submission play a distinct part in the development of leadership trends. Parents encourage children to display themselves before others. They talk before them of their intelligence, of their leadership qualities. Although its roots may lie in unconscious desires, exhibitionism in many children thus is socially conditioned. Not only the strictly personal-social conditioning of children by parents and relatives, but also such cultural patterns as the traditions of leadership in a family, the picture of long generations of successful men and women in a family—these things affect leadership. In our society social status afforded by wealth or professional prestige plays a considerable rôle. On the other hand, a leader may arise from a family in spite of repressive influences. He may have native impulses so strong as to constitute a drive to offset the inferiority arising from the felt repression by parent, brother, sister, or others. When, for example, a second child appears in a family, the first may develop a certain sense of being left out of things because of the over-attention now showered by the mother, father, relatives, and friends on the new baby. So far as his own life organization is concerned, a child may deal with such a situation in one of two ways. He may retire into the background, ignoring the competitor, or develop a sense of insufficiency, and day-dream of being important. Or he may assume an aggressive, dominating attitude to gain attention and maintain his place as the center of the family. This, of course, is often but the carrying out of his own fantasy of his continued importance. Especially if the child is motor-minded and impulsive, these fantasies simply serve as internal stimuli to his aggressive actions. In the one case, the substitute responses remain covert and out of sight of social groups. In the other, they are openly expressed and become the basis for a new scheme of securing ego-expansion. This is probably what Adler means when he remarks that all persons have some sense of inferiority. With some the substitution remains hidden in the fantasies. In others it becomes overt in compensatory behavior. The intensity of the feeling of inferiority appears to have some correlation with the strength of the trends which are sup-

pressed. For example, it has often been said that Napoleon always suffered from a sense of physical inadequacy, and the intensity of his drive for power over men and material things was itself a kind of rough measure of the depth of his sense of physical inferiority.

It is obvious, of course, that not every overt compensation for inferiority develops into leadership. Other qualities are necessary—intelligence, sympathetic insight, capacity to handle other persons and to meet opportunity. To contend that all leadership arises as compensation would be to fall into a narrow particularistic fallacy. Without doubt there is much sound leadership which is a genuine growth of personal power over men or situations. We do not yet know the psychology of great men, but the leadership of men like Washington, Lincoln, William James, and Einstein does not seem to be the result of compensation for inferiority feelings. This belief may be open to question because we know so little of the internal lives of these men, yet they do stand in contrast with other leaders like Napoleon and Roosevelt who seem to illustrate, at least in part, the overcoming of early feelings of inferiority.

The discussion of the psychology of leadership leads to the question of radical, conservative, and scientific leadership. While again we must bear in mind the caution that leadership traits are understandable only in terms of particular situations in which they appear, it will be worth while to make some general comments on leadership in these three fields.

—3. *Radicalism and Leadership.*—Here we shall treat leadership in social situations which are considered contrary to the mores or, at least, are thought to be destructive of them and the values they represent. Thus anti-social leadership in criminal gangs is one sort of radical leadership. Another is found in those who attack the present political-economic organization of society and attempt to make fundamental changes in it. Still other kinds of radicalism find expression in religious and pseudo-scientific extremists of various sorts.

Thrasher's study of gang life in Chicago reveals certain outstanding features of "natural" leaders. He shows how leadership grows out of gang life itself. The following quotation indicates some of the characteristics of gang leaders:

The chief trait of the natural leader as revealed by the majority of the cases studied is "gameness." He goes where others fear to go. . . . He goes first—ahead of the gang—and the rest feel secure in his presence. Along with this

quality usually goes the ability to think clearly in the excitement of a crisis. . . . He is very often the best fighter, and many times he champions the gang in the face of opposition. Another quality is quickness and firmness of decision. He is a man of action. . . . If later developments prove him mistaken, he uses skill as best he can to explain why the error was made. . . . [He has] the confidence of the group. . . . Other things being equal, the imaginative boy has an excellent chance to become the leader of the gang. . . . He "thinks up things for us to do." . . . The leader of the gang is what he is because in one way or another he is what the boys want. The function of leadership is an inevitable growth out of the conflicts and other activities of the gang. The natural leader is the boy who comes nearest fitting the requirements of this function.⁵

There is little doubt that much of the radicalism of both leaders and followers arises from a combination of earlier social-cultural conditioning and certain emotional characteristics. It is difficult to know whether all radicalism is the result of balked ambitions and thwarted activities, but there is fairly valid evidence that some of it is. Modifying the ideas of Freud and Adler, Parker believed that a great many of the radical labor groups were filled with men and leaders who suffered from the inferiority feelings and blocked desires growing out of twisted childhood and youth. In the ideology of revolutionary radicalism they found release from these inhibitions. So, too, investigations of juvenile delinquents and criminals have led various writers to hold that a good deal of conduct labeled by society as "anti-social" arises in much the same way.

Miss Van Waters has reported a case of leadership among delinquents which not only illustrates certain characteristics of leaders, but shows something of the circumstances which produce attitudes of revolt against society in many of our maladjusted young people. She writes:

The delinquent girl leader has tremendous vitality. As we observe her she seems never to tire and she reports herself as being always "full of pep," "on the go." Her schedule is full of useless activity. Her recreation does not leave her with a feeling of satisfaction. . . . Take Rose, who is a delinquent girl leader of sixteen, wherever she goes, she plans what the crowd of boys and girls does. It is not an organized gang, it is constantly changing. Rose arouses no passionate loyalties, no one trusts her very much, but she has great influence over one girl in particular, Florence. [At home Florence is docile and well-behaved, but under the tutelage of Rose "felt brave" and did things which her parents, the neighborhood and the organized community thought wrong.] . . .

⁵ From *The Gang*, by F. M. Thrasher, pp. 345-46, 347, 349, 357. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1927.

The vigor and boldness [of Rose] held an invincible attraction. Rose had with adults a combination of pleasing manners and rudeness that never failed to open doors. She appeared to know so much about the adult world. She had learned some of its habits, like drinking, smoking and swearing. She was unusually skilled in repartee and knew just what to say to traffic officers, policemen, dance hall proprietors, restaurant keepers, gay young men with cars. No one could silence a shocked neighborhood as quickly as Rose.

Even when Rose's leadership somehow resulted in bringing Florence before the court, Florence felt she had gained more than she had lost. "It was so dull at home. I just felt I must get out whatever happened. I enjoyed getting out at night and I would do the same thing over again only I would be more careful what happened." [Florence came from a respectable family, but one in which there was no family unity, no family recreation, no sense of common adventure and common goal. It was just a mediocre, well-meaning but ignorant group of people.]

Rose's family was quite different. [The father was dead, the mother, herself a foster-child, was a hard-working woman who had let Rose have her own way. The father had never made a very good living. He had come from a home full of quarrelling and trouble. He had been fond of Rose, and it was only after his death that she began to be delinquent. She was truant from school, she stayed long hours away from home, and as an adolescent she became a more serious problem.] Her dress was the shortest and tightest, her lips the reddest of any girl in school.

When teachers remonstrated, the mother said the neighbors "told her things," but she didn't know anything against the girl. Occasionally she beat Rose. The school authorities regarded Rose as a nuisance. She made the other children restless. The principal, an old man, said "that girl ought to have been put in the penitentiary long ago." . . . Before she was fifteen two other groups had repudiated her. She was fired from her job in the five-and-ten-cent store because she wore too much paint, and she was ejected from a church party because she was a "rough-neck."

The mother was exhausted by her work. Rose became a rebel from home and school. She had no responsibility. Her personality took on a certain cheerfulness, optimism, and courage. She had a keen sense of humor. She always shifted the blame to someone else. She was skilled in lying and exaggeration. She would always take a dare. . . .

She could drive any make of car, had amazing skill in thinking up exciting things to do. She took the boys and girls to an old barge anchored in the harbor, planned wienie bakes, taught the young people to give false names and addresses when confronted. She was generous, affectionate, large-hearted, in short a personality remarkably well-adjusted to the needs of her group. She was what we call an "integrated" personality in marked contrast to Florence who was ill at ease, retiring, fearful, unhappy, and "disintegrated." Rose sang well, was an expert swimmer, possessed an inexhaustible fund of dramatic ability, always

imitating, posing and caricaturing. Her popularity was enhanced by her ability to defy adults and by one or two items of newspaper publicity when she ran away. But the thing which made her "crowd" grow was the sinister gossip of the adult neighborhood. A girl who was seen with her instantly became "tough," and the process of exclusion which made Rose a stranger to school, work, church and respectable recreation groups, operated swiftly against the newcomer.

Her own group, however, had its equally effective organ of approval and disapproval, "sissy," "goofy," "teacher's pet," "mama's darling," or "good sport," "jazz-baby," and like terms were the overt expression of a subtle, widespread language which embraced or rejected the young people in search of a good time. Many of them discovered they could not tell the truth and get along with their parents.

Rose's leadership, then, will never be solved by testing her intelligence quotient, which is normal, or studying her health, which is perfect, or analyzing her personality, nor will its effect be ended when Rose goes away to the State school. The deepest forces of social life and family relationships enter into the simplest case of "bad companionship."

One thing may be said for these delinquent leaders. Their leadership is careless, nonchalant, and unpremeditated. They do not want to chairman any meeting for their own aggrandizement nor obstruct committee work because they cannot reap the glory. They lead because of the drabness of their surroundings and their own amazing vitality and play-sense.⁶

Such cases of anti-social leadership among juvenile delinquents could be duplicated over and over again. Like cases are found among adult criminals. They reveal very well a number of factors which enter into this sort of leadership. While many radical, anti-social leaders may be thought "queer" or "pathological" according to moral-medical standards, many of them are exceedingly well integrated to do what they are doing. While the direction of their radicalism may arise from bad homes, disintegrated neighborhoods, and poor opportunities plus certain intellectual and emotional traits, nevertheless, once launched in their careers they are as well suited to their situations as any other leaders.

In a case cited elsewhere by the author,⁷ a young man of excellent social background but with a dominating mother and father left home to become ultimately a successful organizer of the I. W. W. His revolt from authority was carried over into the wider social-cultural situation in which

⁶ M. Van Waters, "The Child Who is a Leader," *Survey*, 1927, vol. LVIII, pp. 498, 499-501.

⁷ Cf. K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, 1927, pp. 354-58.

he later found himself. As a radical, he found outlet for his sympathetic and coöperative attitudes and habits, on the one hand, and in his loyalty to the ideology of the communist revolution, on the other, he found an expression of his revolt from authority and all social-cultural restrictions.

Wolfe in his able and incisive analysis of conservatism and radicalism has pointed out that in both these fields emotional-dogmatic attitudes dominate behavior. On the one hand, there is a strong emotional toning; on the other, an intellectual allegiance to certain ideologies. The leader crystallizes for the followers their own less well integrated desires and ideas. He writes:

Effective leadership and organization, holding the volatile-minded rank and file to a steady program, are supplied by the more persistent temperament of the dogmatic-emotional minds, whose motor and emotional releases are of a less hair-trigger type. Such minds are also given to intense resentments, but their resentment is steadier and often amounts to sustained moral indignation. They are given to personalistic fixation of blame, but they may also have very considerable perception of the non-personal causes of existing evils and obstructions, and may consequently make use of the objective scientific analyses furnished by the relatively disinterested critical intellectuals not engaged in the actual "movement."

In the characteristics of the dogmatic-emotional attitude we have the key to the explanation, as to the requirements, of the actual, effective leadership of radical movements. Most active radical leaders, so far as concerns the movement that claims their major interest and attention, are of this type of mind. It is therefore desirable to review its salient characteristics with some care.

The dogmatic-emotional mind holds to its beliefs, valuations, and "principles" with intense conviction and unswerving loyalty. Its principles may or may not have been arrived at through objective processes of investigation and inductive logic. Its observational and reasoning processes are more or less strongly influenced by its emotional interests, and, while usually biased by them, may be at times aided by them, *e. g.*, by sympathetic insight, where the colder critical intellectual would fail to sense essential realities. In any case, its convictions, once formed, are held to with dogmatic persistency. Argument will not dislodge them. They become the premises of its reasoning, and by emotional attachment are placed beyond the reach of criticism. In the more intense dogmatic-emotional types, convictions are held to with religious devotion. We all know single taxers, socialists, "open shop" propagandists, defenders of the classics, advocates of vocational education, feminists and anti-feminists, high protectionists, eugenists, devoted Christians, and sincere atheists of this type. . . .

When, however, the dogmatic-emotional mind happens to get directed into the radical channel, either because of balked personal interests, or because its

keen sympathy makes the wrongs and obstructed interests of others its own, it attack institutions with vigor equal to that with which the dogmatic conservative defends them, and conceives an equally strong antipathy, expressed in terms of personal blame, toward those who represent and defend the offensive institutions.

Since the dogmatic-emotional radical holds to his principles, be they economic, political, or moral, with religious devotion, it follows that he will not easily be drawn off from the attempt to put them into practice. That is, he reinforces his balked desires with vigor and determination. Obstruction and opposition merely increase his reinforcement and intensify his resentment, until finally his "cause" is made a matter of truly religious significance, of religious hope, and may even come to have some of the mystical and militant accompaniments of religion in the narrower sense.

. . . The active militant leaders of progressive or radical movements opposed by powerful, entrenched personal and corporate interests, must not only be motivated by deep desires strongly obstructed, but also somewhat amply endowed with the fighting spirit. Such a temperament has its advantages and disadvantages. It will avoid the refinement of analysis, the meticulousness of judgment, which sometimes put the intellectual in the position of Buridan's ass, starving between two hay stacks for want of decision. It will proceed to push a plan of reform through to success against the determined obstructionist tactics of conservatives and reactionaries, where the more philosophical, critically-intellectual temperament would fail, because of indecision, lack of personalistic aggression, or inadequate desire-reinforcement.

The combative temperament is likely, in its vigorous attack upon the personal agents of obstructive institutions, to conceive the problem of reform or revolution wholly in terms of conflict or of politics, whereas the fundamental obstructions, as we have seen, may be of an impersonal nature and may require for their removal not merely the combating or political outwitting of personal opposition, but painstaking scientific analysis of the whole situation.⁸

As Wolfe indicates, radical leadership undertakes an intellectualistic analysis of social faults; it carries on an active program of education or propaganda; and it uses the appeal to combative attitudes. These are definitely a part of the psychology of crowd behavior. The radical leader merely typifies the whole trend of behavior in those who are at variance with the world around them. Conservative opposition develops much the same technique; by persecution or open conflict it exaggerates the in-group—out-group antagonisms and further intrenches the radical leader in power and prestige. As Wolfe remarks: "Persecution is an effective mode

⁸ From A. B. Wolfe, *Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method*, pp. 177, 178, 179. Copyright 1923 by The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

not only of advertising your opponent's cause, but advertising it at your own expense." The radical leader, then, is characterized by emotionalism, intellectual dogmatism, inability to face social reality as defined by the majority of the larger community. His utopias and millennial hopes are intellectualized fantasies of a better world. With rose-colored pictures he appeals to people of like desires, and they find in him a symbol of their vaguer impulses to escape the hard reality about them.

4. *Conservatism and Leadership.* A contrast in values, if not in traits, is evident in the conservative leader. We may introduce our discussion again by citing an instance of youthful leadership:

Beth is the most popular girl in school. She has been vice-president of the student body, president of the Girl's League, leader in dramatics and athletics. She is pretty, well-dressed with an immaculate freshness and daintiness, . . . her gait is light, she is always literally on tiptoe. "Yes, Beth is the sweetest girl in school," says Martha, who is a far better student.

The boys like her. Beth is no prude, but she does not pet. She considers it something "no self-respecting girl would do." Beth is fond of using such terms, yet her diary reveals day-dreams of lovers. . . . One of the boy athletes of the school says, "I always want to be at my best when I am with her."

One day Beth noticed that a group of boys and girls were getting into a borrowed automobile preparatory to "ditching school." It was driven by a popular young fellow whom all the girls sought. She descended upon this party with flashing eyes, explained the enormity of their conduct and succeeded in sending them all back to school. . . .

Beth is as happy at school as she is at home. Her teachers usually report a sense of well-being when she is about. Her own ambition is to be a teacher. . . . Beth's capacity for hard work is one of her leading characteristics. . . . [The case study reports how Beth identifies herself with her family, how she accommodates herself to her lovable, but rather economically irresponsible father, how she aids her mother in the care of the children, etc. There is no mother-daughter antagonism, and she never reveals any negative feelings toward her father's lack of financial status. She learned of sex at home. The whole life of the family is solidified and happy. There are books, music, games and whole-hearted group activity.]

If we sum it up, we note that she has a confident, imperious manner, an average intelligence and normal health, that she possesses the ability to see things through, that she is witty and light-hearted, a good sport, versatile in her interests, with an attention rather evenly divided between books and activities indoor and outdoor, that she has an intense enjoyment of life, that she is in complete harmony with its behavior codes, has great affection for her brothers and sisters and feels responsibility for them. She has a concern over other people and an

attitude of protection, a tolerance beyond her years. As one fellow student puts it, "You can tell her anything and she understands." She has a definite plan of life and has known handicaps, and these are stimulating to her.⁹

Beth differs very obviously from Rose. As Rose is an excellent type of radical leader, so Beth in much of her behavior typifies the integrated leadership of a conservative. In contrasting the two, Miss Van Waters remarks:

An unseen margin divides her life from that of Rose. The economic level is much the same. Beth is in harmony with the ideas of her community, she is "refined," "lady-like," and loyal—Rose is tough and a rebel. On the whole Rose is a more adjusted personality than Beth, but this has depended largely on the community's definition.¹⁰

The conservative leader is not unlike the radical in many ways, except that he integrates his conservatism in terms of the *status quo*. He accepts the moral, political, economic world around him and essays to control it to his own ends. He has no quarrel with it. It suits him. He will but make use of it as it stands. The man whom Wolfe calls the disinterested conservative is largely concerned with maintaining the present order, where fear of change is the principal motivation. With the interested conservative, antagonism and aggression are much more prominent. In fact, the emotional radical may be distinguished from the emotional conservative—not by the ardor of his feeling or his pugnacious attitudes but by the objects toward which his values and attitudes are oriented.

The conservative leaders have a tremendous advantage over the radical, as by and large they have the support of the folkways. Those who stand as protectors of the system of private property, of the democratic state, of the vested interests of capitalism, of monogamous marriage, and the Christian religion, have the power of centuries of institutionalization behind them, both in fundamental ideologies and in the machinery of social control. Armies, police power, and sheer strength of material goods support the conservative. Only when the masses begin to doubt these institutions do conservative leaders need to fear. It is then, in fact, that conservatism is put upon the defensive, as it was in the Russian Revolution.

What is true of the political-economic order is true of the church. When through education and change of life organization the masses begin to

⁹ M. Van Waters, *op. cit.*, pp. 501-02.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 502.

doubt the established theologies, the conservatives in religious institutions bestir themselves most actively. The conflict of fundamentalism and modernism in the Christian churches reflects the struggle between radical and conservative standpoints, each side having its distinctive leadership.

Neither the radical nor the conservative leader is strictly objective. The bias of personal-emotional wishes prevents their being scientific. As Wolfe says:

In the case of the disinterested conservative it is easy to see that his attachment to things-as-they-are (habituation), his fear of the new and the unfamiliar, his loyalties and pride, and his exaggerated valuation of the past can hardly fail to prevent his mental processes attaining to the scientific level. It is equally plain that the attitude and methods of interested conservatism are diametrically opposed to the scientific spirit, and thoroughly incompatible with it. Just as soon as science becomes the hand-maiden to apologetics of any kind it stands in imminent peril of ceasing to be science and becoming propaganda. The impatience of the radical, his sentimentalizing, his proclivity for the new simply because it is new, his jumping to conclusions, and his espousal of programs without investigation of their probable unforeseen and complicated effects—these and other traits make it improbable that the scientific spirit will frequently be met with in radical ranks, though it is likely to be as common there as among conservatives. In both conservative and radical, traits like intolerance, combat attitudes, emotionalism, and the clinging to ideologies (like eighteenth century individualism or Marxian socialism), are distinctive factors.¹¹

So long as these attitudes persist, it is idle to hope for scientific light from either radical or conservative.

5. *Scientific Leadership*.—The scientific leader occupies an unusual position. His specialization gives him a peculiarly effective status as a definite leader. His work in his own field is quite beyond comprehension except by his own fellow-workers. As we have already seen, outside of his field he may be neither scientific nor significant.

In his own work the scientific leader has great intellectual acumen; he is free from emotional, egoistic bias, and from concern with general popular acclaim or disapproval; and he develops very impersonal and objective attitudes toward the area of his work. His leadership consists largely in assisting others to advance the frontiers of knowledge. He is able to arouse their enthusiasm for research and invention. His prominence, however, is limited by the character of his audience.

¹¹ Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

The scientist and the expert have exerted a profound influence on our social-economic order. Veblen pointed out the close interrelation of the engineers and the capitalistic economic order. Whether the engineers and scientists can be brought into the service of a humane democracy remains to be seen, but certainly we may cherish the hope that they can. In *The Democratic Way of Life* (1926), T. V. Smith stresses the need for the scientific leader if what he calls democracy is to survive. While it is not our place here to discuss social ethics, one psychological comment may be made. The very impersonality and objectivity of science make it difficult for the individual scientist to concern himself with the social results of his discoveries and inventions. The more thorough-going his scientific training, the less he will care about the social use made of his work. This may constitute a barrier to the enlisting of the expert in the ranks of those interested in social-humane betterment.

These things aside, leadership in science will always be a genuine factor in the social-economic order if our present materialistic world is to continue. If the so-called social sciences ever develop their techniques beyond the limbo of subjectivity, the new leaders may be of tremendous importance in changing the social world in which we live.

C. Types of Leadership.

1. *Two Tentative Classifications of Leadership.*—As we have already noted, leadership is not the innate unfolding of particular traits without reference to time or place. It is always related to situations in which various qualities of leadership show themselves. The problem of types of leaders, like the more general problem of types of personalities, is much discussed. At best, of course, our categories must be tentative and incomplete, but there seems to be some solid factual ground for differentiating two types of leadership. One type of leader controls men and practical situations, in business, politics, military activities, and the ritualistic and organized phases of religion. The second type of leader assumes control of ideas and imaginative reconstructions, as in science, art, religion, and philosophy. In the first, control of men and social situations is the dominant feature. We may call this executive or extrovert leadership. The second finds itself in control over material objects, as in invention or scientific research, or over non-material phenomena, as in literary and other arts, in religious and other philosophy. We may call this non-executive, intellectual or introvert

leadership. Schwarz calls the first sort the "man of action." The second may be called the man of thought. In *The Executive and His Control of Men* (1915), Gowin follows practically this same classification. He properly warns us, however, not to overdo such segregation, since leaders in both fields may have many characteristics in common.

It is evident that the face-to-face, personal relations of the executive tend to call out the traits of extroversion. In contrast, the intellectual type is more closely correlated with introversion. We do not know how much to make of this possible connection of extroversion with one and introversion with the other. We constantly find the mechanism of substitution in both types, and in any detailed study of personality we must consider the entire history of the person himself and make an analysis of his social-cultural conditioning as well as of his individual traits. Certainly the person who deals with men is marked by a capacity to meet people in social situations and to adjust himself to them in the process of controlling them. He is able to determine their course of action, and yet he must be flexible enough to appreciate their own behavior trends. The insight necessary to successful leadership, no doubt, means a certain amount of introversion, else the leader's identification with others may not be sufficient to enable him to control and direct them. In the intellectual leader, introverted traits are more apparent. Certainly the poet, the scientist, the artist, and the philosopher who cuts himself off from the currents of men by living in a world created by his own imagination, is introverted. Nevertheless, extroverted traits are essential to enable the intellectual leader to have certain contacts with his fellows. Likely enough introversion and extroversion in their purest forms occur only in the neurotic or psychotic. In all types of leadership there is sufficient balance of both to keep one within the bounds of certain social formulations. In any case the possible correlation of types of leadership, and of types of personality generally, with introversion or extroversion, causes one to hope that subsequent studies may indicate more definitely just how much living "inside one's head" or "outside one's head" plays a part in the direction which such special abilities take.

Bowden's study of approximately forty student leaders in colleges of this country revealed some suggestive results. He divided his tests into two sorts: physical and social. In the physical tests he tabulated height, weight, voice, complexion, hair, and eyes. In the social tests he used the Otis Self-administering Higher Examination as a measure of intelligence. A modi-

fication of the early form of the Allports' rating scheme was used to measure such social-personal traits as strength of emotions, ascendance-submission, extroversion-introversion, expansion-reclusion, degree of insight, over- or under-valuation of self, degree of social participation, degree of self-seeking, and capacity in judging facial expression. Following is a summary of his published study:

Range in height was 67 to 72 inches; median, 68 inches. Range in weight was 125 to 180 pounds; median, $157\frac{2}{3}$ pounds. Voice was judged as follows: high pitched, 11 per cent; medium pitched, 33 per cent; low pitched, 56 per cent. In complexion, 23 per cent were dark, 77 per cent light. In eye color, 58 per cent were blue, 42 per cent dark.

The age range was 20-39 years; median $21\frac{1}{2}$ years. I. Q. range was 96-132; median, 116. The social-personal material was difficult to quantify but the writer found among other things, that all were of the ascendent type; that most of them were the extroverted, "expansive social type"; and that there were no "freak personalities" in the group. Of course, there were variations and as Bowden suggests, any of these general traits can only be understood in reference to particular situations.¹²

Unfortunately we do not have extensive studies of various leaders, so that we are dependent upon observational and interpretative, inferential analyses of leadership. With this caution in mind let us note briefly some aspects of the two kinds of leaders.

The particular form of leadership in any period is determined by the cultural norms in vogue. Where military organization counts for much, where an aggressive culture pattern of war has been adopted, men of executive type are at a premium. The emphasis being upon executives, there is a distinct tendency for leadership to take that direction. When business ethos dominates a whole society, as is the case in America today, the very framework in which a young man or woman grows up is one labeling with success and approval those who follow the executive pattern. The Morgan, the Rockefeller, the Carnegie, who possesses the technique of business leadership is richly rewarded. The same is true of a political career. The machine boss with his party henchmen represents a type of leader in a situation which has many feudal features. Personal fealty, hierarchy of advancement, exchange and sharing of captured booty are common. In the

¹² A. O. Bowden, "A Study of the Personality of Student Leaders in Colleges in the United States," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1926, vol. XXI, pp. 149-160.

legislative field, especially, leadership is largely recruited from the legal profession. The juristic mind fits into the whole institutional framework of our political order. Leadership here may be of the sort deriving prestige from office or it may come from the control of public opinion which lies behind the law-making and law-enforcing organizations. Some phases of religious life call for the executive type of leadership. This is true especially where the organization of new sects takes place. For instance, some religious leaders such as Whitefield and Edwards were able to arouse great but temporary enthusiasm through their revivals; others not only had the capacity to arouse their followers but were able to institutionalize their movements in an effective manner. Such a leader was Brigham Young. Despite enormous physical obstacles and intensely hostile social pressure, he welded a disorganized and discouraged group of men and women into one of the most remarkable religious institutions in our country.

The executive has the organizing and ordering type of mind. He is perhaps made in the somewhat compulsive pattern; at least his drive for power seems related to the sort of thing which one finds in the compulsion neurosis in its more extreme form. That is to say, he tends to arrange situations and even the lives of other persons to suit his own wishes. And yet, too arbitrary an organization does not make the successful leader, because the flexibilities of his followers must be taken into account. The leader must be able so to appeal to the imagination of his followers that they identify themselves with him and voluntarily follow his lead.

An interesting phase of leadership is found in those executives who rise from the mass of common people to positions of power. These persons begin with a distinctly inferior status. Through hard work, shrewdness, and chance opportunity they attain to prominence. When they are finally successful such men usually rate very highly initiative, drive, and ambition. They are likely to be very intolerant of all lack of thrift, drive, and the other qualities which they believe made them successful. Such a leader is likely to be a difficult task-master with no sympathy for his subordinates. Many modern business executives are of just this kind. Men who rise to prominence even in the labor movement are not immune to this hardness and ruthlessness. Power grows by what it feeds on, and often the humble man starting out from a position of insignificance becomes over-impressed with his success. He despises in others the qualities which he suppressed within himself as he rose above his fellow-workers.

Such a change in attitude does not always occur. Subsequent investigation may show, for example, that these modifications occur with men who deal in material goods, while the most successful leader of crowds and publics is just the man who can catch the sympathy and retain the feeling of the masses whom he controls. Alfred E. Smith possesses something of this latter quality. Certainly Lincoln never lost this capacity to understand persons of humble position and to sympathize with them.

Intellectual leadership is also given direction by the institutions of its day. In the Middle Ages the intellectuals were largely absorbed in scholasticism. With the revival in learning and the arts current interests shifted from theology and church jurisprudence, to science, literature, art, and a new philosophy. In our society all forms of intellectual leadership find a place, but those which fit into the materialistic, business ethos get more immediate prestige than any others. Thus scientific research, which may become important for the industrialist and business executive, is considered of first-rate significance. Other forms of leadership, in art or philosophy, have less prestige. Such a situation automatically affects the direction of interest in the rising young man of intellectual promise. The capitalistic order and its executive leaders thus have a definite influence upon leadership in the intellectual field as well as in their own.

Leadership in religion seems to spring, in part, from those persons who have a rich world of emotion and feeling about contemporary life. Religious prophets and seers are frequently semi-neurotic. Dominated by introverted, subjective states of mind, they cast the meaning of life in religious and moral patterns in their efforts to adjust the world to their fantasies. The customary mysticism of these men is an important example of this effort at adjustment. Sometimes this effort takes the form of Oriental contemplation in an area removed from the world's problems. Again, it may have a more apparent relation with our customary world of daily experience; and the religious leader will evolve utopian and millennial schemes to make the world fit his favorite patterns. Again, it may assume a dereistic pattern of a very direct sort, and the religious fanatic will undertake to get into rapport with unseen powers and by magic endeavor to counteract or control his daily world.

In art we have a fine combination of intellectual and emotional qualities in an effort to remake the world, or to add to it by creations of the imagination. The delicate balance of intellect and emotion in art is a great part

of its strength in comparison with either religion or science. Here the leader brings his richly emotional fantasy world under the control of his intellect. Out of this synthesis he extends an important part of our psychosocial environment.

Philosophy is an intellectual recasting of the world into more consistent and permanent meanings. It is important as a basis for the ideologies which serve as rationalizations for human behavior. While, in general, philosophy reflects the culture patterns of the time and place, it must not be forgotten that the philosopher is also the seer and prophet in projecting himself into the future by a reorganization of contemporary ideas into novel and what seem to him more meaningful forms.

On the whole, it must be apparent that the artist, the scientist, and the philosopher live somewhat apart from the current of daily action of the masses. In this respect they differ from the executive type of leader, who at all times must keep his finger on the public pulse. But the intellectual leader finds that even his prestige ultimately rests with his audience or his populace. With some this is a larger group than with others. Sometimes the more immediately popular artist, writer, scientist, or philosopher is soon forgotten. Others, less popular at any given moment, acquire increased prestige with time, and after their death their names may become magic.

In contrast with this, the control of the executive is immediate and has a distinct reference to time and place. The audience of the executive is always more or less directly present. Though the influence of a great leader of men and determiner of institutions does not die with him, yet so far as direct personal influences go, his death ends his power. True enough, myths and legends may grow up about a great executive, and often they furnish an ideology which will influence future events. Yet the leader himself is no longer at hand to deal personally with social situations as they arise. How many times, for example, have people wondered what different course the period of reconstruction following our Civil War would have taken had Lincoln not been assassinated. His removal from the political scene at the opening of a new crisis certainly made for differences in policy which even today affect our political and social life. Yet his martyrdom itself became the cue to the inception of the legends of Lincoln's life and work. Without doubt these have played a great rôle in our subsequent history.

On the other hand, the influence of intellectual leaders is not so much face-to-face and personal. They create legends, myths, and philosophies in the form of art, literature, and history. In other fields these leaders invent new devices and find new realms of the universe through research. Their audience is farther removed from them. Through the medium of printing, painting, and sculpture and through the material features of invention, their influences reach outward and may persist for long periods after their death. In time the legends of the poet, the ideology of the philosopher, may modify profoundly the course of history. While the present and direct control of the intellectual leader may be less, the long-time effects may actually be greater. Marx had but a slight part in the actual development of revolutionary practice in his day, and no one doubts that his greatest influence has been in the persistence of his ideology, altered and enlarged by others. The Marxian ideology is still the core of the whole communistic theory and practice.

D. Leadership and the Masses.

1. *Prestige*.—Any discussion of leadership would be incomplete without an examination of the relation of the leader to the masses which he controls in one manner or another. One noticeable feature of leadership is prestige. The word prestige has itself an interesting history. Originally it referred to illusion, especially to the illusion produced by the juggler's tricks. From this it came to mean trick or illusion in general. Today it has been defined "as distinction (illusory or well founded) attaching to a person or thing and dominating the mind of others or of the public; often, reputation or influence arising from success, achievement, rank, or other circumstances." Prestige depends largely upon the qualities ascribed to the leader by other persons. It is a special case of James' point that a man's personality is reflected by the imagery and recognition of himself by others. It rests upon the apperceptive background of the followers. The leader takes on the color which his adherents give him. If he does not unconsciously do so from the outset, in time he comes to imagine that he possesses the qualities which are ascribed to him by others.

Leadership, then, depends in large measure upon social interstimulation. Obviously the leader is not unaffected by other persons. This is true of both executive and intellectual leadership. With the former the effects arise out of direct interaction. In intellectual leadership the influences may

be more indirect. Through the favorable reception given his work by critics and the public generally, the intellectual acquires a sense of importance. Moreover, the writings, art, science, inventions, or philosophy of other men may stimulate his own productivity. Let us examine the effects of the leader on the masses before we investigate how they, in turn, influence him.

2. *The Leader as Ideal*.—As Emerson says, "It is natural to believe in great men. . . . The search after great men is the dream of youth and the most serious occupation of manhood." The subordinate identifies himself with the leader. Otherwise he could not be a party to the process of domination. Not only do we identify ourselves with our contemporary or past heroes, but we indulge in the same process in our vicarious joy and sorrow over our heroes in the drama, in verse or prose, and even in the plastic or pictorial arts.

Leaders give us a vicarious experience which is strangely satisfying. In our heroes we see ourselves as better, bigger, or more active men. We may even secretly admire the great criminal or other anti-social individual because he represents to us a defiance of authority and the mores. We should often like to display these antagonistic attitudes, but in our timidity and conformity we dare not; in the actions of the notoriously anti-social person we often sense our own secret wishes fulfilled.

The interest of the masses in mystical literature is thus validly explained. This literature satisfies deep emotional longings. It is often dereistic. Since each reader interprets the mystical element in his own way and inserts his own emotional needs and conditionings, its vague symbolism provides an outlet for emotions which otherwise must be rigidly suppressed.

While identification leads to vicarious satisfactions, it furnishes, in addition, a basis for emulation of the leader. The knowledge of a leader, of either kind, may become a stimulus for efforts to be like him. We make the leader an ideal and forever afterwards we may look upon him as a model for our own activities. Darwin said of Humboldt's *Personal Narrative* that "this work stirred up in me a burning zeal to add even the most humble contribution to the noble structure of Natural Science." There are many men who have had others as an ideal. Napoleon was a voracious reader of the lives of former military leaders. There is a common recognition of the importance of hero worship in our educational scheme. To the school child the national heroes: Washington, Jackson, Lee, Lincoln, and others are held up as worthy ideals. Often the school-boy is more impressed

by the desperado type of hero or by famous contemporary personages such as Lindbergh. One reason why Lindbergh became and has remained a hero is not his original surprising flight, but his simple and unostentatious origin, his modesty, and the fact that he fits so well into the whole legend that heroes rise from the common people. In a democratic era the masses are always impressed when one of their number becomes famous. When a member of a group can say, "Well, one of our boys made it," there is encouragement for thousands of others to attempt something outstanding and important. Out of many trials, successes are bound to come. Thus emulation stimulates social selection in the making of leadership.

Identification and emulation of leaders serve another function. The leader is the symbolic projection of an ideal. He stands for something outside the currents of the commonplace. To him are often attributed qualities which are not his own at first, but with which he becomes invested by the social ritual of veneration. The whole process of making myths of our heroes and leaders arises, in part, from the unconscious symbolization of greatness. This symbol of power, wisdom, and fame which we ascribe to the heroes may be thought of as something independent of the individual as an individual. That is to say, the holder of an office of traditional leadership in a social group may not himself be such an ideal character, but the very office he holds, or the prestige the office carries with it, endows him with an ideal power and wisdom quite distinct from his actual capacities. In *The Public Life* Spender makes the excellent point that once a man has entered in the arena of public affairs he becomes the common property of the public. He is no longer himself. He is more than that. His life belongs to the masses. Everything he does may be of profound importance. In a sense, he thereafter has no private life. To be successful he must live up to the great expectations of his public.

Students of crowd behavior have frequently commented on the veneration of the leader by the masses. The adoration of Lassalle in the Rhenish Provinces is well known. Marx is a magic name among communists. With other classes, Bismarck's domination was the source of great admiration and approval. In our country John Brown became a symbol for the North during and after the Civil War. Mary Baker Eddy has become a symbol of faith for the Christian Scientist. The canonization of the living and the dead goes on in our own day, under the ægis of democracy, capitalism, or socialism, just as it formerly went on under the guidance or approval of a

universal church. Every group has its heroes, living and dead. Every political convention sees the banners unfurled and speeches made upon the heroes of the past. It hears again how the present political party is carrying out their principles. The Republicans adore Lincoln, while the Democrats venerate Jefferson and Jackson as their special deities. Religious groups have their heroes in St. Augustine, St. Francis, Luther, Calvin, Wesley, and others. For that matter, the scientists have heroes too: Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, Curie, and Einstein in physics; Boyle, Lavoisier, and Dalton in chemistry; Darwin, Huxley, Weismann, Pasteur, and Koch in biology. All groups, moreover, invariably rationalize the adoration of their heroes. The veneration of scientists for their heroes is no less the result of their identification of themselves with great men in their own universe of discourse than is the veneration of the politician for his hero or the small gang boy for his. The quality of the leaders may be different, but for the individuals within their own group it may be hard to prove that their own heroes are not the most important.

3. *Effects of Veneration on Leaders.*—Leaders are much affected by this veneration. They assume the characteristics thrust upon them by their followers. A kind of circular stimulus-response system is set up between leaders and followers.

In the object of such adoration, megalomania is apt to ensue. The immeasurable presumption . . . sometimes found in modern popular leaders, is not dependent solely on their being self-made men, but also upon the atmosphere of adulation in which they live and breathe. This overweening self-esteem on the part of the leaders diffuses a powerful suggestive influence, whereby the masses are confirmed in their admiration for their leaders, and it thus proves a source of enhanced power.¹³

In brief, the masses attribute to the leaders certain qualities. These, in turn, influence the leaders, who react upon the masses in such a manner as to increase their power because they fit the very picture which the masses created for them. Again we see how leaders and followers always exist in a relationship of interaction. During the Boer War there was a story of two young British officers just out from Aldershot. While their men lay in ambush the young officers paced proudly back and forth in advance of

¹³ R. Michels, *Political Parties, A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (Trs. by E. & C. Paul), 1915, p. 68. Courtesy of Cosmopolitan Book Corporation.

their lines, asking each other: "I say, old chappie, are we doing this just right?" As heroes people must live up to the rôle laid down for them by their followers.

But is this all that the masses do? Do they contribute anything to leadership other than identification, emulation, and veneration?

First of all, the masses carry the culture patterns upon which the special functions of leadership rest. In any field which touches the mores or folkways at all intimately, leadership must fall in line with what the masses hold to be true. More than one ambitious man has been destroyed by hurling himself against the wall of conventional morality. In our own day, in some particulars at least, *change* is in the folkways. The masses expect alterations in our material culture—newer models of automobiles, better radios, faster mail service, improvements in comforts and luxury. In this dimension of behavior leadership is always welcome. It is not so evident, however, that the masses feel any need for changes in the basic economic and social formulations which underlie our material culture. In the mores of sex, of private property, of religion and of political organization, their conservatism restrains the inventiveness of men anxious to be leaders. Those men who here step ahead of current ideologies and practice may not secure any great following. We do not look very seriously for inventive leadership in these areas of life, partly, no doubt, because our moral and social values are so sacred, so thoroughly bolstered up by strong emotions and feelings.

The masses desire material change, but it should not be imagined that they clearly formulate the ideas and invent the means for alterations. Rather do the leaders crystallize the vaguer feelings and emotions of the masses.

The function of leaders in defining and organizing the confused tendencies of the public mind is evident. . . . The originality of the masses is to be found not so much in formulated idea as in sentiment. . . . It is into the obscure and inarticulate sense of the multitude that the man of genius looks in order to find those vital tendencies whose utterances is his originality. As men in business get rich by divining and supplying a potential want, so it is a great part of all leadership to perceive and express what the people have already felt.¹⁴

¹⁴ C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 1909, pp. 135, 148. Courtesy of Chas. Scribner's Sons.

The masses are, however, important to leadership. One is the reciprocal of the other, and the notion that leaders somehow fling their ideas and practices upon a thoroughly docile and subdued people is a colossal bit of nonsense. Bolshevik Russia and Fascist Italy are contemporary instances of this reciprocal relation. In Russia, long abuses and the hardships of war gave the revolutionary minority an opportunity by propaganda to make articulate the deep reaction, long dormant, against the Czarist régime. The minority control of the left-wing socialists or Marxians is, of course, an instance of a small militant leadership of a great horde of people. Yet without the tacit support of the people, the Communist Revolution in Russia would disintegrate. Fascism and the phenomenal rise of Mussolini to power in Italy came only after war weariness and later scandalous abuses from socialistic-labor groups had created a tremendous desire for order and strength where there seemed only strife and disintegration. In spite of the ruthless methods of both revolutions, the fact remains that Lenin in Russia and Mussolini in Italy formulated the vague and uncertain feelings and emotions of the masses of their countries and put them into dynamic and striking form. Bringing order out of chaos is always significant, because the uncertainty of daily crisis is removed and life is again put into frameworks of conduct where the present is understandable and the future is made predictable.

E. *The Techniques of Social Control through Leadership.*

Leaders, of course, are numerically in the minority. In fact, militant minorities and their leaders not only are frequently behind the institutionalized controls, but they are also the ones who shift the ground of control in times of crises. This power of a minority has always been recognized. In practically every mythical Utopian scheme from Plato's *Republic* with its guardian-kings to modern theories of control by the humanized intellectuals, there is a recognition of the place of domination by a small group of leaders. In spite of two centuries of democracy and official mass rule, the facts seem to be that minorities are in control quite as they have always been. The personnel and the labels have been changed from time to time, that is all. Pareto speaks of "the circulation of the élite." That is to say, an inner clique is usually in control in all major social groupings, but the form of control and the individuals concerned change from historic period to historic period. Bousquet paraphrases Pareto's view thus:

The situation is the same in all branches of human activity. . . . Always an élite dominates the remainder of the population even where equality and democracy apparently reign. Nevertheless the élite is not an absolutely closed caste; it is unceasingly recruited from the choice elements that come from below and who possess the qualities necessary to raise them to the summit of the "social pyramid."¹⁵

Leaders in the dominant minority begin the process of institutionalization of their control as soon as possible after they acquire dominance. This institutionalizing of control occurs after every revolution—religious, economic, or political. Lenin and Trotsky entrenched their control in the communist Central Committee. Under the Fascist régime Italy was organized to continue the dictatorship of Mussolini. Even in our own democracy at the outset the aristocratic minority by tax laws and restrictions on the ballot made provision for a continuation of their control. It was not until the period of a political swashbuckler named Andrew Jackson that the masses, led by a new type of politician and a distinctly new sort of élite, came into some semblance of power.

In his *Social Control* (1901), Ross indicated the means of domination employed in various societies. In modern democratic society, certainly, control rests upon techniques other than those existing under a caste system, an oligarchy, or, aristocracy. Among the most important, aside from institutional formulations, are persuasion and flattery. These include advertising, propaganda, and the building-up of various slogans, myths, and legends which will retain the leaders in power. Persuasion, employing gestures and language, appeals to pride, to conscience, to fear and anger, and to hosts of prejudices already vaguely formed but now made articulate. In all this the power of words over emotions and actions is most apparent. In Chapter XVI we shall note how profoundly words affect us, and we shall see that language, with its meanings, is the essence of our social reality. The appeal through words, then, is the appeal to a reality which is a vital thing for the masses. The slogans and catchwords by which leaders carry the masses with them are the counters used in democratic societies, particularly, first to produce and then to increase their control. The masses love words and their emotional connotations. The stereotypes of prejudice and belief are more than mere symbols. They actually acquire a significance

¹⁵ G. H. Bousquet, *The Work of Vilfredo Pareto*, 1928, p. 23. Courtesy of The Sociological Press.

of the deepest sort. Men fight over the words *honor, truth, virtue, honesty, and faithfulness*. They die for their nationality symbols: flags, war-cries, and historic names. As Joseph Conrad remarked:

He who wants to persuade should put his trust not in the right argument, but in the right word. . . . Give me the right word and the right accent, and I will move the world.¹⁶

Flattery is merely a phase of persuasion and is used to enhance the identification of the masses with the leaders. The masses are made to believe in their own importance. In turn, they reciprocate by supporting the leader who so sensibly appreciates their good qualities. Flattery is its own reward and its own authority. The same applies to all forms of praise and promises of reward. They fill the minds of the masses with pictures which are distinctly satisfying and make them content and pleased with themselves and with their heroes.

The whole technique rests upon the capacity of the leaders to arouse faith in themselves. The masses come to believe in the leaders and their programs, not only because these reflect their own vague feelings and inarticulate yearnings, but because through words the leaders seem to make these yearnings clear and obviously just. What language does is to clarify and delimit. While in science this clarification and delimitation is relatively free from emotional association, it is not so with mystical words, with the stereotypes by which social control is and has been enforced. The words and concepts are there, but associated with them are the emotions and feelings which the folk have long had about themselves and their situations. The ethical writer, the rationalistic moral reformer, may say that the words are counterfeit for real definitions and meanings. In any case leadership continues to function by the use of just such terms, and apparently it will continue to do so for a long time to come. For social psychology words and their meanings must be taken into account in interpreting social behavior.

In conclusion, then, we may say that out of these techniques of control and out of the relation of the masses to the leaders arises the mythology of great men. Around the leader are built up stories which keep alive his place in the group maintaining his prestige, and which make the masses feel dependent upon him. Perhaps fundamentally this worship of heroes

¹⁶ Quoted by A. Lipsky, *Man the Puppet*, 1925, p. 34. Courtesy of Frank-Maurice, Inc.

arises from man's very weakness in the presence of his world. Certainly leadership is found in all groups, small and large, primitive and modern. In some cases leadership is institutionalized. In other instances, it is more spontaneous and flexible because the groups are newly formed or less permanent. On the basis of the psychological nature of man and out of his social-culture patterns are constructed the fundamental beliefs in great men. With the evidences of individual differences and of social and cultural experience before us, it seems doubtful whether a pure equalitarian democracy has ever existed or can exist. Certainly the myth of leadership itself becomes one of the determining factors in social life everywhere.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapters XX, pp. 543-78; XXI, pp. 582-621.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises from assignments in *Source Book*, Chapter XX, pp. 578-79, XXI, p. 621.
 2. Why must we distinguish between leadership and headship?
 3. Why must leadership always be studied in reference to social-cultural situations as well as to individual traits? Illustrate.
 4. How is it that leaders in science acquire prestige in other than their own fields? Give examples.
 5. Is the differentiation of leaders into intellectual and executive types sound? Discuss.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
 1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapters XX, p. 579; XXI, pp. 621-22.
 2. Report on Ogburn, "The Great Man versus Social Forces," *Social Forces*, 1926, vol. V, pp. 225-31.
 3. Report on W. H. Cowley, "Three Distinctions in the Study of Leaders," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1928, vol. XXIII, pp. 144-57.
 4. Study of radical leadership: Marx, Bakunin, Lassalle, Lenin, John Mitchell, Haywood.
 5. Study of conservative (capitalistic) leadership: Rockefeller, Carnegie, Gary, Ford.
 6. Study of religious leaders: Beecher, Moody, Bryan.
 7. Genius, like other leadership, is not independent of time and place. Cite examples of men once considered famous in other historical periods, but now looked upon as of little or no significance. Cf. Young, "Genius. Can It Be Anticipated?" *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1923, vol. XXX, pp. 172-76.
 8. The Freudian interpretation of genius and leadership. Compare L. P.

Clark, *Psychologic Studies of Notable Historic Characters*, 1924 (Reprinted from *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1921, vol. VIII), and also his *Napoleon Self-Destroyed*, 1929 with treatment of Cox in *Genetic Studies in Genius*, vol. II (edited by L. M. Terman). There is a large literature on leadership from the psychoanalytic standpoint. Cf. Dooley, "Psychoanalytic Studies of Genius," *American Journal of Psychology*, 1916, vol. XXVII, pp. 363-416, and Barnes, "Service of Analytical Psychology to History," *Psychoanalytic Review*, 1921, vol. VIII, pp. 22-37. Consult files of *Psychoanalytic Review* and other sources.

PART FOUR

Personality and Subjective Patterns

"All thinking being conducted by use of words, much depends upon the words which get prestige from the dominant activities to which they first apply. We shall, therefore, expect to find mechanical metaphors playing a great part in our social sciences."—HOBSON

"If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."

—THOMAS

"Passion and prejudice govern the world; only under the name of reason."

—WESLEY

This section deals with the nature of the internal world of ideas, images, and attitudes. These patterns are bound up with meanings which are largely social in origin, and which can be understood only in terms of the social-cultural milieu. What Bernard has called the psycho-social environment, consisting largely of the symbols of language, lies at the basis of meaning. Hence we must expose the close connection of language content and social reality.

It may be objected that the term subjective or internal pattern is inappropriate. We hold that it is defensible for the reason that reactions are determined by two sorts of factors—by external situations, material objects, and persons; and by internal conditions, emotions, feelings, bodily sets or attitudes, and the images and ideas associated therewith. These internal aspects of personality control overt responses as much as do the physical objects or other individuals that impress one through the peripheral sense organs. This subjective content constitutes what might be called the intra-individual environment.

Following the chapter on language and social reality, we shall examine the place of stereotypes, myths, and legends in behavior. The section closes with two chapters on prejudice which exemplify the influence of the internal factors on behavior.

CHAPTER XVI

LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND SOCIAL REALITY

A. Language and Thought.

Since the manner of conceiving social reality is largely verbal, and since communication through spoken and written language is so vital to the continuance of social reality, we shall discuss the major features of language and its culture content as introductory to the detailed analyses which follow in subsequent chapters.

The relation of language to thought is an old problem. Like many old problems, it is difficult and elusive. Marett remarks: "If language is ultimately a creation of the intellect, yet hardly less fundamentally is the intellect a creation of language." To prove this is extremely difficult, and we can not try here even to attempt it. Rather we shall show how language and thought are woven together and how in a discussion of social meanings—so important in understanding social behavior—this relation is highly significant. If we examine the evidences of the close interrelation of language and thought, we shall perceive at once how intimately language is bound up with social reality.

1. *Language and Brain Mechanisms.*—Thought and speech are closely linked. Speech depends decidedly upon the activity of the cerebral cortex, the last division of the central nervous system to develop. The speech centers of the brain are located in close proximity to the higher association areas. In fact the mastery of speech proceeds hand in hand with the development of the higher forms of anticipatory behavior. This means that basically speech is bound up with the capacity for discrimination, judgment, and concept formation which are so essential to thinking in the technical sense. The motor responses of the speech centers are connected with the vocal apparatus. Conditioning and integration in the higher centers ultimately depend upon the sensory impressions that reach them through the afferent neurons from the eyes, ears, and other receptor organs. Likewise the muscular and glandular responses which are set off from the

higher areas are mediated through the effector neurons passing through the lower centers.

Through conditioning and integration, verbal habits are so built into each other that they constitute one of the most important parts of the response system of the personality. As we have already noted, speech is definitely bound up with social stimulation and the response to these stimuli. If, then, the very organization of the mechanism of language is built up by social stimuli and the corresponding response, and if the objects of the conditioning are social-cultural in nature, it follows that the content, the objects of association, will also be social-cultural. Hence the thought or language response connected with objects in experience must likewise be social-cultural in nature. We cannot ignore the fact that the essential situations which give rise to language development in the person are social and cultural. Even the experience with the material world is constantly influenced by the verbalized interpretations furnished us by other people.

There has been a long controversy in philosophy and psychology as to whether thought or language came first. Some writers, such as Max Müller, have held that thought is nothing but a form of inner speech. More recently, from quite another angle, Watson has come to much the same conclusion. For him, thought is nothing but sub-vocal speech. Some psychologists, however, object to Watson's view and maintain that thought is very distinct from its verbal expression. The latter view rests upon the ancient theory of a sharp separation of mind and body. Whether or not any scientific evidence can be mustered to support the older thesis of the duality of mind and body, is a metaphysical problem which need not concern us. In justice to the critics of the behavioristic view it must be said that probably all thought is not sub-vocal speech. Thought may take other forms of substitutive behavior, such as visual images, facial gestures, or kinesthetic movements of the hands. A geometric problem may be solved by incipient drawing movements in two- or three-dimensional space. But even here, no doubt, speech reactions enter into the total anticipatory activity.

Whatever may be said of the independence or identity of thought and language, in their development the two processes are intimately related. We can not consider the one apart from the other. And whenever communication of thought is involved, we are absolutely dependent upon some form of gesture or language. Any social intercourse which is not direct and overt depends upon incipient substitutive response.

2. *Language and Symbolism.*—It is at once obvious that language is a substitute for certain cruder and more complete overt bodily responses to objects in the environment. Language is linked to covert, internal, and less complete response. When a child grasps an apple and places it in his mouth, his entire organism is more or less integrated in the one activity. Nevertheless his control of apples is decidedly limited in the number he can reach and consume or otherwise dispose of in reference to himself. On the other hand, if the child does not have an apple and calls out the word "apple," the mother may give him the desired object. In this way the substitute response of saying the word "apple," eventually not only stands for the object, but gives the child power to control his social environment. This simple illustration indicates at the perceptual level of behavior both the advantage and the limitations of language reactions. So long as the expression "apple" is used in place of the total bodily response to secure the object, it is a very valuable tool, a splendid instrument for prying one's environment loose through others, and for turning it to one's own use. Yet if the word exists alone, out of context and without reference to the actual object, the mere remark "apple" is socially and personally of less and of different significance.

The important point for us to remember is that speech reactions are fundamentally substitutive reactions, symbolic in nature. They stand for or in place of responses of a more complete bodily sort. They serve the widest range of activities. Often it may be difficult to see how language has any relation whatsoever to overt physical, muscular-glandular action. Yet in the final test of language reactions, it must always be borne in mind that they come down to some sort of bodily reaction which has a wider reach than the language response itself. Even poetry leads to tears, to joy, to heroism. And the most abstract logic of the mathematician or scientist has for its final test its relation to physical or social movement in time and space. We adopt, therefore, the essential thesis that language is symbolic and instrumental in its meaning for the person.

To say that language is necessary for thinking is to say that signs are necessary. Thought deals not with bare things, but with their meanings, their suggestions. . . . Without meaning, things are nothing but blind stimuli or chance sources of pleasure and pain; and since meanings are not themselves tangible things, they must be anchored by attachment to some physical existence. Existences that are especially set aside to fixate and convey meanings are *signs* or

symbols. . . . In the case of signs we care nothing for what they are in themselves, but everything for what they signify and represent.¹

Whatever our view of the relation of thought to language, certainly language is the tool of social intercourse out of which meaning is born.

B. Language and Reality.

The relation of language to reality has long troubled philosophy. The most bitter controversy of the Middle Ages was over just this problem. Nominalists denied and realists affirmed the objective existence of concepts. We do not propose to go into the problem except to say that the symbolic nature of language, especially of conceptual language, led to a query as to whether concepts were anything but symbols, whether they had any substance whatsoever. For social behavior this question has little or no significance. When men act "as if" concepts had reality, and they always have done so, the differences between nominalism and realism become meaningless.

Men have always been interested in language forms. They have been so affected in their conduct by words and symbols that the social psychologist must take cognizance of the fact, not in terms of metaphysical entities, but in terms of the manner in which verbal concepts modify conduct. Although the major features of the subject will be treated in this chapter, throughout the balance of this volume the profound relationship of language to social meaning and social behavior will be apparent. We must at the outset re-examine the nature of the associative thinking which is intimately bound up with language mechanisms, because the whole of social reality is colored by this intimate conditioning of behavior to verbal concepts.

1. *Dual Nature of Associative Thought.*—The child's first speech reactions are largely efforts to learn words which stand for, or in place of, objects, situations, movements, and relationships of persons and things. So long as his speech reactions are confined to these simpler substitutive functions, he gets on satisfactorily with his fellows and with physical reality as conditioned by his fellows. Before long he learns that words bring responses toward him. Even material objects are modified in relation to himself through the acts of other persons. All this enhances his use of words to control his total environment. With the rise of imagery—visual,

¹ John Dewey, *How We Think*, 1910, p. 171. Courtesy of D. C. Heath and Company.

auditory, and verbal—the child's whole response system is enlarged. Where once he was limited to rather gross bodily reactions, he now has a rich range of minor but pleasing activities which stand between objects and situations and his final, consummatory bodily responses. This introduces him into a substitutive, expanded world intervening between himself and the crasser, harder reality of direct contact and bodily response. This world depends largely on the field of anticipatory responses. Thus, if children are not able to find knives, forks, spoons, and plates to complete their play-house materials, they make hastily torn pieces of paper serve as these objects. In the same way verbal responses very soon come to satisfy when the object of desire is no longer to be had. Just as the child dreams at night of the jam denied him in the day-time, so he day-dreams, and increasingly in verbal form, of things he wishes to do or to have when these are refused him. Although he may be weak and powerless in the presence of strength and authority, from day-dreams the child may derive a great sense of power. Freudians refer to this when they speak of the "omnipotence of thought," or, to put it more behavioristically, of the omnipotence of verbal substitutes for immediate reality. These verbal or other covert substitutes are commonly described as escapes from reality, but this description involves us in certain implications about the nature of reality. We believe that it is simpler to consider them an expansion and creation of total reality.² With these verbal substitutes a good deal of pleasant emotional toning is generated. In spite of other people the self-feeling is enhanced. The child, denied freedom of action by his own father, imagines the real father to be some one else. He day-dreams of a good, all-powerful, and loving real parent who has left him but may return. He talks to and about this imagined parent. He may even confuse his fantasy and the social situations around him. Here are the beginnings of the fairy tale, for in the fairy story, dreams come true.

All the things we would have are found in fairy tales. We are in reality weak, but in the fairy tale our heroes are strong and invincible. We are limited in our activities and knowledge through time and space, but in fairy tales one lives forever and can be in a hundred places at once, see into the future and

² It is just the failure of the Freudians and others to recognize that social-cultural and even material reality depends on social interaction and common belief that leads them to their distinction between reality and illusion. Freud's recent *Future of an Illusion*, 1928, is an example of such a faulty interpretation.

know the past. Thus the fairy tale, as an art product, brings back to the adult the lost feeling of omnipotence.³

a. *Objective and Dereistic Thought.*—The conditioning typified in learning to use the word "apple" in reference to the real object, and the entire range of associative thought in regard to actual situations and relations, we have denoted as objective, directive, logical thinking. There is a logic of overt response behind the association expressed in verbal terms, as when the child learns the names of plants and animals, of toys and tools, of persons and social situations. These verbal conditionings aid him in his adjustment to the world around him. As he grows older, these associations become more and more ordered by his formal training. Finally, in our culture, we have the experience of being introduced into the organized knowledge of our world which we call science. From this we reach into the whole range of technology in material culture. These associations, then, of words and actions together, we saw in Chapter VI, are called "true" or directive thinking. There is a reality of response in the fact that words lead to action. For example, the child discovers that a parent's threat to punish him leads finally to the application of the birch rod. So, too, the primitive man learns early that a spear cuts his flesh and hurts him. Essentially, these objects and situations are named according to what they can do to the individual himself. As the pragmatist puts it, the directive, objective associations "work."

On the other hand, the child learns that he can imagine playthings, or conjure up fairies or goblins who will help him in his struggle with adults, and from these associations he may derive almost as great pleasure as from actual power. This kind of associative thinking we called autistic, dereistic, or fantastic. These fantasy associations may influence overt responses just as profoundly as objective, logical associations.

As the power of imagination grows, language expands its control over physical and social reality. This associative relation follows in the wake of both objective and dereistic thinking. To the child the day-dream or the night-dream may be as realistic as any other experience. Certainly all of us can recall nightmares which were altogether too real. So, too, we may recall pleasant dreams which we regretted, when awakened, as having

³ S. Ferenczi, "Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality," *International Zeitschrift für Ärztliche Psychoanalyse*, vol. I, no. 2; from abstract in *Psychoanalytic Review*, vol. I, 1913-14, pp. 223-25.

been only dreams. With children and even with adults there is no sharp line distinguishing the day-dream, the fairy tale, the myth, the legend, from other more ordinary, every-day experiences. Many adults accept as true narratives and ideas which to others seem bizarre, if not pathological. Often parents are confused by the tales which their children tell of weird and strange experiences. To the child they are real enough. Frequently the parents call these narratives "lies." They may punish the child or subject him to such ridicule that he hesitates to tell any more of his fantasies. Such social censorship of his fantasies does not mean that the child ceases to have them, but means simply that he expresses them internally and only to himself. Since the bulk of these fancied experiences, these half-real occurrences, are couched in language terms, it follows that the language expression becomes tied up most intimately with these fantasies. Language becomes inseparable from them. In more extreme cases a secret language may be invented to hide the real nature of the day-dreams.

b. *The Dual Nature of Anticipatory Associative Thought Common to All.*—It is not to be imagined that, in one clearly marked division, we have abnormal, psychopathic sorts of thinking and language, and, in another division, distinctly logical, objective types. Rather our entire thought ranges from the extreme of dereistic thinking seen in the dementia præcox or schizophrenic personality to the other extreme seen in the fields of exact science and mathematical logic. The former is surcharged with emotion, with personal, egocentric wishes fulfilled by associative thought pleasing to the person. It is subjective and often meaningless to others. The other form is cold, deliberate, impersonal, non-egocentric and apparently quite detached from personal wishes of any kind. As a matter of fact, most of us, children and adults, primitive or modern, live at all times in varied states of anticipatory responses ranging from one extreme to the other. The very make-up of social reality is woven out of the content of both objective and autistic associations. The differences here really lie in the variations in content and meaning rather than in any profound divergences in the mechanism of association and integration. Perhaps the emotions and egocentric feelings play a larger part in the one than in the other, but it is only a matter of degree. Accept the premises, that is, the interpretative meaning, of the schizoid paranoiac, and almost inevitably we grant the correctness of his suspicions of the plots of other people to undo him. Grant

the beliefs and premises of the spiritualist, and we can scarcely assail the soundness of his conclusions.

By a series of concrete instances we can illustrate in the range of associations, from autistic to objective, the various points from which people make up their anticipatory responses. As we know, overt activity depends upon these covert beginnings. The schizophrenic patient in the hospital may construct for himself a world of fancy so pleasant, so satisfying, that he needs no one else to help him. So likewise whole groups of normal people have areas in their thinking and acting which are different only in degree from this extreme.

One of the commonest types of dereistic association, and one which exposes the confusion of language with reality, is seen in the following word plays of a dementia præcox patient:

Ho-spit-al. . . . Ho means Hello, spit-all, because all here spit the devil out of them, the spit means just to throw it off.⁴

Here we have an association of names with new meanings, significant only for the patient. The following examples illustrate the sort of things seen not only in schizophrenics but also among children who confuse the word with the reality:

William . . . Will-I-Am. Every person bearing this name contains a portion of the "direct will of God."

Buonaparte, i. e., born apart. (Patient identified himself in part with this personage.)⁴

A child asked if a Mr. Strong was strong physically. Another did not like a man named Stohl because of the sound association with stealing. Many people object to names because they suggest unpleasant ideas. Puns have much in common with this same sort of mental association. In this same category are those interesting associations of sound combinations found in nonsense rhymes, phrases in popular songs, and in slang, carrying no precise meaning but giving us pleasant emotional-feeling tone. The following remarks by a hebephrenic known to the writer are a type of stereotyped dereistic expressions much like the braggadocio of the small boy:

⁴ Cited by F. L. Wells, *Mental Adjustments*, p. 63. Copyright 1917 by D. Appleton and Company. Reprinted by permission.

The patient was asked, "What is your full name?" He replied: "Rebel, amber, emerald, American Golden King, ruler of the world, U. S. A., Uncle Sam, Maurice Farrington." Asked what he meant by "rebel and amber," he answered that it meant "higher than God." "I'm the fourth God myself!" The other three Gods were, first, God, then Jesus Christ, then Daniel Farrington (his father), and then himself. "I'm also Ku Klux Klan leader. One night they appointed me. I paid my fee of \$100,000."

We recognize this sort of thing, of course, in the more extreme case. We have no difficulty in detecting the extent to which such individuals have perverted words and their associations in their feeble attempts to reconstruct reality in their own introverted, selfish, and satisfying patterns. And yet, as we shall see, this is not so markedly different in character from some of the ritualistic, magical thinking that pervades every-day life. This boy, twenty-two years of age, built up an entire delusional system that occupied his time and imagination to the exclusion of ordinary social relationships. He lost contact with the external social world and consumed himself in this monotonous round of autisms. It is only in this sense that we speak of such cases as pathological, meaning thereby that the patient has reached such a degree of divergence from the average socialized personality as to need medical attention and protection. Modern psychiatry does not sharply distinguish between the pathological and the normal. It is only a matter of degree. It is social consensus of opinion and behavior that marks us off from the patients whom we confine in mental hospitals. The patients' conception of social reality, their range of meanings in words, differs from our own, but their behavior mechanisms are not different except in the types of objects or internal content to which they respond.

The following case illustrates very well the sort of pathological behavior which, if at times slightly less violent, might pass unnoticed in our society, or which, if only slightly less divergent, at an earlier date might have been accepted as socially significant. If Queen Anna, as she called herself, had had a clever publicity agent and a good campaign manager, she might have started a new religion, for others not markedly different have done so. In adolescence Queen Anna developed an intense interest in religion. The growth of her system of delusions was gradual. For years she taught school and mingled in social life without undue difficulties. Today, at the age of seventy, she has for more than a generation had a relatively fixed

system in the form of declarations that she is the Church Queen, the Fourth member of the God-head sent on earth to bring about the final salvation of the world and the triumph of the church of Christ. Frequently her exposition takes the form of doggerel of which the following stanzas are samples:

Soon will all nations,
Vast congregations,
Right here convene
To crown the Queen.

It has been the plan of ages
To bring forth this Queen of Sages
To recite Supreme Judgment Pages.

This is the Queen of Exposition.
She's always in the right position.
This is the Queen of Golden Diction
Whose acute pen oft kindles friction.

Queen of Wisdom,
Queen of Wit;
Sharp Her arrows
And they hit.

This is followed by stereotyped prose selections. These productions are written in red ink, with frequent capitalization. They are addressed to the superintendent, the board of directors, the attending physicians, or chance callers whose address she may secure. The royal insignia, consisting of five maltese crosses arranged as a larger cross, always attest the validity of the documents. Her costumes are elaborate, and decorated with intricate tatting which she herself does. She is allowed to wear a crown and she acts the part of the church queen who dwells, as she says, "among lunatics" while she "triumphs over politics." The accompanying prose selections from one of these documents are typical. We can note the recurrent autistic forms:

4 is Our Almighty Supremacy Seal Number, and signifies the Almighty Wedded Supremacy of God the Holy Trinity and Their Almighty Bridal Queen, the Church Queen,

Royal 4 was set upon Our Declaration of American Independence. This land was predestined to become the native land of the Church Queen, Goddess Anna.

We decreed to set Our Almighty Seal Number 4, upon the independence of the Church Queen's native land, July 4, 1776.

We also decreed to set our Almighty Supremacy Number Seal Royal Four, upon the Government of the Church Queen's native land, as follows:—

We decreed that United States Presidents should be elected to serve for four years, only, at each election. We also decreed that Presidents of the Church Queen's native land should be inducted into office on the fourth day of March, that month being revered by angel hosts as the Immaculate Conception Month of King Jesus and Queen Anna, nine months before nativity.

There follows a mass of other materials showing the association of *four* with her delusional system. Under the domination of this deep-rooted mental set or *Aufgabe* she has built herself an enormous dereistic structure.

While Queen Anna is under the care of the state because of occasional violence, she is not essentially different from many popular leaders in religion, politics, economics, and such social groupings as the magical Ku Klux Klan. For instance, here is a religious tract in common circulation:

SUN OF GOD

I AM!

"The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they that hear shall live."—John 5:25.

The sun is the source of all life and all motion; all of the energy on earth comes from the sun. The Son of God is the Sun of God.

This is modern science and ancient scripture. In the very last book of the Bible gods come down from the sun. The sunphone connects your sun with the sun. You are a sun of God.

Modern science says that sunspots are regular periods, about every eleven years, of the rising and falling of tides on the surface of the sun. We are now in the middle of a regular period which will reach its peak in 1928. The next regular period will begin about 1929 or 1930. This is not speculation; it is established science.

The sun is double, male and female. The feminine sun is cool, her brilliance is dimmed and she is kept at such a distance by the male sun that she is hardly discernible. This is up-to-date science and good scripture; the spiritual feminine sun is the inner sun where the dead are now living.

Sunphone treatments, given by either of US, will help you into your own sun, the light of your own divinity.

The next is from a book presenting a curious theory of spiritualism:

The breaking down of the rapport between the conceiving personality and the concept-copies of the precipient, owned by the subjective concepts, permits

the intelligences of the concepts to assume control of themselves, instead of being controlled by the precipient, through the concept-copies of him owned by his concepts of humans.^{4a}

Written by a patient in a hospital, this would be considered valid evidence of a confused mind but there are several hundred pages of this stuff in a serious book. Discussing the relation of meaning to language, James gave the following excerpt from a book entitled *Substantialism or Philosophy of Knowledge* (1878):

The flow of the efferent fluids of all these vessels from their outlets at the terminal loop of each culminate link on the surface of the nuclear organism is continuous as their respective atmospheric fruitage up to the altitudinal limit of their expansibility, whence, when atmosphered by like coalescing essences from higher altitudes—those sensibly expressed as the essential qualities of external forms—they descend and become assimilated by the afferents of the nuclear organism.⁵

There are 784 pages of this kind of material.

One of the favorite occupations of people who see in the Bible a clue to the whole of human history, is to attempt to explain historical events and facts by reference to alleged prophecies in the Bible. Some time ago there appeared a tract in religion which purported to show that the papal system of the Roman Catholic Church was the beast referred to in the Book of the Revelations. This indicates well the relation of symbolism to autistic thinking. Furthermore, it shows how groups of persons conceive the reality of other groups with whom they come into conflict. The article first quotes Revelations 13: 18 as follows:

"Here is wisdom. Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast; for it is the number of a man and his number is Six Hundred Three Score and Six."

The words "Vicar of the Son of God" which are inscribed on the crown of the Roman Pope are in Latin "VICARIVS FILII DEI." Recall that in the Roman numeral system I equals 1; V equals 5; L, 50; C, 100; D, 500. Thus, in VICARIVS FILII DEI we find the following number combination:

^{4a} Donnelly, *Subjective Concepts of Humans*.

⁵ Quoted by W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. I, p. 263. Courtesy of Henry Holt and Company.

6 "I's"	6
2 "V's"	10
1 "L"	50
1 "C"	100
1 "D"	500
Total	666

Therefore, the total 666 gives one the number of the beast spoken of in the passage above. This is considered seriously to be proof that the Pope represents the beast.

If this sort of thing were produced by a child in play, we might consider it amusing; if produced by a dementia præcox patient, we would put it down as pathological. Yet when thousands of people believe and act upon this sort of interpretation of chance passages in ancient writings, torn out of their context, and certainly at best obscure, the whole problem of verbal meaning and its relationship to social reality takes on another hue. To the materialistically minded such concepts are nonsense; to the "faithful" they mean everything. To the man of science the revelations of Joseph Smith, like the visions of John Bunyan, are the products of diseased minds. But the man of science may well remember that Sir Isaac Newton loved to juggle with the meaning of Biblical prophecies. To a student of social psychology, these phenomena are significant because they indicate not only how one man conceives his world, but how thousands of others are led by training and exposure to culture patterns built on such concepts. Men operate in worlds laid down by meanings.

Primitive and modern magic illustrates the same thing. For many primitive peoples, the universe is composed of benign and malevolent spiritual powers whose business it is to aid or discomfit them. From our cultural standpoint the untrained mind of the savage often has associations which we should consider absurd if not pathological. If an enemy has made away with one's material goods or one's wife, one goes to a wizard or medicine man and by paying a fee secures a service which will bring disaster to the enemy. The medicine man makes a clay effigy of the enemy. If the injured man possesses hair, nail clippings, or bits of clothing of the enemy, they are used in making the effigy. Then the wizard repeats a spell over the effigy, pierces it with pins or knives, or burns it. This ritual is sufficient to produce the death of the enemy. Here is a Malay magical charm:

Take parings of nails, eyebrows, spittle, and so forth of your intended victim, enough to represent every part of his person, and then make them up into his likeness with wax from a deserted bees' comb. Scorch the figure slowly by holding it over a lamp every night for seven nights, and say:

"It is not wax that I am scorching,
It is the liver, heart, and spleen of So-and-So that I scorch."

After the seventh time burn the figure, and your victim will die.

The whole basis of superstitions still common in our society rests upon associations of autistic character. In much of this superstition the magical use of words plays a part. As Marett remarks, the spell is one of the most important features of the whole magic-religious ritual. The magical operations will fail if there is the slightest deviation from the precise use of the verbal formula. This sacredness of words is as evident in modern lodge and church ritualism as it is in the ritualism of primitives. Yet our own rituals and our own language seem so natural that we do not recognize their dereistic character.

Tharauds' *The Shadow of the Cross* shows how the Jewish child is led to worship ancient Hebrew as a sacred language:

What Christian can understand the deep significance that there is for a Jew in the process of learning to read [Hebrew]? For the child of Israel, learning to read means casting away like a worn-out garment the old every-day language, the dear familiar Yiddish, made up of all the dialects of the world and words borrowed from every nation among whom the Israelites have journeyed during their tribulations; it means learning to speak as King David and King Solomon spoke in the ancient days of glory; it means learning the sacred language in which the Master of the world gave the Law to Moses, a language of which each syllable was actually formed by the breath of God, a language of which the slightest sound has power to shake the foundations of the earth. Learning to read is to pray.

So, too, the Jewish boy in this community is taught a belief in the actual power of words and symbolic numbers:

He learned that mysterious numbers rule the destinies of men; that the number three brings happiness and the number nine misfortune, as is proved by all Jewish catastrophies, which happen invariably on the ninth of the month; that the figure seven is neutral, sometimes good and sometimes bad, and that the

lot of mortals changes every seventh year; that the Christians are abandoned to heathen worship and adore three gods at once, a dove, a man and a lamb, and that one ought to turn away one's face when one passes a church.

To show the magic in numbers we have only to recall the curious superstitions still current about seating thirteen at a dinner table or lighting three cigarettes from the same match. Gamblers have notorious superstitions about lucky and unlucky numbers.

The language of secret societies, their phrases and numerals, are distinct evidence of dereistic thinking in which emotional fervor and the sense of power of symbols are apparent. Just as the small boy uses the largest words he can to impress his fellows, so a man may employ in anger the words "Hell," "Damn," "God," and the like, not because he believes in divine beings, in hell, or in the system of exorcism, but because, after all, these are doubtless the most powerful words he knows. Such words carry unconsciously a sense of power. Early associations probably have a rôle here. The adult who has completely lost his religious and theological interests still vaguely associates these words with events, and this association comes into play when in fear or anger he is temporarily thrown off his normal course of behavior. In like manner the grandiloquent titles of officers and functions in lodges and secret orders give clear evidence of this curious primitive association of word and thing which still pervades our social life and delimits the social reality about us. A letter from the former head of the Ku Klux Klan announcing to his followers the appointment of Mary Elizabeth Taylor as his "Grand Chief of Staff" shows very well the place of magnificent words in the mystery and solemnity which the Klan always throws about itself:⁶

To all Genii, Grand Dragons and Hydras of Realms, Grand Goblins and Kleagles of Domains, Grand Titans and Furies of Provinces, Giants, Exalted Cyclops and Terrors of Klantons, and to all Citizens of the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan—in the name of our valiant, venerated Dead, I affectionately greet you. . . . [Then follows the message]

Done in the Aulic of his Majesty, Imperial Wizard, Emperor of the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in the Imperial City of Atlanta, Commonwealth of Georgia, United States of America, on this the ninth day of the

⁶ Quoted by L. Percy, "The Modern Ku Klux Klan," *Atlantic Monthly*, 1922, vol. CXXX, p. 125.

year of our Lord, 1921, and on the Dreadful Day of the Weeping Week of the Mournful Month of the Year of the Klan LV.

Duly signed and sealed by his Majesty
(Signed) WILLIAM JOSEPH SIMMONS
Imperial Wizard.

This is not very different from Farrington's expression of his own greatness in terms of Rebel, Amber, God, etc., which we have already discussed. The associations brought out by these words are quite apparent: Genii, Grand Dragons, Grand Goblins, Hydras, Furies, Exalted Cyclops, and even Terrors and all the infantile wishes seen in the world's fairy stories. "Majesty," "Imperial Wizard," "Invisible Empire" obviously imply mystery and aristocratic superiority. For thousands of men of ordinary humdrum lives, for men living in a mechanical age, proud of their material civilization with its power over physical forces and its comforts—bathtubs, automobiles, airplanes, and radios—these words and associations are very satisfying. This is not a mere reflection of the lack of higher education, for many members of the Klan are men of real intelligence and considerable education. Rather it indicates an ever-recurring part of our culture, which we have forgotten or ignored in our preoccupation with material things and in our boasting of great progress over other races and of our civilization.

For the psychopathic, reality is rather restricted in area, and is so divergent from our own reality that we lock up such patients for safety. Yet when millions of people fall into the habits of thought and action seen in secret societies, and worship words, we can hardly denote any behavior as essentially psychopathic or abnormal unless we redefine our terms. The whole notion of social reality is decided by common consensus and mutual participation. We must recognize that men and women, children or adults, all live more or less in a world of fancy, of day-dreams, in a "never-never land" which is tremendously satisfying to them. This world of fancy exists side by side with a world of mechanical devices of the most complex sort, a world of Einsteinian relativity, differential calculus, insulin, the germ theory of disease, and the wonders of television, rapid communication, and all the rest of our material culture. Probably the very drabness of the daily life of many persons gives added zest to the donning of white robes with red crosses, and to secret hand-clasps, and mystical purposes of a Pure, White America, freed of the Demon Rum, Negroes, and

Foreigners. In his excellent picture of the contemporary American scene Merz says:

Here is John Jones, a plain bank-teller of 211 E. Fourth Street, almost anywhere. But here also is John Jones, on Tuesday evenings from 7:30 to 11, a Sir Knight Errant of the Mystic Order of Granada. It is characteristic of secret orders that the names they bear are high-spirited and resounding, on a plane above the routine affairs of daily living. The Shriners are not simply Shriners; they are members of the Ancient Arabic Order of Nobles of the Mystic Shrine. The Grottos are not simply Grottos; they are members of the Mystic Order of Veiled Prophets of the Enchanted Realm.

There are many other "Mystic" orders. There are many "Illustrious" orders, many "Imperial" orders, many "Exalted" orders. Frequently there are orders which are several of these at once. On the heels of the Illustrious and Exalted Order of Crusaders comes the Imperial and Illustrious Order of the Mystic and Exalted Cross. These are good objectives and possibly by this time some five million Americans have identified themselves with at least one of them. Possibly five million more Americans have identified themselves with two other adjectives which prefix the names of at least fifty thriving orders. These two are "Royal" and "Ancient" and the popularity of each is understandable in a nation which has neither a royalty nor antiquity, but a vicarious enthusiasm for them both.

To live in a modern world and be an ancient; to live in a humdrum world and be a knight; to live in a gabby world and have a secret—all this is possible. It is the essence of fraternalism that it does its best to make it possible. An illustrious name is only a beginning. When the password is given and the inner door swings back, it is upon a world as different from the world outside as ingenuity can make it.

No mere Presiding Officer sits upon the dais; we live in a democracy, but if there is one important secret order which has chosen to pattern itself on the Republic, and call its presiding officer a President, the name of that society is not on record. On the dais sits a Monarch or a Master, a Supreme Seignior, an Illustrious Potentate, a Grand Illuminator or a Maharajah. No secretary is a secretary in this world of dreams come true: he is a Thrice Illustrious Scribe. No treasurer is a treasurer: he is an August Keeper of the Strongbox. No citizen is a citizen: he is a knight, a monk, a priest, a dervish, or an ogre.⁷

These high-sounding, mystical, impressive names and phrases make up a reality for us which is vital and alive. The use of capital letters adds weight to the emotions which the phrases set up. As Merz notes, the appeal of all this to a population in a political democracy is but a revelation of

⁷ C. Merz, *The Great American Band Wagon*, 1928, pp. 31-32. Courtesy of The John Day Company.

the deep-seated desire in all of us, commoners that we are, for prestige, for the shining armor of fancy names and magisterial duties. For, in a democracy we have Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, an Imperial City in a democratic commonwealth of Georgia, and an Imperial Wizard over an Invisible Empire.

Those well-intentioned intellectuals who imagine this to be mere froth and of no real consequence in a well-organized, rational society suffer from a belated eighteenth-century rationalism. They do not reckon with the emotions and feelings of man which are closely tied to his ego-expression and hence lie nearer to him than anything else in the world. In our treatment of myths and legends, prejudice, public opinion, and crowd behavior we shall have occasion to refer again to this tremendous hold of emotionalized words over people. To fail to realize that this is part and parcel of our culture, of our social reality, is to fall into the egregious error of those who imagine man to be a rational, deliberate fellow in his social life; it is to fall into the error of those who imagine there is a long stretch between the primitive man described in anthropological treatises or current fiction and ourselves who live in apartment houses and possess radios, drive motor cars, and play golf.

In still another dimension of our daily life the dereistic use of language is common. In theological discussions, in the daily press, and in the public forum, hundreds of stereotyped expressions, such as "Atheist," "Sinner," "Bolshevik," "pacifist," "Butter and Egg man," "flapper," etc., etc., are used with no careful definitions of situation or person. As James once remarked:

If words do belong to the same vocabulary and if the grammatical structure is correct, sentences with absolutely no meaning may be uttered in good faith and pass unchallenged. Discourses at prayer-meetings, re-shuffling the same collection of cant phrases, and the whole genus of penny-a-line-isms and the newspaper-reporter's flourishes give illustrations of this.⁸

We shall discuss this more fully in the chapters on public opinion. Here it is sufficient to point out that in political campaigns, in drives for philanthropy, in dozens of social situations, words and phrases are employed which carry much emotional toning but little definite meaning. Yet this

⁸ W. James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890, vol. I, p. 263. Courtesy of Henry Holt and Company.

very vagueness is part and parcel of the social reality which they express. During the campaign of 1928 a small weekly paper in the Middle West carried a series of items about "The Menace of Al(cohol) Smith." And a cartoon of the same summer had this as a defense of one candidate rather than another:

AL(COHOL) SMITH
HOOVER—H₂O

We can find further examples in another field. It is evident that language serves as a valuable short-cut between events and meanings. Still it may soon degenerate into an easy way of giving something a name and fool us into thinking that the ever-present puzzle of cause and effect has been solved. Henry Adams once remarked that the Law of Natural Selection in biology was an explanation which somehow did not explain. Nowhere more than in the social sciences and philosophy do we find this tendency to verbal explanations. As Stuart Chase comments on the shorthand of language:

Thus it is easier to say "the public" than to give a census enumeration beginning with Mr. Aaron. But when we go further and come to use the word "public" in a trilogy with the words "capital" and "labor"—as is the habit with all our best minds today—it is to drain it of all sense and meaning. Consider the mutilations of such short-hand words as "democracy," "liberty," "morality," "free speech," "individualism," "human nature," "spiritual," "the Anglo-Saxon race," "the consumer," "metaphysical," "Wall Street." Carefully circumscribed these words often have a function, but hurled around as is their wont in the human sciences, they tend to reduce any honest truth-seeker to insanity.⁹

Hobson points out how analogies and metaphors influence thinking in the social sciences. This employment of analogy and metaphor is clearly related to dereistic associations. He remarks:

Common thought and action influence and direct social sciences in another and subtler fashion. All thinking of an abstract order involves the employment of words in a metaphorical sense. The nature of the metaphors employed depends upon the dominant trend of the interests and activities of the common people. The very atmosphere in which social problems are conceived and presented will be saturated with the feelings and thought-processes of this com-

⁹ S. Chase, "Junk," *Nation*, 1923, vol. CXVI, p. 747.

mon life. Thus, quite independently of the subservience to close practical utilities often forced upon the sciences, there will be this strong tendency of the "disinterested" science to take on the coloring of the activities prevalent in the society where it operates.¹⁰

This is illustrated by the fact that earlier people believed the State of divine origin; later it was likened to a ship and sailing; later its description was affected by organic and still later by mechanistic concepts. In short, not only are the types of problems of social science affected by dominant practical concern, but the very working concepts and their interpretations are also influenced by analogies drawn from other sciences.

The social sciences are under the spell of semi-autistic terminology partly because our whole conception of social reality is colored by emotional and feeling reactions. We can hardly expect the mass of people to become objective. We may look for a continuation of dereistic thinking so long as emotions and feelings are dominant. The hope of the ultimate emancipation of the social sciences lies in the possibility of developing a set of concepts of social reality which will be definite, consistent, and logically universal. Whether future generations will permit such an ideal to be made practical is a problem which need not concern us here.

In the natural sciences and in mathematical logic the experts have advanced farthest from dereistic associations and dereistic language. The symbolism of logic and of physics or chemistry is stripped of personal, subjective elements. The symbols are universal and objective for all who know how to employ them. Thus the sign for integration means the same for all scholars familiar with the calculus, and the formula for rate of a falling body is applicable everywhere within the framework of Newtonian physics. Yet individuals using even the symbols of exact science may become emotionally enamored of them. The statistician who announces a new formula may be personally so bound up with his techniques that he fails to see the limitations of his formula, or may attempt to apply it to data where it does not fit. In truth, the fascination of numbers has often been the source of confusion as well as light in science. The check in science, however, is the possibility of verification by other men who duplicate the exact conditions of the experiment. Hence the final arbiter of objective

¹⁰ From J. A. Hobson, *Free-Thought in the Social Sciences*, p. 22. Copyright 1926, The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

reality is the impersonal, non-emotional correlation of phases of reality expressed in symbols universally agreed upon. Men attain to the level of scientific objectivity only in specialized interests. Most of the world's scholars, outside their own fields, are as full of dereistic, emotional associations and expressions as other people. Only an occasional genius can compass objectively the natural sciences. It is very doubtful if any of them ever has grasped or can grasp the whole range of social experience with like objectivity. A man can be objective, at best, only about a very small area of life, and only for a limited period of time each day. His life otherwise is made up of a type of anticipatory associations of phenomena and a range of conduct which lie between objectivity, at one extreme, and the subjectivity of fantasy, at the other. There have been notable scientists who were distinct mystics. Scientific objectivity represents, in truth, a very specialized and selected manner of viewing reality and does not encompass large areas of daily life. The applications of science have so greatly modified our material civilization, that modern man is considered much more objective than primitive man. Still when we observe the mystical attitudes of the ordinary man toward material progress, and especially when we observe the downright primitive worship of the technology and science which produce material changes, we wonder if the masses of mankind simply do not substitute one kind of magic for another. In his delightful book *The Mighty Medicine* (1929), Giddings shows how the fetish of education still lingers, how superstitions and magical practices persist in our own day. Whether in social conduct we can accomplish alterations in reaction analogous to the alterations accomplished in the material world, remains to be seen. In the meantime it is imperative at least to recognize the wide extent of dereistic thinking and acting in social life. To shut our eyes to this fact is itself a confession of failure to view social reality in all of its ramifications. Even in the exact sciences the verbal conceptions or hypotheses constitute the frame of reference within which the scientist works. When the physicist becomes an absolutist, a dogmatist, he has already slipped into a frame of mind where the worship of words and theories obscures further advances.

We do find workers in science who believe so firmly and dogmatically in scientific hypotheses and theories that they are not to be distinguished from the religions in their devotions. . . . At this level we find Lord Kelvin rudely refusing to have explained to him theories inimical to his conclusions, Sir Oliver

Lodge satirizing modern relativity sneeringly rather than examining it scientifically.¹¹

Many people who essay to apply science, and who glibly talk in scientific jargon, substitute sacred words for a really precise understanding. Thus "relativity," "quanta," "colloids" are applied to physical-chemical phenomena; "genes," "gradients," and "vitamins" to biological phenomena; and "inferiority complex," "libido," or "I. Q." to psychological phenomena. Once more we confuse veneration of language with genuine understanding.

To conclude this section, we may say that social reality is dominated in part by dereistic associative thinking. Language plays an enormous part in delimiting this same reality for us. Phrases, words, and entire series of concepts determine in large measure the levels of our behavior, and they belong essentially to the culture behind us. No one of us is born with a superhuman capacity to conceive a world afresh. We customarily accept as valid the social reality implicit in the culture patterns which we find about us, and seldom do we consciously attempt to change patterns which have been built up in long generations. In the material world our concepts have changed rather rapidly, but in the world of social behavior alterations have come slowly.

C. *Language and Culture Norms.*

1. *Language and Technological Knowledge.*—In language, especially in the "stored symbols" of books and other writing, we have the heart of modern science and technology. Even among primitive peoples who have no written language and no science, there exists a great store of verbalized information on fishing, hunting, weaving, weapon-making, and so on through the whole range of material culture. These techniques are carried from one generation to another, not only through direct manual learning, but through speech. The verbal lore of the tribe concerns material culture as well as non-material. So today, although the science and engineering which have so profoundly altered our material world, are based on instruments of precise measurement and the use of novel materials, nevertheless there is a counterpart of all these in language concepts. Without the means of preserving their methods and concepts in language form modern sci-

¹¹ T. S. Harding, "The Whole Truth," *Saturday Review of Literature*, January 5, 1929, p. 571.

ence and technology would be hopelessly crippled. Even more significant, of course, is the straight, objective, impersonal thought which has been developed with experimentation, so that the natural material world can be brought under man's control more and more effectively. In place of magic and common sense we have organized science as an aid in getting on in the world of material things. As we know, this is the area where objective thinking has gone the farthest. The cultural counterparts of objective thinking are found not only in the instruments and machines important for science and engineering, but also in the concepts which are communicated through language with the exactitude of mathematics wherever possible.

2. *Language and Non-Moral Folkways*.—So, too, the non-moral folkways—the conventions of fashion, manners, and social intercourse—are carried from person to person in language terms. What is polite, what is being worn, what is the thing to say or do, is thus communicated. The folkways pass more or less unconsciously from person to person through oral expression. Thus the children of a family are instructed in table manners, in methods of social address, and in all of the social amenities. The very vocabulary of polite society becomes a means of determining social status. Today, with our self-consciousness of culture, we even produce books on etiquette for those not to the manner born. Thus we even codify our manners, just as we communicate our dress styles, in part through language.

With the enormous increase in communication, moreover, we have a widespread standardization of phrase and meaning which we have not had before. It is illustrated in advertising and fashion in the phrases: "Eventually, why not now?" "It's time to re-tire," "Ask the man who owns one." We see the rapid spread of catch phrases, such as "jazz age," which express our current ideas, and the great amount of autism, such as "hitchy kitchy coo" in popular songs. Through it all language becomes inseparable from the behavior of people. As philologists have long known, we may easily study the mutations of folkways and social behavior through a study of language content.

3. *Language and the Moral Definitions of Situations*.—Nowhere is the importance of language more apparent than in the standardization and communication of the moral codes of the group: family, gang, neighborhood, lodge, community, religious sect, or nation. The mores are carried

in the definitions of situations. These consist largely of phrases, words, and verbalized codes pertaining to conduct. They have been built up largely out of situations defined in crises in the past. Subsequently these same definitions may be carried over into similar or even dissimilar situations. Such words as "scab" in the labor market, "boycott," "lockout," and others, represent a language delimitation of conflict situations between laborers and employers. Words like "whore" and "bastard" define persons who do not fit the conventional codes of morality. "Adultery," "fornication," and like terms, define other situations dealt with by the group. And "thief," "burglar," "arson," "criminal" and "traitor" indicate still other situations where group pressures are applied. Even the word "delinquent" applied to juvenile offenders has come to carry unsavory meanings.

Among more primitive peoples and even in modern communities in certain wide areas of social conduct, the codes are carried from person to person in verbal form. The place of gossip of the village face-to-face sort, and also in its modern form of pamphlet, newspaper, and radio, is self-evident. The Mrs. Grundys of our society carry the codes with them in their verbal activities. The preachers in their sermons and the village elders around the store or postoffice do the same thing. And the terms they apply to persons and situations off color are brought down to them from the past and applied to present difficulties. For example, the codes of conduct of an elementary or high school teacher are determined by the standards of the community. Infractions are commonly talked about, and if the teacher does not openly conform in conduct, he is likely to be removed from his position. A student reports the following illustrative incident:

Miss X and I were teachers in the A high school. The community had very definite notions about what teachers should do and especially what they should not do. There were few opportunities for social life in the town for young people. No school dances were permitted high school boys and girls, and public dances were taboo. This girl and I had ambitions to go on to college for further work and were both taking a French course by correspondence from the state university. We decided to do some studying together. On two occasions on Sunday afternoons we took our books and walked down the railroad tracks to the edge of town and sat down in one of the few shady spots in that region to study and talk. The gossips were soon at work and it was not long until the principal of the school and the president of the board of education warned us that it was not proper for the teachers to be seen together. It would set a bad example to the students. The imaginative ladies of the community were soon

ready to announce our engagement. The more elaborately minded even extended the myth into realms of intimate relations which existed only in their own immoral imaginations.

The little child learns a host of words about situations which define for him his conduct and thinking in reference to them. This is "naughty," that is "nice" and "proper." Some expressions are immoral, others highly commended. Most social situations tend to be defined in negative terms, and with these terms are associated emotions of fear of authority. The very lack of positive terminology is *prima facie* evidence of the nature of taboos. They consist of inhibition patterns laid down in the rising generation by those in authority. As we saw in Chapter II, failure to conform to them meets with ridicule, punishment, or other means of enforcing obedience.

It is in the legal codes that the use of highly formalized language is most obvious. In criminal law moral conduct is delimited by the political state. Adultery, fornication, theft, felony, larceny, desertion, divorce, marriage, and other situations are dealt with both by statute and common law and by precedents of court decisions. The Anglo-American common law is a continuation of earlier Anglo-Saxon mores. Likewise in the law of persons, in the law of torts, of contracts and of equity, human relations are defined in relatively definite ways. Here the logic, or illogic, of experience is put into form for universal guidance of behavior. In times of crises like the present, new behavior patterns arise in the economic and political field, on the one hand, and in the field of more personal relations, as of the sexes, on the other. As a result the legal codes are not in harmony with current practices in the community. Court decisions, interpretations, or actual modification of the statutes themselves then gradually change the legal code. The rise of codes regulating public utility corporations is an instance of this from the economic field. In human relations the newer developments seen in the juvenile courts, in courts of domestic relations, in children's codes and welfare legislation, are other alterations which modern life has brought about.

Still, whether in the unwritten mores or in the legal codes, the social situations into which people get are described and delimited in language terms. In the law, moreover, an attempt is made to make these terms more rational and deliberate than are the unconscious and somewhat haphazard unwritten mores. It may be said parenthetically that in spite of some incon-

sistencies the unwritten mores often represent the true tenor of the community codes.

4. *Language and Definition of Social Status.*—Not only are manners, fashions, and moral codes delimited in language terms, but social status is also so defined. The whole of in-group—out-group relationships and of social class lines are indicated in terms which set apart these groups. The expression, "He is not in my class," bespeaks superiority, on the one side, and subordination, on the other. The use of badges, insignia, and other marks of distinction is a mere extension of this. The letter men of a university are a group apart. Though they lack much real solidarity, the honor societies, Phi Beta Kappa and Sigma Xi, possess something of fellowship denoted by their keys. In more highly integrated social groups these distinctions are of great moment. As we noted, fraternal orders are full of such distinctions. The various degrees of an order, the language of the various rituals, the wearing of pins, rings, and watch charms, all speak of class lines. In aristocratic societies this extends to all sorts of honorary orders. Even democracies do not seem to be able to escape these marks of differentiation. In our own day we see crosses or badges of distinction given for meritorious services, we observe the codes of trade unions and of employers' associations. Social distinctions in religious groups inevitably follow ritualism and ecclesiastical hierarchies.

We may say, then, that the whole cast of thought is intimately related to the form and content of language. How a person will think and act in most situations can be determined by a knowledge of the codes of his group. True, behavior varies with group participation, but so do the codes. Really, a consideration of the subject carries us beyond the field of the non-moral folkways, the mores properly speaking, and the techniques of material culture. The whole method of thought, of conceiving the world in which we live, is very largely, if not entirely, fixed for us in our language patterns. We may even contend with a considerable degree of probability that the forms of our thought—whether emotional and subjective or impersonal and scientific—are actually the outcome of habits instilled in us by social groups who initiate us into systems of language reflecting their culture. As we learn more about primitive peoples, we are struck by the power of magical forms of thought on the entire culture of a people. So, too, an Oriental mystic is amazed at the effects of science and material culture upon the thinking and acting of Western peoples. Kinglake makes the

following observation of the effect of magical thinking upon the Occidental who comes into a differently organized environment:

[In the East] you might as well dispute the efficacy of grass or grain as of magic. There is no controversy about the matter. The effect of this, the unanimous belief of an ignorant people, upon the mind of a stranger is extremely curious and well worth noticing. The man coming freshly from Europe is at first proof against the nonsense with which he is assailed, but often it happens that after a little while the social atmosphere in which he lives will begin to infect him, and if he has been unaccustomed to the cunning of fence by which Reason prepares the means of guarding herself against Fallacy, he will yield himself at last to the faith of those around him, and this he will do by sympathy, it would seem, rather than conviction. I have been much interested in observing that the mere "practical man," however skillful and shrewd in his own way, has not the kind of power that will enable him to resist the gradual impressions made upon his mind by the common opinion of those whom he sees and hears from day to day.¹²

This uncritical attitude, this scientifically untrained mind, is the basis for the easy assumption of the practical man that the magic he sees in the Orient or Africa has objective basis. As a matter of fact, our own society is shot through and through with a kind of mysticism and magic of materialism—but we do not recognize it as such. The whole point is that language and forms of thought furnish the atmosphere of social behavior. They constitute the essence of social reality. Ordinarily we are no more aware of this atmosphere than we are aware of the air we breathe. We stress this point at some risk of repetition because through much of this volume, we evidence how subtly and yet profoundly the very form, and the content and meaning, of language give a clue to the behavior of men in groups which no acquaintance with the mere mechanics of stimulus and response would ever afford.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter XVI, nos. 116–117, pp. 449–58. Cf. also, Chapters XX, no. 157, pp. 572–74, and XXII, no. 174, pp. 647–48.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises from assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter XVI, nos. 12–14, p. 458.

¹² A. W. Kinglake, *Eöthen, or Traces of Travel*, 1849, pp. 82–83.

2. Discuss the relation of language to thought. (Cf. Symposium, "Is Thinking Merely the Action of Language Mechanisms?" *British Journal of Psychology*, 1920-21, vol. XI, pp. 55-104, in which Watson, Bartlett, Thomson, Pear and others participated.)
 3. Differentiate between the dereistic thought of the schizophrenic patient and that found among various social groups. What keeps the dereistic thinking of the latter within the bounds of social reality? Show how ideas once considered sound would now be called dereistic if they appeared in our contemporary culture.
 4. Collect illustrations of autistic (dereistic) expressions from cartoons, jokes, pseudo-scientific writing, and literature.
 5. Illustrate the relation of language to (a) technological material culture; (b) non-moral folkways; (c) moral behavior.
 6. Illustrate how words tend to carry emotional freight. (For example, why would most Christians hesitate to name a son "Judas"?)
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
1. The Relation of Language and Thought. (Cf. Dewey, *How We Think*, 1910, and *Experience and Nature*, 1925; Piéron, *Thought and Brain*, 1927; Symposium cited above, *British Journal of Psychology*, 1920-21, vol. XI, pp. 55-104; also, Müller, *Science of Thought*, and *Science of Language*, etc.)
 2. Report Markey, *The Symbolic Process*, 1928 on the relation of language to symbolic processes. Report Lorimer *The Growth of Reason*, 1929, on a similar problem.

CHAPTER XVII

PERSONALITY AND THE CONTENT OF CULTURE

A. The Reality of the Group and Its Culture Patterns.

We have not questioned the reality of the group, since our present concern has been the relation of language to forms of social reality. In some recent literature of social psychology the use of the concept of the group has been sharply criticized. Allport objects to the term group as a scientific concept on the grounds that groups do not exist, but only individuals. We see at once that we are faced with the medieval problem of nominalism and realism over which the scholastics argued long and vigorously. It is not our purpose here to indulge in any of the niceties of this debate. Certainly the reality of the group and of culture as a unit has been called into question, together with the concept of a "group mind," a "crowd" or "collective consciousness," or "group unconscious." The question is clearly one of point of view, that is, of the philosophic premise from which one operates. It is a question, in other words, of metaphysics. Throughout this volume we have assumed the conceptual validity both of the group and of culture patterns. Much of the older controversy over the group or collective mind would be dissipated if psychological terms were eliminated from sociology. If it were necessary, we could maintain that social phenomena may be scientifically described in terms of culture-patterns and group action without any reference to individual psychological mechanisms. So long as we held to our premises and were logically consistent in our description, we should be well within the canons of scientific method and good logic. However, we do not care to enter into this dark region of academic discussion. A recognition of the place of belief and of the power of images, ideas, and attitudes in determining behavior will offer us a simple solution. In spite of Allport's contention that the concept *nation* is a snare and a delusion, men the world over act *as if* there were national groups. The curious thing is that the AS IF's are as significant in social behavior as are the biological organisms and the alleged reality of the individual. If it satisfies

anyone, we may say that in this section we shall discuss the AS IF's of behavior. If a man pictures his family as a unit and as a value, no academic contention will convince him that he is wrong. In spite of logical arguments he will continue to act as if his family as a unit were real. So, too, with the concept *nation*. We may assure a good patriot of the Union League that the national group is non-existent, but he will still be moved to vote particular ways by the words and symbols which revolve around that concept. Possibly Allport and others have been over-impressed by the rise of a new kind of individualism which cuts across older groupings, and have in this way arrived at a new defense of the individualistic thesis. After all, even philosophic premises are not cut off from the cultural background and the personal history of the individual who constructs these premises. The present writer no more believes that the group—family, lodge, trade union, church, or state—has a collective nervous system and a distinct consciousness than do our contemporary nominalists. He does hold that the group is more than a mere enumeration of its constituent individuals; at the very least the interaction of individuals produces some precipitates of behavior which we call culture patterns. Among these are concepts of groups as units. And these concepts of groups become values in themselves as part of our culture. Furthermore, these culture patterns are carried along generation after generation. They are modified by social interaction, but nevertheless maintain an existence independent of any particular individual. The concept of the group, like the concept of customs, of techniques of food-getting and of other culture patterns, is not the product of one individual or even of a generation. All culture patterns are so persistent that we must reckon with them in one way or another if we are to understand human behavior.

B. The Social Content of Images and Attitudes.

1. *Content and Meaning.*—In Part II we pointed out that what went on within the organism was as important as the externally observable activity. Both internal and external reactions are dependent upon intra-individual as well as external stimuli. In the earlier chapters we were concerned with the mechanisms of this relation of organism to environment. We must now deal with the content and social meaning associated with these internal and external factors. The external environment is made up of material objects and personalities. Toward these we have attitudes and habits.

The internal environment is constituted of images and ideas which modify and also determine these same attitudes and habits. A man's image of his mother will be of great importance in aiding us to understand his attitudes and reactions not only toward his mother but toward other women as well. So, too, a man's image of his country, as symbolized by the map or the flag, will assist us to understand his behavior in time of war. The "pictures in our heads" of the negro race in general will definitely affect our relations with individual members of the black race. Our concepts and images of the individual negro, our like or dislike for him, our treatment of him will be determined by the nature of these general images and ideas. Not all images and concepts are visual. They may be auditory or vocal-motor, or may involve other sensory-motor processes of the organism.

The content and meaning of anticipatory and consummatory behavior are determined both by personal-social and by cultural conditioning. Except for descriptive purposes, these types of conditioning are inseparable. Doubtless a man's image of his mother is fixed by infantile personal-social interaction with her, whereas his image and concept of his country grows out of the more conventionalized, standard culture norms to which his family, the school, the church, and the state have exposed him. These concepts are the core of the values which grow out of our social participation. As we noted in Chapter VII, social value is social meaning. We get these meanings only out of social interstimulation. That is to say, we get largely from others our values or content-meanings. They have no significance apart from social life. The attitudes and habits we build up around values are the individual counterparts to these value stimuli. We have already noted how definitely these values are correlated with feelings and emotions.

The importance of the content of images and ideas has been stressed by most social psychologists. What Durkheim and his follower, Lévy-Bruhl, termed "collective representations" are essentially these formalized contents and their meanings. What Lippmann called "stereotypes" are about the same thing. Pareto, the Italian economist and sociologist, calls them "residues."

2. *Organization of Attitudes and Habits around Stereotypes.*—These internal objects of attention become, then, the center around which our basic attitudes and habits are built up. They furnish the means by which we interpret or react to the external objects and persons. They constitute the

"apperceptive mass" which Wundt emphasized in discussing psychological phenomena. Shand and McDougall used the term sentiment to describe the organization of attitudes and habits around these cores. McDougall defines the sentiment as "an organized system of emotional dispositions centered about the idea of some object." Were it not for the unfortunate associations which the term sentiment has acquired, we might employ the concept "sentiment" to denote this patterning of attitudes around these images and ideas.

Any new reactions which we experience are always recast into already existing patterns of attitudes around the old core of content. The direction, then, which new conditioning will take is absolutely determined by the condition of the organism at the time when the new stimuli reach it. We have already observed how novel stimuli come to be interpreted, that is, re-built into the behavior system of the individual only in terms of his past. The crisis of the laborer in the face of technological changes in production is an easy instance. Or, the learning of new facts from science may lead to a reformation of one's philosophy, but only in terms of previous conditioning. The previous conditioning remains fundamental in the development of new attitudes and habits. Our early experiences are so profound in effect that a novel situation merely causes a partial re-orientation of our patterns of action. The cultural stereotypes can never quite be removed once they have been laid down in early life.

The development of stereotyped attitudes can be seen as whole groups develop an Oriental fatalism or an Occidental individualism and self-styled progressivism. Again both intimate personal-social experiences and cultural norms play a part here. Radical resistance to authority or fatalism may arise from parent-child relations, or may be acquired from the folkways and traditions. For example, the fatalistic ethos of some Oriental groups may arise from a long cultural heritage created by population pressures, the caste system, and a certain inertia in material change. In contrast, our Western individualism and our optimistic faith in progress result from an outburst of exploration and exploitation of new land areas, and they are stimulated by mechanical inventions, capitalistic economics, and religious, especially Protestant, formulations with their emphasis upon individual rights and duties in a grand drama of salvation.

Since stereotyped images and ideas are socially determined, language and pictorial presentation provide the form which they normally take. Lan-

guage is, as we know, the essential carrier of most of our residues. As we have observed, language has the nature of an attitude rather than of a complete overt act, and it is through language that men communicate and interstimulate each other in terms of contents and meanings. It is the content of language and not its mechanism which is significant in communication.

3. *Stereotypes and Definitions of Situations.*—Individual and social definitions of situations are made largely in verbal terms. Since communication is basic to social life, it is easy to see how social definitions of situations rapidly become stereotypes. For the individual, situations are usually delimited by the word formula he has received from either personal-social or cultural conditioning. If the individual has been powerfully conditioned by his personal-social relations, his definitions of situations tend to be hedonistic. If cultural conditioning predominates, his definitions tend to be more acceptable to his group because they are utilitarian. If they are personal-social, a conflict may arise within the individual between his own definitions and those of his group. The hedonistic selection of imagery and activity may be labeled anti-social or pathological. If this selection of activity is too divergent, as with the criminal, it may provoke social punishment. If it takes an extreme dereistic direction, as in schizophrenia, it may lead to medical attention. In contrast, the utilitarian selection of the group standards keeps the individual within the bounds of accepted standards.

The verbal stereotypes serve, then, as a means by which the group keeps its members in restraint. All in-groups have words or phrases to describe the recalcitrant member: "stool pigeon," "radical," "traitor." So, too, the relations of in-groups to out-groups are revealed in these language stereotypes. They expose the images, ideas, and attitudes which members of the group have toward outsiders. The trade unionist calls the strike-breaker a "scab." "Wet" or "Dry" describes people in their differences on the liquor question. "Nigger-lover" is an epithet applied to self-appointed friends of the negro by those who maintain more traditional attitudes.

Slogans, catchwords, shibboleths, myths, and legends all represent the verbal images and ideas held by members of a group to describe both themselves and other groups. Sets of such stereotypes grow up to describe every type of group toward which we are oriented, either as members or as non-members. These stereotypes occur equally in primary and in secondary

in-groups and out-groups. Like attitudes and habits, they arise in all sorts of crises: in the crises of birth, puberty, marriage, death; in economic crises, such as strikes and lockouts; in crises caused by floods or fires or earthquakes; in crises of war. These stereotypes aid us in defining the novel situations in terms of past experience. They help to balance and stabilize us when otherwise we might not know how to evaluate or define the new situation.

Since language is bound up with the nature of social reality, and since it is often closely connected with dereistic conditioning, stereotypes show both objective and dereistic form. The logic of feeling, which is the basis of so much of our social definition and reaction to situations, is revealed in the nature of the stereotypes. Whether words, phrases, or myths, they are frequently surcharged with autistic associations. If so much of our reaction to the world around us is determined by emotion rather than by reason, the anticipatory stereotypes should and do indicate it. Thus the stereotyped language of social reality grows out of the non-logical or illogical organization of our world of values. Since we live in a world of non-logical, irrational conditionings, the content and meaning of our world reflect the same thing. Our world of values is not an immaterial, non-personal, logical, super-terrestrial sphere. It is constructed out of our emotions and our ego-centric desires for satisfactions of a fantastic, autistic sort, as well as out of reasoned consideration of our needs and of methods of satisfying them. In the world of material culture, perhaps, we may be more rational than in art, politics, religion, and philosophy. The material world dealt with by science has become de-personalized, inhuman, and almost static. But in these other dimensions of life we are still emotional, dereistic, and driven by desires which are cluttered up with all sorts of primitive and irrational vestiges of infantile conditionings.

Because stereotypes are bound up with social reality, they are like other phases of social life in having a certain continuity. Not only is this seen in the persistence of slogans, catchwords, and shibboleths, but it is evident in superstitions and in so-called fictions of a more organized and definitely patterned sort.

C. Myths and Legends as Organized Pictures of Our Social World.

1. *Nature of Myths and Legends.*—Not only do brief stereotypes of all sorts enter into our mental content or sets of values, but the stories of

heroes and of past and current events furnish us with an organized, more or less complete picture of our culture which colors practically everything else in life. These stories we discuss as myths and legends. We may define myth as the more illusory, imaginative material which is poured into us from our social contacts. By legend we mean those stories which have some factual basis, but which in the re-telling and recasting have lost their objective accuracy and have accumulated all sorts of imaginative details. Both legends and myths are highly important for the continuity of social life and culture patterns. Without them the past and present, as well as the future, would seem chaotic. With them the world takes on meaning and form, and does not need to be constantly recast by us or for us. They make our social reality stable, predictable, and capable of being endured.

The ordinary man today is as unaware of the myths and legends about him *as* myths and legends, as is the primitive person. Our rationalistic tradition is so omnipresent that we imagine myths and legends to be consciously fantastic, purely imaginative, make-believe stories which only ignorant pre-literate folk believed. Presumably in our own enlightened age they do not exist except in the pretty books which we buy for children at Christmas. We are no more conscious of our own myths and legends as something false, than are native peoples. With us, as with them, myths are a real and actual part of our psycho-social environment. What Malinowski says about myths in primitive groups applies equally well to our own:

Myth as it exists in a savage community, that is, in its living primitive form, is not merely a story told but a reality lived. It is not of the nature of fiction, such as we read to-day in a novel, but it is a living reality, believed to have once happened in primeval times, and continuing ever since to influence the world and human destinies. The myth is to the savage what, to a fully believing Christian, is the Biblical story of Creation, of the Fall, of the Redemption by Christ's Sacrifice on the Cross. As our sacred story lives in our ritual, in our morality, as it governs our faith and controls our conduct, even so does his myth for the savage.¹

The myth is not merely a symbolic or superimposed story of creation, or an extraneous narrative of a possibly fictitious event.

Studied alive, myth is not symbolic, but a direct expression of its subject-matter; it is not an explanation in satisfaction of a scientific interest, but a nar-

¹ B. Malinowski, *Myth in Primitive Psychology*, 1926, p. 18. Courtesy of W. W. Norton and Company.

rative resurrection of a primeval reality, told in satisfaction of deep religious wants, moral cravings, social submissions, assertions, even practical requirements. Myth fulfils in primitive culture an indispensable function: it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man. Myth is thus a vital ingredient of human civilization; it is not an idle tale, but a hard-worked active force; it is not an intellectual explanation or an artistic imagery, but a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom.²

Myths and legends, then, are considered genuine and real by the believers. We are not conscious of our own myths and legends as anything strange, foreign, or devised for amusement, but as actual accounts of events and meanings.

It is evident that savage myths and legends mean little to us largely because they are outside our culture. Gomme, a great student of mythology, remarks: "The story into which the myth is woven is not a story to those who believe in the truth of the myth. It is just this belief in the truth of the myth or legend which sets it distinctly apart from romance or fiction." Moreover, myths are not created out of nothing, but have, as a basis, some crisis. They deal with economic needs, with warfare, adventure, success or failure in life, with birth, puberty, marriage, death, and future life. They may arise as a wish fulfilment in the presence of some difficult situation, yet they serve to stabilize us in the presence of our own difficulties.

Myths and legends come down to us from the past as a part of our cultural heritage. They are, however, never static. They are in the making today just as they have always been. In modern propaganda myths and legends are deliberately constructed for the purpose of social control.

We shall leave an analysis of propaganda to a later section. Our present purpose is to examine the more or less unconscious growth of myths and legends. As a clue to this growth we must examine their psychological features.

2. *The Psychology of Legend- and Myth-Making*.—The psychological basis of myth- and legend-making lies in the field of perception, memory, and imaginative association which we examined in Chapter VI. We noted there the fact of individual differences in sense capacity. Some people hear more accurately than others. Some see better. Others may have keener touch, or smell, or taste. Apperceptive mass, that is, retained past experi-

² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

ences, greatly influences all perception. We see largely what we are trained to see by our family or friends. If we perceive what we unconsciously wish to perceive, our very wishes have been shaped by what we have been taught to expect and to want to see. Thus perception is a synthesis of past experience or meaning and present sensation. The apperceptive mass or meaning is determined by personal-social and cultural conditioning. Stories of heroes and our childhood instruction in the meanings of our culture form the substratum on which all subsequent perceptions are built. Moreover, emotions and feelings color our perceptions, especially in the formative years. It is in this period of early childhood, in fact, that dereistic associations with their emotional accompaniments are most easily formed. These early conditionings, so largely made up of language, are the basis of our adult social reality. In short, all perception is affected by individual differences in sensation, by the situation in which it occurs, by the direction of attention to particular aspects of the situation, by emotional factors, and by the traces of past experience.

Now, memory of past experiences is not an accurate photographic reproduction of perceptions and actions. It also is affected by other images, other perceptions and emotional states, and by the lapse of time. The process of forgetting and recalling is as dynamic as perception or any other anticipatory response. Says Stratton: "The memory not only grows less clear, but it actually tells a different story as time proceeds." Not only do we find in memory transposition of items in time and space, condensation, typification, secondary elaboration and dramatization, as the studies of Freud, Crosland, and Whipple have shown, but in the very process of communication of memories from person to person these alterations are enhanced. A story may gather or lose detail in the re-telling. Narration in this way is a creative process. Although individuals may be certain that their accounts are accurate, we know how faulty they actually may be. To indicate the manner in which legendary material takes form in every-day life, we quote at some length:

In 1871 Alexander Jester started east from Kansas in a light spring wagon with canvas top, drawn by two small pony horses. While fording a stream near Emporia, as the horses were drinking, he fell into conversation with Gilbert Gates, a young man who was returning from homesteading land in Kansas. Young Gates was travelling in what was then known as a prairie-schooner drawn by a pair of heavy horses. Jester had three young deer in his wagon, and

Gates a buffalo calf. They decided to travel together and give exhibitions with their animals to meet expenses. When they reached Paris, Missouri, Gates had disappeared. Jester's explanation, at the preliminary hearing, was that he became homesick and sold his outfit to him that he might hasten home by rail. Jester was seen leaving Paris driving Gates' heavy team with his own lighter team tied behind. Later he sold the heavy horses and various other articles known to have belonged to Gates, but which he claimed were purchased. It is not the purpose of the writer to decide the merits of the case, but rather to call attention to certain exceedingly interesting psychological features.

Jester was soon arrested but escaped, and was not brought to trial until 1901. Thirty years had therefore passed since the events concerning which witnesses were called upon to testify. Besides, there was a blinding snow-storm at the time when the crime was supposed to have been committed; and, of course, this would have interfered with accurate observation. Further, when the witnesses "saw" the things which they related they were not aware that a crime had been committed. Two preliminary questions thus suggested themselves: First, would any one note, as carefully as the subsequent testimony indicated, the peculiarities of a chance traveller on the road, especially in a blinding snow-storm, and at a time when no reason existed, so far as known, for unusual observation? Second, would observers, under these circumstances, be likely to remember, after the lapse of thirty years, the minute details of what they had seen?

The incidents were of the unimportant, uninteresting sort that were frequently experienced at that time. Even the prairie-schooner could hardly have been exceptional enough to attract special attention.

When the trial was held, two women described the size and color of all the horses, the harness of the heavy team, the figure and appearance of Jester—height, a little over six feet, weight about one hundred and eighty pounds, with a hook-nose, gray eyes, powerful physique, and large hands. They further testified that, looking into the first wagon as it approached, they saw lying in the bottom the outlines of a human form with a buffalo-robe thrown over it; and they gave this testimony confidently, thirty years after the crime, notwithstanding they were twelve and fourteen years of age, respectively, when the events transpired, and though they were riding at a canter in the face of a heavy snow-storm, with veils tied over their faces, and the horses which they met travelling at a fast trot when they passed in the storm. A farmer swore that the buffalo-robe was covered with blood, and still another witness that, while helping Jester start his wagon, the canvas blew back and he saw the body of a man with his throat cut. The description of the body was that of young Gates.

A man who had just been married, and was taking his wife behind him on his horse to their new home, described the horses attached to each wagon, the wagons, and the dog; and this in spite of the fact that his own horse was going at the "single foot" gait, that Jester's horses were trotting past, that it was snow-

ing hard, and that, being on his honeymoon, other thoughts and interests would seem to be occupying his mind.

A man of thirty-six, who consequently was six years of age at the time of the crime, testified that later, during the thaw and heavy rains of spring, he and his father saw the body of a young man of eighteen or twenty years of age floating down the stream. He described the color of his hair and complexion, and said that he had on a blue-checked shirt and blue overalls. His description of the shirt agreed with that of Mrs. Gates of a shirt which she had made for her son. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that neither the father of the six-year-old boy nor the girls who saw the outlines of a human form in the wagon, nor the man who helped start Jester off, said anything about their observations until Gates' disappearance and Jester's arrest had been published.

It is quite evident that, whatever the merits of the case, the testimony of these witnesses, after a lapse of thirty years, was amazingly exact. Yet it would be unfair to assume that they were dishonest. All of those from whose testimony we have quoted were people of good standing in the community. They could be relied upon both in word and deed. The attorney for the defense, to whom the writer is indebted for the facts in the case, speaks in the highest terms of these witnesses. "They were among the best people of Monroe County," he says. "They wanted to be truthful, and they were very friendly to me, entertaining me overnight when I was looking up evidence preparatory to the trial."

What then was the explanation of their remarkable exactness, even in the smallest and in some instances least noticeable and least interesting details? The key to the mystery lies in the way in which the case was worked up, in the publicity that it received, and in human psychology. After Jester's final arrest, Pinkerton detectives were employed and seven or eight leading criminal lawyers of Missouri and Chicago were engaged to assist the prosecution. The detectives, as they secured one fact after another, cultivated the information by suggestive questions and statements to those with whom they conversed. When, for example, a prospective witness said that there was a buffalo-robe in the wagon the detectives would ask if it covered the outlines of a human form. The man would think it likely, and soon that it did. Of course the case was featured in the county newspapers. It was a first class news story. Pictures were published, pictures of Jester and Gates, pictures of the horses and wagons, pictures of the dog, and pictures of scenes in the chain of events leading to the alleged crime. The pictures were based on what witnesses said they saw, and what the detectives said they must have seen, and reportorial imagination supplied whatever was lacking. The clothing of Gates was described, the articles he had with him enumerated, the facts to which certain witnesses would swear were told to other witnesses and reported in the newspapers. Indeed, all the events of the crime as it was conceived by witnesses, reporters, and detectives were portrayed and described with much the effect of a moving-picture representation, until fact and fiction were indistinguishable. It is a well-known principle of psychology that if you tell a man something often enough he finally accepts

it; and as he continually repeats it, even as a possible fact, it ends by becoming firmly fixed. Then he believes that he saw or heard it.

We must not forget that all this happened thirty years after the events. The undetected vagueness of memory-details of the witnesses furnished a fertile soil for the growth of imaginary pictures. The attempt to see faces in the moon is comparable to their experience. With a dim outline, or a sketch with several possibilities, there is always a strong tendency to fill in the outlines, usually with what is in one's mind.³

An amazing illustration of the extent to which myths are believed is the popular reaction to McCutcheon's novel, *Graustark*. Published a generation ago, it had an immense sale. The story was so vivid and engrossing that people all over the country imagined it to be factual history. The following account reveals some of the serious beliefs of the people who wrote Mr. McCutcheon about *Graustark*:

A woman in Cleveland asked him to give her directions for reaching Graustark by rail after landing in Europe. Her daughter was an invalid, and the mother was quite sure that the climate of Graustark would be "of untold benefit to her." Another woman wrote that her husband was dying of consumption and she felt that if they could buy or rent a house on the mountainside at Edelweiss they could avert the death that seemed so near. These were the letters that hurt him to answer.

Brighter was the telegram Mr. McCutcheon once received from an Eastern city. It read: "To decide a bet, what is the quickest way to get to Graustark?" Then there was the Cincinnati cynic who took exception to the hour fixed in one of the *Graustark* stories for the departure of a passenger train. "Such stupidity spoiled the book" for him. Then there were the persons who asserted or suggested relationship with the royal families of Graustark or the adjacent States, or with the American heroes and heroines. The publication of *Beverly of Graustark* moved one correspondent to write with the hope of establishing a family connection with Beverly Calhoun. Her object was: "I am getting up a family tree so that I can join the Daughters, and it may be that you can help me some."

A Washington man wrote that he was organizing a Graustark Club in his lodging-house with the idea of escorting the entire party to the principality as soon as the weather was favorable for the trip. Of course there were the tales of travelers who professed to know all about Graustark, and found Mr. McCutcheon seriously at fault in his local color. One such traveler, however, was generous. A San Francisco woman who wrote to ask the longitude and latitude of Graustark said, "I have a friend here who has traveled extensively.

³ E. J. Swift, *Psychology and the Day's Work*, 1920, pp. 273-77. Courtesy of Chas. Scribner's Sons.

She says she has been in Graustark twice and loves it very much. Your description of the country is excellent, she says. We expect to go abroad this fall, and I am writing to ask how we can reach Graustark. My friend is in the East and I can not find the place on the map. She says she has seen the Princess Yetive, and has gone through the castle."⁴

If confusion of fact and romance can arise in this manner, it is not surprising that in crises of larger social importance, both perception and memory may become even more inaccurate and imaginative. Van Langenhove's study of the growth of legends about the guerilla warfare of the Belgian civilian population against the invading German army in 1914 is an interesting illustration from contemporary history. From slight incidents, often themselves misperceived, wild stories of the cruelty of Belgian civilians became fixed in the minds of Germans, both at home and in the army. These stories were supplemented by legends of similar civilian guerilla activities against the Germans during the Franco-Prussian War. As they were relayed home by letter and by narratives of wounded soldiers sent back to recuperate, the stories grew. They frequently developed stereotypes which exposed an anti-Catholic prejudice. There had been some misinformation about the activities of Belgian priests in inciting civilians to action against the German army. The Protestant North Germans, who made up large sections of the invading army, found it easy to believe the original tales. The legends finally grew until they were woven into newspaper accounts, into fiction, and even into official military reports. Of course the Germans at home expected colorful accounts of adventures against the enemy. Children are not alone in wishing war to be glorious and cruel at the same time. In the presence of eager listeners the soldier on leave from the front must have felt an irresistible social pressure to embroider his stories with vivid accounts of the heroism of his comrades and the satanism of the enemy. Doubtless many of these legends are living today. Thousands of Germans accept them as factual material. These legends with their patriotic stereotypes must still color German attitudes toward Belgium and the whole tragedy of the World War.

Now we must not suppose for a moment that this sort of thing is peculiar to something called "the German mind." It happens inevitably in all stories of critical situations as they are remade over and over again in the telling.

⁴ From "Buying a Ticket to Graustark," *Literary Digest*, 1928, vol. XCIX, p. 51. Courtesy of author, Arthur Maurice.

In exactly the same way, tales of German atrocities circulated in all of the Allied countries. The favorite tales described satanic Germans who poisoned wells, cut off children's hands and women's breasts, and delighted in wholesale rape and plunder. During the emotional, almost hysterical, state induced by war, people are ready and anxious to believe the wildest tales. During the war this incident occurred in one American city, and it could be duplicated almost anywhere.

A speaker at a public meeting described the horrors which the German invaders had brought upon Belgium. He described German troops riding into a town, seizing children right and left and cutting off their hands. He said that he had himself actually seen these children running about the streets the next day with the stubs of their arms exposed. The audience was shocked but fascinated by these gory details. A surgeon among the listeners, who retained some semblance of sanity, could not swallow this particular statement. He asked the speaker if he did not know that as evidently there had been no medical care provided for the children, they would bleed to death in a few hours. His simple question would have made it impossible for any "sane" person to affirm or believe the story. But the lecturer lost his temper and tacitly accused the doctor of unpatriotic sympathies by saying: "The gentleman evidently does not want to believe my story." The hearty applause of the audience made it only too evident to the doctor that it was futile to attempt the simplest argument with a crowd and a speaker emotionally attuned to believe anything vicious about an enemy.

We may summarize the factors which are significant in the development of legends about an observed event:

- (1) The emotional state of the observers. This is usually increased at the time of observation, if the situation is dramatic.
- (2) Errors of perception at the time of observation. If the event is spectacular or unfamiliar, it is more difficult to perceive it accurately. Attention will be limited to a few details.
- (3) Errors in recall. These are especially evident when the event is later being described to others.
- (4) Predispositions, the apperceptive mass, of the observers. These predispositions are made of old stereotypes, prejudices and legends still persisting in the observers.
- (5) False interpretation by the observers. As far as they imagine the characteristics of the observed individuals, the observers will err in interpreting their acts.
- (6) The time elapsing between perception and recall. After a very brief in-

terval, the event as recalled differs from the actual event. As the time elapsing between the event and its recall increases, observers begin to add or change or forget innumerable details.

We have already noticed that early emotional associations have a more powerful effect upon behavior than the more intellectual notions acquired in later life. The following is from the notes of an American who was in Germany from 1912 to 1914.

In the years before the war I used to hear hot and obviously sincere speeches by socialists who said that never would they go to war for the Kaiser. They would rather shoot their officers than their French fellow-workmen. Or if forced to shoot, they would shoot into the sand or into the air. Yet some of these very orators were the most anxious and ready to go to the front when the war was actually declared. The reason is not far to seek. Newspaper propaganda and ignorance of actual international events were important. Patriotic attitudes toward the mother country, her sacredness, her great history and wonderful future had been instilled in them as children in emotionally appealing colors. The effects of early home and school training outweighed the adult accumulations of the Marxian ideology. In a time of supposed national danger their economic theories about a world-wide utopia under the control of communists and proletarians disappeared in the emotional desire to defend their home and country.

In England and America large numbers of declared pacifists were soon comfortably uttering the stereotyped war cries. These renegade pacifists were often most bitter against their former leaders, persons like David Starr Jordan and Jane Addams, who maintained some consistency of attitude in the new situation. Preservation of the in-group is fundamental in all culture patterns. Those who in time of crises do not conform are bound to lose the respect and good-will of those who follow the traditional patterns, and who believe the myths of national greatness which they may relive in the enthusiasm of conflict.

D. The Social Function of Myths and Legends.

The myth and legend are adult extensions of the infantile world of fantasy and make-believe. For the adult they furnish socially acceptable frameworks for understanding the past and the present and for defining future responses. They give continuity to social reality. They are part and parcel of the social world in which we live and move and have our being. The

particular errors of perception and memory which play a part in the rise of myths and legends are merely the natural psychological processes by which the social reality grows up through group participation. They gratify the wish to appear superior to other groups. Our own egos expand as we participate in groups imagined sacred and motivated by highest ideals. All myths and legends are self-justificatory. In this way they are like rationalizations; but they are more continuous, more integrated, and furnish something of order and meaning to the world. While myths may have less basis in fact than legends, the psychological mechanisms in their development are much the same. There is more than a dash of imagination in the myth. There is perhaps less concrete fact at the outset, but it remains, nevertheless, as important as the legend in serving as the foundation of ideologies and as an interpretative tool in getting about in our world. We may say that legends are modified accounts of the past events and of historic personages, whereas myths are imaginative accounts of the meaning of life. In this sense they are the basis of philosophy. In other aspects they are a projection of our wishes into the future. Yet the differences between myth and legend are rather of degree than of kind.

The most significant myths and legends arise around crises and concern the major operations of our physical and social world. They are a part of our value-meanings which aid in social control. The more common life situations around which myths and legends have arisen and still arise involve religion and supernaturalism, economic or material culture, and political problems. Much of what passes for history is loaded with myths and legends of various sorts. Our purpose, however, is not to criticize these pictures but only to interpret them as they affect behavior.

1. *Religious Myths and Legends.*—One of the most persistent types of religious myth is the belief in a millenium or future blissful state in which all problems will be solved and no difficulties will ensue. Confronted with a difficult world in which to live, we turn to fantasy for release and emotional balance. These fantasies arise out of historical crises which the group has met. They become crystallized into standard forms and may persist for hundreds of years as the basic beliefs of nations and peoples. The forces provoking critical situations are often conceived as hostile spirits or demons, against which are arrayed the forces of light and well-being. Thus the notion of a future perfect state was injected into later Hebrew mythology. As Israel met disaster after disaster, the whole thought of many of her

leaders ran to fantasies of release from their intolerable situations by some fiat of Jehovah.

Rebuffed on every hand, persecuted and denied social status, the early Christians developed a whole mythology of the impending end of the world, the return of Jesus, and the restoration of all good things imaginable. The outbursts of John in the *Book of Revelation* are obviously an extended wishful myth. The wicked and hateful Roman Empire will be destroyed, and then God and the saints will come in all their glory.⁵

Hebraic-Christian millenarianism is not an isolated phenomenon. Similar hopes have existed in other groups far removed from them. They existed in Egypt, Babylon, and Persia long before the Christian era. Throughout the entire period of Christian, that is to say, Medieval European and Modern Euro-American history, these hopes of blissful future states have arisen over and over again.

As the year 1000 A.D. approached there were many people who thought that the consummation of perfection would soon be reached. Various groups prepared themselves for the end of the world. In the latter half of the twelfth century Joachim of Floris, an Italian monk, developed a mythological picture of the future.

Three formative factors are observable in the making of his system of interpretation. In the first place he was an ardent admirer of the monastic life in its stricter forms; consequently his future church was to be an idealized monastic order. He was also inclined toward ecstasy and was fond of meditating upon the supposed hidden schemes of God in history. Thirdly, he applied his mystical temperament to the interpretation of the Bible, and particularly to its prophetic elements, as a means of determining the future course of events. The outcome of Joachim's reflections was a new division of human history into three epochs. First, there was the age of law, or the age of the Father, when the supreme demand upon men was obedience. The appearance of John the Baptist marked the transition to the second age, which is that of the gospel, or of the Son. This is the age to which the present earthly church belongs, when men are striving toward the attainment of mystical knowledge. The third age, which is that of the Spirit and of the truly spiritual church, has not yet dawned. The date for the end of the present order and the inauguration of the age of the spirit was fixed at the year 1260, the years during which the true church had remained hidden being equal to the days that the woman mentioned in Rev. 12: 1-6 re-

⁵ It would be interesting to know, for example, how many times the somewhat obscure and certainly derelict writings of Saint John have been reinterpreted to fit contemporary conditions and made to serve as the basis for recasting the myth of the impending end of evil and the bringing in of the good.

mained in the wilderness. When the new era arrived the present church would not be abolished, but marvelously purified and restored to its primitive simplicity. The elect would be assembled from the west and from the east, both Jews and Gentiles being converted. After a final conflict with the powers of evil, to be followed by the final judgment, a new order would be inaugurated. This new society was to be organized after the model of a great monastery in which monks as the truly spiritual men would displace the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and humanity would enter upon its final Sabbath day of peace and purity.⁶

Just before the Reformation, there were numerous similar attempts to reinterpret the bad times in terms of scriptural prophecy. Militz of Kromeriz, a forerunner of John Huss, made such an attempt. The Taborites and their successors, the Bohemian Brethren, had some real influence in provoking revolt against the Roman Church. The Pope was declared the Antichrist. The second advent of Jesus was frequently predicted. Throughout the whole period of stress following Luther's revolt from the Church, there arose throughout Europe various millennialistic formulations. Definite dates for the second coming of Christ were fixed and the downfall of the Roman Church was commonly predicted. One interesting English movement is thus described:

By the year 1663 millennial teaching had crystallized into a definite political propaganda known as the Fifth Monarchy Movement, bitterly antagonistic to Cromwell. Its advocates professed allegiance to King Jesus only, affirming that he was about to appear and establish a fifth world-monarchy. The four previous monarchies were reckoned as the Assyrian, the Persian, the Grecian, and the Roman, the last-named still existing in the form of the Roman church. The champions of these views believed that duty called them to fight for King Jesus, thereby demonstrating their fitness to receive him at his coming. Heretofore they had been praying and preaching, but now they believed that the time had come to act for God. This conviction expressed itself in two unsuccessful attempts at insurrection, one in 1657 and the other in 1661.

The motive of the Fifth Monarchy Movement was not only hatred for Rome, but also a strong leaning toward communistic ideals and mystical experiences. One quotation from their official declaration reads:

We freely give up our lives and estates unto our Lord King Jesus and to his people, to become soldiers of the Lamb's army, abhorring mercenary principles and interests. And for this work's sake we desire not to love our lives unto the death, neither will we ever (if we may speak so great a word with reverence

⁶ From *The Millennial Hope*, by S. J. Case, pp. 184-186. Copyright by the University of Chicago Press, 1918.

in the fear of God) sheath our swords again until Mount Zion becomes the joy of the whole earth.

One of the prophetesses of the movement stresses mystical knowledge as a peculiar source of millennial wisdom, in contrast with the information to be derived from careful study. While in a state of trance she enjoins her companions thus:

Thou shalt read the visions John had,
Not after the learned doctor's way;
But thou shalt read them in plainness,
And clear light in the day.
Thou shalt not read what's spoke of Dragon and Beast
With university art;
But thou shalt read with kings' seven eyes
And an enlightened heart.
Thou shalt not run to antichrist's libraries,
To fetch from thence any skill
To read the Revelation of Christ,
But be with knowledge fill'd.⁷

In the eighteenth century the interesting Ronsdorf sect arose in Germany, and spread to Switzerland, Holland, and England. Mixed with its millennial hopes were mystical elements; a young girl received dereistic visions of the glories of the new kingdom to be established in 1730. The Shaker movement in England and America evidenced another sort of millennial fervor. After the French Revolution, Napoleon was made the Antichrist in the ideologies of various groups which looked for a catastrophic end of evil and a sudden installation of the good. In the nineteenth century a number of sects built on millennial hopes arose in England: for example, the Catholic Apostolic Church (Irvingites) and the Plymouth Brethren (or Darbyites). In America there were the Millerites, and other adventist sects which showed almost the same general pattern.

All of these movements have much in common. They appeal to the imagination of the depressed classes and to those who can not believe in any slow, evolutionary changes in the world. They appeal to those who look for some divine fiat to cure the world's ills.

Evidently millennialism arises in the psychology of fantasy. In times of crisis common sense and the techniques of science often fail to offer solutions, or at best they seem slow and halting. The form which these psy-

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 192-93.

chological fantasies take is to be understood only in terms of historical events and current situations. From the outset Christianity has been marked by these culture traits: belief in the innate evil of the world; in a sudden, catastrophic end of the world; in the coming of God to sit in judgment; in the restoration of the world to as perfect and satisfactory a state as existed in the Garden of Eden. Psychologically this is an infantile return to a state of perfect bliss where no conflicts or problems trouble the human mind. In the Christian picture there is a future return to the golden age when man knew no sin and no hardship. Not only in religious formulations, but in economic and political mythology, this fluctuation from good to bad to good again is very common. Man in his adult fantasies seems to fluctuate between hopes for a millennial perfection and hopes for a return to some arcadian past of untrammelled freedom and beauty.

2. *Economic Mythology*.—Not only do we find millennialism in the church, but the various utopias of a perfect economic order are millennial in pattern. The religious and political fantasies have frequently contained distinctly economic features. Yet it is especially in the modern period that men have time and again announced schemes by which the depressed classes might raise themselves by their own bootstraps out of poverty, illness, and early death. In the eighteenth century Abbé Morelly and François Babeuf outlined plans for ideal communistic societies. In the post-Napoleonic period of reactionism we find Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Étienne Cabet, Louis Blanc, and Robert Owen each announcing socialistic schemes of economic-political reconstruction. The quasi-utopian scheme found in the ideology of Marx and Engels is ostensibly based upon Hegelian dialectic. According to Marx, the proletarian labor movement was the third and final step in Hegel's dialectical scheme of evolution. It was as inevitable an outgrowth of historical sequences as any other millennial schema. It differed from others only in that the secondary rationalization was more elaborate and more profound. Unlike most economic radicals, George Sorel in his *Reflections on Violence* showed a keen insight into the place of the myth in instilling solidarity into the proletariat and in moving men to mass action in the general strike. Throughout the whole range of radical ideals the same strain of fantasy is found. In contrast with communism, for example, most anarchism is not built on a utopian future so much as on a return to a primitive naturalism which shall be free of the Antichrist of the political state.

There are no more urgent needs than hunger, thirst, and shelter. The failure of men to satisfy these valid needs leads them naturally and almost inevitably to formulate visions of future states which are either a return to an imagined pristine purity or a construction of new and everlasting forms.

3. *Political Mythology*.—Political millenniums are as common as those of religion and economics. Not to go further afield in ancient history, one may mention Plato's *Republic* as a utopian wish done in the grand manner. It is so well conceived and so incisively treated that it has been the inspiration for hundreds of later utopias, religious, economic, and political. Plato's dream was not realistic, but imaginary throughout. Another classical utopia, although it professes to be historical, is Plutarch's idealistic description of the life of Lycurgus of Sparta. Similar utopias occur in Greek, Norse, Celtic, and Arabic legends, which describe an earthly paradise to the west or in the Atlantic Ocean. The whole series of stories of a lost Atlantis are of this sort. They were as implicitly believed in their time as are our verifiable facts today. Saint Augustine's *City of God* illustrates the early Christian fantasy of a perfect world.

Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516) set a new pattern in political and economic myths. After his time various ideal descriptions of the political state were attempted by Hobbes, Filmer, and Rousseau, among others. Sir Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* (1624-1629) shows the growing faith in science as the key to universal happiness—a type of myth which has continued with amazing persistence to our own day. Tommaso Campanella's *Civitas Solis* (1635), an ideal communistic society, was probably much influenced by Plato's *Republic*. De Mandeville's *Fable of the Bees* is unique in that it describes the downfall of an ideal commonwealth. Other utopian pictures appeared throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the nineteenth century we have Bulwer Lytton's *The Coming Race* (1871), Samuel Butler's *Erewhon* (1872) and *Erewhon Revisited* (1901), Edward Belamy's *Looking Backward* (1888), William Morris's *News from Nowhere* (1890), various books of H. G. Wells, and hosts of utopias of a distinctly socialistic or communistic sort, like Theodor Hertzka's *Reise nach Freiland* (1893), which depicts an imaginary communistic society in central Africa.

The whole series of religious, economic, and political utopias gives further evidence of the tendency to project the solution of contemporary problems into a realm of rationalized fantasy. These fantasies are always dressed in a garb of contemporary political and social phraseology de-

signed to catch the imagination of men who can not come to grips with the concrete problems of their society. Yet we must not imagine that even these fantastic pictures are without value to the groups that believe them. They not only give emotional solace in every-day crises, but, if they sufficiently fire the imagination, they may be the basis for attempts to alter the present order in the direction of the imagined better one. Just as the gang members live out their romantic day-dreams, the ideologies of a religious, economic, or political group may become the basis for attempts to alter the social organization. There are doubtless forces which will control the direction which these efforts at change will take, for men do not live by faith alone. Their forms of faith, nevertheless, are important in determining their attempts to control their environment. The whole doctrine of social progress is linked up in many ways with millennial hopes. During the French Revolution, with the shadow of the guillotine upon him, Condorcet had such amazing faith in progress as to write:

The result of my work will be to show, by reasoning and by facts, that there is no limit set to the perfecting of the powers of man; that human perfectibility is in reality indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth independent of any power that might wish to stop it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us. . . . What a picture of the human race, freed from its chains, removed from the empire of chance as from that of the enemies of its progress, and advancing with a firm and sure step on the pathway of truth, of virtue, and of happiness. . . .⁸

A great deal of mysticism and fantasy has always been connected with the theory and doctrine of progress. Auguste Comte's *Religion of Humanity* is very definitely a utopian dream. The faith in science, first made prominent by Francis Bacon, continues ever stronger today. The whole ideology of large cities, large-scale production, rapid transit, easy communication, and the other quantitative aspects of our modern culture bespeaks its foundation in this faith in an ever upward and forward moral advancement of mankind. Many social reformers actually look upon "progress" as a kind of mystical power which inevitably will accomplish the ultimate perfection and complete salvation of man.

4. *Historical Legends and Social Attitudes*.—In each generation the children in a tribe, community, state, or nation are early brought into contact

⁸ From Marquis de Condorcet, *Equisse d'un tableau historique des progres de l'esprit humain*.

with the history of their society. This history conveniently introduces them into the folklore of the group, its ways of doing things, and its ideals and standards of conduct. Moreover, this introduction is essential to the continuity of culture patterns of the group. It is necessary to social stability and social control. One of the most impressive devices is the narration of the life stories of great men, the heroes of the past. While political events may constitute the major part of even contemporary history texts, it is a fair assumption that the things which most impress children are the personalities of history. We need to believe in great men. If we do not have them, we create them out of any material at hand. This is a natural phase of our ethnocentrism. Every group believes in the importance of its own past, including therein its heroes. In the telling and retelling of the great events surrounding our heroes, the imagination rich in wish-fulfilment is given free scope. Just as the narration of an occurrence before a court, or the re-telling of experiences in war or other crises is colored by emotional toning, so in the frequent repetition of the tales of our heroes, bits are constantly added here and there until the original actuality of personality and event is completely obscured. Every historian knows this. He realizes that aside from the most careful and painstaking approach and use of his data, history is not scientific in any ordinary sense of the word. It is more akin to literature and art than to science. Some historians dislike to admit this, but only because to be scientific is in the folkways and to believe in a place for fictions and art is to be out of caste. The fact remains that men unconsciously construct the pictures of their heroes to fit their wishes. Thus they satisfy their own egos by vicarious participation in the great events of their heroes. No one would maintain that Plutarch's *Lives* are scientific pictures of the characters he describes, and yet they live for us in an amazing way. We have a kind of scale of legends—the earliest go back to such mythical characters as Perseus, Hercules, and Odin. Then we have such heroes as Achilles, Ulysses, and Æneas, and in northern Europe the romantic legends of King Arthur. Yet colossal legends have grown up about actual historical figures like Alexander the Great, Julius Cæsar, Charlemagne, Richard the Lion-Hearted, and Joan of Arc. In modern history the most tremendous figure is Napoleon. Around him has collected such an over-towering mass of legend and counter-legend that the historian is baffled and the layman is at the mercy of each new writer, as again and again the picture of this man is changed in color.

In our own country the legends run from those about John Smith, Miles Standish, George Washington, Andrew Jackson, John Brown, and Abraham Lincoln, down to the current legends of Roosevelt, Wilson, Walter Hines Page, and Calvin Coolidge. A good many ardent members of the conservative class in the country have been disturbed by the biographies of Washington by Rupert Hughes and W. E. Woodward, because these men have smirched some of the rosy pictures painted of the father of our country. This is perfectly natural reaction by persons whose faith in the legends is strong and who feel that the maintenance of the legend is essential for patriotism, as possibly it really is. Our school children are given fanciful pictures of our national heroes at a time when their minds are peculiarly prone to fantasy and fairy tale anyway. We wonder if psychologically it could be otherwise. We induct them into history at an age when their minds are dominated by emotional thinking, and yet we wonder later why as adults they are so incapable of objective thought on national questions.

The process is really inevitable. If we did not have our present legends to hand on, we would unconsciously create others. For that matter, the attempts of contemporary writers to "de-bunk" our history after all merely create a new type of legend. It is utopian to believe they make us any more rational about our forefathers.

One of the most interesting instances of the stretch between legend and fairly reliable historical facts is the case of John Brown. Apparently he was one of those curious mixtures of personal shiftiness and half-mystical belief in a great mission. His life was replete with shady business dealings, and he clearly lacked a sense of social responsibility toward the community and even toward his family. Yet after the Harper's Ferry episode he was a figure around which public opinion crystallized in an amazing fashion. The legend of Brown as a crusader had a most profound effect upon the attitudes of thousands of Northerners at the outbreak of the Civil War.

No character in American history is more generally interesting than Abraham Lincoln, around whose personality have grown up legends of all sorts. The legends satisfy the various groups of people of our country. The religiously-minded see in his humanity a great and deep religious soul. The more tough-minded repeat the legends that he did not follow any creed and that he once wrote an essay in defense of atheism which his literary executors are said to have destroyed or suppressed. Many people

object to the legend of his ribald stories. Others see in them a picture of a real man on the frontier. Certain legends attempt to make him out the offspring of poor white trash, while others try to rescue him from such "infamy." Some emphasize his steadiness of work, while others show him to have been a bit shiftless and inclined to take life easily. Then, too, the "log-cabin to president" stereotype is supported by the story of Lincoln's rise to the White House. The Civil War period is replete with legends about Lincoln. Yet there is a certain sectional difference in the concepts of Lincoln, as anyone knows who has lived south of the Mason-Dixon Line. Especially in the generation after the Civil War Southern boys and girls were not given the same accounts of Lincoln that their Northern neighbors got. For them, instead, were tales of Davis and Lee which differed profoundly from the stories told of these personalities in the Union states.

As we have become more and more skilled in advertising and conscious propaganda, legend-making has become more deliberate. This is clearly the fact with the legends of Roosevelt, Wilson, Page, and Coolidge. We all remember the deliberate stimulation of interest in Roosevelt which swept through the public schools a few years ago. Legends, favorable and unfavorable, concerning Wilson are still being manufactured. The rise of the Coolidge myth, and of the legends about Walter Hines Page are phenomena of yesterday.

Whether legends are deliberate or not, the fact remains that the masses of mankind live in these images. They serve a distinct purpose in arousing hero worship, in bolstering up in-group patriotism and in affording vicarious satisfactions for the common man. As with religious formulations, if tomorrow we destroyed the myths and legends about our heroes, we would the next day begin unconsciously to make new ones. And so the process of myth- and legend-making never ceases. We have but to look about us to see the rise of stories of political leaders like Ex-Governor Smith, Senator Vare, and Secretary Mellon, or to witness the growth of legends about business and industrial leaders such as Morgan and Ford, or about inventors such as Edison. We can note, too, the rise of legends about prize-fighters, baseball players, arctic explorers, and airplane heroes. The process is ever-present. Failure to take cognizance of it as it affects the concept of social reality and helps determine behavior is to be wilfully blind.

There are a good many earnest persons who belittle or regret myth-making. They consider it foolish or pathological and somehow a bit devil-

ish or evil. This very attitude is but an illustration, in another dimension of our lives, of the persistence of the eighteenth-century cult of rationalism and of its myth that man is largely an intellectual, deliberate, and scientific creature.

While for the professional historian history may be objective and scientific in method and even in content, for the populace it always was and still is rich in emotional suggestiveness. It is a dynamic part of our cultural environment. It is not something superimposed on us as cold fact, but teems with life and gives us courage in crises, affords us solace in disaster, and provides all of us with a world of vicarious but nevertheless real living. We must remind ourselves that man does not live alone in a colorless world of passive objectivity, but in a subjective, emotionally toned world of attitudes and images, and that this world of image and attitude determines his conduct quite as often as does the purely physical universe.⁹

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapters XVI, nos. 108-115, pp. 419-49; and XVII, pp. 461-79.

B. Questions and Exercises.

1. Discuss questions and exercises for assignment in *Source Book*, Chapters XVI, nos. 1-11, p. 458; and XVII, pp. 479-80.
2. Discuss the reality of the group and of culture patterns. Is it legitimate to use such concepts?
3. Why is it essential to know the content of mind and behavior as well as the mechanisms? Show why the analysis of mechanisms alone will not reveal the complete picture either of anticipatory or consummatory behavior.
4. Illustrate the development of stereotypes from present-day cases.
5. What is the relation of stereotypes to language? (Cf. Chapter XVI.)
6. What is the relation of stereotypes to definitions of situations? Illustrate.
7. Correlate the growth of the myth and legend with the psychology of childhood fantasies. What are the differences between infantile fantasies and these adult myths and legends?
8. What is the significance of the current myth and legend in social behavior?

⁹ Certainly we can not separate sharply the objective or material from the subjective or emotional world. Our own interpretation of the material world is of course affected by our own images and attitudes. Physical science can no more escape from its own intellectual premises than can any other human activity, and the famous Newtonian concept of an absolute and mechanical eternal world is badly shattered by contemporary physics.

9. Cite some of the common contemporary myths and legends of events and personalities: in (a) history, (b) politics, (c) religion.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapters XVI, p. 459, and XVI, p. 480.
 2. Report Frazier, "Psychological Factors in Negro Health," *Social Forces*, 1925, vol. III, pp. 488-90; and Johnson, "Newspaper Advertisements and Negro Culture," *Social Forces*, 1925, vol. III, pp. 706-09 as illustrating the influence of myths and legends on attitudes and habits.
 3. The contribution of psychoanalysis to an understanding of the place of myth- and legend-making. (Cf. Ricklin, "Wishfulfillment and Symbolism in Fairy Tales," *Nervous & Mental Diseases Monograph*, 1915, no. 21; Abraham, "Dreams and Myths: A Study in Race Psychology," *Nervous & Mental Diseases Monograph*, 1913, no. 15; Rank, "The Myth of the Birth of the Hero," *Nervous & Mental Diseases Monograph*, 1914, no. 18; Burrow, *The Social Basis of Consciousness* and other psychoanalytic materials in the files of *The Psychoanalytic Review*, etc.)

CHAPTER XVIII

PREJUDICE AS OUTCOME OF SUBJECTIVE PATTERNS

A. *The Nature of Prejudice.*

Social prejudice has a controlling place in much of our behavior. It is rooted in the stereotypes in which are mingled myths and legends of group conflicts, and like every other feature of social behavior, it has both psychological and cultural foundations. It accompanies the mobility of populations which throws strange people into contact for the first time. It is related to economic and social competition. It is a distinct phase of in-group—out-group rivalry and conflict.

The meaning of prejudice is apparent in the word itself. In the simplest sense it signifies just what it says, "to pre-judge," to make a decision beforehand.¹ A prejudice is an opinion or attitude, favorable or hostile, based on prepossession and therefore biased and irrational. In ancient Rome to pre-judge meant to determine social status, and this status-determining feature has not been lost. At present we do not determine status by private, secret judicial hearings, but in the court of public opinion and conversation where are expressed the feelings and attitudes of superior groups toward those considered inferior. Morse defines prejudice as "undue prepossession in favor of or against" some person, thing, or idea, as "a mental cramp or tension which renders an individual unable to see or consider anything but from a single point of view." Often it is "a wilful perversion of judgment because of interest and passion." Bigotry and prejudice go hand in hand together. The prejudiced person tends to be obstinately and unreasonably attached to some particular creed, doctrine, or opinion, and to be intolerant of others. As Morse says, such a person looks upon truth as static, absolute, and unchangeable. Prejudice lies at the basis of conflict, and retards efforts toward more rational solutions of some of our most

¹ The Latin word *prejudicium* meant a precedent, or a preceding judgment; also a special form of judicial examination precedent to a trial, especially in matters regarding *status*. Cf. *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., vol. XXII, p. 277.

pressing social and economic problems. It is the opposite of tolerance. It is the foundation of tendencies to crystallize reactions into narrow and eternal frameworks. Prejudice fills our minds with such pictures of other groups that free contact with them is difficult. Prejudice presupposes the superiority of one's own group to those outside, and is essentially the foundation of ethnocentrism. The negative, antagonistic attitudes toward the outsider have counterparts in attitudes and ideas of superiority toward one's own in-group. We shall first discuss the psychological and cultural phases of prejudice as a general phenomenon of in-group—out-group relations. We shall then sketch briefly certain major types of prejudice in contemporary society. Because of different cultural backgrounds—religious, racial, and economic—each of these types has somewhat different psychological features.

B. *The Psychology of Prejudice.*

1. *Personal-Social Conditioning of Avoidance.*—One of the most common assumptions among uninformed people is that prejudices against races, religions, and divergent groups are innate. The prejudices of the common man against the negro, the Oriental, and the Jew seem so natural that he assumes he was born with a dislike for these people. In popular literature this notion is taken for granted. Physiology and psychology, however, give no support to any such theory of an instinct of prejudice against other races or persons of divergent culture. White and colored children, unhampered by adult interference, play together with as much ease and spontaneity as they do among themselves. There is certainly no evidence for a specific instinct of prejudice. On the other hand, we should not imagine that there are not deep-seated emotional and reflex action patterns which come into play in building up various prejudices.

At the outset we must take into account what Royce calls "natural antipathy" for those who are different from us. All children develop negative reactions toward certain persons who come into the range of their experience. These may be based on physical appearance, gestures, voice, and general behavior. There is no doubt that individuals differ in bodily odor; and it is certain that races do. Gilbert Murray tells of a Japanese waiting-maid who fainted at the smell of a number of Europeans and Americans sitting at dinner. Both Japanese and Chinese students have told the writer that they are quite aware of the distinctive bodily odor of the white race.

White people are aware of the differences in odor between themselves and the negro race. Still, sensory accommodation in the field of smell goes on very rapidly. One man who spent years in the West Indies among negroes and American Indian-negro mixed bloods told the author that he was never aware of these odor differences after he had been associated with these people a few weeks. He played basketball and other games with these boys, went with them on picnics, and associated with them in school, but was never conscious of differences of this sort. Because of infrequency of contact large numbers of people never acquire such sensory accommodation. Naturally, difference in odor furnishes one basis for an awareness of divergence in personality.

Still more significant, perhaps, is the awareness of differences in color. Color is always more evident than odor, and it is accordingly more difficult to break down older ideas and attitudes associated with color. A child coming into contact for the first time with a yellow- or black-skinned individual may naturally be somewhat uneasy because it is something strange and unfamiliar toward which he has no technique of conduct. So, too, strangeness of facial contour and gross bodily physique also mark off others as unfamiliar. Habit plays a large part in developing either avoidance, or adaptation to differences. After his long sojourn in the heart of Africa Livingstone said of his first contact with whites: "One feels ashamed of their white skin; it seems unnatural—like blanched celery—or white mice." And Stanley reported his experience as follows:

As I looked into their faces, I blushed to find that I was wondering at their paleness—the pale color, after so long gazing on rich black or richer bronze, had something of an unaccountable ghastliness. I could not divest myself of the feeling that they must be sick; yet, when I compare their complexion to what I now view, I should say they were olive, sunburnt, dark.²

If we touch a person of color, we may get a distinct sensation of different texture of skin. People report a distinct consciousness of the finer texture of the Hindoo skin or the different "feel" of a black man's hand. One man reported the touch of negro skin as like the feel of a snake. Yet whites in the South have no such consciousness after they have been handled as children by negro servants.

² Quoted by W. I. Thomas, "Psychology of Race Prejudice," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1903-04, vol. IX, p. 608.

Associated with odor, color, and touch are differences in costume which are at once noticeable. Strange clothes, divergent cuts of hair, or ornament—these things are quickly noted and make us aware of the unfamiliar character of those before us.

These things are psychologically basic to awareness of differences, but speech is particularly so. We can not communicate with the stranger within our gates. We do not understand language which sounds like a mere jumble of sounds with no rime or reason to it.

Yet our natural, untrained avoidance of persons of strange odor, color, skin, or speech is not alone sufficient to build a prejudice. Children have just these antipathies or negative responses to people of their own race or group. Speech differences are also evident. A man's deep bass voice may cause a small child to cringe and move toward its mother or father. These avoidance reactions are natural enough. If the differences are great enough, we may actually develop fear of the persons, especially in terms of auditory, visual or tactile stimulus. Even this will not in itself produce prejudice as we understand it. There must be some other factors superimposed on these physiological and psychological foundations. These influences arise from cultural conditioning.

2. *Cultural Conditioning and Prejudice.*—We must, as Royce says, give names to our antipathies. We teach the child that color means something, that it is a value toward which an attitude of avoidance is built up. In other words, we early begin to construct for a child the cultural framework in which will be cast his behavior toward members of strange races, cults, and other outsiders. Definitions of behavior toward these groups are laid down in language concepts which grow out of in-group attitudes of superiority, coöperativeness, and social solidarity. Since position in our own we-group means status and definite predictable relations to other members of our group, so, too, our relations with out-groups come to be determined by cultural norms. Where the relations of in-group and out-group are those of subordination and superordination, as are the relations between negro and white in the Southern states or in South Africa, status is related to the feelings of ethnocentrism expressed in prejudices.

Man has always looked askance at the stranger. The very terms "barbarian," "Ausländer," "goi," bear the marks of this attitude in their historical meanings. The unfamiliar is the unpredictable. Fear of the unknown comes into play very quickly. Anger is aroused by unconventional and mis-

understood types of conduct. Our own customs are always right and proper. We may attack by ridicule the notion of the propriety of other customs; but more effective is the exposition of traditional barriers common in all in-group—out-group relations.

The tendency to set off our own group from another may be defined as *social distance*. Social distance implies subordination and superordination. It indicates the tendency to move toward an object or person, or to retreat or withdraw. There is an ambivalence of emotion which may approach love and hate in the most extreme forms. Social distance means aversion and avoidance, on the one hand, and friendliness and close contact, on the other. It means coöperation or competition and conflict. As Bogardus says, an analysis of social distance gives a measure of "acting together" and of "acting apart." A student recently remarked about the Japanese that "they are all right so long as they keep a good distance from you." He apparently meant not geographical or spatial but social or psychic distance, reflecting the proper attitude of superiority of the dominant white race. Social distance signifies not merely spatial isolation, but the more important isolation of ideas and attitudes. The Jew living in the ghetto is not only segregated in a neighborhood reserved for him, but is cut off from contact with the Christians by reason of his ritual and folkways. In spite of physical proximity and of business relations with Christians, there remains a sense of remoteness, an isolation, which indicates a definite barrier to easy inter-participation. In a caste system, as exists in India, social distance is codified and standardized. In our society of "open classes," as Cooley calls them, it is the function of prejudice to keep the "outs" from getting in with the "ins." Thus the Jew is excluded from golf clubs, the Catholic from certain social circles, and the negro from the white trade unions. In a society of mobility and of economic opportunity there is much class flexibility, but the shift from one class to another is not possible without some strain between those already inside and those on the margin or the outside who desire to secure similar privileges.

As protection against the penetration of the inner precincts of personality and group individuality, there are the defenses of suspicion and aversion, of reticence and reserve, designed to insure the proper social distance.³

³ From *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, by R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, p. 230. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1921.

Even in our open class system the psychological mechanisms of avoidance are at work. The culture patterns which have grown up around the in-groups give the direction which these take in the individual. The culture patterns of one group furnish names or stereotyped labels for other groups. This "categorical motive," as Shaler called it, this pigeon-holing of persons into certain groups—niggers, wops, kikes, fundamentalists, bolsheviks, radicals, Babbitts—is the conventional method of handling those out-group members who try to break across the barriers of our own in-groups. We may want them to come into relationship with us up to a certain point, but we do not wish them to come further. The negro is all right in his place, as a personal servant or as a workman, but not as an equal. The Jew is all right as a rag-picker, a pedler, or a small tailor, but not as a social equal or as the member of a college fraternity. Here the technique of the matter is to give the out-group a label to categorize them. Henceforth all members of the others-group are known by the same group stereotype. It is first a negro who commits a certain crime, then Mr. Johnson. It is first a negro who wins a school medal, then Mr. Jefferson. Likewise it is first a Jew, then Mr. Aaron, who absconds with a bank's money. We brand individuals with standardized stereotypes received from our culture long before we know them personally. Relatively unbiased people can not escape such comments as "He looks like a Jew," or "He is a Babbitt." It is doubly hard for people who carry the marks of different color to escape without definition in terms of the group labels before being defined as personalities. For most of us cultural patterns determine in unlimited ways our reactions toward the members of out-groups.

As we saw in the preceding chapter, stereotypes are natural. They aid us in getting about in our world. They are short-cuts in social interpretation and give us a clue in defining our conduct toward others. But when associated with emotional sets, stereotypes give rise to misunderstandings unless social interaction is rigid, conventional, and limited to a code. Such codes are norms of conduct in relation to out-groups. The Southerner knows the accepted manner of handling the negro. His Northern friend, who does not, often gets into difficulties because the negro himself has no set method of activity outside the standards to which he has been accustomed by living under Southern norms.

Crises play a part in the whole problem of prejudice. Where the caste or

class system is accepted, the reactions of individuals from two or more groups to each other go on without undue strain. If the caste system is destroyed, neither knows what to do in the novel situation, and a crisis ensues. The culture patterns disintegrate and men are thrown back upon more natural, spontaneous personal-social methods of handling their relations. This is well illustrated by the relations of the Southern whites and the negroes after the Civil War and by the relations of the Jew in the Gentile world of America. New relations mean the development of new social definitions of situations. The individual person-to-person accommodations are projected on the group, and then become crystallized. They constitute thenceforth the sanctioned method of handling the novel situation. After the Civil War the Ku Klux Klan did just this. The code of lynching or other forms of terrorism was devised when the older techniques disappeared under the federal laws imposed on the Southern states.

3. *Historical Antecedents to Prejudice.*—Like all standardized attitudes and reactions, prejudices rest on myths and legends. The stories of the Ku Klux Klan affect both whites and negroes. The mythology of inherent negro inferiority helps to support the white man's domination. The myths of Jewish worship enhance the gentile's feelings of dislike. Historical myths have played a part in producing prejudice. In modern times, mobility of peoples has been of great significance. So long as there was little or only gradual movement of people, as from Europe to America, there was little prejudice among various groups, because there was little social strain. From 1820 until the Civil War some conflict and prejudice arose in our eastern cities over the Irish and German immigrants. The "Native American" movements were expressions of this inter-group antagonism. After the Civil War the flood of the "New Immigration" from southern and eastern Europe, brought to America hordes of strange-looking and strange-speaking peoples with divergent customs. Naturally a crisis arose and prejudices sprang up wherever the foreigners and older American stocks came into political, social, or economic competition.

Not only mobility, but size of groups and differences in cultural heritages produce prejudice. Where there are great numbers of people with novel cultures, strain is likely to arise. And economic competition rapidly produces strain. The prejudices toward the New Immigrant must be understood in terms of economic rivalries as well as those of language, custom, and religion. The prejudice against the negro in Northern cities is

definitely related to his economic competition with white laborers.

We shall now discuss more specifically race, nationality, religious and economic prejudice. While all of these have much in common, it is necessary to take into account the historical setting and the particular circumstances of group contacts in order adequately to understand the prejudices. It should be noted that in all of these types of prejudice there may appear all or some of the other factors. In race prejudice economic factors loom large, and even in religious prejudices economic rivalry is not to be ignored.

C. *Negro-White Prejudice.*

Since we cannot understand any social behavior without taking into account two factors—individual capacities, attitudes and ideas, on the one hand, and cultural, historical forces, on the other—it will be well to trace briefly the principal historical facts which lie behind the present negro-white prejudices.

1. *The Cultural-Historical Basis of Negro-White Relations.*—Slavery was practiced in Africa long before it was introduced into the New World. With the expansion of agriculture in the Americas, especially in the semi-tropical and tropical areas, there came a demand for cheap labor which the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and English slave-traders supplied. While slavery was accepted by the English and Dutch settlers generally, it developed principally in the southern colonies. In our Southern states the social adjustments of negro to white were stable enough. The negro accepted his status, and on the whole the personal relations of negro slave and master were satisfactory. Northerners still retain many stereotypes from such propaganda as *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, with its bloodhounds, its Simon Legree and the fleeing Eliza. The cruelty, barter, and inhuman practices in slavery were not so much the results of personal relations as of a faulty economic system and attendant attitudes. The attitudes of inferiority and submission of the negroes were balanced by those of superiority and domination by the white master-class. In general the relations of the races in slavery did not lead to difficulty. Social distance was carefully defined. There was good-will and security for the slave. The question of tolerance did not arise, since it was not necessary in the system. The negro had his place and he remained in it. He had no desire to participate in the white man's world. There was no competition, no conflict of interests between the races, but accommodation in terms of the slavery patterns.

The sentiment of the negro slave was, in a certain sense, not merely loyalty to his master but to the white race. Negroes of the older generation speak very frequently, with a sense of proprietorship, of "our white folks." This sentiment is not always confined to the ignorant masses. An educated colored man once explained to me "that we colored people always want our white folks to be superior. . . ." ⁴

The white master-class accepted the negro as a person, and often admitted him to intimate and trusted positions, but never accepted him as a *race*. The negro still remained chattel property. Nevertheless between the white males and comely negresses a sort of concubinage grew up. This practice gave the basis of the Southerner's sex attitudes toward the negroes. These facts must be remembered, for they lie at the root of social attitudes which persist to the present day.

The causes of the Civil War were not human relations in the intimate sense, so much as wider aspects of local and national problems. The economic system of slavery proved wasteful. While the Southerners were not fully conscious of it, there were indications on the economic horizon that ultimately changes would have to be made. Secondly, there was the conflict over the political power of the slave and the free states. This problem was not unrelated to the economic aspects of slavery. Associated with this was, thirdly, the whole question of state and federal power. Men still fought to centralize political power or to maintain intact the power of local self-governing groups. In addition, we must remember that the socio-religious propaganda of the abolitionists stimulated public sentiment in the North toward slavery. Although it did not meet with favor in many Northern centers, when the crisis came this propaganda had its effect. The Emancipation Proclamation itself was but a war measure designed to crystallize opinion in the North and to throw further dismay into the Southern forces.

The defeat of the South and the emancipation of the negroes from slavery brought tremendous changes. The South was torn asunder—politically and financially—and its population greatly reduced. The Reconstruction period saw the meddlesome carpet-bagger, encouraged by federal laws, stimulate the negro to ideas and practices for which he had no preparation. Disfranchisement of the Southerner led to the control of local and state governments by negro and carpet-bagger, and thus to mistreatment of the

⁴ R. E. Park, "Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1913, VIII, quoted in *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, by Park and Burgess, p. 630. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1921.

Southern whites and a false education for the negro. The whites were thrown back upon conflict attitudes for survival. The negro was filled with fantasies of an ability and greatness which he did not possess.

Booker T. Washington described the fallacious notions acquired by the colored people in those days. They imagined that freedom meant imitation of the frills of white civilization. They tried to telescope the cultural ages which separated white from black by taking to useless education—they learned French, Greek, and mathematics instead of the attitudes of thrift, the techniques of farming, the sense of property-responsibility, and the habits of sanitation.

During the whole of the Reconstruction period two ideas were constantly agitating the minds of the colored people, or at least, the minds of a large part of the race. One of these was the craze for Greek and Latin learning, and the other was a desire to hold office. . . . The ambition to secure an education was most praiseworthy and encouraging. The idea, however, was too prevalent that, as soon as one secured a little education, in some unexplainable way he would be free from most of the hardships of the world, and, at any rate, could live without manual labor. There was a further feeling that a knowledge, however little, of the Greek and Latin languages would make one a very superior human being, something bordering almost on the supernatural.

In another place he remarked:

One of the saddest things I saw during the whole month of travel which I have described was a young man, who had attended some high school, with grease on his clothing, filth all around him, and weeds in the yard and garden, engaged in studying a French grammar.⁵

There was clearly no adequate preparation in cultural attitudes or technique for the new relations of whites and blacks. The negro had no training in economic responsibilities, in the duties of citizenship, or in independent thought. Nor was there any change in the social attitudes of the white man, who did not accept the altered schema. The negro was and still is "a nigger," to be addressed by his first name only, with little or no soul, not much higher than an animal. He was shiftless, irresponsible, and untrustworthy. It is no wonder that the Southerner turned to violence to keep the negro in his place. The original Ku Klux Klan was the result of an in-group feeling expressing protection for itself. The negro could not be re-

⁵ From *Up From Slavery*, pp. 81, 122, copyright 1901 by Booker T. Washington and reprinted by special permission of the publishers, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc.

turned to slavery. The Union armies had settled that, once and for all. But the negro could be taught by crude methods that "he did not belong." Rage at the assumption of equality and power by the blacks, fear of their changed legal status, desire to maintain the supremacy and hence the safety of the white race—these were the roots of the techniques of social control employed. In desperate instances they took the form of intimidation, flogging, and even lynching, rationalized in terms of the protection of white womanhood and the prevention of growth of negro political-economic power. As the Union power relaxed its harshness, legal subterfuges were devised to protect the political sacredness of white control: grandfather clauses, Jim Crow legislation, and lack of provision for negro education. In addition there was actual intimidation to prevent the negro from exercising his legal right to vote.

The negro had, on the one side, the sort of fantasy we have described, and, on the other, the concrete problem of meeting his fundamental needs of hunger and shelter. He was forced into a new form of economic dependence by a system of tenant farming little better than the late Mexican peonage. In some ways this was worse for him than slavery, because the personal nexus of master and slave was gone, and only the impersonal relationship of barter and money remained.

Emancipation did bring one thing to the negro. This was *mobility*. In spite of attempts to hold him to the land, he was free to move about. Any slight improvement of his economic status made it possible for him to drift to the city or elsewhere in an effort further to improve his economic condition. It led to increase in wealth, education, travel, and a new type of life. Mobility is one of the keys to the present changes in the South and in the North in the status of the negro. It brought the negro into Northern and Southern industrial centers. With it has come the gradual rise of racial self-consciousness in the colored group. The very segregation of the negro into limited districts has fostered this group consciousness. In spite of handicaps, education among the negroes has been distinctly improved and they have a new advantage in achieving a higher social and economic status. This recent development of race consciousness is nicely illustrated in the following story:

A few years ago a man who is the head of the largest negro publishing business in this country sent to Germany and had a number of negro dolls manufactured according to specifications of his own. At the time this company was

started, negro children were in the habit of playing with white dolls. There were already negro dolls on the markets, but they were for white children and represented the white man's conception of the negro and not the negro's ideal of himself. The new negro doll was a mulatto with regular features slightly modified in favor of the conventional negro type. It was a neat, prim, well-dressed, well-behaved, self-respecting doll. Later on . . . there were other dolls, equally tidy and respectable in appearance, but in darker shades, with negro features a little more pronounced. . . .⁶

The incident is really significant, for it means that the negro has begun to substitute his own stereotypes of himself for those of the white man. After all, art represents the ideals of the group. And it may be remarked that the venture was a success. As Park remarks, the whole episode revealed the degree of earlier cultural assimilation in slavery and the present break from his own past. Not only is the negro attempting to give up the frills of white civilization and instead to learn the fundamental techniques, but these newer developments of art are significant measures of his awakening. Beginning with Paul Lawrence Dunbar there has been a distinct ethnocentric trend in negro poetry and music and more recently in the novel and short story, and in painting and sculpture.⁷

Not only in art, but in the whole economic and social structure the negro is pressing forward. These advances are not made without provoking antagonistic action and attitudes in the dominant white classes, South and North. The experiences of the negro abroad during the World War taught him that in other areas of the world the prejudice against his color is not intense.

If we take a cross-section of the contemporary problems of race prejudice, we shall have to differentiate between those which exist in the Southern states and those which have arisen more recently in the North. In the last generation there have been many changes in the South. The growing industrialization, the improvement of education among the masses, the building of good roads, and the increasing use of the automobile have facilitated contact with the larger world outside. Superstition and its related practices are still retarding forces, but significant changes are apparently in the offing. The migration of masses of negroes from the South since 1917 has produced a real problem in the North. It is said that since 1917, 1,200,-

⁶ From R. E. Park, "Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1913, VIII, reprinted in *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, by Park and Burgess, p. 626. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1921.

⁷ Cf. A. Locke, *The New Negro*, 1925, as an example of recent negro advances.

ooo negroes have migrated northward, largely to certain industrial areas. This migration has developed attitudes and techniques of race adjustment previously unknown. Let us examine briefly some of the features of prejudice, first in the South and then in the North.

2. *Negro-White Relations in the South.*—The relation of the negro to the white man in the South even to this day has the features of a caste system, rather than those of pure prejudice; that is to say, the prejudices against the negro have been highly standardized in culture patterns. So long as the *status quo* of superiority and inferiority is not disturbed, all is well. In the South the negro is treated as a person in his infractions of the code. In the North the tendency is to treat him collectively. Certainly the most violent mob activities against the negroes as a racial group have occurred in the North: in Springfield, Omaha, East St. Louis, Chicago, Washington. In the South the recalcitrant negro is dealt with as an individual offender against the social code. Punitive justice is directed against persons, not against the whole race.

This treatment of the negro as an individual permeates the whole structure of negro-white relationships. So long as he maintains his social distance, the negro is accepted as a person in all sorts of relations to the white. He is not accepted as a group, or considered an equal. A Southern student came to the North to learn social work. She told this story of her apprenticeship with one of the agencies:

My first assignment was to visit a colored family. It was one of the sorest trials of my life. I could not bring myself to address the negro husband, who was at home ill, as "Mr. Johnson," because we always called negroes by their first names. I simply could not overcome my aversion to calling any negro man "Mister." It did not seem right or proper. My family had once had many slaves. Although our property had been much dissipated we always had a number of colored servants. They were always called "Tom," or "George" or "Sally," or "Mandy." In the South we like individual negroes. Our relations with them are close and sympathetic. I recall attending a funeral of an old servant a year or two ago. During a recent visit to my home town I went out to call on my old mammy. But to deal with the negro family as a case worker for a social agency on any terms of equality even of speech, was a bitter experience.

This is the common attitude of the Southerner. He accepts the negro, in his place, as a person, but not as a social or racial equal. A young man from one of the larger Southern cities described how his attitudes toward

the negro were conditioned by personal-social and cultural influences. Colored men and women are looked upon as satisfactory servants. "The good ones like to be bossed; they know what you want and do it. The common run of negroes are dishonest, lazy, and shiftless." He also told how in later adolescence his gang teased and abused negro boys and men when it sought adventure and new experience. While this was all in play, it nevertheless enhanced their attitudes of superiority toward the colored people.

The pattern of superiority is so deeply imbedded in the culture of the Southerners that they often resent any implication that there is a "Negro Problem" in the South at all. They are quite convinced that the attitudes of domination and submission are right and will remain the basis of future relations. As one man said, "if the Northerners would leave us alone, we'd handle our negroes all right." A man from Kentucky expressed common attitudes toward the negro when he said they were a "shiftless," "law breaking," "bootlegging," "immoral," "fighting" lot of people who have to be held constantly in check by the police force. "They have no morals," he remarked. "They live first with one woman and then another. They don't know their own children and don't seem to care." This young man was brought up in Ohio, but went to college in Kentucky. There, through social infection, he soon picked up the common attitudes of the Southern white population.

Although the industrial and commercial changes of the South have also brought social and educational changes, the fact remains that the Southern attitudes are an expression of the general culture levels. Culture level is not a reflection of some innate, original ability or lack of it, either white or black. It is a function of education, opportunity, and general culture exposure.

Like any other environment, the Southerner's personal-social and cultural environment is surcharged with emotional images and much dereistic, primitive thinking. Belief in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon people over all others is itself a possible rationalization of self-defense against a more satisfactory bi-racial accommodation. The notion of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race appeals to the Southerner but without the usual sense of responsibility. Rather it is an escape from the reality of the negro problem. The rural Southerner particularly is cut off from the general stream of higher culture. Illiteracy is high. Here superstitions about

the world and religion and about the negro are still common. Conservative theological dogmas are in force. The world is divided between the forces of evil and those of righteousness in terms of old-fashioned Biblical analogies and fundamentalist teachings. The negro is excluded from an equal place in this theological scheme of things. In a *Handy Guide for Beggars* Vachel Lindsay told of a conversation with a pious, poverty-stricken farmer in rural Georgia with whom he was spending the night. "Then he asked me whether I thought 'niggers' had souls. I answered 'Yes.' He agreed reluctantly. 'They have a soul, of course, but it's a mighty small one.'"

The retarded culture of the South is an effect of isolation, both physical and social. While religious revivals offer some release from mental ennui, they do not absorb all the excess emotional drive generated in the common man. The moving picture is just beginning to penetrate the rural sections. As good roads become common, isolation will begin to disappear. Yet for the most part the masses do not live in the same cultural world that the masses of the urbanized North do. The rural Southerner has no technique for recreation. He does not know how to play. Gossip, religion, and fanciful pictures connected with religion and the negro make up his inner, subjective world, and largely determine his behavior. Superstitions about planting crops, about unlucky days and numbers and magical cures are common. The more systematized myths of organized religion furnish even more of the rural Southerner's world. The opposition to the Darwinian theories of evolution is a typical example of this cultural lag. The opposition to Governor Smith's candidacy for the Presidency because of his Catholicism is another. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the whole fantasy is the recent revival of the Ku Klux Klan and the concern over white political supremacy. This supremacy is customarily associated with sex taboos and the moral control of the negro.

The psychology of the Ku Klux Klan need not detain us, since we have already examined the nature of the fantastical thinking found in lodges and secret societies. With its ritual, its stereotypes of purity, and its crusading purpose to save the country from the domination of the negroes, the Catholics, and the Jews, the Klan recreated the world in autistic terms for the Southern masses. Above all else it afforded a new means of play. At the same time it gave a chance to exercise authority over the negro once more without recourse to law and without fear of individual responsibility.

It had potent shibboleths. It stood for One Hundred Percent White-Protestant-Americanism, Protection of White-Protestant-Womanhood, the Detection of Crime, especially that of bootlegging among negroes and the poor white trash, and the detection of the infraction of the traditional standards of sexual morality of the community.

The idea of pure womanhood carries great emotional freight with most Americans, and particularly with the Southerners. As everyone knows, there exists a curious double standard of sex mores in the South. The whites have access to the negro women within the limits of custom, but a definite barrier is set up against like relations between negro men and white women. It is true that lynchings for alleged rape constitute but a fraction of the total number of lynchings. Nevertheless autistic generalizations out of chance cases of sexual crimes have created a vast mass of superstition and a body of techniques for dealing with the negro in this kind of social relations. In Jamaica, in South America, and in other parts of the world, the whites and blacks get on well enough without undue fear of sexual crimes by the negroes. In the South these fears frequently become genuine bogies.

The terrific taboo against the sexual approach of the negro to white women may sometimes constitute a powerful negative suggestion to the negro. It is not surprising that he does occasionally engage in a sexual crime. If we were inclined to follow the Freudian interpretation, we could probably make out a case that the taboo arises, in part, from the white man's sense of guilt in his relations with colored women. Possibly this defense mechanism may be further affected by a felt sexual inferiority to the male negro. In any case, a strong tradition and practice segregates the sexes of the two races. A whole world of fantasy surrounds this taboo. It is also evident that this intense sex consciousness is a partial outgrowth of the Christian attitude toward sex—a denial of its reality, a categorical statement of its sinfulness, and a technique of dealing with it by dereistic thinking and acting.

The custom of lynching, though dying out, bespeaks a primitive, violent manner of handling a conflict situation. The rationalization for lynching is revealed in the following defense from a Southerner:

The only way to teach the ignorant negro the logical connection between the crime and the punishment is to inflict the punishment while public interest is fixed tensely upon the crime. Moreover, speed is required because punishment is

sure only when it is speedily applied. The indignation and abhorrence which wrong-doing always excites effervesce too quickly. Let an unruly child induce its parent to postpone punishment for a week or month, and the offense will be punished inadequately, or not at all. Thus the law's delay is a force of evil.

The present prevalence of negro crime is due probably in some measure to unwholesome notions of social equality and intermarriage that they have inculcated—the natural, elemental passion to breed upward, to mate with a higher order, called forth in violent form.

Psychologically a lynching does for the lynchers just what a war or any other crisis does for a larger group. It offers release from ordinary tensions of a severely organized life. After it is all over, it becomes the basis for elaboration into myths of a vivid kind. The events of a man-hunt are retold with enjoyment and zest. Souvenirs from the rope that hung the culprit or bits of burnt clothing, or scraps of firewood picked from the bonfire, are exhibited on occasion. Thus lynching is an important social event for thousands. Its persistence despite opposition from the North and from the more enlightened communities of the South is simple evidence that it is not only a method of social control when the negro violates the code, but a means of releasing pent-up emotions through a kind of socially-sanctioned mob violence. It is the living-out of a day-dream of superiority. It is new adventure in a world otherwise rather humdrum and dull. The disappearance of lynching in the South is correlated with the increase in educational opportunities, the expansion of different culture standards, the breakdown of isolation by improved communication, and the gradual emancipation of the masses from superstition.

E. F. Young pointed out that the rate of lynching per 100,000 population is much higher in rural, less well populated counties than in counties of denser population. These more sparsely settled counties are the areas where ignorance, isolation, and economic hardship make racial conflict most likely.⁸

With the rise of better accommodation of white to negro in new economic situations, probably there will be shift in the social attitudes of both races. In truth, the general race problem has not been caused by the white man alone. The negro assumes a certain cockiness as soon as he gets ahead in the world, just as do all other people risen from the lower culture levels. In time he may overcome this, especially if the corresponding attitude of

⁸ Cf. E. F. Young, "The Relation of Lynching to the Size of Political Areas," *Sociology and Social Research*, 1928, vol. XII, pp. 348-53.

the whites is one of tolerance rather than of antagonism. A Southern negro wrote of the new difficulties in the changed situation developing in the South:

Significant is the changing attitude of the South toward work and industry in relation to the negro. For instance, organized labor in Memphis, Tennessee, recently petitioned the school board of that city to take the mechanical arts out of the curriculum of the negro schools. Labor that was first stigmatized by slave labor and subsequently by cheap negro labor can now be done by white men. The labor viewpoints of the changing South have led many whites to crowd negroes out of work once considered too menial for the touch of white men. The upper class white man disdained to accept the services of a white man who would condescend to take the job of a negro. The attempt of the city fathers of Atlanta to restrain negro barbers from serving white women and children is an instance of what economic competition can do and of the new social viewpoint towards jobs long considered the black man's by right and tradition. . . .

The negro may lose or gain in the industrialization of the South. He may be forced out of certain "race jobs," but on the other hand he may find compensation in new lines of industry as he is beginning to do already, especially in the North.⁹

In other words, new conflict attitudes are arising, built on economic competition in new fields. As the South becomes industrialized and approaches the rest of the country in its modernization, the negro-white relations will change, but whether toward a more peaceful accommodation remains to be seen.

3. *Negro-White Contacts in the North.*—In the North, the negro-white relationships have a different historical setting and at present a somewhat different aspect than in the South. As a result of the Abolitionist propaganda and the Civil War, the North theoretically, at least, accepted the negro as a political if not entirely a social equal. It is easy for us to be tolerant of a people with whom we have had no direct contact, whom we know only through idealized stereotypes created in books, pamphlets, and sermons on human equality. Moreover, so long as the negroes seen in the North were the occasional students in colleges, or personal servants, or porters on trains and in hotels, no prejudice arose. We did not invite these people into our homes, nor did we come into any economic competition with them. We accepted them *en masse*, in theory; we avoided them as

⁹ W. S. Turner, "The Negro and the Changing South," *Social Forces*, 1928, vol. VII, pp. 117, 118.

individuals. They lived in their segregated ghettos of color, and we had little or nothing to do with them. In a way they were insulated from us more than their black relatives in the South were from their white master-class. With the industrial growth of the North, especially in late years, a tremendous number of negroes have migrated into our Northern industrial cities. This rapid influx produced new attitudes and habits as it brought new economic and social adjustments.

We must recognize that Northerners have picked up from Southerners many attitudes regarding negro inferiority. Prejudice need not result from direct social contact; it is often "derived." It is derived from reading, from conversation with those who claim to know, and from old myths like the Mammy stories, the jokes and tales of negroes, and from the theater, vaudeville, and motion picture. All of these media of communication make stereotypes and create attitudes as well as does rubbing shoulders on a job. Our principal negro comedians are not negroes at all. At first they were Irish-Americans; today they are largely Jews. For a long time, until the recent fad for "Negro Culture" began, we seldom if ever saw a real negro on the vaudeville stage. The funny negro yarns and the queer antics were made by burnt-cork artists who created and reflected our stereotypes of the indolent, humorous, ignorant, and happy-go-lucky negro, all smiles and songs.

In another way, the motion picture enhanced certain antagonistic attitudes toward the negroes. We can not estimate the effect which Griffith's famous screen version of Dixon's *The Klansman* may have had. It is highly probable that people of the North who had, at best, vague notions about negroes, then for the first time got definite images of negro crimes and felt the need of violent methods to keep these people in leash.

Yet even these stereotypes were not emotionally intense so long as the negro remained outside the Northerner's every-day world of work and play. When in answer to a call for cheap labor the negro came in great numbers into our industrial districts, social relations began to change. The factors behind the race riots of 1919 in Chicago are typical. Such incipient conflicts had gone on elsewhere, but without violent outbreaks. The report of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations entitled *The Negro in Chicago* (1922) presents in detail the social, economic, and psychological factors which produced the conflict.

Friction began when thousands of negroes from the South came to the

North, especially to Chicago, to work in industries. This led to serious housing problems. The inevitable expansion of the blacks into areas previously occupied by the whites brought difficulties. The mingling of whites and blacks in the industrial plants led to further friction. Finally the negro bloc in politics became so significant that the negro was exploited by various political factions. Thus housing problems, labor conflicts, and the introduction of the negro into local politics made possible the outbreak of hostilities over a trivial affair. "Expectant" attitudes were built up which were set off and came into action at the thought of further usurpation by the blacks of assumed white privileges.

Other cities had minor conflicts. In Detroit a race-riot over the Dr. Sweet case was narrowly averted. Threats of violence forced the negroes to leave a number of industrial towns. Thus the dominant factor in the Northern negro problem is probably economic. The barring of the negro from trade unions is typical. The liberalism of organized labor disappears when its white solidarity is threatened. This is but an evidence of the more fundamental in-group loyalties which determine even economic policies. The reaction to current negro problems of persons who do not know much about the negro from direct contact is illustrated by the following letter sent the New York *Nation* from California:

Sir:—I do not think a pro-Nigger magazine like *The Nation* is fit to be read by young people. The Niggers have entirely too much to say, and when we see Niggers appointed by the Federal Government to boss hundreds of white girls, I don't think *The Nation* needs to cry over their fate. This is a white man's country and must be run by white men.

It is my intention to drop *The Nation* when my subscription expires. The first thing I know it will turn Pro-Jap.¹⁰

The entire problem of negro-white prejudice is, of course, intimately related to the traditional white attitudes of superiority. It grows out of the in-group—out-group relations inevitable in the social process. The dissolution of such prejudices is complicated in the case of the negro by the fact that these prejudices are deep in our Anglo-American culture patterns. Built upon these are the vivid and recent experiences of both South and North with the negroes who do not yet possess a culture as high as that of the whites. Worse, all of the rationalizations covered by our stereotypes, myths and legends, are exaggerated by pseudo-scientific discussions of

¹⁰ Correspondence in *The Nation*, 1923, vol. CXVI, p. 72.

racial inferiority, when in plain fact our data are as yet terrifically incomplete. Though the reports from intelligence tests seem to indicate that negroes are inferior to whites in performance on the tests themselves, the fact is that no adequate techniques have been developed for measuring the subtle influences of early personal-social conditioning and exposure to inferior cultural environment. Moreover, the whole significance of emotional conditioning must be taken into account. In those investigations in which the groups seem fairly equal in background, the overlapping is enormous even when the whites are slightly superior on the average. This means that the great bulk of the two races, even when measured by the white man's tests, coincide in intellectual ability. It is unfortunate that many intelligent people use results of intelligence tests to support their prejudices.¹¹

Before we conclude this section we should point out that there are areas where the whites and blacks get along very well together. Race conflict seems to depend upon economic competition and cultural notions about superiority and inferiority. In South Africa race friction is increasing. In Jamaica, in some of the other West Indies, and elsewhere the accommodation of race to race has been worked out fairly well. We find little prejudice against the black in continental Europe. Again this can not be entirely due to lack of contact. In France there seems to be little or no prejudice even though during the World War both American and African blacks were quartered in French towns and villages everywhere. In England, on the other hand, there is much color prejudice in spite of no direct contacts. The following results of a verbal questionnaire made over rather wide areas of France and England are interesting.

When the data obtained from France and England are compared the contrast existing between the color prejudice of these two peoples can not be doubted.

It would seem justifiable to conclude that relative to the English the French lack color antipathy. However, when discussing attitudes such as color prejudice, it must be borne in mind that any distinction of attitudes between individuals tends to be quantitative rather than qualitative. Thus it follows that in the table below the effort to segregate and classify people into one of three groups on a basis of their color prejudice is entirely artificial because of the qual-

¹¹ We do not say that the races are equal in every respect. We ought to take account of possible temperamental and emotional differences as well as intellectual ones; and caution is always necessary. In any case the overlapping is great; and in social advancement, cultural exposure is so important that it is hard to predict advancement in terms of I. Q. alone.

itative nature of such classification. Within any white group there are, of course, continuous quantitative degrees between the extremes of those whites who are violently prejudiced against colored people and of those who are more or less prejudiced in favor of the dark skinned peoples. Somewhere in between these extremes will be a neutral zone in which prejudice or bias does not exist. Therefore, any general conclusion regarding group prejudice must be based upon a recognition of the quantitative nature of such phenomena. Thus in making the statement that, relative to the English, the French lack color antipathy it is not intended to lump the varying individuals of a nation or to abstract the "average" attitude. It is simply a convenient way to suggest the conclusion that if the attitudes of all the French people could be classified and reduced to a curve of distribution that curve would be skewed towards the "color acceptance" end, while on the other hand, a similar curve for the English would be skewed towards the opposite, or violent prejudice, end. Whether the French people would accept a negro of comparable culture on a basis of absolute equality in all social relationships it is impossible to determine. The writer believes, however, that in such contacts the determining factor would be personality and not color difference.

Table 15: Showing Comparative Color Prejudice in France and England

	<i>Total Number of People Questioned</i>	<i>Without Prejudice</i>	<i>Doubtful Cases</i>	<i>With Prejudice</i>
France	360	279	72	9
England	315	14	47	254

	<i>Number of Hotels Questioned</i>	<i>Admit Colored People</i>	<i>Do not Admit Colored People</i>
France	31	24	7
England	20	4	16

The above conclusion has been arrived at by a much less involved and far more vital method by an American negro. This man, formerly an American soldier, was living in a small French village with a white wife and three children. He appeared to have been absorbed into the local culture and, although evidently enjoying the opportunity of speaking English, scoffed at the suggestion of his returning to America. His attitude can best be summed up by his reply to that suggestion. "Boy," he said, "over here I's a man, over there I's a nigger."¹²

¹² R. T. Lapiere, "Race Prejudice: France and England," *Social Forces*, 1928, vol. VII, pp. 107-08.

To explain this divergence the writer goes on to say that whereas the French have had direct experience with colored people, the English scarcely know any negroes and have had only slight contacts with Hindoos. However, the strong color prejudice of the Englishman lumps negro and Hindoo into one category. This stereotype is probably derived from a long tradition of British wars with colored peoples. It grows out of myths and folktales of Africans and Orientals, and it has carried over into the attitudes of the every-day Britisher. Some writers commenting on this aversion of British and American peoples to colored races have gone so far as to posit a definite instinct of race prejudice in the so-called Anglo-Saxon race, and they explain Latin racial tolerance by saying that as the Latin is dark-skinned, he is himself racially nearer the negro. Such fantastic thought can have no standing in any respectable scientific circles. It is merely a typical attempt to explain complex social psychological data by resorting to biological mysticism. Doubtless the solution of the problem will be found in the deeper strata of our culture patterns rather than anywhere else.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapters XVIII, pp. 482-502; and XIX, Section A, pp. 505-28.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises for assignment in *Source Book*, Chapters XVIII, p. 502, and XIX, nos. 1-9, pp. 538-39.
 2. How do culture patterns influence the rise of prejudice? Illustrate.
 3. What place has competition in the development and maintenance of prejudice?
 4. Does prejudice exist only where divergent races, classes or religions come into close contact?
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
 1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter XVIII, p. 503, and XIX, p. 539.
 2. Report on Lasker, *Race Attitudes in Children* (appropriate sections).
 3. Report on White, *Rope and Faggot, A Biography of Judge Lynch*, on lynching in the United States today.
 4. The history of lynching in the United States.
 5. The ecology of lynching in the United States. (Cf. E. F. Young, "The Relation of Lynching to the Size of Political Areas," *Sociology and Social Research*, 1928, vol. XII, pp. 348-53.) Concentration of population, type

of farming, land values, education, etc., should be correlated with lynching rate.

6. A critical analysis of the statistical studies of mental measurement made of negro students and negro draftees in World War. (Cf. Garth, "Race Psychology," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1925, vol. XXII, pp. 343-64 for references. Also, Willey and Herskovits, "Psychology and Culture," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1927, vol. XXIV, pp. 253-83 for references on anthropological side of race differences and culture.)

CHAPTER XIX

PREJUDICE (*continued*)

A. *White-Oriental Prejudices.*

In this country, extreme prejudice against Orientals is largely confined to the Pacific Coast, where White-Oriental problems are most acute. Of the milder sort of prejudice which is diffused over the country, perhaps the best illustration is to be found in our college towns. In most of our larger universities there is a sprinkling of Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and Filipino students, with here and there a Hindoo. These students, who are usually from the aristocratic and upper commercial classes of the Orient, commonly experience real difficulty in securing housing facilities on a basis of equality with the white students. They are frequently denied admission to college dormitories. The typical rooming-house keeper, even if not prejudiced, refuses to take them because it will ruin her trade with white student clientele.

G., a professor in a Philippine university, brought his family to the states while he completed his doctorate. He speaks excellent English; he is educated and cultivated in every sense of the word. He was refused houses and apartments in the better neighborhoods because the native Americans thought him negroid. He was embarrassed, and his cultured wife, who comes from a well-considered family in her own country, was distinctly shocked. The family was finally forced to rent a house in an undesirable section of the city. G. was extremely popular among the students who knew him. In the university community he felt little or no social pressure. But the town population was nearer the traditional American stereotypes about colored races and as usual substituted abstract labels for discrimination among individuals.

Chinese and Japanese students report similar experiences in almost every college or university community.

The prejudice against Orientals has both a color basis and an economic basis. The Anglo-American distaste for colored races came into play at the time when the Chinese appeared among us. However, the intense prejudice

grew up only when the Chinese began to compete with white labor on the Pacific Coast. So long as the Chinaman was an occasional cook, or a laundryman not in competition with white labor, he was tolerated. When in the 70's and 80's he appeared in large numbers as cheap labor, he promptly came into conflict with the white groups. Legislation barred his further immigration into this country, and since that time the Chinese have not been the victims of any marked prejudices in the Far West.

With the Japanese much the same process has taken place. Prejudice is largely a matter of economic competition rationalized in terms of a Yellow Peril and a fear of giving way to strange and more ambitious people. The Japanese have been accorded much more intelligence than the negro, hence the fear of them is that much stronger in the minds of the white inhabitants of California, Oregon, and Washington. As one man said, "They are sly and dangerous." The typical attitude was expressed at an American Legion convention at Redmond, Oregon, in February, 1922:

Five American Legion posts in central Oregon took action last night emphatically to oppose the colonization of Japanese on irrigated farmlands in the Deschutes valley. Opposition is to be exerted through a central organization, consisting of two representatives from each local organization. . . .

"Education is a good idea, but it is a fact that some of the most notable reforms were made possible only by the use of means other than peaceful," said Mayor Hosch.

"We know the result of Japanese colonization in California and the trouble that state is having with Asiatics," said W. T. McNulty, Sisters post commander, "We do not want a duplication of that situation in central Oregon or any part of Oregon. Our answer must be emphatic."¹

It is interesting to note that contemporary Japanese opinion is even more distinctly fearful of American aggression in the Orient. The United States is thought to hover over the Pacific in an attempt to stop the natural expansion of the Oriental peoples. The fears of both Americans and Japanese are those of an in-group facing an out-group.

A general color prejudice against Orientals is revealed in an incident told by an American woman who was very sympathetic to Oriental students:

A young Hindu of the Brahman caste was an honored member of my family for seven months. Late one evening, when it was necessary to go into the city,

¹ From *Portland Oregonian*, February 5, 1922.

he kindly offered to take me in his automobile. When we reached the city and he tried to stop his car, the brake did not hold perfectly and we struck the car directly in front of us slightly. The Hindu student was the essence of courtesy and immediately sprang out of the car, inquiring anxiously of the American from the car in front about the extent of the damage done, and expressing his desire to make reparation. His inquiries were met with curses and an immediate demand for ten dollars. It was obvious that the damage was very slight, and the student refused to pay the ten dollars, but said that he would go with the owner of the car to the garage and pay whatever charges were necessary to have the slightly bent fender repaired. Another tirade of words came from the man, and he very rudely and brutally said, "You will come with me to the police court."

At that moment I stepped out of the car. It was dark and the man had not seen me. I said to him, "There is no cause for you to be excited. We will take care of the damage." He replied, "I beg your pardon. I did not know that there was a white woman in the car. I am sorry I spoke as I did."

I then gave him my address and told him to have the car repaired and send the bill to me. He got into his car and we heard nothing more from him, and no bill was presented.

B. *Nationality Prejudices.*

1. *International Antagonisms in Europe.*—Racial prejudice and national prejudice have much in common. In Europe nationality prejudice has had a distinct growth, especially since the war. These antagonistic patterns are rooted deeply in nationalistic rivalries. Through myths and legends the children of various countries acquire prejudices about their own superiority and the inferiority of the other national groups. Differences in language and culture content enhance these chauvinistic beliefs. Antagonistic attitudes between Germany and France, restimulated by the war, can hardly disappear for generations. After more than ten years of peace, decided prepossessions still color the international policies of both countries. In the first years after the war the feeling of hostility toward and fear of Germany was peculiarly strong in France. In Germany, not only did the populace chafe under the terms of the treaty, but the French occupation of the Ruhr and the Rhineland enhanced prejudices and misunderstanding. We may also note that the quartering of French colonial troops in the occupied areas produced a type of color prejudice formerly unknown there. A double basis for this antagonism was probably the enforced contact with negroes as military policemen and the fact that the French were deliber-

ately fostering resistance in order to make political capital. The following news item reveals how social pressure mobilizes itself to enforce prejudices:

Bremerhaven, June 2.—Woe be to the German girl seen in Bremerhaven with a Frenchman or Belgian, or in the company of any man whose skin is racially colored.

The "Lower Weser Branch of the Scissors Club" has been formed here for the purpose of snipping off the hair of any "Fräulein" who associates with such foreigners, among whom it includes natives of India, negroes, Chinese and Japanese. All tresses thus obtained are sold and proceeds devoted to Ruhr relief.²

An increase in the intensity and extent of prejudices in Europe naturally followed the international conflict of 1914-1918 and subsequent political and economic measures.³ Behind these, however, lie older patterns to which the newer stereotypes fasten themselves. Thus prejudices, when they concern the more serious problems of group survival, always tend to organize themselves into larger patterns connected with nationalistic myths and legends. They constitute the new definitions of situations and consequently determine the social interaction of the various nationals who come into contact with one another.⁴

2. *Anti-Foreigner Prejudice in America*.—In our own country the nationality prejudice is directed very largely against newly arrived immigrants. The "Native American" and "One Hundred Per Cent Americanism" movements are an expression of the desire of those already in power to maintain their superiority against the newcomers. Antagonistic attitudes and their attendant behavior patterns have existed almost from the first generation of our national life. Uninformed people sometimes imagine that One Hundred Percentism is a reaction against the flood of peoples from eastern and southern Europe which marked our immigration from 1880

² Dispatch in *New York Evening Post*, June 23, 1923.

³ In Chapter XXVII we shall deal with the effects of deliberate propaganda in fostering prejudices during the World War.

⁴ The Hindoo nationalism fostered by Ghandi and his followers in India is an interesting case of a non-resistant expression of antagonism. In the Euro-American culture, passive non-violent coercion is not common. Prejudices and violent reactions mark in-group—out-group relations, at least in crises. With the Hindoo nationalist group led by Ghandi the whole technique is different. In fact, it is so divergent from the Occidental pattern that the British are at a loss to know how to deal with it. If only the Ghandi followers would fight back, then the resistance could be attacked by military force. Non-violence is a method of opposition with which the West is unfamiliar. Cf. however, C. M. Case, *Non-violent Coercion*, 1923.

to 1914. As a matter of fact, the same treatment of foreigners, the same attitudes, have been prevalent since 1817, when the Irish first began to appear in considerable numbers in this country. In 1817 the *American Daily Advertiser* commented on the coming of the Irish:

Let us not forget, before it is too late, what motive brings these people to our shores. Let us remember that it is cheap lands, high wages, food in plenty, and freedom from military service; not a love of our institutions, or a belief that our form of government is better than they have. Let us remember that they come with all the prejudices which are the result of race and early training, and that in welcoming what seem to be the oppressed of other lands, we may really be taking an adder into our bosom.⁵

The prejudices of the old population against the new have continued throughout our history. Only the objects of the prejudice have changed. When the Irish had established themselves in our political, economic, and social life, the Germans came in for adverse treatment. Afterwards, when the German-American was assimilated, prejudice was directed against the still newer arrivals—Italians, Jews, and Slavic peoples. In the 1830's a number of patriotic bodies were organized. In 1835 "The Democratic Association of Native Americans" pledged its support to Harrison in the presidential campaign. In July, 1837, "The Native American Association of the United States" was founded in Washington, D. C. Riots and disturbances of various sorts ensued between the foreigners and the Native Americans. The causes of friction were basically economic, but rationalized in political and religious terms. Religion was a common excuse for opposing immigration. Out of it we have the rise of the still-current legend of a Papal plot to undo the American democracy. As early as 1838 the Citizens of Sutton and Millbury, Massachusetts petitioned Congress to inform them, among other things:

Whether there are not designs against the liberties of our country by means of this great influx of foreign emigration? Whether the character of many of the emigrants does not augur a vast increase of pauperism and of crime in our land? Whether there is not a foreign conspiracy existing against the government of this great republic and measures adopted and plans now in operation for its execution? ⁶

⁵ Quoted by K. Young, "Baiting the Alien: An Old Habit," *Nation*, 1925, vol. CXX, p. 710.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 710.

The agitation continued down to the Civil War. Various associations were organized for the defense of Native American Labor. The Know Nothing Party founded in the 50's was distinctly a Nativist movement. It adopted the technique of a secret society to gain its ends. The organized prejudice of this group incited fear and antagonism in the foreign-born and in some instances led to open conflict. Abraham Lincoln is worth quoting to obtain a calm and rational criticism of the whole prejudice. In 1855 he wrote to his friend Speed:

I am not a Know Nothing, that is certain. . . . How can any one who abhors the oppression of negroes be in favor of degrading classes of white people? Our progress in degeneracy appears to me pretty rapid. As a nation we began by declaring that "all men are created equal." We now practically read it "all men are created equal, except negroes." When the Know Nothings get control, it will read "all men are created equal except negroes, and foreigners and Catholics." When it comes to this, I shall prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretence of loving liberty—to Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy.⁷

Recent One Hundred Percentism has become entangled with the ideology of the Nordic race thesis—thus coupling another myth with a current conflict. This myth began its career with the publication in 1853 of Comte de Gobineau's *The Inequality of the Human Races*. This hypothesis, somewhat modified, caught on to the rising Germanic tradition of greatness which had such growth in the Bismarckian period. In turn, a new type of mythical anthropology and history arose in Houston Stewart Chamberlain's monumental *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. The whole doctrine formed one of the rationalizations for the rising power of the newly formed German Empire and helped to perpetuate the myth of Germany's place in the sun. The doctrine, modified again to suit our own American English and Puritan tradition, took vogue with us with the publication in 1916 of Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race*. This Nordic myth has been spread far and wide through the writings of such men as Lothrop Stoddard and Charles J. Gould. Since it fitted into their scheme, the Ku Klux Klan took up the battle cry. So did the Daughters of the American Revolution and other patriotic associations bent on bolstering up the superiority thesis of the older population against the inroads

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 710.

of divergent peoples and cultures. The popular literature of the period from 1917 to 1925, particularly, is filled with this ideology. It has been so common and so frequently commented on that we need not describe here its psychological and cultural roots. The following brief editorials from an Hundred Per Cent American newspaper are illustrative of the attitudes. The first deals with the matter of white supremacy:

Do you believe in "White Supremacy"? Of course you do, if you are a white man. Then why in a country that is so preponderantly of the Nordic race should the right of "White Supremacy" be questioned? Not because of the Jap on the west coast. Not because of the few of every race under the sun which are within our borders.

The Mongolian, the Semite, the Ethiopian, the Malay each have a "pride of race" as they have a perfect right to have. What is the answer? *Miscegenation*. The half-breed, the quarter blood—the taint.

The real black man does not want to be white. The Chinaman is proud of his nationality. But each Being with white blood in his veins aspires to the place of a white man and tries to put himself on a plane of equality with a white man in a white man's country. He will use every means that he can find in order to attain his ends. Even will he call upon the colored race from which he sprang to assist him in accomplishing his designs. .

Anyone who has lived in the South will tell you that the dangerous element is the "mulatto." But you say I know many white people who advocate social equality of the races. SO? Can you prove that statement? May it not be that there is a taint?

Think it over.⁸

The second is especially directed against the foreigners within our gates who do not appreciate our kindness in permitting them to stay here:

You certainly have the right to forbid that neighbor in the next block from coming upon your premises, digging up your lawn, sitting in your hammock or playing with your croquet set. When you want your relatives to live with you, they are invited to come and if you don't invite them you would think that they had their "nerve" if they insisted on coming, and would probably give them the "boot."

If your cousin lived with you and tried to bring his brothers and sisters to live with you also you would undoubtedly order him to leave.

You are the master of your own home and the king of your castle and the white people of the Nordic races are the rightful and righteous inhabitants of the North American continent. They conquered the wilderness, they builded

⁸ Editorial, *Western American*, Feb. 28, 1924.

this nation, they have perpetuated the ideals of freedom and are to continue to do so in spite of cousins, aunts, uncles or any other human being or agency. The European has been invited to live with us, the Oriental we have told to stay at home.

We still invite the white man to our shores but we are going to tell him when to come and how to come and in what numbers. Until he has proven his right to remain he is just an invited guest. If he proves unworthy he must leave and Americans are not to be dictated to by him or any of his relatives across the pond.⁹

The typical in-group superiority is expressed throughout. The substance of rationalizations may differ, but the fundamental attitudes remain the same.

Like all other attitudes, prejudices against foreigners and their children are constructed through early conditioning. The home, the neighborhood, the school, and the church all play a part in the process. Lasker recently published an analysis of the factors which contribute to the development of prejudices. His *Race Attitudes in Children* (1929) is a mine of valuable information. He shows how in the younger children avoidance and antagonism are built up out of fear, cruelty, combativeness, and ridicule, and how in adolescence condescension, rivalry, and class consciousness are added. As we have already noted, prejudice is not purely personal-social in origin but is an outgrowth of culture patterns built around in-group—out-group relations. Parents forbid their children to play with Italian children whom they meet on the street or in the public parks, and thus induce negative reactions toward the foreigners. The principal of a public school in an American city of 60,000 with a large Italian population reports:

Many of our best American-born women are intensely interested in the Americanization of the foreigners. Yet they refuse to send their own children to schools where Italian or Portuguese children attend. If they happen to live in districts where these groups are large, they have their own children transferred to schools where the children are all of "their own kind." Others send their children to the State Teachers College Training School in order to keep them from contact with foreign youngsters.

In spite of their intellectual interest in the external mechanics of Americanization, such mothers are certain to transmit their attitudes to their children.

⁹ Editorial, *Ibid.*, April 11, 1924.

The neighborhood response to the foreigner is seen in the following comment of a man of French-Swiss background who had lived for over thirty years on the margin of an Italian district:

I don't like them. The "Wops" steal you blind. They steal everything they can lay their hands on that is loose. They do not want to be Americanized. They are dirty and have no neighborhood pride. They work their children instead of sending them to school. I believe the American capitalists are trying to reduce the laboring Americans to the same level of life as the "Dagoes" and the Japs.

Most of the older American families avoid, if they can, intimate contact with foreigners, and tend to move out of sections where the latter come to live. They keep their children from relations with the children of the foreigners, and out of these actions the children themselves rapidly acquire the parental ideas and attitudes.

While the school may break down some of the antagonism developed in the home and the neighborhood, it often accentuates it. Schools reflect the attitudes of the home and the neighborhood. Teachers are often of the older American stock, and they naturally share the attitudes and ideas of the parents of the American children. If the foreign child is backward in learning he is certain to be singled out for attention and even ridicule by the teachers and pupils. If an Italian or Polish lad appears in school with unclean hands and face, he is often reprimanded in the presence of the other children. Not infrequently the reprimand enhances nationality prejudices. "Nice American children do not have dirty hands and faces." The playground contacts of the children often foster antagonism. A teacher wrote:

Recently two girls had a fight on the playground. One called the other "a Wop." "I'll have you know I'm no Wop, you," the other retorted. Then they made for each other.

Aside from these extra-curricular contacts of children with each other, the school subjects often give direction to nationality prejudices. The anti-British tone of many American histories is notorious. Stories told of German atrocities during the World War period have definitely biased individuals who declare that even now they have difficulty in shaking off their prejudices. Many adult organizations interfere with the school cur-

riculum by their insistence on the teaching of those patriotic attitudes which create or stimulate prejudices against other nations.

Certainly Christian churches are not free from prejudice-building. In Sunday School classes and in sermons, pictures of the benighted heathen peoples are added to other images and stereotypes about other nations and races. Our missions are supported by a combination of piety and a sense of superiority over the non-Christian peoples.

3. *European-American Prejudices.*—It should be noted that, like the Japanese, the European has developed certain definite images of us which color his picture of America and give the basis for prejudices. Due to the motion pictures of Western life, to newspaper and periodical literature, and to conversational legends, one common image of America is that of an untamed country, peopled by gun-carrying cowboys and desperadoes, or filled with mobs that lynch negroes as their principal sport if not their major occupation. Then, too, the reputed greed of the American, and his curious spendthrift ways while he is in Europe, make two mutually contradictory pictures for the European. Contemporary European cartoons depict Uncle Sam, the stereotype for Americans in general, as a money-grabbing fellow chronically intent on picking other nations' pockets; and, on the other hand, as a foolish spendthrift on a holiday, the easy prey of exploitation. Political prejudice against us is usually added to this image. The political prejudice is the result of the European concept of our international policies, especially those toward Latin America. Political cartoons show perfidious Uncle Sam with one hand offering to all nations the olive branch of perpetual peace, and with the other hand reaching toward all the territory south of the United States. Of course there are corresponding American stereotypes of Europe which provide the ideational content for our attitudes of antagonism and avoidance. For many Americans, the French are immoral both in personal and international relations. Besides refusing to pay their national debts to us, they gouge American tourists at every turn. The Italians are ignorant and ridden by superstitions. The Germans, to many of us, are still the horrible people pictured for us by war-time propaganda. The Russian communists are uniformly a bad lot, out to wreck our pleasant capitalistic and political order. The British are not only dull in humor, but insatiably ambitious and inclined to hoodwink us in our disarmament proposals. The anti-British sentiment so prevalent in large numbers of people in the United States is fostered by the traditional history

teaching of the schools, by propaganda of anti-British newspapers, by cartoons, and by other means. Since the British are so near to us in culture, in some ways the nationality prejudices are easily fed. Attempts on the part of Britishers and Americans to promote a genuine Anglo-American *rapprochement* are often viewed as another effort of perfidious Albion to regain control of this country.

In all of these cases political, economic, and even religious factors enter into the social attitudes built upon either side of the Atlantic. Out of these popular images are formed the prejudices which flare up in crises and furnish the drive toward war when relationships become too strained.

C. Religious Prejudices.

I. *Jewish-Gentile Antagonisms*.—Prejudices for and against the Jew are economic as well as religious. Yet because of the popular Gentile conception of the Hebrew people as a distinct religious if not racial group, we shall discuss the Jewish-Gentile prejudice in this section.

The antagonistic attitudes toward the Jew are caused largely by the following factors—divergence in religious views, economic competition, political attitudes, and intellectual interests.

So long as the Jews came to our country in small numbers and served us as tailors or pawnbrokers, there was little prejudice of any kind against them. It was when their numbers increased and the divergences of their culture thereby became more noticeable, that the prejudice became serious. There is a long-standing religious antagonism between Christian and Jew. The Jew has definite myths and legends which have produced stereotypes of superiority. He is one of the "Chosen People." He is part of a community with long historical antecedents of which he may well be proud. But for the Christian the Jew is an inferior person—dirty, ill-smelling, and offensive if he is from the lower economic classes, or arrogant and ostentatious if he is from the middle classes. For the more orthodox Christian he is damned of God because he rejected the teaching of Jesus. He is even one of those who crucified Christ. Christian children are told the stories of the Jewish crucifixion of Christ. In Europe, particularly, even stranger stories are circulated of the horrible Jewish customs of sacrificing Christian children as a part of their religious rituals. In the autumn of 1928 this story spread about New York in connection with the disappearance of a child

just before one of the important Jewish festivals. The myth that the child had been kidnapped to be sacrificed by the Jews was quickly formed. For a time the anti-Jewish feeling of the Christians and the immediate attitudes of defense among the Jews created a situation which seemed really menacing. Like other prejudices and myths, these stories do not circulate only where there is direct contact with their objects. One of the most interesting qualities of myths, legends, and prejudices is the fact that they thrive, sometimes even more luxuriously, where there is little or no direct contact with the people who are their objects.

Jewish religious practices, of course, diverge from those of Christianity; and whatever is different in social custom always arouses attention and tends to set up antagonisms. Hebraic dietary regulations, the unusual dates of Jewish religious holidays, and the strange dress of the older Jewish generation are simply wrong. At the very least, they are ridiculed by all good Christians.

A teacher in a large Middle Western city had the following experience with Hebrew children:

A real problem arises where school lunches are served to Jewish children, especially if they come from the poorer classes. I faced the difficulty of dealing with various food taboos. The question of meat was a constant bug-bear. Beef was permissible for them only if purchased from "the Jewish butcher." (It had to be blessed by their rabbi.) Because of the general educational red tape, it was difficult to make exceptions and to buy meat from the Hebrew shops. Pork about the place created a panic. Milk, in part, solved the problem. The dealer left three-quarters of a quart per child per day. The school nurse and dietician agreed that the children needed much butter, and since this was not to be had at their homes because of the expense, orders for a liberal supply were given. But on no account, according to Jewish diet taboos, could milk and butter be mixed, either at the table or in cooking. Oleomargarine might be used as a fat if it had the proper origin, but the head dietician prohibited its use in the schools. Various vegetable fats, such as Crisco and Snowdrift, were not acceptable to the Jews because they looked like lard. Mazola oil saved the day. It was comparatively easy to convince the children that it was made of corn, although they always wanted to think it was chicken grease, so cherished by a Jewish housewife.

The effort to be clean about the school kitchen was almost tragic in consequences. The mere mention of soap created an uprising, marked by emphatic choruses of "Honest to God, we dassent do it." Vegetable soaps were no more acceptable than those made from animal fats. In desperation I sent for a box of

Gold Dust powder. It didn't say on the box what its constituents were. I didn't know, nor did I want to. Its reaction upon the city water there created no suds, and it *did* cleanse. I had no desire to deceive the children, but it was my salvation.

Various holidays—of which there seemed to be no end—brought further difficulties. I always encouraged the Jewish children to observe these days with their families. During these periods the Hebrew children were restless. And the Scandinavian children, who were about equal in number, resented what they considered the special privileges of the Jews. . . .

Although I repeatedly tried to ascertain why the Jewish pupils were afraid to eat Gentile dishes, all one would ever say was, "Honest to God—I dassent do it." They seemed to fear some unseen, indescribable force that must do them harm did they not comply with the rituals. Some unmentionable terrible calamity would surely overcome them if they failed to abide by these dietary laws.

The Jews naturally resent the Christian's image of them. While today religious prejudice is hardly aggressive enough in America to provoke outbursts of violence, like the pogroms of Russia and Poland, Jewish feeling against Gentile notions sometimes runs high, as it did at the time of the alleged kidnapping mentioned above. Naturally the Jews wish to create a more favorable image of themselves in the minds of Christians. Hence they react against novels, legends, and artistic productions which they think unfair. The type of thing which sets up resentment is illustrated in the following dispatch from Boston under the headline:

VANDALS SMEAR CANVAS

Famous Painting, "The Synagogue," Spattered

Boston, February 22.—Chemical analysis of a black, ink-like material, spattered on John Singer Sargent's famous painting, "The Synagogue" on the walls of the Boston Public Library, has been ordered by the librarian. The police have been asked to trace the vandal.

The painting had been a storm center for more than two years. Objections to its presence in the public library are made by Jews who maintain that in its symbolic presentation of religion of old it is an insult to the Jewish race.

The legislature two years ago passed an act directing the state department of education to take the painting by right of eminent domain for use in the teaching of art in university extension work, but the department says it is impossible to do so. Hearings are again in progress on the question of removing "The Synagogue" from the library.¹⁰

¹⁰ From *Eugene Register* (Oregon), February 24, 1924.

The Jews feel that such misrepresentation of their religion is detrimental to their position in American life. It sets up negative responses in both groups and thus fosters a marked feeling of social distance.

Equally powerful in building up prejudices against the Jews are the stereotypes and myths about their economic practices. In a study of prejudice a number of Gentile students reported that in early childhood they acquired the notion that typically the Jew was a pawnbroker, pedler, or junk man. Thus one of their most powerful stereotypes was that Jews were "money-grabbers." Popular parlance has a verb "to jew down," which is clearly an evidence of the power among us of this stereotype of sharp trading. This is another illustration of the fact that the stereotype intrudes itself into the more spontaneous personal-social interaction of individuals. That is to say, the Jew as a money-maker is the pattern into which every Jew is fitted, willy nilly. The ordinary Gentile, for example, knows little or nothing of the rich variety of types of Jews recognized by their own group. The individual differences among Jewish persons who have shaken off the rigidity of their former ritualism, quite escapes the usual Christian. For instance, in Elmer Rice's drama, *Street Scene*, Rose, a Gentile, is amazed to discover that her Jewish friend, Sam, knows nothing about Hebraic religious practices. It is a discovery for her to learn that not all Jews go to the synagogue.

It is just this interposition of an image or idea which constitutes the main problem of prejudice in social contacts. A man is first a negro, a Jew, a Catholic, a dago, and only subsequently Mr. Johnson, Mr. Aaronson, Mr. Murphy, or Mr. Giolotti. Extended into unique verbalisms or elaborate myths, these pictures form the apperceptive mass on which social intercourse is built.

The economic life of the Hebrew in our midst has its historical roots in the ghetto. The medieval Christians of continental Europe definitely restricted Jewish activities. The Jew as a business man served a definite social-economic purpose. For example, he was accorded certain rights to buy and sell on holy days, something the faithful Christian could not do. Thus the Jew served the community and increased his own wealth at the same time. So, too, in the Middle Ages he was permitted to take interest on loans, a practice denied to the Christians. On the other hand, in many countries he was forbidden to hold real property. This fact encouraged the growth of an ethos of a different character from that of the military land-

holding aristocracy and the peasantry. This ethos produced in the Jew a mobility not common among those deeply attached to the land, such as the age-long peasant peoples of Europe or Asia.

In the development of the modern capitalistic system the Jew has played a distinct rôle. Yet his business interests and methods are not essentially different from those of other people who attempt to make profits in their work. Accusing the Jew of being a money-grabber is most probably a defense reaction of the Gentile in the presence of competition. We tend to find in others what we find in ourselves. When we blame others for practicing what we ourselves practice, we may fairly suppose that our resentment is an ambivalent reaction to our own manners and morals.

The Hebrew is often accused of being anti-nationalistic. Some patriots accuse him of being an international, radical laborite; others, an international banker. In this connection it is interesting to note one aspect of the propaganda carried on against the Jew by the Ku Klux Klan. Much was made of the fact that some of the prominent Communists in Russia, Germany, and America were Jews. Good citizens of the country could want no better proof than this, that the Jews are attempting to control the world by spreading disaffection among the laboring classes, by making them class conscious, restless, full of subversive ideas, and skilled in the technique of revolution. But this was not all. The wily Jew is also fast obtaining control of the great international banks. Hence, unsuspecting Gentiles are caught between two attacks, and with his usual craftiness, the Hebrew wins in either case. If the world becomes communistic, the Jews will be in control; if it continues to expand along capitalistic lines, the Jews will retain and increase their power over the rest of us. There is no escape from this deep Jewish plot to rule the world. Thus ran the arguments for the need to curb the expansion of Jewish activities.

The Jew is said to be a poor citizen, and his very internationalism is cited as evidence of it. Since he lacked citizenship in many European countries he has no background for cultivating political consciousness in our country. No doubt there is some correlation between current democratic political ideology and the ownership of land, the freedom of opportunity, and the feeling of responsibility for the maintenance of the state. In many countries, as we have noted, the Jew was denied ownership in land and political rights. Out of his strictly business life he developed a much more cosmopolitan point of view than his contemporary Gentiles. He has long

been a city-dweller, which means sophistication, mobility, and restlessness unknown to the more stolid rural population. This traditional background makes for some political restlessness, as shown by Jewish participation in radical movements or by his sympathy for international peace plans. In any case, his citizenship is thought to have a quality different from that of the Nordic Christian. As a matter of fact, any such divergence is due not to innate tendencies, but to circumstances of personal-social and cultural environment. The Jews vary in their radicalism or conservatism as do members of other groups. A label like "radical" or "conservative" applied to Jews as a group is as faulty as any such label applied to any other nationality, religious or political unit. But in out-group—in-group relations, generalization based on selected cases is always common.

Due to the great influence of their rabbinical learning, the intellectual tradition among the Hebrews has been strong. In Europe the intellectual professions offered the Jews a considerable outlet for their ability, though only within socially-accepted limits. Veblen pointed out the distinctive contributions which a long line of eminent Jewish scholars have made to European-American culture. Nevertheless, until quite recently, there has always been considerable pressure from the religious and political groups against the professional advancement of the Jews.

About the middle of the seventeenth century, when the city council of Halle in Würtemberg gave some privileges to a Jewish physician on account of his admirable experience and skill, "the clergy of the city joined in a protest, declaring that '*it were better to die with Christ than to be cured by a Jew doctor aided by the devil.*'" ¹¹

Except in certain special instances, the Jews did not play any great part in the early intellectual life of our country.¹² There were few Hebrews in the country prior to 1850. Since then their number has been increasing, and a great influx has occurred since 1890. The professional ambition of the Jew has made itself felt in the pressure which their increasing numbers have put upon the colleges. Apparently American colleges and universities first became aware of this social crisis about 1921. The Gentile Brahmin class which until then had held the gates of learning sacred for its own sons, began to discover that more and more Jews were crowding through

¹¹ J. Morse, "Psychology of Prejudice," *International Journal of Ethics*, 1907, vol. XVII, p. 500.

¹² They had some place in early political activities, however.

the college entrance examinations to seek higher education. The anti-Semitic feeling had earlier developed among Gentile college students themselves. For example, in 1907 a graduate student at an Eastern university had this experience:

As he came out of a class in government, J. noticed on the bulletin board an announcement of a debate between his college team and that of a neighboring institution. He mentioned the approaching debate to his friends and asked two or three of them if they intended to hear it. "Oh, no," one of them replied for the others, "in these days nobody goes out to those things. You see, the Jews have taken over the whole business, so that no one cares about it any more."

In increasing numbers the Jews were filtering into law, medicine, and teaching, and it was not long before the pressure of this competition began to be felt in these professions. This pressure had its repercussions on the colleges and universities. Students were limited in number, psychological tests and other devices were introduced at just this time; and though it is hard to prove it, many feel fairly sure that in these ways the college administrations very gracefully reduced the number of Jewish students in the larger and more aristocratic institutions.

The social pressure in the colleges continues. Where there is no limitation of numbers, as in publicly supported schools, discrimination by fraternities and various club activities is the principal form which the prejudice takes. Jewish young men and women are not admitted to Christian fraternities and sororities. They have their own, but they do not generally mingle with those of the Gentiles. Again this inevitably develops an antagonistic attitude among many Jewish students. The daughter of a New York City family of unusual social prestige expressed intense disgust and disappointment at the manner in which she and other Jewish women at a Middle Western university were treated socially. Gentile college men hesitate to be seen with Jewish girls because they fear the ridicule of their fraternity brothers or friends. A Gentile fraternity man recently remarked: "Yes, I went out with Z. F. once or twice. I didn't realize that she was Jewish." When he discovered this, he stopped seeing her. The social patterns are set by the Gentiles. The Jews are considered outside the pale of the most exclusive college sets. At one college the "Ginger Club" is an exclusive dancing club supported by Gentile fraternity groups. No Jews are

admitted. While many Jews may and often do win academic prizes, the social life of the campus is divided by class lines. As one sorority girl put it, "the Jews are noisy, impolite, and smelly." She admitted that she knew but few Jews and none well. She had simply acquired the current stereotypes of her group and applied them to all Jews. Many Gentile students recognize the irrationality of this attitude, but they are afraid of the ridicule which would be heaped on them should they cut across social convention.

In the professions the competition is keen. The college world can furnish numerous examples of brilliant Jews who have been forced out of teaching and research work by social pressure. The Jew is felt to be forward, over-critical, and non-coöperative; and there is, of course, sometimes a factual basis for this feeling. The writer recently learned of this incident: A young Jewish instructor in a large university complained bitterly to an older professor, also a Jew, of the inferiority of the men in his own and another department where he had intended to pursue graduate work. The instructor had been on the campus only a few days and had hardly met the men of whom he complained. Even with tolerant Gentile faculty members this sort of thing tends to set up a stereotype against the Jew in general. It often happens that the possession of a Hebraic name will serve as a barrier in securing fellowships or teaching positions. Not infrequently Jews take over Christian family names in order to cover up their origin.

L. P., who had begun his scientific work about the time this country entered the World War, changed his name from one definitely Hebraic to one distinctly British. He then moved to another part of the country. Later he finished his graduate work, married a Gentile woman, and succeeded in his profession. Without doubt changing his name greatly aided him to make successful social adjustments.

This case may be contrasted with the one, cited in Chapter XIV, of the Jew who finally gave up teaching because of prejudice against him in college and university circles.

Although there are many Jews in the intellectual professions, the persistence of anti-Semitic prejudice shows the power of stereotypes in determining human relations even in the fields, like science, where men are supposed to be free of bias. One may be a great scientist in a special field

and still be full of traditional conceptions about race, religion, and politics. The transfer of objectivity is very slight.¹³

In literature and the fine arts the Jew has contributed abundantly to our culture. Some of this creative productivity has centered around Hebrew culture itself, but much of it has the universal appeal of all great art. So too, the Jew has contributed much to our philosophy.

Continued anti-Semitic prejudice keeps many Jews from close contact with the Gentile world. In many instances Jewish artists have tried to assimilate themselves with Gentile culture, and in the end have given up the attempt. Meeting with harsh criticism and obvious avoidance, the Jew, like others labeled as "outsiders," has found his emotional balance once more by identifying himself with some Jewish group or movement. Such experiences keep up in-group—out-group attitudes and habits among Gentiles and Jews, and prevent the disappearance of unreasoned prejudice.

The degree of prejudice against the Jew in these four fields differs in various localities and situations. Its continuation is largely further evidence of the hangover of irrational attitudes and their continual rebuilding in terms of contemporary crises. In spite of propaganda, the bitterness against the Jew is not so intense in America as it is in Europe. Neither is the prejudice so serious as in negro-white relations. Nevertheless, its persistence indicates the inertia and conservatism of social habits and the ease with which we fall into stereotyped methods in retaining our social status.

2. *Protestant-Catholic Prejudice.*—While Protestant-Catholic conflicts have not the violence they once had, they still persist in milder forms. Protestant children are brought up in a series of stereotypes, myths, and legends about the Catholics which markedly affect their attitudes and reactions to them. They hear stories of papal plots against the government of the United States. A writer in the *Atlantic Monthly* told how these myths were kept alive in his youth. Pood Wamsley watched a Roman Catholic procession and later heard his father and other men discussing its whole meaning. Later Pood gave his playmates a whispered harangue on the matter:

"Didja see them Cath'lic kids p'radin' yestiddy? Lissen!

"Ja know what they're doin'? Lissen! Ever' one of them is bein' trained to be soldiers when they grows up. That's what them Cath'lics is doin'. Soon's they

¹³ Cf. K. Young, "The Need of Integration of Attitudes among Scientists," *Scientific Monthly*, 1924, vol. XVIII, pp. 291-305, for a discussion of the wider reaches of this matter.

git 'em all trained and they're growed up, they're goin' to seize the whole country and take charge of it an' ever'thing!"

"Howja know?" one of his aghast hearers inquired.

"I know," returned Pood, mysteriously. "There's certain people watchin' ever'thing they do, and when the time comes—" He broke off with a far-away, portentous look.

"How kin they do it?" some one asked.

"How kin they do it? Don't ja know that ever' time a baby boy is born in a Cath'lic family, they take and bury a gun under the church for him to use when he grows up? And they bury enough am'nition fer him to kill fifty people with!"

"Well, why's the marshall let 'em, then?"

"Huh! The marshall! Bob Mounts don't know nothin' that's goin' on!"

"Why n't somebody tell him?"

"The time ain't come yet. It's a comin' tho! Trouble is—the govinment. Can't expect to do nothin' while Cleveland's president. They say that, sekurtly, he's mebee a Cath'lic himself." ¹⁴

Common Protestant stereotypes about Catholics are that they are "idol worshipers," that they "have no Bibles," that they are "inherently dishonest." Many otherwise tolerant and well-informed Jews and Protestants alike misunderstand the attitude of the Catholic Church toward modern science, and refuse to listen to Catholic expositions of the attitude of the Church.

These stereotypes do not necessarily arise among Protestants only in strongly Catholic neighborhoods. Nothing could be more intense than the anti-Catholic prejudices of many rural communities in the South, where there is hardly a single Catholic family in a whole county. The writer found this distressing conflict in a family which lives in an almost exclusively Protestant village. The father is Protestant, the wife and her mother are Catholic. The father persists in openly telling his children shocking stories about Catholics, and not less openly he points to their maternal grandmother as a member of the church which promotes these shocking practices. He of course is, not too indirectly, striking at his wife also for being a Catholic. He is producing disastrous inner conflicts in his children by causing them to side with him against their mother, and at the same time he is, of course, creating in them distinct attitudes toward Catholics as a group. In another instance, a father of liberal views who has given his family no formal sectarian training, and who prides himself on keeping his

¹⁴ L. Mellett, "Klan and Church," *Atlantic Monthly*, 1923, vol. CXXXII, p. 587.

children free of religious prepossession, was quite chagrined to find that his ten-year-old daughter had acquired certain notions that the Catholics were "bad," that "they worshiped idols," and had various other evil practices. The youngster had spent a summer with a Protestant aunt who had piously told her weird anti-Catholic tales. Though the child had earlier played with Catholic children, she had never particularly singled them out as being at all different. Now she had definitely antagonistic images which disturbed her relations with all Catholics.

In sections of the country where political and economic competition operates between groups having Protestant or Catholic affiliations, there are prejudices on both sides. The Ku Klux Klan spread a great deal of propaganda among Protestants about Catholic plots to control the government. "The Catholics control the army because most of the officers are Catholics"; "The Pope plots to seat a Catholic in the Presidency," and so on. Historical legends serve as a background in these contemporary feelings and attitudes. The whole tradition of the Protestant revolt against the papacy has been carried down to the present time. It has become a part of the mental-emotional freight of the average Protestant.

Quite naturally, Catholics have many stereotyped prejudices about the Protestants: They have fallen away from the true faith; they will not be saved hereafter; they possess no true church or true priesthood armed with divine authority; born in heresy, they develop worse heresies as they go; some of them actually tolerate divorce and even the conscious limitation of the number of children born in their families. Just as Gentiles frequently talk as if a Jew of today had personally assisted at the crucifixion of Jesus, so Catholics talk as if Protestants today had personally conspired with Luther and Calvin against the unity of the Mother Church. A child born in a Protestant family finds Protestantism quite as "natural" as a Jew finds his Judaism or a Catholic finds his Catholicism; but it is a Catholic stereotype to refuse to recognize this simple fact. Mr. F. P. O'Malley gives amusing examples of Irish Catholic stereotypes directed against Protestants in "American Sons of th' Ould Sod," in the *American Mercury* for September, 1929. Many perfectly honest Catholics, who probably have well-behaved liberal Protestants as neighbors, seem heartily convinced that the liberal wing of Protestantism menaces civilization itself. The attachment of liberal Protestants to modern science is notorious; the occasional change in scientific theories is also notorious. Apparently it is a Catholic stereotype

to point to these shifts as an evidence of the complete unreliability of scientific theory in comparison with the assumed unchanging character of dogma. Obviously the fact that the first chapter in Genesis does not change is small proof that it is a better account of the origin of man than a modification of any particular theory of evolution.

In both Catholic and Protestant stereotypes we should note the tacit implication of the superiority of the in-group over the out-group. Each group has stereotypes attributing to itself the socially essential virtue of loyalty; the attitude is identical, but its object is the Church for the Catholic and the Bible for the Protestant. The notion of Christian suffering for the truth is the same for both; but the Catholic remembers English persecution of Irish Catholics and the Protestant remembers St. Bartholomew's Day. Thus the ego of the individual Catholic expands in its association with a historic social group of such obviously unique virtue and thus also does the ego of the individual Protestant expand and receive sanction.

The presidential campaign of 1928 is an excellent example of how religious prejudices may be revived and exaggerated when occasion demands. The propaganda carried on against Governor Smith during the summer and autumn of that year stirred up old prejudices and added new details to the tradition of a "Catholic menace." Adherents of Governor Smith, in turn, responded quite in the manner of their opponents. Old prejudices were phrased in new terms. We have no technique to discover how much the campaign actually altered the fundamentals of the prejudices. Possibly it merely made them more explicit in action. Without the development of critical attitudes only with difficulty can adults be greatly changed in their basic prejudices. At best, these changes seem always confined to minorities, no matter what the country or the creed of the individuals.

D. Prejudice among Economic Groups.

In discussing the interplay of economic groups in Chapter XIV we pointed out the development of antagonistic attitudes in the various groups. The prejudices which the laboring man feels for the rich employer are determined for him by historical legends and by the in-group—out-group conflict. The prejudices, myths, and legends among organized union men have a long history growing out of the intermittent controversy with their employers. The prejudices of the unorganized, common, and semi-

skilled laborers have their roots in more general myths of the hard-fisted rich man, and in vague and inarticulate resentment at low pay, poor working conditions, and irregular employment. The capitalist-employer is blamed for every kind of economic hardship. A student reports a conversation with a transient laborer who was hitch-hiking from place to place in search of work:

We passed a large railroad gang and the man called my attention to the fact that all the laborers were Mexicans. He said he couldn't even get a job at that kind of work because the railroad company had found "white men" dissatisfied with the low wages which the Mexicans accepted. The company had ruled "to hire no more whites." He blamed our laws and the millionaires for importation of the Mexicans. His prejudice seemed to have an almost purely economic basis. He thought that the white employers in agriculture in California who a few years ago had been proud of the faithful service which they had received at low wage rates from "the little brown brother" were "getting what was coming to them" now that the Japanese were giving them sharp competition themselves.

The employers, in turn, have their biases against the laboring classes. We saw in our previous discussion how frequently they blamed all sorts of industrial difficulties on the daily worker. These prejudices have certain historical patterns created in the relations of capital and labor since the rise of the modern industrial system. Aside from the conflict between employers and employees, economic factors play a decided rôle in all forms of contemporary prejudice. Much of what passes for race or color prejudice is basically economic. The fear of losing economic position is often rationalized in terms of racial, nationality, or religious prejudices. This fact confirms Park's definition of prejudice as a form of defense reaction against loss of status.

In the history of Catholic-Protestant prejudices, economic factors have played a part. In the sixteenth century people of northern Europe grew restless under the monetary drain put upon them in the selling of indulgences, and in the paying of tithes and dues demanded by the Church at Rome. Myths and legends were current in Luther's day describing the extravagance and luxury of the papal court bought at the cost of the hardships of faithful Catholics in northern Europe. The intimate relation of the Protestant Revolt and the rise of modern capitalism is another evidence of the close alliance of certain theological views and economic practices. It is only natural that some phases of this alliance should find their way into

the common prejudices of members of the two groups. To many thrifty hard-working Protestants the leisurely, easy-going life of the South European or Latin American Catholics furnishes a basis for both religious and economic prejudice. The Catholic not only worships false gods in a too highly ritualistic manner, but he is also immoral because he lacks our thriftiness, our steady industrial habits, and our faith in the capitalistic order.

In brief, myths, legends, and prejudices all together constitute certain aspects of our internal stimuli, or our subjective, anticipatory patterns which determine the nature of our social reality. As we have indicated, this reality is largely symbolic, and largely composed of language and visual images. The names that we apply to the groups against which we are prejudiced are the counters which we use in dealing with the individual members of the groups. They stabilize and define our social reactions.

Our prejudices are distinctly related to our techniques of maintaining social status. In times of severe conflict we may retain our status by force. But ordinarily we retain it by those words and legends which indicate our superiority. These words and legends give us as individuals a place in the social world secure from the inroads of members of other racial, political, religious, or economic groups.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter XIX, Section B, pp. 528-38.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 - 1. Discuss questions and exercises for assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter XIX, nos. 10, 13-15, p. 539.
 - 2. What are the principal factors which produce White-Oriental prejudice?
 - 3. What is the psychology of One Hundred Percent Americanism? Why does each succeeding group of immigrants provoke prejudice in the older American population?
 - 4. What conditions in American life tend to allay Gentile-Jewish prejudices? What conditions foster it? Illustrate by citing cases.
 - 5. What conditions are favorable to the continuation of Protestant-Catholic prejudices in our country? What conditions are decreasing it? Illustrate by citing cases.

6. What conditions are exaggerating anti-American sentiment in Europe? What conditions are cutting it down?
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
 1. See appropriate assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter XIX, p. 539.
 2. Report on G. B. Watson, "The Measurement of Fair-Mindedness," *Teachers College Contribution to Education*, 1925, no. 176.
 3. The Development of anti-American Prejudice in the Orient.
 4. Report on Young, "Psychology of Oriental-Occidental Prejudice," publications of *Institute of Pacific Relations*, 1929.
 5. Trace the development of techniques for restricting Jewish enrollment in our privately-endowed colleges and universities.
 6. Report Lasker, *Race Attitudes in Children* (appropriate sections).
 7. Report Veblen, "Intellectual Pre-eminence of Jews in Modern Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, 1919, vol. XXXIV, pp. 33-42.
 8. Report L. Wirth, *The Ghetto* as a social-psychological study of Jewish backgrounds.

PART FIVE

The Crowd and the Public

"Truth—never shows herself in crowds."—BUTLER

"Some of us fall behind the fashions, but no one ever gets ahead of them."
—PARK

"Opinion is truth filtered through the moods, the blood, the dispositions of the spectator."—PHILLIPS

"Here shall the Press the People's right maintain,
Unaw'd by influence and unbrib'd by gain."—STORY

The present section deals with those aspects of collective behavior which are described by the terms, the crowd and the public. The crowd is a grouping of relatively large numbers of persons who are in physical and psychological contiguity to each other. We exclude from the crowd the primary groups of family, playground, neighborhood, congeniality groups and gangs. The public is a non-contiguous grouping. We exclude from the public the more distinctly organized and formalized (institutionalized) secondary groups. It will be necessary to keep in mind the cultural trends which lie at the basis of crowd and public behavior. Nevertheless, in crowd and public activity, the culturally determined reactions are less evident than are certain more natural, spontaneous responses. Thus the crowd and the public represent forms of human association somewhat more dependent on personal-social than upon cultural-institutional relationships. Both the crowd and the public depend, moreover, upon mobility and communication. The former is further contingent on contiguity of space, the latter only on contiguity of time. The former is a type of person-to-person grouping based on locality. The latter is a type of grouping based on ease of communication without reference to locality but resting upon common interests.

At the outset we shall deal with certain general characteristics of the crowd. Then we shall study some of the more specific features of crowd and mob psychology. The audience will be treated as a specialized form of crowd. Fashion touches both the crowd and the public as a form of collective behavior. The section will conclude with a treatment of public opinion, including a discussion of censorship and propaganda which reveals the relation of public opinion to social control.

CHAPTER XX

THE BEHAVIOR OF CROWDS

A. *Types of Crowds.*

We must differentiate at the outset between a crowd and a mere throng of people. A mass of people passing back and forth in a street does not constitute a crowd, not in our sense of the word. A crowd must have a certain common psychological interest, no matter how temporary. There must be some common focus of attention, some common orientation toward an object of concern by a considerable number of persons. Conway remarks that a crowd can hardly develop unless the number of persons be larger than a jury or a dinner party. In short, a crowd is a psychological formation dependent on common experience and numbers.

We may begin by describing various sorts of crowds; for on this basis we shall better be able to make an analysis of crowd behavior.

1. *The Passive Transitory Crowd.*—At the simplest level there is the merely temporary, passive crowd which observes men putting up a new sign in front of a theater or which listens to an argument between a motorcycle policeman and a speeding autoist stopped at an intersection. Even a group of people standing in the stern of a vessel may develop the rudimentary features of crowd as they watch a passing boat or a school of fish in the wake of the vessel. In none of these situations is it necessary that there be any conversation among the members of the crowd. There is common interest and an incipient crowd formation in the spatial sense.

Another type of street crowd is illustrated by the mere suggestiveness of looking at some particular object. The following anecdote was told by a somewhat sophomoric American tourist:

One of our favorite stunts was for two or three of us to wander along the busy streets of London or Berlin in the evening and to stop suddenly, gaze earnestly into some shop window, and jabber violently about some supposedly interesting object on display. Gradually other passers-by would be attracted. The more inquisitive would peer around us or over our shoulders. Others would join

them, and soon quite a crowd would gather, each person trying to see what it was all about and pushing and shoving in order to see better. At about this point we would allow ourselves to be pushed aside. We would then slip across the street to watch the performance. Sometimes a chance crowd of this sort would persist for several minutes before finally dissolving.

The mere sight of other people peering into holes, over fences, at near-by or far-away objects excites, probably through our conditioned reactions, like responses in us. We have a curious feeling, in the famous words of Mr. Micawber, that "something is about to turn up" and so we look too. A throng of country folk in town for the circus has been known to stand and gaze into the clouds for a long time because a couple of wags began peering upward, probably with binoculars, and talking about a balloon. As they crane their necks somebody comments on seeing the speck "way up there," or remarks how it has "passed behind that cloud."

These early conditionings of curiosity, of expectancy, have been exploited by all sorts of crowd controllers—political orators, sleight of hand artists, mob leaders, and respectable advertising managers. The circus barker exploits them to inveigle a crowd into his show.

In these situations the stimulus is not particularly significant for the individuals, and the whole configuration of the crowd is brief and impermanent. There are other types of rudimentary crowds in which the novel situation is more distinctive and in which antagonistic responses are set up.

2. *The Aggressive Transitory Crowd.*—The reactions of a group of passengers to stimuli of danger on an ocean liner which has met with an accident would constitute more antagonistic crowd responses. If a number of immigrants who could not communicate except within their family groups were confronted with a fire or other accident on shipboard, a crowd would be formed, although the common denominator would be rudimentary emotional reactions and communication reduced to bodily gestures. If leadership should arise in such situations it would be the result of the most primitive sort of power, physical and ingenious. The focus of attention would bring out rudimentary curiosity, fear, and rage reactions. Yet even in this crowd there would be a certain universality or community of activity.

Consider a heterogeneous throng waiting for a train to take them on a summer excursion. If the train is delayed, a common interest may in time

weld the individuals into a crowd. A few more vociferous individuals begin to talk loudly to their friends of the abominable service of the railroad. Gradually others talk in little knots. They all mill around and around on the platform. If the train is seriously delayed, the crowd displays a tendency to blame the station officials for its non-appearance. There may be even a fairly concerted movement toward the ticket office to demand explanations or the refunding of the fares. But when the train finally does arrive and every one is aboard, the crowd attitudes and activities disappear, and the whole incident is quickly forgotten. While the crisis continues, however, the rudiments of vigorous mass action are in evidence.

The following report by an American student describes a temporary crowd in Berlin in which the motive was distinctly prepotent, and finally resulted in aggressive mass action:

When there was potato shortage in Berlin I saw in a market place many hundreds of women waiting in line for potatoes. A farmer appeared driving a small wagon loaded with potatoes. He named a price for his potatoes which was beyond the means of the women. Quickly and spontaneously they raided the wagon, stripped it of potatoes, and dispersed before the police appeared.

This was a spontaneous mass action provoked by the hunger and suffering of the Berliners during the hard winters following the peace treaty. The American noticed no apparent leaders here, but doubtless there were some more aggressive women in the crowd who furnished a pattern of reaction for the others.

When there is a common language and some common social-cultural background, the crowd is likely to be more integrated. Whatever responses the crowd may make would be at a higher level than those of the non-communicating immigrant group. In the non-communicating group the influence of the leader is circumscribed because he cannot use verbal signs in controlling the action of the crowd. A common language always makes the leader's control more flexible.

An individual relatively strange in both language and cultural background may be affected by a crowd situation during a crisis. An American student, who spoke and read German easily, had spent nearly two years in Germany before the war. Naturally he read the newspaper accounts and talked to many Germans about the matter, and yet he felt no particular sympathy for war as such or for this one in particular. In fact, he was in

some mental conflict as to who was responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. His principal interest was the observation of human behavior under war conditions. At the time he wrote in his diary:

After dinner Jerry and I dropped into the business district of Frankfort and found a wave of mild excitement running through the throngs of people moving up and down the street. The evening journals had brought us the information that General Von Hindenburg had inflicted an horrible and telling defeat on the Russians at Tannenburg in East Prussia. As I read over the dispatches, images of pleasant days spent in and near the Mazurkian lake country came back to me. I also recalled local stories told there of the manner in which Von Hindenburg had for years past put the Fifth Army Corps through difficult maneuvers in this very lake region in anticipation of just such attacks from the East as the Russians had now undertaken.

We strolled down the Allee talking of how long we might remain in Germany and of the possible duration of the war. We came into the Square just off the Circle as a crowd was forming to celebrate the victory of General Von Hindenburg. In this Square were several statues—the omnipresent one of Bismarck, as well as others of national heroes—a fitting place indeed for the celebration. An immense crowd pressed around the Bismarck *Denkmal* from the high base of which army officers and public men made impassioned speeches, promising the people that now the Russians were defeated, in a few weeks the armies of the Empire would sweep into Paris and that the navy would defeat the English on the high seas. Thus would Germany and her allies be vindicated. Lusty voices in the crowd took up the song "Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles, über Alles in der Welt."

Up to this point Jerry and I had shown only a normal interest in listening to the speeches and in watching and hearing the behavior of the crowd. But the singing of this war-like song, the grip on one's imagination and feeling of the strength of this nation fighting for its territory brought in my own case a great lurch forward into more intimate relations with the crowd members. Then came another song—one which has always stirred me. Is it because of my Nordic ancestry and its love of adventure? I do not know. But the music and the words to "Die Wacht am Rhein" got under my skin, so that I found myself singing the chorus with great force. I felt myself being surcharged again and again with emotion.

A feeling of expansiveness, of wanting to get into the fight, into the great emotional swing of this people, surged through me. I remarked to Jerry, "If I were a German I'd be in this thing in a minute." And I believe that had this enthusiasm persisted, I should have done so. I had witnessed just this sort of thing in good German friends of mine, men who had once expressed very liberal or even socialistic views, who now actually wept because they could not join the colors at once, but were remanded to civilian life to await their subsequent call from the war office.

Several months after this experience this American wrote:

It is a curious thing that to this day, I cannot hear "The Watch on the Rhine" without catching something of a martial spirit, a desire to fight, with images of myself in fine uniform, marching in military step with others. This is all perhaps based on childish dreams of being a hero, but it nevertheless illustrates the tremendous suggestion which a singing, shouting crowd may have upon a relative outsider. There is no doubt in my mind that this song has a rhythm which appeals to my early conditioning and even to my prepotent patterns to struggle, to expand and to fight.

We should not forget here, of course, that the American and the German were not so far removed from the same impetus. The existence of the culture pattern of war is evident in America as in Germany. The interesting thing is that the songs sung and the speeches made were distinctly German. Nevertheless there was an emotional carry-over due to the common affective, emotional basis of both the American and the Germanic pictures of war—marching, fighting, uniforms, glory, etc. In other words, there is a drainage of emotional reactions into a new content, in this case Germanic not American. If the defeated enemy had been the American forces, the emotional reaction might have been strong but of opposite direction.

3. *Crowds and Serious Crises.*—Another type of crowd arises where the crisis is very intense and where leadership may become a much more pertinent factor. In a physical crisis such as a flood, a cyclone, an earthquake, or explosion, at first there is usually a great mass movement arising from fear. This is often followed by a more organized crowd which attempts to escape danger in more rational fashion, or which tries more consistently to overcome some of the hardships of the situation. In lynchings and revolutions there are more aggressive physical responses and a distinct heightening of the usual emotional and distinctive domination of behavior. Marked crises in religious and business situations may provoke crowd action in which behavior is perhaps not quite so violent as in lynching or revolutionary mobs. Nevertheless the difference in behavior is only one of degree, not of kind.

In revolutionary times crowd behavior often goes to great extremes. The literature on revolutions is full of legends of street fighting and mob action. The French Revolution has been a classical example of mob behavior. We

all carry an image of the storming of the Bastille, an image probably acquired from Dickens' *Tale of Two Cities*. Our historical images of the nineteenth century are filled with revolutionary episodes of the struggle of the masses for political and economic rights. In these images anarchistic and later, socialistic mythology play a very large part. The propaganda of Bakunin and his followers crystallized a great deal of industrial unrest among the working classes, especially in Italy, France, and Spain. The resulting mass movement had considerable effect upon the subsequent history of Europe, in the formation of legends and stereotypes of revolutionary reactions against alleged capitalistic exploitation.

During the Russian Revolution of 1917 mob action arose in spite of organized efforts to check it. When the inhibitions in the form of culture norms are released, the behavior of men and women is thrown back upon more rudimentary behavior patterns, involving fear and rage especially. While out of such violence new institutions may be born, emotional mob behavior is typical in the period of transition.

In our own country mob action has been exemplified in the mass action against the horse-thief in the Far West, by race-riots in the North but especially in the development of lynching as a means of social control of the negro in the South. Lynching affords not only a means of control of the recalcitrant negro, it also furnishes the participants with a good deal of emotional release from repressions which they feel in their daily dealings with the black men. When some negro stepped too far across the limits of the mores of the community, he was treated as an example for all others. Through this means there grew up a definite technique in handling the negro and the community more or less approved of this method. In fact, various communities devised their own methods of dealing with the negro offenders. In some areas hanging was in vogue, in others burning or shooting.¹ In fact, culture patterns come in time to govern even mob behavior.

It is interesting to observe how the Southern manner of dealing with negroes who break the mores carries over to new situations. Thus in the recent labor disputes in North Carolina and elsewhere there has been considerable mob action in which kidnapping and flogging played a part.

¹ Cf. W. White, *Rope and Faggot, A Biography of Judge Lynch*, 1929, for a number of cases.

4. *Crowd Epidemics*.—Another type of crowd behavior must be considered before leaving this subject. We refer to the epidemics of crowd action which often sweep through a whole population. Occasionally these waves of emotional crowd behavior persist for a considerable time. These are not mere isolated instances of crowd behavior stimulated by some particular crisis within a single community. They have a wider spread. They are related to deep-seated sentiments and feelings which are current in a particular society. Often they are dependent on some form of suggestive propaganda for their diffusion over a large area. With ease of communication these mental epidemics are often closely linked with public opinion. In these crowd crazes we must look both to the cultural and to the psychological setting. Certainly they have been common phenomena in Western society from the Middle Ages to the present time.

At the outset they took on religious form. One of the earliest was the pilgrimage mania which began about 1000 A. D. and lasted in its fullest intensity for a hundred years. This was followed by the Crusades. These were distinctly mass movements stimulated by religious leaders, particularly certain popes, by medieval orders of knights, and by various economic groups. Italian merchants who did a good business in transporting the crusaders to the Holy Land were particularly in favor of the Crusades. The activities of Peter the Hermit and Pope Urban II in arousing the masses to make the First Crusade furnish a typical picture of how such movements are started. In Palestine itself Peter the Hermit conceived the idea of freeing the Holy Land from the infidel Mohammedan power. Receiving the approval of his project from Simeon, Patriarch of the Greek Church of Jerusalem, Peter repaired to Pope Urban II:

Urban received him most kindly; read, with tears in his eyes, the epistle from the Patriarch Simeon, and listened to the eloquent story of the Hermit with an attention which shewed how deeply he sympathised with the woes of the Christian Church. Enthusiasm is contagious; and the pope appears to have caught it instantly from one whose zeal was so unbounded. Giving the Hermit full powers, he sent him abroad to preach the holy war to all nations and potentates of Christendom. The Hermit preached, and countless thousands answered to his call. France, Germany, and Italy started at his voice, and prepared for the deliverance of Zion. One of the early historians of the Crusade, who was himself an eyewitness of the rapture of Europe, describes the personal appearance of the Hermit at this time. He says that there appeared to be something divine in everything which he said or did. The people so highly revered him,

that they plucked hairs from the mane of his mule that they might keep them as relics. While preaching he wore in general a woollen tunic, with a dark-coloured mantle, which fell down to his heels. His arms and feet were bare; and he ate neither flesh nor bread, supporting himself chiefly upon fish and wine. "He set out," says the chronicler, "from whence I know not; but we saw him passing through the towns and villages, preaching everywhere, and the people surrounding him in crowds, loading him with offerings, and celebrating his sanctity with such great praises, that I never remember to have seen such honors bestowed upon any one." Thus he went on, untired, inflexible, and full of devotion, communicating his own madness to his hearers, until Europe was stirred from its very depths.²

While Peter the Hermit was having such success the pope crossed the Alps into the somewhat alien territory of Philip I. Following the Council of Clermont, he began himself to advocate a holy war against the infidels. Great throngs of people crowded into Clermont to hear Urban II preach the need of a crusade. Note the use of then current stereotypes:

The great square before the cathedral church of Clermont became every instant more densely crowded as the hour drew nigh when the pope was to address the populace. Issuing from the church in his full canonicals, surrounded by his cardinals and bishops in all the splendor of the Romish ecclesiastical costume, the pope stood before the populace on a high scaffolding erected for the occasion, and covered with scarlet cloth. A brilliant array of bishops and cardinals surrounded him; and among them, humbler in rank, but more important in the world's eye, the Hermit Peter, dressed in his simple and austere habiliments. Historians differ as to whether or not Peter addressed the crowd, but as all agree that he was present, it seems reasonable to suppose that he spoke. But it was the oration of the pope that was most important. As he lifted up his hands to ensure attention, every voice immediately became still. He began by detailing the miseries endured by their brethren in the Holy Land; how the plains of Palestine were desolated by the outrageous heathen, who with the sword and the firebrand carried wailing into the dwellings and flames into the possessions of the faithful; how Christian wives and daughters were defiled by pagan lust; how the altars of the true God were desecrated, and the relics of the saints trodden under foot. "You," continued the eloquent pontiff, "you, who hear me, and who have received the true faith, and been endowed by God with power, and strength, and greatness of soul,—whose ancestors have been the prop of Christendom, and whose kings have put a barrier against the progress of the infidel,—I call upon you to wipe off these impurities from the face of the earth, and lift your oppressed fellow-Christians from the depths into which they have been trampled. The sepulchre of Christ is possessed by the heathen, the

² C. Mackay, *Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions*, 1852, vol. II, pp. 7-8.

sacred places dishonored by their vileness. Oh, brave knights and faithful people! offspring of invincible fathers! ye will not degenerate from your ancient renown. Ye will not be restrained from embarking in this great cause by the tender ties of wife or little ones, but will remember the words of the Saviour of the world himself, "Whosoever loves father and mother more than me is not worthy of me. Whosoever shall abandon for my name's sake his house, or his brethren, or his sisters, or his father, or his mother, or his wife, or his children, or his lands, shall receive a hundredfold, and shall inherit eternal life."

The warmth of the pontiff communicated itself to the crowd, and the enthusiasm of the people broke out several times ere he concluded his address. He went on to portray, not only the spiritual but the temporal advantages that would accrue to those who took up arms in the service of the cross. Palestine was, he said, a land flowing with milk and honey, and precious in the sight of God, as the scene of the grand events which had saved mankind. That land, he promised, should be divided among them. Moreover, they should have full pardon for their offences, either against God or man. "Go, then," he added, "in expiation of your sins; and go assured, that after this world shall have passed away, imperishable glory shall be yours in the world which is to come." The enthusiasm was no longer to be restrained, and loud shouts interrupted the speaker; the people exclaiming as if with one voice, "*Dieu le veult! Dieu le veult!*" With great presence of mind Urban took advantage of the outburst, and as soon as silence was obtained, continued: "Dear brethren, to-day is shewn forth in you that which the Lord has said by his Evangelist, 'When two or three are gathered together in my name, there will I be in the midst of them to bless them.' If the Lord God had not been in your souls, you would not all have pronounced the same words; or rather God himself pronounced them by your lips, for it was he that put them in your hearts. Be they, then, your war-cry in the combat, for those words came forth from God. Let the army of the Lord, when it rushes upon his enemies, shout but that one cry, '*Dieu le veult! Dieu le veult!*' Let whoever is inclined to devote himself to this holy cause make it a solemn engagement, and bear the cross of the Lord either on his breast or his brow till he set out; and let him who is ready to begin his march place the holy emblem on his shoulders, in memory of that precept of our Savior, 'He who does not take up his cross and follow me is not worthy of me.'"

The news of this council spread to the remotest parts of Europe in an incredibly short space of time. Long before the fleetest horseman could have brought the intelligence, it was known by the people in distant provinces; a fact which was considered as nothing less than supernatural. But the subject was in every body's mouth, and the minds of men were prepared for the result. The enthusiastic merely asserted what they wished, and the event tallied with their prediction. This was, however, quite enough in those days for a miracle, and as a miracle every one regarded it.³

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

From this beginning the enthusiasm for the crusade spread throughout Europe. What was practically a mob psychosis arose. Miracles and supernatural events were attributed to leading persons, and for nearly two centuries the whole of Europe felt the psychological impress of the crusading mania.

Toward the end of the Crusades the flagellant epidemic began in Europe, and an order of flagellants arose within the Catholic Church. A general craze for receiving punishment and for punishing others took form. Crowds of persons passed through city streets brutally whipping each other for the glory of their souls. This sadistic-masochistic mania lasted nearly a hundred years.

In the middle of the fourteenth century occurred an outbreak of anti-Semitism, and the Jews were violently persecuted everywhere. During this same period the Black Death caused a great wave of terror among the European peoples. Then, toward the close of the fourteenth century, a series of dancing manias began in Europe and lasted over a hundred years.

So early as the year 1374, assemblages of men and women were seen at Aix-la-Chapelle who had come out of Germany and who, united by one common delusion, exhibited to the public both in the streets and in the churches the following strange spectacle. They formed circles hand in hand and, appearing to have lost all control over their senses, continued dancing, regardless of the bystanders, for hours together in wild delirium, until at length they fell to the ground in a state of exhaustion. While dancing they neither saw nor heard, being insensible to external impressions through the senses, but were haunted by visions, their fancies conjuring up spirits whose names they shrieked out; and some of them afterward asserted that they felt as if they had been immersed in a stream of blood, which obliged them to leap so high. Others, during the paroxysm, saw the heavens open and the Saviour enthroned with the Virgin Mary, according as the religious notions of the age were strangely and variously reflected in their imaginations.

Where the disease was completely developed, the attack commenced with epileptic convulsions. Those affected fell to the ground senseless, panting and laboring for breath. They foamed at the mouth, and suddenly springing up began their dance amid strange contortions. . . .

It was but a few months ere this demoniacal disease had spread from Aix-la-Chapelle, where it appeared in July, over the neighboring Netherlands. Wherever the dancers appeared, the people assembled in crowds to gratify their curiosity with the frightful spectacle. At length the increasing number of the affected excited no less anxiety than the attention that was paid to them. In towns and villages they took possession of the religious houses, processions were every-

where instituted on their account, the masses were said and hymns were sung, while the disease itself, of the demoniacal origin of which no one entertained the least doubt, excited everywhere astonishment and horror.⁴

Other dancing manias followed this one, and it was not until a century later that this mania died out, to be promptly replaced by the witchcraft terror or demonophobia.

The fear of witches began as a mass movement about the beginning of the fifteenth century and persisted for more than two hundred years. The spread of this popular madness forms one of the most amazing stories in modern history. A veritable *paranoia persecutoria* seized the masses. Every person suspected in the least way of dealing with evil spirits was inhumanly maltreated. Both Catholics and Protestants were victims of this epidemic. Nowhere in the literature of social behavior have we better evidence that stereotype, myth, and legend constitute a valid part of the social reality. The Christians of this period peopled their world with a host of evil demons, who constantly duped human beings into league with them to injure other people and to bring destruction to their own souls. The entire psychology of gossip and myth-making is wonderfully illustrated in the development of witchcraft persecutions.

At the opening of the seventeenth century there was a change in the nature of the popular delusions which swept over the Western world. The Reformation, with its variety of divergent sects, was an accomplished fact. Europe was undergoing profound economic, political, and social changes. Capitalism was steadily replacing the medieval economic order. The desire for money profits replaced the desire to save souls as the only worthy occupation. From this shift in emphasis to money and from the desire to make great profits, arose the speculation manias which continue down to our own day. Among the noteworthy early ones were the tulip mania in Holland, where a craze for buying and selling tulips disrupted the normal business life of Holland for over a year. Then about 1720 came the Mississippi Scheme in England and the South Sea Bubble in France. Thousands of persons were made bankrupt in a fury of popular speculation. Similar manias occurred throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries down to our latest stock-market enthusiasm on Wall Street. The land-buying craze of the 30's, the Gold Rush of 1849, the stock-market mania before

⁴ Quoted in *Introduction to Science of Sociology*, by Park and Burgess, pp. 879-880. Copyright by the University of Chicago, 1921.

the crisis of 1893, and the one before the crisis of 1907 are easily recalled. Still more recently the oil booms and Florida land boom swept thousands into the vortex of emotional excitement and ultimate financial ruin. In 1928 a great surge of speculation on Wall Street had reverberations over the entire country.

The growth of speculation manias has not caused other mental epidemics to cease entirely. There have been a series of religious revivals in our country, from those of Whitefield and Edwards in the early eighteenth century down to the latest performances of Billy Sunday and Aimee Semple McPherson. Following is a description of one of our most popular revivalist preachers:

People began to assemble at 6: 30 P. M. By 7: 30 every seat was occupied. The evening was warm and even before the meeting began, the air became humid and unpleasant. The revivalist, who likes to be known by a familiar nickname, came in about 7: 30 and stood about on the edge of the platform gaping at his audience. The chairman did not announce his identity, and many did not know until later that he was the great revivalist. This very element of surprise was effective. Shortly before 8 P. M. the chairman introduced the speaker in an informal manner. After the introduction, the revivalist asked the congregation to stand while he delivered a prayer. This itself was an effective group activity. And when he ended with the Lord's Prayer in which all participated, the feeling of crowd integration became quite definite. Then came the old familiar song, "Onward Christian Soldiers," in which all joined—a further effective device for producing the sense of crowd solidarity.

As he climbed into the rather narrow pulpit, the revivalist made the witty remark that he felt like Samson with his shorn locks since it was clear that he could not move about so freely as on the ordinary revivalist platform. He then produced a sympathetic response from his audience by flattery. He referred longingly to the family "trundle bed" and his "poor old mother." He remarked that he was born and raised in the best agricultural state in the Union, Iowa. But soon he had moved to the best all-around state in the good old U. S. A., Oregon, and to the best section of that State, Hood River. There was hearty applause from Iowa people, from Oregonians—especially those from Hood River, and from a considerable body of the other loyal citizens of the country generally. He next proceeded to his text.

He began his sermon with "Is it well with thy wife? Is it well with thy husband? Is it well with thy child?" Using whatever acrobatic contortions the narrow pulpit permitted, screaming and shouting, he developed his text. He told horrible stories of ruined lives of husbands, wives and children. After each repetition of the text, he demanded of his audience, "And is it well with thee?" He appealed through painting pictures of sinful lives saved from hell and dis-

aster by God's mercy. He played upon the stereotypes of home and mother, of broken-hearted fathers praying on their deathbeds for the conversion of their wayward sons. He touched the fear of everyone by his gruesome narratives of sudden death. He called the modern husband a "lazy, tobacco-absorbing buck-passing bird," and thus caught the attention of disillusioned wives and of self-righteous husbands. His stories were personal and intimate in tone, filled with common street slang and colored by bizarre details. He gave specific names and street addresses. He related his own miraculous conversion after he had narrowly escaped taking the "last fatal step."

He described American young women as "vamping, frizzle-headed, gum-chewing Janes" that are a "peril to mankind." He called the automobile a "segregated red light house on wheels and no longer segregated." The "Amen corner" applauded heartily when he vigorously demanded that we return to the "good old-fashioned curfew." He hoped for a national law to compel boys and girls to go to bed early and to stay there. He assured the audience that boys and girls know more deviltry today at sixteen than their grandparents ever knew.

To great applause he attacked the bootlegger and his patron.

He pleased the audience in his discussion of evolution. He did not believe that his ancestors were once ugly, hairy monkeys with long tails. Despite godless scientists who say that he came from the ape, he believed that God created him and that as one of God's creations he was good enough. To disprove the dogma of evolution he declared that because "both a cow and a cocoanut give milk, it does not follow that they descended from a milk-weed." The audience laughed in hearty sympathy with his logic.

In general his technique was to talk rapidly, scream and shout, exaggerate his characterizations, and make extreme gestures. He swung his arms, mopped his sweaty brow with a large handkerchief, and moved back and forth in front of his audience. He appealed blatantly to sentiments of love, hatred, sympathy, and disgust. His entire sermon was just that curious mixture of the sublime and the ridiculous which is so dear to the hearts of American audiences.

He ended his sermon by beginning to pray. Because he did not alter his tone or general manner at first many of his audience thought he was still preaching. He paused in the middle of his supplications to inquire if any of the audience wished him to pray for them.

After he had finished, the congregation joined in another well-known song, "I Love to Tell the Story." Before the meeting broke up a minister of the synod arose to remind the audience once more what a wonderful man the revivalist preacher was.

In all of these epidemics we see certain distinctive features. Death and the problem of sin and immortality constitute for Christian communities fundamental problems. Religious revivals are mass efforts to treat these deep-seated emotional patterns in man. Yet, not only religious crises con-

cern him. He is also today under the domination of a powerful economic ethos. The profit-seeking motive has taken great hold of the fantasy to get something for nothing—the infantile desire to have one's cake and eat it too. In this way the notion of luck has come into play in the speculative manias which still mark the modern capitalistic regime.

Certain common psychological mechanisms are doubtless involved in all of these crowd phenomena, both those of temporary and those of lasting and widespread effects. Some crowds are temporary, leaderless, and evanescent. Others are integrated around leaders and issues and tend to assume a more formidable character. To analyze any particular instance of crowd behavior, the cultural background, the personal-social experience of the people and the direction of leadership must be recognized.

B. The Mechanism of Crowd Formation.

It is evident that the crowd is not a mere horde or congeries of people distributed in space. As Le Bon pointed out, the crowd always has a psychological dimension. Crowds may be transitory or of a more intense persistent type, as illustrated in the lynching mob or in mental epidemics. In all of these certain general characteristics appear. Of course, there are unique features in every crowd situation due to a different configuration of factors. We shall examine here only certain more general features.

Crowds tend to form in times of crises. Novel stimuli cause us to change our responses. These stimuli may be passing ones, like the noise of two automobiles crashing into each other, the falling of a steel girder into the street, or the sound of a siren at a fire. Again the stimuli may involve situations of a seemingly more significant sort, like the crisis of an alleged crime by a negro in the South, or the alleged depredations of a cattle rustler in the Old West. The call of a religious revivalist will also set off crowd responses. In other situations the particular trend of the stock and bond market may throw men into a frenzy of excitement and cause them to behave in a distinctly crowdlike way.

We have, then, at the outset some combination of novel stimuli, called a crisis, which sets off definite perceptual and motor responses. There is a particular appeal through the eye, the ears, or the nose. Perceptions, therefore, are essential in the setting up of crowd behavior. We see the object. We hear the cry of distress. We smell the burning building. We experience

then what Bentley calls a presentative consciousness. That is to say, there is a direct and immediate stimulation, a corresponding awareness or perception of the situation, and a distinct tendency to act.

Not only mere perceptual responses are evident, however. These new situations call to mind old associations. Previous conditioning determines very largely, though perhaps not entirely, what we do. That is to say, even in temporary crowd responses, the apperceptive accumulations give a direction to our responses. These internal factors may be largely in the nature of highly charged emotional attitudes and responses, but nevertheless the predispositions of the individual are important in his reactions. The writer once witnessed the varied responses of a theater audience when a fire broke out. Most of the spectators made a rush for the doors, but a former fireman in the audience reached one set of doors ahead of the others, and threw his weight against the crowd in an effort to hold the doors closed. There was great excitement until he shouted a few orders. The crowd promptly calmed down and filed out in orderly fashion. The man's foresight saved an inevitable jamming of the doorway and probably much injury. The vast majority, driven by natural fear, ran from danger as rapidly as possible; but the fireman's training had established a set of predispositions which cut across his own natural impulses, and caused him to act for the ultimate safety of the group. His apperceptive background produced calmer and more rational responses, whereas those of the others rested on prepotent tendencies to flee from danger.

The previous conditioning of a lynching mob is all-important. This type of crowd behavior became almost institutionalized in the two generations following the Civil War. In handling the recalcitrant negro the Southern whites evolved a technique of mob violence. This technique was rationalized by such stereotype phrases as "keeping the nigger in his place," "protecting white womanhood"; and such phrases were rapidly made a part of Southern culture norms. So, too, the very methods of apprehending and killing the negro are somewhat conventionalized. Thus we may say that people have an apperceptive background for crowd action, and that where it is as deeply associated with emotions and feelings as in the Southern lynching bee, crowd action assumes an almost institutionalized form. Similarly, legends and myths of fabulous fortunes made in gold or oil rushes, or in land booms, or on the stock market both exaggerate our manias of

speculation and give them patterns. In our study of crowd psychology, therefore, we must take into account the immediate stimulation as well as the perception and the apperceptive background.

In addition to these factors, however, which are largely individualistic, the effect of the crowd itself must be considered. In a genuine crowd there is a spatial rearrangement of the individual members, both in reference to the stimuli and in reference to each other. Persons in a crowd form a distinct configuration not seen in the mere horde or in the persons passing to and fro on the street.

The first factor in crowd psychology which is caused by the crowd itself is the common focusing of attention upon the same stimuli. This common attention to the same stimuli produces a reorganization of individual responses into a common pattern. We may call this the polarization of response. In its simplest form, polarization indicates an all-to-one relation: the individuals of the crowd respond to the single object of attention—a physical situation, a speaker, or a leader. In extreme mob action this all-to-one relation may be modified, and in the organized audience a one-to-one relation becomes apparent.

Associated with this polarization there is, on the part of the crowd, not so much a face-to-face as a shoulder-to-shoulder relationship. As individuals push in toward the center there are a lateral pressure and a lateral movement, which are important factors in crowd psychology. The pushing and shoving are visually perceived, and we know that movement is detected on the periphery of vision, not at its focus. This lateral movement of others, then, is promptly observed and becomes a continuing stimulus to our own actions and makes us feel at one with them.

Associated with this visual perception of movement, are the tactual sensations made by physical contact with other bodies around us. There are people in front of us, to either side and behind, and from all of them we receive tactile stimulations, sometimes of a rather vigorous sort. The greater the number of people, the more crowding and craning of necks there will be. Added to this stimulation are kinesthetic sensations arising from our own bodily movements. We lurch forwards or backwards with the others. We reach out a hand or start to run, and our awareness of this movement is in turn a further stimulus to action. All this time we are projecting our sensations—kinesthetic, tactile, visual, and auditory. As we experience images of these sensations in those about us, we have a curious sense of sol-

idity and common action. In the repercussion of stimuli peculiar to crowd psychology, this impression of the universality of our sensations and purposes intensifies our own sensations and we may shortly commit actions which, done by isolated individuals, would be considered obvious marks of insanity. Particularly may we act in this way if a leader appears in the common focus of crowd attention. He harangues us in stereotypes as familiar as the air we breathe. He recalls the images of our cultural myths and legends. Stereotypes and images alike carry an enormous emotional significance; and as members of the crowd we give them our unreserved, if temporary, allegiance. Thus the speaker defines and crystallizes our group action. With cheers for our nobility or shouts of virtuous rage we promptly do as a crowd what we may individually regret at our leisure.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter XXIV, pp. 693-720.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 - 1. Discuss questions and exercises from assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter XXIV, p. 720.
 - 2. Distinguish between the crowd and the family group; between the crowd and a mere throng of persons.
 - 3. What are the differences between the shoulder-to-shoulder and face-to-face groups?
 - 4. Are crowds more or less likely to form today than ever before? Discuss.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
 - 1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter XXIV, pp. 720-21.
 - 2. Reports on (a) Alaskan Gold Rush; (b) the Oil Land booms.
 - 3. Report on the speculation mania of 1928 on Wall Street and over the whole country.
 - 4. Report on selling mania in 1929 at the time of the Stock Market crash.

CHAPTER XXI

CROWD BEHAVIOR AND PERSONALITY

A. *Ego-Expansion and Crowd Behavior*

The present chapter offers a psychological analysis of the effects of crowd behavior on personality. We have already noted that both perception and associated images must be taken into account in an understanding of crowd action. The perceptual factors are the sights, sounds, and physical contacts by which we are made aware of masses of persons around us behaving much as we behave. Still, we see, hear, and feel in ways distinctly affected by the internal nature of our organism, by the internal determinants of our attention. These include not only conscious memories and ideas, but many vestiges from earlier experience the source of which is often lost. When these vestiges appear in consciousness and behavior, they are disguised and rationalized beyond recognition. In this chapter we shall study the apperceptive background of mass action and its effects on crowd behavior of the individual.

Both external observation of crowd behavior and reports of participants indicate that mass action is psychologically different in quality from those phases of social interaction which we see in the ordinary primary or secondary group.

1. *Emotions and In-group Attitudes.*—The most obvious aspect of crowd behavior is the sense of emotional freedom which it gives, the loss of the feeling of individual social responsibility, the disappearance of rational thought, the fixation of attention and behavior on one desired end only, and, as Ross puts it, the “depression of the sense of self.” Martin has pointed out that the crowd man is marked by three distinctive states. The first is a sense of absolute rightness in what he is doing with his fellows. Second, there is always a large component of hatred and violence in his attitudes and actions. And third, the participant has a heightened sense of his own importance. That is, he indulges in a kind of paranoic ego-ex-

pansion. Let us take up some of the features of this psychology in more detail.

The fixation of crowd attention upon one object to the exclusion of all other stimuli has long been recognized. It was once thought that we had here a sort of mass hypnotism. While we hardly so describe it today, there is no doubt that the psychological basis of what we have called polarization changes the nature of our thought and of our attitudes. In crowd action a form of dissociation is set up which frees many impulses otherwise covered up in the course of more standardized social behavior. In our usual social intercourse the conventionalized or socialized codes keep our actions within a particular framework. Our deeper emotional reactions of anger and fear and our deeper mental sets for ego-expression are checked. We may not like Mr. Jones to whom we are speaking but common politeness demands that we speak as if we did. The law insists on what are called "rights" of others, so that though we are angered at the alleged immoral behavior of other persons, we dare not turn our rage loose on them. We are afraid of the growing competition from the negro workmen about us, and we may speak of it among our friends; but social custom and the legal code inhibit us from carrying out our more primitive impulses to attack them personally. In the process of social conditioning through which we have all passed we have acquired attitudes of respect for the law and the mores. We have been conditioned to the standards of welfare in the community. The need for social coöperation, for common action for the good of the larger group, has been insisted on. Our conventions of manners have taught us to react politely even to people whom we distrust and dislike. We have been conditioned into attitudes of mutual aid, of loyalty, of patriotic responses to the symbols of the group—the flag, the insignia, and the printed code. Still, there always lie within us certain antagonistic attitudes. The more deeply emotional ones are those of rage and fear, toward the outsider or the stranger, toward the divergent person and his group. In contrast we are conditioned to love those of our own family, class, community, religion, or nation. Our ego is constructed out of this matrix of aggressiveness and superiority of our own group and its values, and an ambivalent set of attitudes opposing the others-group and denying their values.

Even in our strictly personal-social interaction there arise attitudes of fear and anger, on the one hand, and love and sympathy, on the other. As

we saw in our discussion of group life, even within the in-group there are rivalries and antagonisms, but they are held in leash by the cultural norms of the group. Nowhere is this more vividly seen than in antagonisms within the family, both among the children and between husband and wife. Such person-to-person competition exists in other groups: lodges, schools, and professional associations, among business men in the same Rotary Club, and among persons within trade unions, political parties, and religious organizations. Yet the social and cultural codes hold us within a framework of behavior that does not permit much unlimited and "free," that is, unrestrained, expression of our competitive attitudes and emotions toward the others around us in our own in-group.

In a crisis, however, within any in-group, some of these inhibited tendencies come into play. For example, in a family quarrel, persons often unburden themselves of recriminations and threats which may actually amaze them more than the people to whom they are addressed. If an open conflict develops within a labor group, the bitterness between the factions is frequently more intense than is the bitterness of the whole group toward the capitalist employers. Generally, then, we may say if a crisis arises between in-group and out-group, where some incipient antagonism already exists—but where, in the daily relations of the members of the two groups, this is held in check—the deeper-lying attitudes of hatred, fear and avoidance which have been heretofore buried in the personality will almost certainly be expressed. No matter what their object, the antagonistic attitudes are directed against the out-group.

This is precisely what happens when the crowd forms in situations involving conflict and avoidance or escape from danger. The fixation of attention, the stimuli which set off emotional patterns of rage and fear for our safety, and our sense of superiority, produce a dissociation from the other patterns in our personality. We become set for types of action which are motivated by tendencies hitherto held in check. That is to say, they have been inhibited by the presence of actions and attitudes of an opposite, a more kindly and socialized, sort.

2. *Unconscious Mechanisms and Participation in the Crowd.*—Many students of crowd behavior, especially Le Bon, Sidis, and Martin, have noted the place which the subconscious or unconscious mechanisms occupy in crowd behavior. Martin holds, for example, that in the crowd the unconscious is released and that the individual's hatred and suppressed egotism

come into action. Whatever our theory of the unconscious, the fact remains that the crowd situation does give rise to ideas and actions which are normally repressed. What Freud called the "censor" is released. The more or less repressed tendencies come into operation. As we saw, the censor is that set of inhibiting attitudes and ideas which is built up through personal-social and cultural conditioning. In sleep, in day-dreams, and in the dissociated states set up in the fixations of crowd situations, these inhibitions are shunted, and the less socialized but more powerful natural impulses come into action. These more primitive reactions go back to infantile conditionings and native reactions which have been suppressed.

In the release of these inhibited tendencies and attitudes under the type of dissociation seen in the crowd, the attitudes and action are characterized by what Stekel has called "parapathy"—that is, a confusion of reality and fancy which we find in the dream and the fantasy. In other words, though fantasy plays an important rôle in the construction of our attitudes and behavior in other social relations, it comes into its own in the crowd reactions. The very sense of freedom and irresponsibility which is fostered by the crowd situation is merely a phase of this dream-like stage of thought and action. A college student had indulged in a rather brutal hazing episode; with about twenty others he took a lad from his room, tore his clothes, handled him roughly, clipped his hair, and with a burning chemical painted some college insignia on his head.

After it was over it seemed to me we were all out of our heads at the time; but it was a glorious experience while it lasted. Herb A. and I were the ring-leaders. We went to a side door of the house where Mark L. lived and asked for him. When Mark came to the door we asked him to step on to the porch. Then we all pounced on him, grabbed his legs and arms, and dragged him down the street away from the house. We were in a frenzy of excitement at catching one of the dubs who had failed to take part in the College Day exercises. We met L.'s resistance by superior force and by threats of violence: "Shut up, or I'll knock your block off!" "Ah, give him a poke!" We handled him brutally and the more he fought the more vicious we became—twenty men to one. "We'd teach these lousy loafers to stay home when the rest of the college spent a day in hard work cleaning up the campus and whitewashing the huge college letter on the mountain side above the town." There was lots of profanity, and a distinct letting go of violent desires. It was all great fun.

This student also said that afterwards it all "seemed like a dream to him." Later he became well acquainted with the victim and often regretted the

episode. After all, as he rationalized it, "Mark was only a symbol" for all the chaps who failed to take part in the College Day exercises.

We need not imagine that the individuals in a crowd action do not know what they are doing. The dissociation is not one of the deep sort found in somnambulism or stupor, but rather the sort found in milder states of disaggregation of consciousness. The techniques of handling the situation are often perfect. The point is that the dominating motive is emotional; the intellectual and social conditionings of right and wrong, of kindness and fair dealing, are lost under the stress of a deep impulse to injure some one.

Allport aptly remarks that "the individual in the crowd behaves just as he would behave alone, *only more so*." That is to say, his instinctive-emotional tendencies and his early infantile conditionings are released by the social facilitation of the crowd. While privately he would like to be violent, in the crowd he even goes beyond his own impulses and outdoes himself in his brutality, in his primitive responses.

3. *Ego and Crowd Activity*.—One of the most significant aspects of crowd behavior is the expansion of the ego. The crowd offers to the man in it an opportunity to indulge freely his own impulses; and to get something for nothing is one of our deepest wishes. His self-importance swells far beyond that of his ordinary social life. He lets out on the crowd's victim all that he has so long repressed. In the case of the college boys doubtless all of the hazing party wanted to avoid the hard labor of College Day, but they conformed to the code, only to express their own dislike of the whole business by "taking it out on" the one who failed to participate. We have here the psychology of the scapegoat in all societies. We load the victim down with all of the sins of the community and drive him from our midst. He carries away with him our own unintegrated attitudes and wishes, and we are now temporarily freed from the strain of having two antagonistic impulses within us. Our violence against the victim has relieved us of our own mental conflicts.

This thrusting on the victim of our own wishes, our own desires not to conform to group standards, is another important phase of crowd action. We use the familiar mechanism of projection. We attribute to the victim the very ideas, impulses, and attitudes which we have repressed in ourselves. We accuse him as we secretly accuse ourselves. Our own hatred and fear are projected upon him. A great part of the catharsis of crowd

violence is given by this ritual of purification of our own mental conflict by projecting it on the other fellow. Stereotypes and legends of our ordinary prejudices become very prominent. To keep up our courage and to give social sanction to our acts, we shout these stereotypes to one another as we proceed in the crowd business.

This behavior is evident in crowd action toward races and classes which we fear and against which we develop great antagonism. These other people threaten our security and status. They have a freedom and a drive which contrasts unfavorably with our own sense of inferiority and of insecurity. Possibly some of the violence exerted in the South against the negro for sex crimes is a reflection of the repressed but primitive sexual tendencies in ourselves. So, too, the violence with which self-styled "superior races" meet the economic competition of other races is possibly caused by doubts of our capacity to retain our present favorable position.

The crowd, then, is marked by hatred and intolerance. Hatred is a combination of fear and rage directed against some object. It is built up against members of out-groups and their symbols and culture. It is essentially a defense mechanism. Like all defense mechanisms it keeps us from really solving particular situations in themselves. Instead, it confirms us as we adjust ourselves to new situations by using older social definitions based partially on attitudes of fear and hatred. In the crowd these attitudes become dominant. The objects of crowd attention are feared. They arouse intense antagonism. Our victims are naturally always wrong in their behavior and ideas. Our intolerance of them is largely an outgrowth of our hatred for them. But we can always defend it. In truth, we say, it is not intolerance, but strict justice; and strict justice is always stern.

Intimately related to intolerance is bigotry. We may define a bigot as a person who holds a view or creed with no regard for common reason or common notions of objective social reality. In a crowd a man is a bigot; he is always right. The absolute character of the crowd's ethical judgments is always apparent. What is done is ethically most correct, and easily justifiable, at least for the moment, by the members of the crowd. This heightened state of self-righteousness and self-importance is probably a form of delusion of grandeur.

In their more extreme form mechanisms of this sort are seen in the paranoic patient who imagines he is God, Caesar, Napoleon, Jesus, or a billionaire. The sense of superiority fostered by the in-group comes to its

more violent fruition in the crowd attitude toward itself.¹ Our lodge, our fraternity, our labor group, is superior to others. Our nation is the best, the greatest, the wealthiest, the most powerful. We identify ourselves with these stereotypes, and in the crisis of a crowd situation we act as if they were true. *They are true for us.* When our antagonists do not accept our definitions, we become hysterical and deport them or lynch them. If the object of our crowd mania is another nation, we mobilize our forces to destroy them if we can, or at least to reduce them to a position where their inferiority will be apparent even to themselves. Rational people sometimes object to Stephen Decatur's famous remark: "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be right; but our country, right or wrong!" It is unreasonable and possibly unethical. It expresses the quintessence of all patriotism, and reveals as does no other aphorism our irrational, emotional but fundamentally sound love of and respect for the in-group.

Martin believes that all crowds are against somebody or something. Whether this is altogether true depends on our definition of a crowd. The rudimentary, fleeting crowd gathered around an accident or a street preacher may not show much of this antagonism, but apparently people in a crowd soon develop some sort of antagonistic attitudes. Thus someone is blamed as the cause of the accident. Or the corner evangelist persuades us to hate the devil and all his ways. Even when a crowd is passively witnessing heroic acts in a dangerous situation, an antagonistic attitude is apparently built up toward the situation itself. Crowds which display sympathy without a balancing hatred of some sort are probably rare. Possibly they could not show sympathy if it were not offset by the ambivalent attitude of avoidance and antagonism.

Our laughter in a crowd reveals the same sense of superiority; it is always egocentric and self-righteous. In a crowd we always laugh at others, never at ourselves. To ridicule a crowd is to put oneself in grave danger of becoming an object of its attack.

The release of the inhibitions normally held in check permits us to escape from social responsibility. Our social taboos are off and we enjoy a

¹ Here we see the fact that the fundamental attitudes built up toward social groups and institutions grow out of and reflect fundamental psychological trends. We teach our children the superiorities of our own groups, and then we wonder how people in a crisis can be so violent and so insistent on the absolutely just and correct position of their own church, their own party, their own nation. Their insistence on what is obviously not so is merely an extreme expression of the basic conditions of social-cultural training.

great sense of freedom and unrestraint. Probably our sense of irresponsibility is not quite conscious. It is rather that the crowd being what it is, we are dissociated from our normal moral selves. As Allport says, "The fact that others approve of what one wants to do by doing the same thing themselves gives a comfortable sense of moral sanction." There are not, however, the logical steps of reasoning which many writers seem to attribute to people in a crowd.² Before or during our crowd activity we probably do not employ even such rudimentary logic as to say, "Well, others do it, I can, too." Or, "I have long wanted to do this and now that the crowd is doing it, I'll get in it." These bits of pseudo-logic are rather our rationalizations *after* the event, when we are possibly uneasy about the social reaction to our presence in the crowd.

While we actually enjoy a tremendous feeling of freedom, at the time and often afterwards we usually think of our acts as entirely proper. All crowds are self-righteous. We always defend even the violences of our mob action in terms of socially approved ends. The Ku Klux Klan, existing in a political democracy, assumed the trappings of an Oriental oligarchy in costume and ceremonial. In its code and conduct it very undemocratically undertook to regulate the morals and manners of millions of people, but always in the name of powerful American stereotypes: protection of white womanhood, obedience to law, abolition of sin, etc. A large part of its strength lay in affording adventure, release from boredom and repression for its members, all within the frame of a socially approved ideology.

Whenever fundamental values of group survival seem at stake the more rational moral self, which is the result of conditioning to a code of distinctly higher order, gives way in the face of crowd situations. The moral self is too recently acquired by the personality to maintain its control over the lower and much more fundamental drives of ego-expansion and of hatred and fear of the others-group.

With the absolutism, hatred, intolerance, and ego-expansion found in the crowd, there occurs what Ross called an "arrest of thought." The intellectual processes are dominated by the emotions. What the crowd does may be entirely appropriate to the situation so far as techniques of accomplishing the crowd purposes are concerned. But whatever intelligence we employ is under the direction of our deeper emotional drives; we thus

² Thus even Allport, *Social Psychology*, 1924, pp. 312-313.

reverse our usual situation. Without deliberate consideration we fall into suggested patterns of action.

In December, 1925, a certain city experienced a run on the banks. The day previous five small suburban banks controlled by one man failed to open. Although this affected less than 2 per cent of the city's deposits it was sufficient to precipitate a run on the downtown banks. The banks, knowing what would happen, were amply prepared at opening time the next morning. In our own bank we had two extra policemen to guard the cash, there was so much more than usual.

There was not a teller in the bank but knew that the bank was sound and that, if for any reason it should close, it would pay out dollar for dollar with dividends for the stockholders besides. There was absolutely no chance for any one to lose his money and we all knew it.

By ten o'clock a fairly good-sized crowd was milling about the entrance—a *few who wanted their money*, others who were just curious. The lobby was soon filled. By eleven o'clock it was crowded; outside the crowd extended a quarter of a block on either side of the building. Special policemen were trying to keep traffic moving to no avail. By twelve o'clock the lobby was almost impassable from the struggles of those who were in trying to get out and those who were out trying to get in. Women had their dresses torn, several fainted and men pushed each other aside and literally fought for places nearer the windows. Tellers were paying out money just as fast as credentials could be presented and verified. Such a lot of money to pay out! How long would it keep up? The ordinary supply of money was used up and tellers were paying out from packages of brand new bills by serial numbers, this being quicker than counting.

At one-thirty the word was passed around to the tellers to slow down and take their time; that it seemed impossible to get rid of the crowd in a hurry as had at first been the plan. The idea now was not to close at the regular time but to keep open until everybody who wanted it had his money. In other words, they gave up trying to bring the crowd to a reasoning state of mind and settled down to wear the idea out.

One lady, whom I knew well, drew a twenty dollar balance at my window. She was a woman who spent twenty dollars for a hat or shoes and hose whenever she wished. Her lovely coat which she was carrying on her arm had one sleeve partly ripped out and the fur cuff was ruined. After she had her twenty dollars, I asked her why in the world she subjected herself to such discomfort to get twenty dollars. Well, she had come down to D. and F.'s to shop, had seen the crowd and had come over to see what was going on. A lady with bills in her hand explained that they were having a run on the bank, that she had just gotten her money and hoped the bank wouldn't close until everybody else got his. The lady then expressed the opinion: "If you have money in the bank you had better get it out as soon as possible." A man confirmed the advice and from

eleven o'clock on she had been trying to get to the window. It was now after two. For more than two hours she had been jammed and trampled about in the crowd for twenty dollars which could not have meant very much to her. When asked why she did it, she said she didn't think how much she had; she just thought she *must* get her money before the bank closed and she added (for reason had returned), "I'd give the whole twenty if some one could get me out of here without my having to buffet the crowd again!"

A fine example of social facilitation. Having once adopted the idea of getting her money, the stimulations received from others in great numbers on all sides apparently trying to do the same thing and expressing the same common purpose augmented her desire to respond to such an extent that everything else was excluded from the field. Attention was focused on the one suggested act. Any reasoning about the matter was inhibited. At she said, she didn't *think* when she saw *all the crowd* trying to get their money out. Notice the social projection (perhaps a third of the people were really depositors).

As to my own feelings, in the beginning I had not thought of my balance. The bank was sound, we had plenty of money, anybody who wanted his money could get it. By eleven o'clock I had recalled that my purse contained the remnants of a five dollar bill and I wished that I had written a check yesterday. As the crowd grew more determined to get its money I began to want my money too. The facilitation to my desire to conform to the crowd idea was not quite strong enough to inhibit my critical attitude toward the act. I knew the officers would feel such an act showed disloyalty, besides the whole thing was so foolish. Nevertheless it was a mighty struggle. I found out afterwards that two of the tellers did cash checks for their balances—instances of the stimulation being too strong for any inhibitions they may have set up against yielding.³

4. *Stereotypes and Crowd Feeling.*—Altogether, in the crowd, we use intellectual processes to effect our purposes at the time, and we use them later to rationalize our acts. We may even be in a frenzy of emotion and yet intelligent in our choice of means to secure our ends.

We may here consider the place of symbolic forms and words in the emotional release of crowds. Many of the stereotypes of in-group superiority, such as honor, justice, freedom, love of country, and national security, are heavily freighted with emotion. As we know, the words often represent the undertone of repressed emotionalized drives which are covered over by these symbols. Nowhere do we see this better than in the way in which words are used to arouse a crowd to action. Cunning speakers will always play up all the old stereotypes and legends which command

³ Mrs. E. Vaught, "The Release and Heightening of Individual Reactions in Crowds," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1928, vol. XXII, pp. 404-05.

responses of a violent sort. Because it reveals so many of our principles, we give at some length a description of expert methods in applied social psychology.

For some weeks the newspapers had reported the organization of the Ku Klux Klan in several cities in our state. About a week before the first meeting in our city the papers in both advertising and news columns announced that the Reverend Mr. X would lecture on the Ku Klux Klan in the city's largest theater.

On the night of the lecture I arrived at the theater early, to find it already nearly full. Within a quarter of an hour after my arrival there was not a vacant seat and people were standing up at the side and back. The preliminary tuning of the audience was going on all around me. Two men seated next to me were talking about the danger to our country from the increasing numbers and political power of the Catholics. One of them described the organization of the American Protective Association nearly a generation before. They assured one another that the Pope was trying to obtain control of the United States as rapidly as possible. There was no doubt that a papal plot existed. They described how the Catholics were organizing everywhere to capture the government by force of arms. "Do you know," one man remarked, "that every Catholic church contains an arsenal? In the basement of their churches arms and ammunition have been found." He gave concrete instances. He also informed his companion, and anyone else who was listening, that the Catholics, if they could, always built their churches on high ground overlooking the rest of the town, so that they could later be used for military observation. With "You don't say!" and "Is that so?" from others, the two continued to revive old legends and to stir the emotions into mild fear. All around there was a buzz of conversation. Everywhere in the house the conversations were the same: the Catholics are dangerous and some such organization as the Klan was desperately needed.

Promptly at eight o'clock the curtain was raised. The audience saw a small pulpit in the center of the stage; on one side, a cross flaming with electric lights, on the other, an American flag. From the wings then appeared a dozen hooded and white-robed figures who slowly moved into a semi-circle behind the pulpit. They bowed to each of the mighty symbols in turn and stepped to the back of the stage where they took up a formal position. The speaker of the evening stepped forward.

Before associating with the Klan, the Reverend Mr. X. had been a professional revivalist. He carried himself well and had a very pleasant and effective voice. In a calm and quiet way he said that he and his friends were there to tell the true story of the Klan. The Klan did not wish to defame or injure any church, creed, race, or color. The Reverend Mr. X. waxed warmer. The audience listened attentively, leaning forward in their seats to catch every word. A kind of tension actually seemed to run through the house.

Our America, said the Reverend Mr. X., has a glorious history. It is the great

free country where every man has an equal opportunity, where bias and hardship are unknown. It is a Christian country, dedicated to freedom. But new and alien forces are appearing in our national life. The negroes are becoming race-conscious. We may lose control of our country to a race who would not, if they could, understand the real meaning of America. One purpose of the Klan, the organization which he had the honor to represent, was to preserve the dignity and virtue of white Protestant womanhood and to maintain law among a lawless race.

We have been too ready to welcome to our country foreigners who have no conception of our national life. In the goodness of our hearts, we have offered to thousands of Europeans a refuge in our country. Yet many of these people do not take up our American ways and remain hostile to the generous purposes of our government. The Catholic menace is especially serious. Catholics breed quickly and their numbers are increasing at an appalling rate. The Army and Navy are largely commanded by Catholic officers. Catholics insist on sending their children to their own parochial schools, where they are frequently taught the foreign languages of their parents. In short, there is every indication that the Catholics are making a remarkably successful attempt to seize control of our country. As the Pope has always destroyed freedom when he could, Catholic control of America means an end of our traditional liberties.

The Jews also are a menace, second only to that of negroes and Catholics. The Jews are a great power in the money world. Worse than that, they are also responsible for the Russian Communist Revolution and everywhere they are busily spreading the insidious Bolshevik propaganda. The Jew is a poor citizen; he has no attachment to this country and no interest in it save as a place to make money. But Bolshevism is the greatest Jewish menace. Unless we range ourselves solidly against it, we shall surely be destroyed.

The Japanese are also a serious menace. His audience, living on the Pacific Coast, knew already how the farmers in California were being crowded to the wall by the Japanese. The Japanese would inevitably spread, as they too breed rapidly, and in fact some communities in the very state where he was speaking had already felt their competition. The sole purpose of the Klan was to protect American virtues and standards. It was ever watchful of the national welfare and of Christian morals. And so the Reverend Mr. X. concluded.

He had had the undivided attention of his audience throughout. His occasional humor always brought laughter. He had thoroughly frightened his audience by telling them of all the out-groups which threatened their security and status. But he had assured them that by concerted action they could save themselves, and had made them righteously enraged and determined to combat the out-groups. In short, he had skillfully converted an audience into a crowd. As the leader of an angry, fearful, self-righteous crowd, he was heartily applauded when he finished.

When the speech was over, the hooded figures on the stage again bowed to the flag and the cross and filed out. The crowd was then shown a motion picture

which confirmed their fears and rages. During the World War, an American industrial city was entirely given over to the manufacture of munitions of war. Laborers gladly coöperated with capitalist employers to speed the work. But a serpent had to crawl into this picture of an idyllic industrial system so filled with a noble purpose. Destructive radicals came to town and preached sedition to the contented workmen. The radical leader was a handsome and be-whiskered devil who received endless funds from Moscow. The radical agitation became intense. Strikes were declared and bombs were thrown. Chaos threatened the industry. But righteousness triumphed as American marines and indignant citizens finished off the foreign rascals. The audience gave the same attention to the moving picture that they had given to the Reverend Mr. X. It was a powerful confirmation of all that he had said. It played upon the same prejudices, used the same stereotypes, and increased their crowd determination to resist all such attacks by out-groups.

Now we should note that this community was almost exclusively Protestant and agricultural. In the entire state there were few Jews and fewer negroes. Very small groups of Japanese had appeared, but only in two or three of the fruit-growing districts. The one large city and a few scattered lumber camps had a numerically insignificant number of radicals. Nevertheless, the stereotypes and legends worked. In this town, a year later, two thousand men paraded as Klansmen. For several years the Klan dominated municipal and county politics. During the term of one governor and one legislature the Klan completely controlled the state government. The lecture and the film had been used all over the state, and though in many towns there were actually no Catholics or negroes or radicals, the appeals to prejudice had been just as effective. The powerful symbols had everywhere aroused fear and rage; and the desire for action against the out-groups had been successfully given the action pattern of voting Klan tickets. Thus the audiences became crowds, and each crowd member participated vicariously in the great crusade against the diabolical powers which threatened his security. His ego was satisfactorily expanded and he enjoyed complete self-righteousness.

B. A Theory of Crowd Behavior.

A crowd may be defined, then, as a contiguous and spatially distributed group which has a circularity of responses in common language and gesture toward each other, and shoulder-to-shoulder massing or polarization toward some object of attention. The crowd has sufficient numbers to pre-

vent intimate, face-to-face contact, especially in the presence of some stimulus which affords a common focus of attention. An audience has certain institutionalized features and the public is a non-contiguous grouping. The crowd is neither of these. Psychologically the crowd releases the inhibitions of attitudes that have been censored by group-sanctioned patterns of behavior. This release of repressed images and action patterns is facilitated by the dissociation of consciousness and behavior from that normally found in social intercourse. Repressed images and action patterns are released with greatest violence in crises involving the fundamental values of the group—the retention of status and survival itself. Crowds are relatively temporary, but their effects and the threat of their recurrence are highly important in social control.

The crowd is one of the most spontaneous forms of collective behavior. It may start from any combination of in-groups, even from the family if it is large enough. It may easily arise from neighborhood, gang, or interest groups whenever the members come into contiguous relation with each other. In the psychological mechanisms involved and in its meaning to the individual, the crowd is not a kind of collective mind. It is the coöperation of personalities at the lowest common denominator of reaction, namely, emotions and deep-laid habits which rest upon infantile conditionings and early formulations toward the in-group. Participation in crowds has for individuals many qualities of an ecstatic experience. The mass religious behavior of the Middle Ages shows that there is much in common between religious ecstasy and the emotional experience of the crowd man. Though religious crowds are still frequent, today crowds tend to form in crises involving our dominant contemporary values—racial, class, economic, and political. In all of these crowds the emotional heightening of the individual is evident. He is released from every-day routine and its repression of his deeper desires to have new adventures, and to dominate those whom he does not like but dares not attack alone. The reverberations of crowd violence are powerful; and as crises increase in number, crowd solutions for crises are likely to increase until crowd action is finally checked by some other social force.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter XXII, Section A, pp. 627–58.

B. Questions and Exercises.

1. Discuss questions and exercises from assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter XXII, nos. 1-24, pp. 664-65.
2. How does a crowd bring out our suppressed attitudes and unconscious tendencies?
3. Just how is the ego expanded in the crowd?
4. Cite illustrations of crowd behavior you have known. Analyze the inception and development of crowd activity.

C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.

1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter XXII, p. 666.
2. Report on Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, for a psychoanalytic interpretation of group behavior. Cf. McDougall, "Professor Freud's Group Psychology and His Theory of Suggestion," *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 1925, vol. V, pp. 14-28.
3. Report on Durkheim's theory of collective behavior. (Cf. *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*.)

CHAPTER XXII

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AUDIENCE

A. *The Nature and Psychological Setting of the Audience.*

Although an audience is not a crowd under our definition, it is a special form of collective behavior closely related to it. The audience is really a form of institutionalized crowd. It has much in common with the crowd, and differs only in the purpose and form of its organization. That is to say, the configuration differs. The audience is less spontaneous. It is regulated in time and place. It is definite in purpose, and its organization limits the psychological effects produced.

1. *Physical Configuration of the Audience.*—The audience as a rule forms in a special structure of some kind. The meeting place has a distinct physical character. The seating arrangement is designed to produce polarization of common attitudes. The seats are usually arranged in rows, often in a slight semi-circular form, in front of which is the speaker's stand. The seating facilitates attention to the speaker or performer rather than to the persons on either side. Though the shoulder-to-shoulder configuration of the crowd is found in the audience, the spacing of seats prevents too great a massing of persons. It thus inhibits the rise of crowd reactions beyond a certain point. An audience may be massed in a hall eager to hear a speaker; and, as we have seen, a cunning appeal to prejudice may convert it into a crowd, but the physical configuration does not itself foster such a development. Nevertheless, the general form of an audience tends to produce crowd behavior. This is apparent if we contrast a lecture hall with a committee room or seminar room where small groups meet for deliberation.

The seats in some meeting places are more formal than in others, and in time there is an association of place and performance. Formal seating is common to churches, although the meeting places of the more divergent and less ritualistic sects are hardly distinguishable from those of a farmers' grange or of a public auditorium. As a rule, of course, these sects conduct their services with very simple rituals. Their gatherings are much like

political audiences. In political, labor, and general lecture halls the seating is often more compact and less formal. This is particularly so in classrooms, where the seating is largely arranged for the convenience of students.

The speaker's relation to his audience is also standardized. Unless the room is very small, there is a raised platform or stage where the speaker stands. Of course, this permits audience and speaker to see each other better; but it also sets the speaker off from his audience. The audience has literally to look *up* to the speaker; and the speaker's illusion of superiority and the passivity of the audience are both enhanced.

The speaker's stand may of course be used for notes, but its principal purpose is further to set the speaker apart from his auditors. The writer knows a professor who can not lecture unless he has a reading stand before him. He says that he is "uncomfortable" without it; that he feels "exposed to the students" if he does not have it. The stage has the barrier of the orchestra and especially the footlights, which emphasize the separation of the actors from the audience.

2. *Psychological Features of the Audience.*—Audiences gather for a more or less definite purpose. The meeting is announced beforehand. People talk to each other about attending, and the press may comment on the coming lecture or performance. There is set up in us what we may call preliminary tuning. The title of the lecture or the play or the name of the speaker may arouse discussion or lead to imaginary comments about it, or may call up associations from past experience. Our chief object in attending a political rally may be our desire to encounter the personality of the speaker. William Jennings Bryan was always enormously popular as a speaker, although as someone once said, "people listened to him but voted for the other candidate." So, too, in the presidential campaign of 1928 Ex-Governor Smith attracted great crowds everywhere largely because of his vivid personality. We may discuss with our friends an approaching lecture on some subject of interest, or we may read up on it or recall individually our own notions about it. We may attend the theater in the anticipation merely of relaxation and amusement, or we may have heard comments about the particular play which whet our appetites to see it for special reasons.

As we have noted, the very configuration of the seating and the platform tends to produce polarization. When the audience first gathers, this polarization may be of a feeble all-to-one sort, as we look at the drop cur-

tain or the vacant stage and the decorations. The preliminary tuning is continued by conversation with people about us and by individual fantasy. While some conversation will be simply gossip, there will always be a residue of talk about "What will the play be like?", "Is the speaker a good one?", "What do you think of his views?", and so on. When the lecture or performance actually begins, the polarization becomes distinctly an all-to-one sort, with the members of the audience paying most attention to the speaker and very little to each other.

In time this focusing of attention on the speaker changes the nature of the polarization to a kind of one-to-one relationship. True, there usually remains a feeble, marginal awareness of other auditors right and left, in front and behind; yet if our attention is fixed on the speaker, we tend to fall into a one-to-one relationship with him. "We lose ourselves" in the speech or the play. We so identify ourselves with the speaker as to lose our sense of social relationship with those around us. It is because of this that audiences take on many features of the crowd.

The speaker is generally the active agent in this form of social interaction. He carries ideas and emotions along with him. By painting verbal pictures, by telling stories, by exposition of facts or by logical arguments, he suggests the trends of imagery and the recall of associated feelings. The auditor is the more passive member of this person-to-person relationship. Though his mind may be full of images and his body full of aroused emotions and feelings, he still remains relatively inactive. Whenever the audience begins to act, the purely active-passive relationship breaks down. Laughter, tears, applause, shouts of approval, or boos of disapproval are ideo-motor evidences of the more active participation of the audience. In some situations the speaker makes a definite bid for this sort of response from the audience; in others it is accidental. In a serious, formal lecture of a scientist, it may be quite unconventional and distinctly poor form. For the most part, the relation of speaker to audience is one of domination and submission, or of active and passive participation. The speaker is superior, at least temporarily. He carries us along with him. We do not dominate him to any extent. Sometimes he dominates us by ideas, and at other times he arouses our emotions of fear, sorrow, anger, or laughter. In any case our participation is less determined by our own initiative than it is suggested by his actions.

There are speakers who can almost force their auditors to agree with

their beliefs and then to act accordingly. Conway called such men "crowd-compellers." Wendell Phillips was a "crowd-compeller," when he spoke against slavery. A recent study indicates how Phillips succeeded in controlling hostile audiences.¹ He knew how to capture attention, how to enlist suggestion, and how to make use of his prestige. His height and physique he displayed to advantage. His attitude of superiority and his self-control caught the attention of his auditors even when they were unfavorably attuned to him. His skill in repartee forced a recognition of power by his auditors. Phillips employed three types of symbols in his control of his audience: visible, auditory, and verbal. Of the first, posture, muscular movement, gesture, facial expression, and eye contact were prominent. Of the second, quality, variety, control, intensity, and rate of speech were important. Of the third, he used a wider range of verbal forms and devices with favorable than with unfavorable audiences. Among the various devices which he employed were: frequent use of the singular pronoun *You*, literary allusions, liberal use of analogy, similes, the synecdoche, personification, hyperbole, apostrophe, illustrations and humor. With hostile audiences he used allusions and hyperbole most frequently; with favorable audiences he used more varied devices.

Other speakers call up in us familiar and old responses which we like. From their suggestions we revive old emotions and feelings. Lincoln in many of his speeches used these devices of familiarity, plain example, and common humor.

The audience, on the other hand, has its own effect upon the speaker. Just as the masses always affect the leader in other groups, so here the speaker who arouses negative and antagonistic attitudes in his audience may provoke a response which will make him change his type of argument or even force him to discontinue his speech. A magnificent "crowd-compeller" like Wendell Phillips may start by deliberately overcoming hostility. Occasionally we see vaudeville actors desperately trying to provoke laughter from an indifferent or even hostile audience. At times the whole relation of performer to audience becomes a game to see which will submit to the other. After all, the passivity of the audience in its attitude toward the speaker is only relative and never absolute.

¹ R. H. Barnard, *A Study of the Control of Hostile Audiences in the Anti-Slavery Speeches of Wendell Phillips*, M.A. thesis 1929, University of Wisconsin.

B. *Types of Audience.*

Some features of the psychology of audiences can best be revealed by a discussion of various types of audiences. For our purposes we may distinguish between two sorts of audiences. The first are gathered to secure information of some kind—to listen to a travelogue or an argumentative address. We may call this the information-seeking type. The other sort gathers for relaxation and amusement. It is dominated by a different anticipatory and final response pattern. We may call this the recreational type.

1. *The Information-seeking Audience.*—The two most common information-seeking audiences are those of the public lecture and of the classroom. The public lecture may be of a very formal sort—the church service with the sermon as the core of the meeting, the scientific or literary lecture, or even political or economic addresses, in which propaganda often plays a distinct part. These audiences are usually selective in personnel. In our society they represent, very largely, secondary group relations among the participants. In some, notably in the church, the meetings are institutionalized to a high degree. In the general public lecture sponsored by special groups, and in political meetings which are periodic in time and space, the formalization is less marked.

The various informational audiences have different sorts of preliminary tuning. In the formal church service these anticipatory reactions are highly standardized. The individual has a certain intellectual-emotional set before he reaches the church. Once he is there, the lights, the stained-glass windows, the whole configuration of the building further prepare him for the religious service. In the more emotional, less stabilized types of religious service, such as the revival, the tuning is more obvious and more primitive in nature. A student who once served as musical director for a well-known evangelist thus described his employer's common procedure:

At the appointed hour we began the services by getting the entire audience to join in singing. I began with any common songs which I thought the people would know. These did not have to be, in fact they seldom were, religious. Rather they were old favorite folksongs of America: "Old Black Joe", "Dixie", "My Old Kentucky Home." In the years of the war and shortly thereafter, "Tipperary" was popular. Almost any song which every one knew was good. Even romantic or slightly jazzy songs were acceptable at first. The principal idea was to get everybody singing. After a few of these popular songs I had

them sing more religious pieces such as "Onward Christian Soldiers." The religious songs, however, needed to have no direct relation to the subject of the revivalist's address. Only toward the end of the opening period of song did we introduce religious songs bearing more directly on the subject of the evening.

The technique here is obvious. Group singing breaks down a sense of individual isolation. It removes differences of social status and builds up common emotions and feelings. It is peculiarly effective in wiping out the sense of intellectual divergence. Rich and poor, urban and rural, high church and low church, Christian and non-Christian—all may meet on the common ground of old familiar tunes. With this as a bridge the speaker can lead his audience into the promised land of religious emotional experience. For the most part, church services appeal to the emotions; and a true crowd is more easily produced whenever this is so.

The particular features of the audience occur in the classroom only where the lecture system is in vogue. The polarization of the audience disappears in a discussion, except that with fixed rows of seats the students are oriented to the instructor instead of to each other. The true discussion group is the informal seminar sitting around a table. In the classroom lecture group there is usually a certain repetition of preliminary tuning. Meeting at regular times and places produces common anticipatory reactions. During the term a regularity of performance not seen in the occasional lecture will be developed by the members of the class.

The informational audience of lecture or classroom has certain psychological characteristics. Its emotional tuning is reduced to a minimum. Intellectual and esthetic rather than emotional attitudes are aroused. In the political lecture emotional attitudes usually are aroused, and so political audiences frequently change into crowds. In the informational lecture, then, intellectual associations are aroused—either genuine reasoning or acceptable rationalization. The intellectual participation of the audience, however, is passive. It is largely receiving information. While there may be the relief of humor and laughter, the audience does not participate overtly in the discussion.

Sometimes after the lectures in public forums the leaders try to arouse a discussion by the audience. If the members of the group know each other, there may be some questions and some slight debate. However, if the group is heterogeneous, the discussion does not usually advance very far. It is

likely to be a mere questioning of the speaker, who then continues and expands his lecture, or it becomes a series of short lectures by those who have something they wish to say before an audience. In the discussion an auditor will occasionally wax eloquent and emotional, and actually change a part of the audience into a crowd. In America it is extremely difficult to change a passive, receptive audience into an active discussion group at the close of a lecture. In England the practice of heckling a speaker is common. Although this is not discussion, it evidences a more active intellectual or emotional participation by at least some of the auditors. The common passivity of American audiences is partially a matter of habit.

In the class lecture the same thing is more or less true. The lecture method is thus often deprecated as an educational device, because if the students are psychologically passive, their learning may not be very permanent or profound in effect. Other factors enter into the situation, of course. If the students have a genuine curiosity for the content of the lectures, and if they themselves read, they may gain a great deal from informational lectures. Some academic subjects lend themselves very effectively to this method of instruction. Perhaps a combination of lecture with discussion and laboratory or field work is psychologically the best method of teaching. In such a combination the student benefits both from his passive reception of information and from his active discussion and application in the laboratory.

Generally, then, the informational audience is passive as in comparison with the crowd or the audience seeking diversion. The polarization of group attitudes is less completely of a one-to-one sort. The all-to-one relation persists, and the auditors are more aware of each other. Interest is probably less vital and more easily distracted by stimuli from without.

2. *The Recreational Audience.*—The recreational audience is also controlled by a certain formal arrangement of time and place. Advertising often sets up anticipatory responses. The seats are usually arranged as they are in the informational lecture room. Unlike the classroom or public auditorium, the building has decorations which, like those of the church, direct the preliminary tuning of the audience.

In every play the performers give the audience a picture, a creation, which has the appearance of more or less reality or of ideality. The actors *play* rôles of personalities for us. They produce an illusion of real or ideal life, and recreate it in forms which attract our interest and temporarily carry us out of ourselves. In this sense the audience has an experience in the theater

different from that which it has in the lecture hall. It is carried along with a modicum of intellectual and a maximum of emotional and esthetic interest. Dramas differ in the mixture of these elements, but on the whole the emotional and esthetic predominate. Nevertheless some dramas like Shaw's are cleverly disguised lectures on social questions.

One of the most common phenomena is the vicarious experience of the audience in the drama. We live in the play in a way which we do not live in a lecture. The polarization, therefore, often takes on a distinct one-to-one relationship between the individual and the action before him. The more complete our identification, the more intense our satisfaction. Our vicarious action constitutes precisely the appeal of the drama. It lifts us out of our humdrum every-day lives and takes us into a fairy land of comedy or tragedy. It is distinctly a fantasy experience. It is, in fact, nothing but a socially accepted form of day-dream, done vicariously by others for our pleasure. As children we may construct our own day-dreams, and even work them out into dramas. In adult life we may not do this sort of thing very frequently, but our attendance at the theater furnishes us with such fantasies already made, and prepared in socially accepted emotional and esthetic forms. Like religion, the drama affords under social approval an outlet for repressed desires, for both sympathetic and antagonistic impulses. It creates for us illusions dear to our hearts.

The problem of esthetic standards and values is always with us. Whatever the technical expert in esthetics may say, these values are always more or less a part of our cultural heritage. They are relative to time and place. They may have certain universal, absolute features but these features rest upon the universal characteristics of culture and human nature. We can point out very easily how our esthetic values rest upon our cultural background by considering the fortunes of exotic drama. From the larger public, exotic drama secures little support, unless it has first become a fad with particular groups. Thus realistic dramas of tabooed subjects like sex, capitalistic exploitation, and religion, are frowned upon by censors who usually represent public taste, whether they are the press or the official censors of organized government. O'Neill's *Desire Under the Elms* met with much disapproval because it offended the morals of a large section of the population. In the case of O'Neill's *All God's Chillun Got Wings* the producers had to discontinue showing the first scene, because it showed negro and white children playing together as companions. In place of

the actual performance one of the cast had to read the first scene from the manuscript as he stood before the curtain. The actual picture of the free and spontaneous mixture of children of the two races had offended the taste of a sufficient number of people to end its overt performance.

Comedy gives the audience a chance to laugh at life. Often the dramatist directs his humor at current foibles. Sumner remarked for the Middle Ages: "The populace did not want more preaching and instruction, but fun and frolic, relief from labor, thought and care." In this respect we are quite at one with our medieval ancestors. Even in comedy, ridicule and sarcasm have limits, because not all audiences like to have themselves held up to the mirror of comedy if the reflection is too evident and too sharp. Romantic comedy-drama is very popular at the moment. A conflict between good and evil is finally successfully resolved by a hero and a heroine. This pattern of hardship, crisis, threatened defeat, and final triumph of right is a favorite theme in folklore and legend. Its presentation in the drama is really nothing but a special form of this pattern. After daily defeats, after crises which are never resolved very successfully, we find it delightful and pleasant to participate vicariously in the successful resolution of a crisis much like our own. If we can not have success, thrills, beauty, love, or wealth in life, at least we find in the drama an imaginary expression of our desires. We project ourselves into the romance of successful adventure which we see before us.

Tragedy may seem more difficult to explain. At first thought it appears strange that we should enjoy seeing creative day-dreams which have death and defeat as their outcome. But tragedy may represent the ambivalent feature of what we find in the romantic comedy-drama. In tragedy the characters act in overwhelming situations. While much comedy may reveal lower characters, the truly great tragedy presents an ideal, more heroic person than the ordinary individual. Yet through it all there runs an artistic presentation of cause and effect in human relations which fits our attitudes and value-meanings about life. Not all life is rosy. Not all life has a happy ending. Perhaps we obtain a satisfaction, a catharsis, from tragedy simply because it heightens the universality of our own hard experiences. We weep at sentimental tragedy because of the sympathetic induction of sorrow just as we might weep in real life. This very weeping may in the end be pleasant, because, after all, we realize that it is but a fantasy acted for us. The hero is not really dead.

The melodrama of blood-curdling plot and intense fears is a special case. In an earlier generation the violent "blood and thunder" drama was more common than it is now. People liked these dramas for the same reason that children like ghost stories. Up to a point, children like to be frightened, because after all father or mother or nurse is really there in spite of the fantasy that the place is filled with goblins "who will get you if you don't watch out." Our interest in mystery plays indicates this same sort of attraction. They thrill us, but in the end they leave us satisfied by their resolution of the crisis.

In all of these tragedies the illusion may be so strong and effective that during the performance we may lose all consciousness of those around us and live imaginatively in the drama. The fear produced may be so great that some of the audience will scream at the gruesome performance before them. But if we scream, we enjoy screaming; and we may attend the play again for the pleasure of screaming at the same things.

An interesting counterpart to the participation of the audience in the play is the reactions of the actors to the audience. Most actors say that they can "feel" the responses of the audience. They "sense" whether the play is "going over" or not. The problem of the mechanism of this effect needs much careful investigation, but observation seems to indicate that the actors are influenced by the subliminal stimuli of slight noises of the audience. Certainly they are affected by the laughter or tears of the audience. It is common knowledge among actors that the first laugh by the audience is important for the success of the first act, if not indeed for the success of the whole comedy. Clever humor, witticisms, and foolish gestures set off the audience. They are devices to release the inhibitions of the audience. They produce a receptive mood. If the play drags, the audience settles back, to assume critical attitudes, or to become passive or indifferent. Actors say that they can "feel" this change in the responses of the audience. A recent Broadway drama opens with several minutes of the ribald conversation of several newspaper men who sit about a card table waiting for news. The dramatic action does not really begin until almost at the end of the entire first act. If it were not for the "smart cracks" made in the first twenty minutes, this play, or at least its first act, would be a "flop." Long stretches of dull acting in the end usually kill the drama as a stage success. The play must keep the audience in active vicarious participation, else it fails. One reason Shakespeare and older dramatists have so little general

appeal today is that their subject-matter is so out of the picture for the ordinary man of the street. Only the intellectually sophisticated appreciate the comedy and tragedy of other culture periods.

The physical conditions of the theater at the time also affect the relations of actors and audience. If it is too warm or too cold, the attention of the audience is distracted, and the actors notice the reaction very shortly. A producer of stock plays in a college town once remarked that Wednesday was a bad night because so many young couples came out together. They seemed more concerned with each other than with the play, and their indifference to the play was felt by the rest of the audience and also by the actors. Actors have stereotypes describing the kinds of audiences which attend plays on certain nights in the week. Audiences on Monday night are said to be very different from those on Friday or Saturday nights; and the Sunday-night audience is still different. Just how they diverge, it is often hard for the actors to say. They seem to sense these differences quite definitely, but they can not make them very explicit to the enquiring social psychologist.

Audiences come tuned for certain kinds of entertainment, and if this is not provided, the whole performance may be spoiled. We have all seen amateurs change a serious drama into a farce because the audience laughed at misplaced emphasis. Then, if we know the villain intimately as a star athlete or as a stolid business man, we make the wrong associations for the success of the play. Our wrong associations may stimulate responses quite opposite to those desired by the dramatist.

If an audience is annoyed by a delay in beginning a play, it may become a crowd. Disapproval of the delay may be heard in remarks all over the theater. We may applaud, in irony, give cat-calls, and shuffle our feet until the entire audience become very restless. All our anticipatory reaction changes from the expectancy of amusement to antagonism.

To secure more active participation by the audience, musical comedies often use a runway from the stage to the audience. The actors go down into the audience to sing, to make jokes, and to create a more active interest in the play. The popular and pretty leading lady kisses the bald head of some rich old man, and at once every member of the audience feels that it is not only great fun but that he is right there playing with the actors in the make-believe world. In some vaudeville performances the mingling of the actors with the audience is used very effectively. Directors of cabarets and night

clubs, where the audience is much more informal and polarization is not assisted by rigid seating arrangements, find this mingling of entertainers with the audience a very effective trick to secure the friendly participation of the audience.

The active participation of the audience in vaudeville performances is very evident. The trapeze artists, the magicians, and the dancers provide us with thrills. The jokes and songs are highly amusing, as they usually refer to tabooed subjects—notably to our sexual relations. Our laughter at these jokes indicates very clearly the vicarious function of the drama or vaudeville. We laugh first at the jokes about tabooed subjects because laughter is socially expected in these places. Often, in fact, many people who laugh at the more obvious associations miss the full significance of the joke. Others laugh simply because they have been conditioned to do so when they hear others laugh. Laughter always releases personal strain produced by the mores. By noting the changes in what is considered humorous on the stage we can discover the changes which have occurred in the mores. At the moment we can note the growth of vaudeville humor about sexual perversions. In the more respectable theaters such jokes are usually well disguised, but in the cheaper burlesque houses, largely frequented by men, the rather undisguised jokes and gestures suggestive of perversion arouse great laughter.

Man has always made jokes about the relations of the sexes. The theater simply panders to this sort of thing because it furnishes a relaxation from the rigors of taboo. A married man may laugh uproariously at a mother-in-law joke when he would not dare to defy such a person in real life. Thus, in a general way, we account for the interest of people in risqué stories of all sorts.

The motion picture fits into this general scheme of dramatic things just described. We may note first the distinctive features of the motion picture. Until the very recent introduction of the talking film, the cinematograph had of course to depend exclusively on visual stimuli. We are dominated by visual and vocal-motor types of imagery. In our social communication the vocal interchange is perhaps more significant than the visual; and yet in twenty years an entirely new type of dramatic form has been evolved with full reliance upon pictorial rather than verbal presentation. Whatever language there is, is inserted in brief flashes of printed conversation or exposition between long stretches of picture. European producers have demonstrated that they can make even more effective presentations without using

even these slight verbal explanations. Man has always been attracted to movement as well as to speech; and the moving picture is just what it says it is—a moving view of people in various situations. The audience is entirely controlled through the sight alone of bodily actions, especially of those facial and manual gestures which take the place of language. The silent drama can arouse tears or laughter, pity or anger, as well as the spoken one. In some ways the motion picture has appeals which the spoken drama lacks; in some dimensions it leaves our imaginations freer than does the drama.

Today we have the talking picture, and the form of the motion picture is undergoing a change. Some critics believe that we cannot now superimpose the spoken word upon a dramatic form constructed to dispense with it, without doing violence to the art of the silent pictures. On the other hand, a great many people seem to prefer the spoken film; and the amazing success of such productions as those of Al Jolson probably indicates that they have an appeal which hitherto has not been recognized. If a combination of pictorial and auditory appeal can be effected, there is no apparent reason why talking pictures may not completely supplant the silent films. Certainly, we must always take into account the power of the spoken word to arouse the emotions. Whether the mere superimposition of speech upon the present form of the motion picture can be accomplished without sacrifice of certain art values intrinsic to the moving picture remains to be seen.

Whatever we may say of these changes, the motion picture has found a distinct function in creating for us a fantasy world that is extremely popular and satisfying. The gorgeous settings of the more expensive current productions give the ordinary humble citizen a great thrill. He lives for the time being in a world of luxurious homes, servants, limousines, beautiful women, and strong men. The adolescent girl is often particularly delighted by this sort of thing. On the other hand, the western drama makes its great appeal to the young man, who lives vicariously in the dashing adventures before him. For the child, adolescent, or adult the motion picture, like other dramatic forms, creates a world of fantasy into which he can for the time escape from his daily life. Moreover, the whole field of drama meets social approval. It is a conventional outlet for our unfulfilled desires and our unrequited heartaches.

We should note the place of the drama and the vaudeville in the creation of stereotypes. There is no doubt that along with the novel, the short story,

and the cartoon, the stage creates and feeds stereotypes of all sorts. For example, it gives us standardized pictures of the Jew, the negro, the immigrant, or the drunkard. So, too, the Western films produce certain hero stereotypes. We are told that the moving pictures have created almost the entire body of stereotypes by which the European masses define and delimit Americans. We are scandalously wealthy and live in luxurious sin; or we are gangsters and cowboys. Our daily rituals are shooting Indians, robbing banks and stagecoaches, and kidnapping the beautiful daughters of wealthy ranchers. Fortunately our rituals also include the daily rescuing of these same young ladies. Thus we see, once more, how the world of fantasy is part and parcel of the social reality in which we live. Stereotypes, myths, and legends are created and kept alive by the mechanisms of social interaction which we use in social situations—in the school, in the home, in the history book, in the novel, in the drama, and in the public press. Not only do the drama and the vaudeville afford recreation in socially approved ways, by creating a dream world in which we may live, but they also contribute to our prejudices, to our beliefs, and to our legends—the roots of crowd behavior and of public opinion.

The audience is, then, not a mere object of information and amusement, but it is always engaged in real social interaction, overt or imaginary. While the informational audience may be more passive, even here we find common ideational associations in its members. Individuals in the amusement audience participate in social reality more aggressively and in more emotional and hence more satisfying ways.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter XXIII, pp. 668–90.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises from assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter XXIII, pp. 690–91.
 2. What effects has the physical configuration of the gathering place upon the behavior of the audience?
 3. How does an audience tend to set up a preliminary tuning or anticipatory response field?
 4. What differences in behavior may be noted between a theater audience and one (a) in a church, (b) in a lecture hall?
 5. Compare from your personal experience the silent motion picture with

the talking picture in the effects upon the audience: laughter, tears, verbal comments, etc.

C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.

1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter XXIII, p. 691.
2. Analysis of how vaudeville and motion pictures feed stereotypes, myths and legends in past and contemporary society.
3. Investigation of the relations of audience to actors.
4. Study of psychological effects of drama on audiences.

CHAPTER XXIII

FASHION AS COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

A. The Nature of Fashion.

1. *Fashion as Collective Action.*—Fashion may be defined as the prevailing style at any given time. Style itself, says Nystrom, is a characteristic or dominant “mode or method of expression, presentation or conception in the field of some art.” In other words, fashion applies to the prevailing mode in such things as are subject to change in form or style. Styles appear and disappear in clothes, ornamentation, architecture, vehicles, conversation, vocabulary, music, literature, and even in more serious art, religion, and philosophy.

Fashion is a phase of collective action which has much in common with crowd behavior. It rests in large part on physical contiguity, but today is dependent for its spread and persistence upon rapid communication and transportation. It is, therefore, related to the behavior of the public as well as to that of the crowd. Fashions are not in the mores. They are a phase of the non-moral folkways. Fashion is a type of common thought and action which depends upon certain currents of ideas and actions running through a group. These currents are relatively impermanent and superficial; and in contrast with mores which alter slowly, fashions are highly temporary and characterized by a state of flux. Yet in their time fashions seem important and significant. They are a part of the social ritual. They have, as Spencer said, a certain ceremonial aspect. In a society like our own, fashion may affect any aspect of human behavior.

It extends all the way from dress and ornament to ideals of character and favorite objects of enthusiasm and devotion. . . . Fashion dictates the virtues which shall be esteemed and the vices which shall be tolerated from one generation to another; also the doctrines, political and other, that shall be accepted or condemned. Gestures, attitudes, usages, like kissing, shaking hands, bowing, smiling in conversation, are arbitrary and conventional, controlled primarily by fashion, ultimately by taste. Like ornament and decoration, they add an

element of grace and pleasure to the intercourse of men and make it easier. They therefore contribute to its utility.¹

In a static, unchanging society where class or caste lines are well drawn, fashion in the modern sense can hardly be said to exist. The things which we today commonly consider as determined by fashion—styles of clothing, ornamentation, housing, vehicles, amusements, etc.—may be highly standardized aspects of these cultures. In some groups infraction of dress conventions not only leads to ridicule and minor social pressure, but may, like abuses of the mores, be dealt with in more drastic ways. The castes of India have not only distinctive language forms, but rigid forms of dress and manners. Changes are frowned upon even within the castes. To them the old ways are the right ways. As Ross says, “caste inhibits competitive consumption” among people.

Every class of Japanese society was under sumptuary regulation. The nature of them is best indicated by the regulations applying to the peasantry. Every detail of the farmer's existence was prescribed for by law—from the size, form, and cost of his dwelling, down even to such trifling matters as the number and the quality of the dishes to be served to him at meal-times. A farmer with a property assessed at twenty *roku* (of rice) was not allowed to build a house more than thirty-six feet long, or to use in building it such superior qualities of wood as *keyaki* or *hinoki*. The roof of his house was to be made of bamboo thatch or straw; and he was strictly forbidden the comfort of floor mats. On the occasion of the wedding of his daughter he was forbidden to have fish or any roasted food served at the wedding feast. The women of his family were not allowed to wear leather sandals: they might wear only straw sandals or wooden clogs; and the thongs of the sandals or the clogs were to be made of cotton. Women were further forbidden to wear hair bindings of silk, or hair ornaments of tortoise-shells; but they might wear wooden combs and combs of bone—not ivory. The men were forbidden to wear stockings, and their sandals were to be made of bamboo. They were also forbidden to use sunshades, or paper umbrellas. In Izumo I found that, prior to Meiji, there were sumptuary laws prescribing not only the materials of the dresses to be worn by the various classes, but even the colors of them, and the designs of the patterns. The size of the rooms, as well as the size of houses, was fixed there by law,—also the height of buildings and of fences, the number of windows, the material of construction.²

¹ W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society*, vol. III, 1927, pp. 2119–20. Courtesy of the Yale University Press.

² From L. Hearn, *Japan, an Attempt at Interpretation*, pp. 182, 183, 184. Copyright 1904 by The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

In Europe even in modern times there are distinctive dress, dialects, and manners in the various social classes. In the more isolated areas the older peasant costumes often persist. Wherever class lines are sharply drawn, there is a tendency to conservatism in matters which in our democratic countries are open to all through changes in fashion.

Class conventions are more sharply drawn in England, for example, than they are in this country. An English merchant would scarcely feel comfortable if he did not dress for dinner, whereas in America dressing for dinner is far less common among persons of corresponding wealth and education. We see the influence of ancient convention in clothes in the behavior of British royalty. The court follows long-established forms. On certain formal occasions the clothes and ornamentation of previous centuries are required. During his visits in Scotland the king must on occasion wear the kilts of ancient Scotland.

In modern Western society with its swift changes and heightened animation of life, with its mobility and rapid communication, fashions change rapidly; and the changes themselves are really a part of the social ritual. Today the control of fashion over our lives is everywhere evident. It has become a distinctive phase of our daily life.

Fashions run in cycles. What is in vogue today, may tomorrow be quite *passé*. Kroeber studied the cycles in dress styles among women. From an examination of fashion plates from 1844 to 1919, he gathered some enlightening statistics on changes in fashion. He used various measurements—total length of figure from center of mouth to tip of toe; distance from mouth to bottom of skirt as a measure of height of gown from ground; distance from mouth to the minimum diameter across the waist as a measure of length of waist; depth of décolletage; diameter of skirt at hem; etc. We may briefly summarize some of the more interesting of his findings:

The figures on the percentage of width of skirt to the total height of the figure show that beginning in 1844 there was a rapid widening of the skirts to 1859, when the widths of skirts more than equaled the entire height of the figure. These were the days of the crinoline. There followed, by smaller rhythms up and down, a decline in the widths of skirts until 1910-11 when the hobble skirt was in vogue. Then came a sharp rise in widths of skirts up to 1917 to be followed by a drop in 1918.

For the same period the data for height of skirts from the ground is interesting. In 1844 the skirt barely escaped touching the ground. From 1860-1870 there were slight fluctuations, the skirts sometimes sweeping the ground, at

other times rising an inch or two above. From 1875 to 1887 skirts became shortened, not like those of 1926-29, but very definitely off the ground even to the extent of exposing the shoes of the wearers. In the latter 90's and down to 1910 skirts swept the ground. Then came the very rapid rise in skirts which did not culminate until about 1927.

The trends in décolletage and length of waist showed some fluctuations, meaningless so far as depth of décolletage is concerned, but showing definite cycle of fifty years in the length of waists,—1853 showed the longest waists, 1903 the shortest. The data for relation of width of waist and width of décolletage to the height of the figure also reveal changes. From 1844 to 1867 was a period of very tight lacing. This was followed by a period when lacing was not so tight. Then came the period in the 80's and 90's when tight corsets were in style. From about 1905 on there was a distinct widening of the waist which marked the beginning of the trend toward the elimination of corsets which was practically accomplished about the end of World War period.³

This investigation, and later ones, show that fashions follow certain rhythms; also that we can measure statistically trends in fashion, but that we can predict only the general direction of such trends, not their absolute direction or quantity.

Paul Poiret, the famous "King of Fashion," remarked:

It is not possible to predict Style. Everything, indeed, is permitted. Style makes progress by contrasts, and one must expect anything from it in the way of excess. Think of the cries that would have been uttered in 1900 if the public had seen women walking along the streets with the short skirts now worn. And if, tomorrow on Fifth Avenue, a fashionable woman is seen wearing trousers, what will your grandparents say? ⁴

It is evident that certain fashions run to extremes. We see this in the fluctuation between long and short skirts, large and small hats, baggy Oxford trousers and narrow, tight ones.

2. *The Craze or Fad as Extreme Fashion*.—The more superficial aspects of fashion change are often referred to as "crazes" or "fads." A fad is usually confined to minor details of dress and ornamentation. We find a stimulation, a vividness, and an excitement in the craze which makes it extremely appealing. Crazes in fashion are really types of mental epidemics, and are open to the same interpretation. Over a period of ten years Bo-

³ Adapted from A. L. Kroeber, "On the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exemplified by Changes of Fashion," *American Anthropologist*, 1919, vol. XXI, pp. 235-63.

⁴ P. Poiret, "Who Sets Our Styles?" *Forum*, 1928, vol. LXXX, p. 192. Courtesy of publishers and of American agent of M. Poiret, Mr. Charles I. Reid.

gardus collected from a large number of people a listing of seven leading fads. He discarded all fads reported each year except those cited by at least five persons. This left a total of 735 different fads, which he tabulated "according to the phase of human life which they represented."

Table 16: Showing Classification and Distribution of Fads ⁵

<i>Classification of Fads</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
Women's dress and decorations	534	72.7
Men's dress and decoration	80	10.8
Amusements and recreation	42	5.7
"Slanguage"	27	3.6
Automobiles	23	3.1
Architecture	16	2.0
Education and culture	13	1.7
Total	735	99.6

Thus fads in women's dress are more numerous than all other types of fads, and fads in the clothing of both men and women constitute nearly three-fourths of the total. Analysis showed that most of these fads were very superficial, such as kewpies, labels on automobiles, artificial moles, current phrases, and marathon dancing.

B. *The Psychology of Fashion.*

1. *Individualism and Conformity in Fashion.*—A psychology of fashion should try to explain our curious modern habit of looking for the novel, the exciting, the different in dress, decoration, speech, and manner. The modern specialized, mobile world is dynamic and changing in contrast with the static organization of life in previous ages. While men no doubt have always been attracted by color, pleasant sounds, dancing, and chances for recreation, today this seeking and following of changes in fashion is in the folkways. It is a part of our daily existence and we are accustomed to it as thoroughly as the stable Chinese population is attuned to local custom and ancestor worship.

Like so much of our social behavior, fashion is an outgrowth of our emotional and irrational tendencies. The alterations in dress and ornamenta-

⁵E. S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, 1924, p. 159. Courtesy of the Century Company.

tion, in vehicle design, and in song and dance, are often not utilitarian. Yet as a rule, when we are pressed for a reason for our behavior, we follow custom once more and fall back on contemporary rationalizations. Thus the women in a class in social psychology five years ago assured the author that bobbed hair and short skirts had come to stay once and for all. They "were so convenient," so "sensible" that women would never give them up. At the present moment over thirty per cent of the young women in another social psychology class are wearing their hair long again. A little survey of sixty junior and senior women in this class revealed that all but one had had their hair bobbed at one time or another. Already we observe in fashionable dress a distinct lengthening of the skirt. Utility is not the *raison d'être* for fashion. It never has been and it never will be. While certain things once fashionable may become utilitarian and stable, fashion *qua* fashion does not rest on usefulness. It is essentially irrational:

The influence of fashion over the human mind is such as to make a style, when accepted, seem beautiful, no matter how hideous it may appear at other times when not in fashion. It is hard to believe that the hoop skirt, the bustle and the leg o'mutton sleeves were once considered very charming and highly appropriate. No doubt the present fashions will in time seem just as ridiculous and even, possibly, as hideous as do these past styles seem to us now.⁶

The hold of fashion on us is rather its emotional appeal to our fancy, to our sense of importance, and to the sense of social approval it affords. Here is one of the paradoxes. While fashion aims at difference, it also still aims at approval. It is approved because it is followed by others. Fashion, as Ross remarks, means a certain uniformity of practice. It does not imply any uniformity in intellectual processes whatsoever. Yet when too many follow a fashion, it decays and a new one arises.

Simmel analyzed this apparent paradox in fashion between individualization and social conformity, or, as he said, socialization. Fashion satisfies man's desire for novelty, for differentiation, for individuality, and still, at the same time, it makes for social adaptation and uniformity of action:

Two social tendencies are essential to the establishment of fashion, namely, the need of union on the one hand and the need of isolation on the other. Should one of these be absent, fashion will not be formed—its sway will abruptly end.

⁶ P. H. Nystrom, *Economics of Fashion*, 1928, p. 9. Courtesy of The Ronald Press Company.

From the fact that fashion as such can never be generally in vogue, the individual derives the satisfaction of knowing that as adopted by him it still represents something special and striking, while at the same time he feels inwardly supported by a set of persons who are striving for the same thing, not as in the case of other social satisfactions, by a set actually doing the same thing.⁷

Thus fashion furnishes for the personality a nice balance between the desire for conformity, security, and sense of social solidarity, and the desire for distinction, for individuality, for differentiation from others. The whole sway of fashion is related really to the disturbance of this ever-shifting balance of individualism and socialization.

2. *Fashion, Desire for Change, and Ego-Expansion.*—Psychologically fashion rests on our desire for change, for divergence, for being set apart from others. We grow bored with styles long in use. Certain seasonal changes in clothes and decoration illustrate this. In the spring of the year we secure new clothes, redecorate our houses, and purchase a new car. We are on the lookout for new fads. How much of this desire for change is a purely psychological reaction to *ennui* and how much of it is an outgrowth of the very culture pattern of fashion, it is difficult to say. Certainly in some societies the old and traditional is so sacred in the minds of people that alterations in what for us is mere fashion are unimaginable. At any rate an alteration in fashion may offer us an opportunity to compensate for "disappointment with achievements," as Nystrom remarks. A change in clothes may stimulate a revival of self-feeling. A young woman once remarked that whenever she "felt blue" or disappointed she found that purchasing a new pair of shoes quite restored her to good humor.

This desire for change is related to our egoistic wishes for social approval. It is probably rooted in our infantile and childhood habits of exhibitionism, of showing off, of dressing up and being distinct in costume and manner in order to gain the attention of our parents and others. However, fashion, as a part of social ritual, is related to mobility, to specialization, and to the rise of modern secondary groups. As we noted above, where status is fixed in the mores, where there is group isolation and little or no flexibility in code or manner, fashion in one sense may hardly be said to exist. The things which change—phrases, songs, decorations, clothes, or modes of travel—do so imperceptibly. Fashion is really to be understood only in terms of rapidity and method of change. Hence it reflects the mobility of persons, atti-

⁷ G. Simmel, "Fashion," *International Quarterly*, 1904-05, vol. X, pp. 137-8, 140.

tudes, and opinions. We have today actually constructed a folkway of change rather than one of stability. It is in the folkways to be up with the fashions of our particular group no matter how quickly they may be altered. Whatever may be in early strictly personal-social experience of exhibitionism becomes more firmly fixed in us by the additional conditioning which we get as we grow up and discover that there is actually a convention of fashion. And to be in the fashion is to be noticed by others. In other words, early personal-social conditioning becomes integrated to cultural conditioning.

This desire to be divergent, to gain attention, leads to emulation by others who look upon us as prestige-bearers, as persons to be followed. Others unconsciously or consciously identify themselves with us as leaders. Emulation, therefore, aids the spread of fashion in any group. This leadership in fashion has in many things become institutionalized by the manufacturers of dress goods, automobiles, and other articles of fashion. Our various groups actually follow the lead of Poiret, the merchants on Bond Street, or the fashionable designers of automobiles or houses.

If fashion marks us off as individuals, it may also be a means of compensating for our sense of inferiority. When we dress in the latest fashions, we are marked as of the élite. The *nouveau riche* always attempt to keep up with styles in consumption of goods as well as by showing evidences of conspicuous leisure. Simmel remarked:

From all this we see that fashion furnishes an ideal field for individuals of dependent natures, whose self-consciousness, however, requires a certain amount of prominence, attention, and singularity. Fashion raises even the unimportant individual by making him the representative of a class, the embodiment of a joint spirit.⁸

The young immigrant often adopts current fads in dress and manner in order to overcome some of his sense of insufficiency. In the same way the ordinary working man or woman may attempt to dress in fashionable clothes in order to obtain the feeling of superiority which goes with being in style.

The housewife who does her own housework probably dresses in an apron or a house dress for the purpose, and as long as she is dressed in this manner and is doing the routine work of the home, it is likely that she feels as if she

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

were something of a drudge. If after completing her work she makes a change to an afternoon dress or street garment, the change makes a lady out of her. . . . Something of the same thing takes place when factory workers don their street clothes after emerging from the factory at the close of the working day. In their factory clothing they are workers. In their street clothes they are ladies and gentlemen, and in their minds comparable in every way with ladies and gentlemen of any grade or classification.⁹

Many students of social behavior have maintained that women's intense interest in fashion is clearly a case of compensation for her sense of inferiority in this world of men. In an earlier day they found compensation in dress and ornamentation to attract men, on the one hand, and to set themselves off from men, on the other. Today the tendency for women's styles to ape those of men is possibly the result of the changing position of women in business, politics, and the professions. Our contemporary ideology of the equality of the sexes is doubtless greatly influencing the direction of fashion. Women attempt to prove their equality with men by adopting the manners, dress, and habits of men.

In a certain sense fashion gives woman a compensation for her lack of position in a class based on a calling or profession. The man who has become absorbed in a calling has entered a relatively uniform class, within which he resembles many others, and is thus often only an illustration of the conception of this class or calling. On the other hand, as though to compensate him for this absorption, he is invested with the full importance and the objective as well as social power of this class. To his individual importance is added that of his class, which often covers the defects and deficiencies of his purely personal character. The individuality of the class often supplements or replaces that of the member. This identical thing fashion accomplishes by other means. Fashion also supplements a person's lack of importance, his inability to individualize his existence purely by his own unaided efforts, by enabling him to join a set characterized and singled out in the public consciousness of fashion alone. Here also to be sure, the personality as such is reduced to a general formula, yet this formula itself, from a social standpoint, possesses an individual tinge, and thus makes up through the social way what is denied to the personality in a purely individual way.¹⁰

We can hardly doubt that our desire to expand our ego, to identify ourself with activities which give social distinction, is a powerful factor in promoting fashion and changes in fashion.

⁹ Nystrom, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

¹⁰ Simmel, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

3. *Fashion and Sex Attraction.*—From time to time writers have discussed the possible relationships between dress and personal adornment and sexual selection. It is easy to draw an analogy between secondary sexual decoration in animals and human adornment, but the analogies are really very far-fetched. We need not go into the origin of dress and personal ornamentation except to say that there is much evidence that while dress doubtless had utilitarian values in the colder climates, both dress and personal adornment were stimulated by man's wish for self-expression and by his desire to gain the attention of other members of his group. In earlier societies the male dressed much more gorgeously than he does today. We can hardly decide whether this was due to a desire to please women or to convey an impression of leisure-class power. The more practical and business-like dress of contemporary men seems sufficiently attractive to women, nor do short skirts, bobbed hair, rouged faces, and cigarette smoking seem to make women less attractive to men than they were in the days of Richardson's *Pamela*. While behind dress and personal decoration there may be a deep urge toward sexual attraction, the content of fashion in dress seems dependent on other than purely sexual desires. Whatever is accepted as current in fashion will be thought attractive by the other sex. Men may oppose sun-tan powder or stockingless legs, but once this style is under way, the women who follow it may be a bit more attractive simply because they typify the distinction of being in style. Likewise, if Western women should adopt the trouser skirt, it would not be long before women *not* dressed in that style would be considered out of class.

In fashion we modify our rationalizations very readily. If it is sexual attraction, one style is as good as another. Whatever is moving toward universal acceptance at the moment is correct. When it is universal, however, it no longer is in the height of fashion. Once fashions reach a saturation point, they decay. As fashion spreads downward, from one social class to a lower class, the leaders begin to change their fashions. This shift in modern fashion is almost its outstanding characteristic. It seems an intimate part of our touch-and-go civilization, where nothing appears to be permanent. For most of us, rather than detracting from its interest, this transitory nature of fashion adds to it piquancy and zest.

C. *Fashion and Group Behavior.*

1. *Influence of the Élite on Fashion.*—In his inimitable book, *The Theory*

of the *Leisure Class*, Veblen pointed out the influence of the upper classes on standards of fashion. "Conspicuous consumption" and "conspicuous leisure" are two of the marks of class distinction, especially in a capitalistic society like our own. We can hardly doubt that the upper bourgeois classes have played the largest rôle in establishing the folkway of frequent changes in fashion. The leadership of these classes and social control through fashion go hand in hand. Reputability is highly essential to the adoption of a fad or fashion. The prestige-bearers have a distinct place in determining the direction of changes in fashion.

The very character of fashion demands that it should be exercised at one time only by a portion of the given group, the great majority being merely on the road to adopting it. As soon as an example has been universally adopted, that is, as soon as anything that was originally done only by a few has really come to be practiced by all—as is the case in certain portions of our apparel and in various forms of social conduct—we no longer speak of fashion. As fashion spreads, it gradually goes to its doom.¹¹

Today fads and fashions spread very rapidly through all classes of our population. With the ease of cheap duplication of expensive luxuries the filtering downward of these things takes place quickly. At the bottom of the gradation of luxury objects we have the five and ten cent chain-stores. These institutions afford for the poorer classes the illusion of luxury without the expense. It is an amazingly interesting study in social psychology to see how these stores have a prominent place in the diffusion of objects of fashion.

The very speed of the downward seepage of fashion has its reverberations on the plutocratic pace-setters. When every housemaid, shop girl, and ordinary stenographer can possess cheap imitations of expensive objects, the wealthy leaders feel an intensified desire once more to be divergent. While we always have some solid satisfaction in our awareness of the financial and class difference between a glass setting in a cheap ring and a genuine diamond, for the practical purpose of impressing other people glass may be almost as good as diamonds. From across a street we may find it hard to discriminate between the trimming on a hat which appears out of the servants' door and that worn by milady who steps out the front door into her waiting limousine. As soon as the lower classes begin to adopt some fashions, the upper classes move on to others.

¹¹ Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-38.

The diffusion of fads and fashions is not confined to material things. Non-material fads and fashions—smart phrases, jokes, popular songs, and dances—are spread through the general population by newspapers and magazines, by the radio, the vaudeville, the motion picture, and the spoken drama. Even advertising encourages the dissemination of non-material fads and fashions by associating them with sales suggestions of material goods.

Yet in both material and non-material fashion changes, individuals of the élite classes play an important rôle. In dress and personal adornment we have had an interesting series of such influences. For example, Lafayette's visit to America in 1823 made a great impression on the trends of fashion. His attire in the older French tradition helped maintain the conservative French influence in America for several years. Louis Kossuth, the Hungarian patriot, who visited this country in 1851, was everywhere enthusiastically received. He was largely responsible for introducing into America the soft felt or velour hat, which at the time was a part of the costume of the Hungarian nationalists. In 1860 Albert Edward, Prince of Wales, later King Edward VII, visited the United States. Following his visit the Prince Albert coat was worn by American men and remained a part of our formal attire for a long time. Nystrom says that Americans are less inclined today than they were formerly to be dominated by such foreign influences of notable persons. At least the visit of the Prince of Wales in 1924 did not lead to any changes in styles, although there was an effort made to introduce certain plaids, snap brim hats, and other apparel which he used. These were, however, hardly innovations as all these or similar things were worn before he came. In 1923, following the excavations at the tomb of Tut-Ankh-Amen, we had a craze for Egyptian patterns in dress goods and decorative designs. Various World's Fairs have had some effects on fashion changes, in dress and personal adornment and in architecture.

Today manufacturers and merchants are vitally interested in fashion changes. It has sometimes been said that dress designers and manufacturers deliberately modify fashion. In the opinion of many, advertising is used to set the fashions. It is doubtful if the matter is so simple. The changes are largely imperceptible at first and not so consciously controlled as some believe. However, the close connection of economic structure and fashion warrants our brief attention.

2. *Business and Fashion*.—There is no doubt that we spend an enormous amount of money on fads and fashions. In his *Tragedy of Waste* Chase esti-

mates, on the basis of tax returns, that in 1919 the people of the United States spent nearly twenty-three billions of dollars for what he calls luxuries. This sum represented a full one-third of the entire purchasing power of the population. We spent three-quarters of a billion for perfumes and cosmetics, five billions for luxuries in foods, six hundred millions for soft drinks and ice cream, a cool billion for candy, three billions for resorts, races, and joy rides. In the *New York World* for June 14, 1924, F. W. O'Malley reported his observations through the shopping district of Fifth Avenue in the spring of 1921. The cheapest shoes in several shops were \$25 a pair, in one ultra-smart shop ordinary street shoes were priced at \$65. Plain straw sport hats for women were \$25, small dress hats ranged from \$75 to \$100. Silk stockings for evening wear ranged from \$10 to \$25 a pair. In one shop, lace stockings were marked at \$500 a pair. Women's gowns of the one-piece street variety ranged from \$250 to \$350, smart evening gowns ("popular price") began at \$700 and ran up to \$1200. Ultra-smart evening gowns were priced as high as \$5000. Russian sables ran from \$12,000 up to ten times that figure for matched Russian sables. Vanity cases ranged from \$36 to \$200; cigarette cases from \$175 to \$350. Lorgnettes were priced at \$500 to \$1000. Jewelry, of course, ranged in prices from \$1000 up to very large figures.

If we looked at the price lists of plain and fancy automobiles, we would find like ranges in prices; so, too, with houses, radios, and hundreds of items in the world of fashion. The writer once overheard two salesmen discussing the price of a piano on display in a fine Fifth Avenue shop. It was made in eighteenth-century style, and was undoubtedly handsome. One man inquired: "Aren't you handling the X style and make any more?" "Oh, yes, we do carry a few, but this type goes over much better. It's not of the same quality as the X by any means, but it looks better and people want that sort of thing today." In an era of speed and change we prefer fleeting style to built-in quality.

The makers of fashion-goods have developed an elaborate technique to create public interest and demand for their wares. They strive desperately to go with the currents of public fads. Manufacturers and distributors have attempted to inaugurate fashion crazes, but they are rarely successful. The consensus of opinion seems to be that fads arise rather spontaneously and spread rapidly, and that predicting their rise and diffusion is extremely difficult and financially risky. Extremes in fashion appear to be a phase of

our rapidly changing life, of our superficial social contacts. To foist these on people deliberately seems social folly; and yet manufacturers naturally attempt to trade on the trends in fashion and to stimulate our desire to "be in the swim." The *Daily News Record*, a trade paper of the clothing manufacturers, had an investigator make a study of men's clothes at Palm Beach. He commented as follows:

The one big thing worth your deepest consideration is the fact—18 per cent of the men on the golf links are wearing flannel trousers instead of knickers. When your time comes to sell flannel trousers in quantity play them hard! A man at a summer resort with just plain white flannel trousers is a hick. People will think he has just one pair that he washes and presses in his room at night. It's like a man who wears nothing but plain blue collar-attached shirts. Very few men *can afford* to let people think he doesn't change his shirt every day. Your customers should all have plain white flannel trousers, of course. But they should alternate with a pair of stripes or several pair of various stripe effects. You should sell more flannel trousers than you sold knickers if you promote the fact—in your advertising—why a man should have a *set* of flannel trousers. Be frank and tell the men in your town why they should have whites and grays, plain and with stripes. . . . The public while they are sure what they want, they want to be told what they want. They will believe a chart showing in cold hard figures what the men they envy and imitate are wearing.¹²

This frank statement of the fundamentals of appeal is sound psychology. It represents well the conscious manner in which the clever advertising manager tries to put into practice the principles of social control in fashion. He simply applies the basic facts of human behavior.

Parisian designers of women's clothing have long been leaders not only in France and on the Continent but in this country as well. We have developed a definite mental set toward Paris styles. "Made in Paris" is a stereotype of great sales value. Leaders of fashion the world over patronize various well-known French designers. Worth, Poiret, Paquin, Lucille Ltd., Lelong, Redfern, Patou, Chanel are names to conjure with in the world of fashionable dress. The distribution of styles through periodicals reaches millions of persons still farther removed from the dominating fashion group. Bryce told of an experience in a remote Oregon village two generations ago. He was amazed when he heard a woman ask a clerk in a store if a certain fashion magazine had appeared. Upon inquiry he found out

¹² Quoted by S. Chase, *The Tragedy of Waste*, p. 94. Copyright, 1926, by The Macmillan Company. Reprinted by permission.

that the dominant social group of this isolated country town attempted to follow the latest dictates of fashion from Paris.

As instability of fashion is one of its dominant characteristics, the designer, manufacturer, and merchant are all confronted with serious economic risks. Styles of dress and decoration change over night. Recent styles become obsolete with the announcement of newer ones. The manufacture of dress goods and decorative materials involves tremendous risks because fashions are so capricious and unpredictable. Manufacturers are forced to spend time trying to estimate fashion trends, and then by speeding up production they must attempt to capitalize on current fashion interests.

Quite naturally manufacturers often wish to keep fashions stable, in their own economic interests, of course. Years ago the corsetmakers tried to stop the changes in fashion which now have produced the corsetless woman. Manufacturers of hairpins were greatly distressed by the bobbed-hair fad, which curiously gave the barbers a great increase in work. In the spring of 1925 one trade paper reported a drive by its members against the felt hat for women: felt hats wear too long. Thus the pendulum of fashion swings its curious measure, and our economic system, so far as it is concerned with this, tries to anticipate its direction. It is certainly doubtful if the economic interests can create fashion *de novo* or prevent changes. Almost every concerted effort to oppose or create definite changes in fashion has been quite futile.

3. *Fashion and Morality.*—In our own Christian culture the dominant churches have made numerous attempts to control the direction of fashion, especially fashion in things considered sacred or taboo. From the fourteenth century on, laws have appeared against indecent clothes. In the religious enthusiasm of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation distinct efforts were made to control personal apparel and ornamentation. The clergy and moralists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries denounced what they considered indecent dress—at about this time women began to uncover the neck and bosom. The Puritans, Quakers, and some other sects have tried to stipulate dress and to prevent the exposure of the woman's body or the use of any personal adornment. Outside certain narrow circles the mores rejected this as excessively severe. Ultimately the mores always control fashion.

In our own day, various preachers have repeatedly inveighed against

fashion changes. The Catholic church in Poland is recently reported to have forbidden young Polish women from participating in international beauty contests on the grounds of indecency. Various municipal ordinances and local mores attempt to prevent the wearing of scanty bathing suits by women. Recently some American communities forbade young women to appear on the streets without stockings—a fad which has been permitted elsewhere. As in so many other ways, the breakdown of the old folkways and mores is evident in dress. Except in isolated areas where present-day animation and modern living have not become common, styles of clothes and ornamentation seem to be escaping more and more from the older moral standards.

Whether exposure of the neck and bosom, at one time, and of the legs and arms, at another, contributes to immorality seems always to provoke debate. Probably about the same psychology is evident here as in the sexual attraction of dress which we have just discussed. What is considered proper and right in the folkways of fashion is generally accepted. People in countries like Japan and Russia do not seem morally offended by seeing nude men and women bathe together. Women's smoking may not seem immoral to us, but it certainly would have seemed so two generations ago. Sumner's statement that "whatever is, is right" applies to fashion as to everything else in the folkways and mores.

4. *Fashion and Utility*.—Occasionally people who are rationalists in their notions of social behavior attempt to institute reforms for sensible dress. They may affect certain minorities, but, as Bogardus remarks, "efforts by women to establish a Dress Reform League have never been far-reaching." The reason is not difficult to find. Fashion makes irrational appeals. It has its strength in feelings and emotions, not in intellectual considerations. The hoop skirts in the 1870's, the waist-pinching and the bustle in the 1890's, the leg-o-mutton sleeve in one day and the tight sleeve or none at all in another, long skirts yesterday and short ones today—if fashion appealed to our reason it could hardly oscillate so violently. In fashion, as in prejudice, in crowd behavior, in public opinion, and in all of the social attitudes and activities, men and women are illogical and impulsive rather than rational. In the days of narrow Sedan chairs woman wore wide-spreading paniers. In the day of crowded stage coaches women wore crinolines. The hobble skirt did not make for ease in getting in and out of street cars or

automobiles. The irrationality of change is illustrated in this little story of Poirer's:

Even stranger still is the history of the short skirt. I have been to America three times. My first visit was in 1912. As you know, they began to wear short skirts in 1913. I brought with me a film which showed the parade of my models in my gardens in Paris. Naturally, all of them wore short skirts—skirts shorter than those ordinarily worn, but much less short than those worn today. I had planned to interest my American public in this new fashion, but the film was refused by the censors and was not passed by the customs officers. It was refused as obscene, because one could not see ladies parading with uncovered legs. It is hardly believable today. What must that customs officer think, if he were alive now, when he sees all women walking along the streets with their skirts to their knees? But he must already be dead from mortification!¹³

There are, of course, some utilitarian tendencies in some features of dress and personal decorations. As upper- and middle-class men have more and more pursued lives of activity rather than of leisure, there have not been the frequent fundamental changes in costume that we see in earlier historical periods. Thus the pantaloons, made common in the French Revolutionary period, has been taken over by most classes except on ceremonial occasions in Europe or in amusements in our own country. So, too, perhaps women in industry and business may insist upon retaining some of the practical advantages of the short skirt, bobbed hair, and the more masculine manner. At least such fashions may change more slowly than those which concern us in our leisure time and in the frills of polite social intercourse. With the whole modern tendency to rapid change, fashion is overstepping more and more the bounds of its original domain of personal externals and is acquiring, as Simmel remarks, "an increasing influence over taste, over theoretical convictions and even over the moral foundations of life." As the *rationale* of the capitalistic social-economic order comes to affect the life organization of men and women, certain things formerly in fashion may become more stable parts of the more permanent folkways, and other things may increasingly become aspects of fashion. But it seems unlikely that fashions and fads will disappear, unless the Universal Robots of Capek come into being with some future standardization of life. Such a profound change would imply equally profound modifications in the biological character of human beings as well as in the present direction of civilization. Alterations of this sort seem remote and fanciful indeed.

¹³ Poirer, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-92. And already (1930) skirts are longer again.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter XXII, Section B, pp. 658-64.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
1. Discuss questions and exercises from assignment, *Source Book*, Chapter XXII, nos. 25-28, p. 665.
 2. How do the folkways of fashion changes reflect the nature of our collective life today?
 3. How does fashion afford both individualization and uniformity in behavior? Illustrate.
 4. Distinguish between fashion and morals.
 5. Why does the "imitation" of superiors rather than of ancestors in costume tend to equalize the social classes?
 6. Cite illustrations of the spread of fashion into other fields than dress and personal adornment.
 7. What effect has the coming of athletics for women made on trends in fashions in women's clothes?
 8. What influence has the professionalization of women's occupations had upon feminine fashions?
 9. Cite illustrations of conspicuous consumption and conspicuous leisure in modern times.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.
1. See assignments for reports and longer papers which bear on fashion in *Source Book*, Chapter XXII, p. 666.
 2. Report on Nystrom, *Economics of Fashion*, Chapters II, XII, XIII and XIV for illustrations of changes in fashions.
 - 2a. Report on Hurlock, *The Psychology of Dress*, especially Chapters III, VII, IX, X on motivation, on the place of the élite, and on the sex and age factors in fashion.
 3. Report on Sumner and Keller, *Science of Society*, vol. III, Chapter LX, on "Ostentation and Prestige" as a revelation of the relation of fashion and personal adornment, to self-feeling.
 4. An analysis of changes in styles of furniture in the modern historical period to discover if there are any cyclic changes such as Kroeber found in women's clothes.

CHAPTER XXIV

PUBLIC OPINION

A. *The Background of Public Opinion.*

1. *The Public and the Crowd.*—We may describe the public as a more or less amorphous group not conjoined in space. It corresponds to what Bentley called the assemblage. While the crowd depends on physical contiguity, the public does not. A public is held together by other than face-to-face communication. Its social meaning rests in the fact that a scattered group of people may think and act in a similar or even identical manner. The crowd is a shoulder-to-shoulder relationship, with a common focus. The unity of a public rests upon an indirect psychological relationship to a common center. We can belong to only one crowd at a time; but we may belong to several publics at the same time, each public having some particular interest. As we use it, the term "public" refers not to one great mass of persons living in a community, a state, or a nation, but rather to various groups in secondary contact. The notion that the word "public" applies to the general and more or less total population arose, doubtless, from the fact that much of the treatment of public opinion has come from political scientists, who are most interested in the political aspects of community life. While the term public opinion may be so narrowly defined as to cover only opinions about political issues, we shall use it here in a broader sense. The "public" does not apply merely to that part of the population which is concerned with political problems. We use it to indicate various interest groups, especially those marked by the secondary group characteristics. Therefore we should speak of *publics* rather than of a public. There is a political public, a financial public, an art public, and so on throughout the whole range of modern interests and activities. When we study the newspaper and periodical as reflectors or makers of public opinion, we discover that they treat not only politics, but all phases of contemporary life.

The opinions of these various publics are usually expressed in more or

less open manner through the press, pulpit and forum, and more intimately through conversation. We shall discuss the psychological character of opinion in a subsequent section. We may say here, however, that it is essentially this talking about affairs of common concern that constitutes public opinion. In other words, it has a distinctly social rather than a private or personal significance. The objects of public opinion are felt to concern all members of the various groups.

2. *Ecology of Public Opinion*.—In the earlier village and primary group organization of society, public opinion depended upon factors distinctly different from those on which it depends today. While certain aspects of the process remain the same, in present-day public opinion new factors intrude themselves

a. *Village and Rural District*.—The village and town life which characterized our American life down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century was very largely the outgrowth of the culture typified in the towns of New England and the northern colonial area. We find in these communities a primary group organization not unlike that of village life in Europe during the previous two thousand years. Before modern means of communication, while these villages were relatively isolated, nevertheless their life and culture were fairly homogeneous. Except for Teutonic and Scandinavian immigration into the rural areas west of the Great Lakes, the immigrant tide affected more particularly our large cities. Social control in the villages rested in mores common to the Protestant-American type, principally with Puritan backgrounds.

The development of public opinion in any crisis depended upon gossip and conversation over the back fence, in the village store and postoffice, in the church and neighborhood gathering, and in the village assembly. The elders of the group, that is, the older and more prominent men of these communities, no doubt crystallized and gave direction to the common currents of opinion running through the village. On the whole, life was not very complex, and the range of activity was not very wide. The major crises involved infractions of the moral code and the common political interests of taxation, roads, education and public institutions. If some crisis arose, such as the burning of a neighbor's barn, the development of a bad mudhole in the county highway, or the overcrowding of a school building, the inhabitants did not have much difficulty in discovering the fundamental facts. On the basis of these facts, through conversation and

personal associative thinking, a consensus of opinion about the situation could easily form. From this consensus of opinion a common course of action might be promptly determined. If the village school teacher did not live up to the folkways of the town, she was sure to feel ridicule and censure of a mild sort. This gossip usually was sufficient to bring her into conformity with the village standards. The gossips might exert sufficient pressure on violators of the moral codes to drive them out of the village. Thus, if the teacher's conduct were too divergent, she might, and usually did, lose her position, being replaced by someone more satisfactory. Sometimes a whole community might mobilize to control the actions of a recalcitrant member. If the tax rates were to be raised, the citizens had opinions and exchanged them with others in terms of their wishes for civic improvements and a realization of added financial burden. However, life in the town or village was conservative and public opinion was decidedly narrow. Even today rural communities oppose consolidation of school districts, refuse to increase taxation for local improvements, and exhibit a great indifference to the larger political issues.

While American villages felt themselves to be a part of the larger political state and nation, their information about politics depended on the weekly newspaper and on occasional campaign speeches. In times of agricultural crises considerable public opinion arose. This is illustrated in the rise of the Populist movement and the Grange. Yet, for the most part, political public opinion concerned itself with the details of village life.

Public opinion of special interest groups was confined very largely to matters of religion. A village might have a half-dozen rival Protestant sects, each with its own membership and each developing certain opinions on affairs of common concern. In spite of differences in dogma and faith, these sects all held fast to certain fundamental moral codes, so that the mores affecting such things as sex conduct, Sunday observance, dancing, card-playing, horse-racing and gambling, and the general scheme of honesty and fair dealing were only superficially in dispute. The result was that little public opinion was generated on these attitudes. Since they were fully accepted in the mores and folkways, they were not subjects for talk and discussion.

In general, American towns and villages were essentially alike as regards mores and folkways. Questions to be decided by group opinion were settled in a direct, face-to-face manner. In the larger issues of state and

nation the older Puritan-American political-religious standpoint persisted. Because of this body of fundamentals the country at large was fairly homogeneous in spite of the relative isolation of communities.

b. *Urban District*.—With the increase of population, with specialization in industry and the whole growth of modern business, the simple village social organization has broken down. Rapid transportation and communication, especially within the present century, have practically destroyed the provincialism of the village. This has made possible the astounding increase in city populations. While at the outset our cities were largely overgrown American villages controlled by primary group mores and folkways, the last half-century has witnessed great changes. The coming into our cities of large numbers of immigrants of divergent cultural backgrounds, especially peoples of southern and eastern Europe, has introduced new points of view and new ways of living. This has produced a heterogeneity of sub-racial type as well as a mixture of cultures. Even without these forces, urbanization would have produced distinct changes in our modes of living.

The increasing importance in our life of secondary groups, dependent, as they are, on voluntary and only partially personal interests, is another phase of the situation. Man is no longer tied to the family and neighborhood by geographical location, nor is he limited in the scope of his occupational choice, his political or church affiliations, his marital adventures or his recreational activities. In short, mobility and increased division of labor and the attendant expansion of the capitalistic economic order have produced remarkable alterations in our attitudes and habits. While in its emphasis upon the utilitarian virtues of thrift, economy, good works, temperance, and the repression of natural tendencies, there is much in capitalism which harmonizes with the Protestant and Puritan social-religious order, certain conflicts have arisen out of the expansion of our economic life. Our mores are in a state of flux. Our codes are no longer standardized; that is to say, they are no longer generally accepted by all of us. Where once we took for granted many details in the codes, now we discuss them. A kind of experimentation in new forms of social behavior is going on all about us.

The stimulus and scope of public opinion have changed. First of all, there is an enormous extension of the range of excitation. Urban life produces a wide variety of situations unknown to village life; it is more mobile, more flexible, more complex. Our economic, social, and political

relations have a wider reach. The range of our gossip is greater. Nevertheless we can not in person cover the entire area of interest. We depend on indirect and secondary sources of information and interpretation, and our facts and inferences are changed by the minds of those who bring them to us. The newspaper has long been an important medium of communication. Recently the motion picture and the radio have become important. This means, then, that the sources of news are not the same in the city as in the village, and that the psychological effects are different. Public opinion is of a more inferential, imaginative character than it was in the primary group. Public opinion today is increasingly like crowd behavior and less like that of the more stabilized primary life of the neighborhood and village.

Opinions can not be discussed and spread over wide areas by means of mere face-to-face talk alone. While in the small neighborhood or village, opinion was made by face-to-face gossip and discussion, today it reaches out to secondary groups and is dependent on rapid communication. It is brought to most of us through organized means of expression such as radio stations, newspapers, periodicals, and books. A good deal has been made of the importance of these organs in forming opinion. Yet while they furnish us with the basis of our opinions about things not immediately before us physically, even today public opinion is dependent, in part, on gossip and conversation in a face-to-face manner. In some aspects, therefore, contemporary public opinion is made by non-contiguous secondary groups, but for its completion it requires something of face-to-face relationships.

Gossip and discussion are organizing as well as disorganizing forces in the community and lead ultimately to a form of action. In other words, out of this opinion-making arises a definition of any particular situation. It is in this manner that definitions of situations become a part of the mores and later may even form the basis of our legal regulations.

B. Psychology of Public Opinion.

1. Theories of Public Opinion.—We may well trace very briefly certain theories of public opinion. They will serve as an introduction to our analysis of behavior trends in this collective activity.

The oldest and still most commonly accepted notion rests upon the thesis that man is a rational being whose opinions are formed from cool

and deliberate reason applied to any problem in hand. Ellwood among others holds this view. He says that public opinion is a "more or less rational group judgment" and is to be sharply distinguished from public emotion and sentiment. To be thus rational, Ellwood says further that public opinion must be "formed under conditions of disinterestedness." This view goes back fundamentally to the eighteenth and early nineteenth century doctrine of the rational man. Upon this theory we may predicate a deliberate, sane social control. This dogma has become a stereotype in political circles. Recently a nationally known political speaker referred to the "infallible common sense" of the public to justify their actions in an election.

A second thesis is that public opinion is really minority opinion foisted upon the masses by the wiles of minority leaders. This theory implies that the masses are controlled by the sentiments and emotions of the few, who use popular stereotypes to gain their own concealed ends.

Associated with this view is the notion that public opinion, while not uninfluenced by minorities, arises out of the currents of feeling and emotion about serious problems which run through the various publics. That is to say, opinion develops in crises, but always in terms of attitudes and sentiments largely emotional rather than intellectual. If leaders do anything, they simply crystallize these attitudes and sentiments and restate them in intellectually acceptable formulas. The masses accept these formulas as their own. They seem sound reasons for their beliefs, attitudes, and actions.

There are, then, really two divergent views on the nature and make-up of public opinion. The one view rests upon the thesis of the individualism and rationalism of man, the other upon a more collectivistic theory of behavior and the doctrine that man is guided by his emotional attitudes and sentiments rather than by his cold intellectual considerations. This view definitely challenges the idea that public opinion could ever arise out of "conditions of disinterestedness." Opinion can become widespread only when groups of people are vitally concerned with issues.

2. *Psychological Foundations of Public Opinion.*

a. *Group Life and Public Opinion.*—The non-contiguous group so prominent in the public opinion of today produces a different sort of social interaction than does the crowd or primary group. In the crowd we are

directly under the influence of perceptual stimuli. We hear, see, smell, and touch the reality around us. If we live in a village and hear news about some interesting event, if we wish we may verify the news by going to the place to see and hear for ourselves. The appeal to the individual is direct and personally verifiable. Group opinion here is made by discussion and gossip, and finally a consensus of opinion is precipitated. Sometimes, especially in a crisis, opinion arises out of crowd action and thinking. In the non-contiguous public fostered by modern life this direct and personal contact with events and situations is, for the most part, lost. The bulk of facts are brought to us by the organized gossip of newspapers and periodicals. Much news comes from areas unreachable by the ordinary man. He is removed by distance and time from the actuality of which he reads or hears. He is definitely limited in the amount of personal verification he can make. Interposed between him and the actual event is the mechanism of communication. The area of communication is psychologically one of secondary and tertiary testimony, of imagination and of inference. We have already noted the way in which the testimony of witnesses distorts the observed event or situation. Not only are the various original witnesses unreliable, but further communication of the testimony produces additional distortions. Finally, in the selection and presentation of news, tertiary changes are consciously and unconsciously made. Thus the very material of public opinion is colored by imagination and inference. Furthermore, the reaction of the individual to the public as a group is slightly different from his reaction to the crowd. Here imagination and inference play a larger rôle in the participant himself.

In the contiguous group, whether crowd or not, we have the sense of "we belong," of "we believe." In a kind of collective way we identify ourselves with the group. We have a feeling of direct membership based on perceptual experience. The main object of our thought is the group as a unit. In contrast, the polarization of the individual toward the public is often characterized at the outset by the phrase "I belong." The mass is at the other pole of the relationship. In the one case we see, hear and feel the mass around us and by participation or identification and by social projection we lose ourselves, as it were, in the crowd. In the non-contiguous public we are often much less active. We have to infer the mass. Our ego-centric trends become more dominant because our participation is controlled by inference and imagination. The phrases "I approve," "I am

ridiculed," "I agree with the idea" illustrate the covert verbal expression of much of our participation in the public. Man's relation to his public is more passive than to a crowd and yet, in a sense, more individualistic. Through imagination and inference, largely unconscious, built up by communication and by the existence of common attitudes, ideas, and habits, a feeling of social unity arises, a feeling of universality about our public that produces some of the same sense of participation which we get in the actual crowd. Allport describes this as the "impression of universality." Because we respond in a certain way to a speaker, a news story, a magazine article, we imagine that others are responding in like manner. Because of common personal-social and cultural conditioning, as well as because of common biological structure, our response systems are in fact much like those of others. Furthermore, newspapers help construct this inference by such phrases as "It is said," "It is the common belief," "It is the consensus of opinion here." Moreover the public is, in many respects, an imagined crowd, and much that appears in the organs of public opinion resembles the material which passes current in crowds. Especially is this true in a time of intense crisis. It is this fact which compels us to treat public opinion as a counterpart of crowd phenomena.

b. Opinions and Attitudes.—Opinion is ordinarily defined as judgment, based on grounds insufficient to produce certainty. It is in nature a provisional conviction, a view held as probable. Public opinion, then, is the beliefs of people about things which concern them as members of various primary and secondary groups. The mores and folkways—more specifically questions of honesty, sexual conduct, manners, fads, art standards, philosophies and alleged facts—when really challenged would constitute the field of public opinion. It is at once evident that opinions arise where there is some crisis. As old definitions no longer seem to hold for a particular situation, both discussion and action change. People act outside the accepted code, or they express a disbelief in some idea or form of conduct. In this manner public opinion arises. Consciousness of new behavior trends, awareness that the former codes of conduct do not apply, leads to discussion, to new emotional responses, to gossip and, above all, to differences of belief as to what should be done.

The place of difference of opinion can hardly be over-emphasized. It is sometimes thought that public opinion refers only to the final general consensus of an entire group. This, however, is rather the end-product.

Bryce's treatment of public opinion seems to emphasize this final aspect more particularly. We must always recognize that divergencies as well as agreements are essential to public opinion. We can make this clear by contrasting what Ross calls preponderant opinion with public opinion. Preponderant opinion exists where no questions are raised. For instance, monogamous marriage is generally accepted in the Occidental world. It rests upon preponderant opinion. On the other hand, in America today, such matters as the tariff, war debts, divorce, the Volstead Act, child labor, free verse, censorship of art, the teaching of biological evolution—all are matters of dispute and hence of public opinion. In all these, divergence as well as agreement is significant.

We must also make clear the relation of opinion to attitude. While public opinion rests upon attitudes, opinions are much more superficial than attitudes. As we noted in foregoing chapters, attitudes are fundamental tendencies to act. They are incipient overt responses. Opinion, on the other hand, is much more superficial, much more a verbalization of our attitudes. If we define attitudes as incipient action patterns, we may say that opinions are verbal expressions of these action tendencies. Therefore, in the process of verbalization we are often confronted with the mechanism of rationalization at work.¹

Attitudes, therefore, are not opinions. An individual's own account of his attitude in his opinion; but opinions are after all largely what the psychoanalysts call a "rationalization." They are his explanations and justifications of his attitudes, rather than his actual "tendencies to act."²

Yet opinions are related to attitudes. These verbalizations are indicative of what lies underneath them. In spite of rationalizations, an examination of opinions reveals a rich undersoil of emotional set and feeling which gives rise to the intellectualizations of gossip and discussion. Thus, the myth, the legend, the stereotype, and prejudice which are so heavily loaded with wishes and emotional, dereistic associations are the bases of most

¹ For this reason the measurement of opinion as a reflection of attitude is open to some question, because what a man says he believes or says he will do, may be quite different from his real attitude on the matter or his real action when action is necessary. Cf. L. L. Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1928, vol. XXXIII, pp. 529-54; R. Bain, "An Attitude on Attitude Research," *ibid.*, 1928, vol. XXXIII, pp. 940-57; E. Faris, "Attitudes and Behavior," *ibid.*, 1928, vol. XXXIV, pp. 271-81.

² R. E. Park, "Experience and Race Relations," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 1924: vol. IX, p. 20.

of our opinions. For this reason we doubt if public opinion rests upon the so-called rational faculty; it seems rooted in our deep-laid attitudes and images which have been colored to an amazing degree by our personal-social experience and especially by our culture patterns. Hence, not cool and deliberate attention to the issue marks the development of public opinion, but rather the arousal of old stereotypes, by suggestion through oral and printed gossip. We shall see how this operates in our discussion of propaganda. For the moment an illustration from the presidential campaign of 1928 will suffice. Perhaps not in a generation has the country been so aroused over a presidential election. The opposition to Governor Smith was particularly vigorous in many sections of the country because he was a Roman Catholic and because he advocated a modification of our laws controlling the liquor traffic. A leaflet circulated during the campaign, especially in the Southern States, indicates the appeal made to old myths, legends, and prepossessions of many Protestants in America. The leaflet was a bundle of stereotypes.

HELP WHIP SMITH AND SAVE AMERICA

We now face the *darkest hour* in American history. . . . An uncultured *Papal product* who speaks in the dialect of the slums to function before the world at the head of a supposedly civilized nation. The infamy, the shame, the disgrace of it. . . . It means the *Pope* above the *President*, the Canon Law above the *Constitution*, and the *Papal rag* above the *American Flag*. . . . We face the *conflict*. . . . The happiness of *your children* in coming years and the *protection and salvation of American Institutions* depends on the service you render now. . . . May *Almighty God consecrate* you to this *service*. *Our fathers gave their blood and their lives* to build and save America. . . . *Quick action, hard work*, and serious *sacrifice* will win. . . . His election means the *destruction of American institutions*. . . . We need a million men and women today who will swear with uplifted right hand that with the help of the *God of our Fathers* no dupe of the *pope* shall desecrate the *sacred office* once held by such *patriots* and statesmen as *Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln*. . . . Keep Smith out of the *White House* or *America* is doomed.³

This sort of thing was common during the campaign. Very canny, or fanatical, opponents of Governor Smith circulated millions of these materials, knowing that in the minds of thousands of persons they would arouse old myths, images, and fears of the papal domination of the United States.

³ From *The Rail Splitter*, Milan, Illinois, 1928.

If public opinion is made by cool and calm consideration of issues, we rarely see such deliberation in political elections. In the 1928 campaign other appeals were made: prosperity, protective tariff, retention of homely virtues of the past, etc. It is doubtful if calm and deliberate thought determines opinion in other, non-political publics. Man here as elsewhere seems controlled by deep-set images and emotional conditionings which move him to action in one direction or another. He does not seem to be the rational creature sometimes pictured in the political textbooks of history or civics. Thus the myth of papal domination is as old as the arrival of any considerable number of immigrants who professed the Roman Catholic faith. Certainly by 1820 this set of opinions was expressed in the daily press of the country.⁴ This myth has been kept alive for over a century; and in the latest political campaign it sprang to active life again because Protestants were faced with a possible loss of political control. These deep-laid attitudes found expression in a genuine fear of an alteration in the country's policy and philosophy. These appeals may not be rational, but they are effective. They are the material out of which social reality is constructed for thousands of people all over the land; to deny their efficacy and to doubt their place in public opinion is to be either ignorant or deliberately short-sighted.

c. *A Theory of Public Opinion*.—Perhaps we may now venture a theory of public opinion. We may say that it is formed by verbalized attitudes, beliefs, and convictions, which are essentially emotional, and their associated images and ideas. It is formulated in a crisis when people differ in their definitions of new situations. The amount of rational and scientific discussion in public opinion is small, although in special groups, of course, opinion is occasionally based on fact and logic. But even the public opinion based on fact is usually, in the end, incorporated into the larger schema provided by emotional attitudes. We circulate public opinion first by conversation and gossip, second by various modern organs of communications, especially the newspaper and radio. Undoubtedly in our opinions about subjects not geographically near us, the secondary organs of news and opinion are most essential in furnishing the material for face-to-face discussion and comment. But the newspaper and radio do not entirely create public opinion. Though they arouse our prejudices, myths, and

⁴ Cf. K. Young, "Baiting the Alien, an Old Habit," *Nation*, 1925, vol. CXX, pp. 710-11, Cf. Chapter XIX.

legends, they themselves equally reflect the currents of belief and conviction which are the results of direct social intercommunication. Social interaction in public affairs obviously depends upon both facts and their interpretations. Truly the newspapers and other organs of opinion bring both to us. They influence the direction which our public opinion takes, but they themselves have already been influenced by our common attitudes. In short, public opinion arises when as groups we are faced with issues, when our old frames of behavior are breaking down. Because these ancient patterns are deeply engrained in us, it is impossible for our opinions not to be influenced by our emotional attitudes. Finally, when a consensus of opinion is attained, we may proceed to action as a group.

C. Studies in the Formation of Public Opinion.

Before we close our discussion of the nature and psychology of public opinion we may discuss briefly recent efforts in social psychology to analyze more satisfactorily the formation of, and changes in, public opinion. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses have been attempted; here we can mention only a few examples of each.⁵

1. *Qualitative Studies of Public Opinion.*—Personal opinion is not unrelated to public opinion. When questions of immigration, the treatment of negroes, divorce, war and peace, are being publicly discussed, the changes in our individual attitudes and beliefs make the ultimate change in our more collective opinion. We may mention changes in individual attitudes toward members of other races:

Early in my life, as far back as I have any recollection, I was taught to hate the negro with all the force my childish impulses could muster. To me, all negroes were fiends and intent upon killing me if ever they obtained the opportunity. . . .

This attitude of hatred for the negro I developed purely from environmental influences in my home life. The first words I remember having heard my father tell me were to keep away from negroes, that they would harm me. Whenever my mother wished to instil discipline in me she would threaten that "a big black man would get me" if I didn't behave. . . .

However, as I grew older and began to read here and there about social problems and their relation to the negro I began to have a change of attitude. It did not come suddenly, and even yet my attitude is somewhat influenced by

⁵ The reader is referred to the mass of material collected in W. B. Graves, *Readings in Public Opinion*, 1929, for an idea of the formation of public opinion through various agencies. Cf. also S. A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics*, 1928.

the early training I received. Of course, I soon learned that the sole idea in a negro's mind was not to go about killing people. That attitude changed early. But still, even after that change, I had a tremendous dislike for all negroes.

As I remember it, it was in my second year of high school that first I learned of the narrow ideas that I held of the negro problem. I followed a series of articles that dealt with the situation at length, told how the only solution of the problem was to educate the negro and give him a chance of rising from his low social position. This, of course, proved highly interesting to me because it was the first inkling I ever had that anyone looked with the least possible hope upon the negro. Up to that time he was in my mind a social evil which it would be impossible to get rid of.

It was only through continued reading and study that I saw the folly of my stand and that my attitude was based upon a false valuation of the negro entirely. I learned that if he were given a chance to educate himself he would not be a scourge to the state.⁶

Bogardus gives the following illustration of how our individual observation may alter our opinions of individuals and groups formerly looked upon with disfavor:

Till very recently I held the Jews in much disrespect, partly supported, but in the main without foundation, except as one might consider prejudice and misinformation reasonable grounds for opinion and belief. I had thought of the Jew in the light of current antagonisms. My views were incorrect as touching the part he played in the killing of Christ. . . .

But after personal investigation, and observing Jewish life at close range, I must confess that I am more favorably disposed and more agreeably impressed with them for many reasons.⁷

Elsewhere Bogardus gives an instance of how myths and propaganda affect attitudes and opinions. A student relates:

Several years ago I should have reacted favorably toward the French-Canadian. This would have been due to his connection in my mind with romance and adventure in the early days of our country when the trapper and fur-trader were likely to be of that race. Longfellow with his *Evangeline* helped to strengthen this childhood impression.

But during the war, the papers contained frequent accounts of the refusal of the French in Canada to coöperate with the Canadian government in sending men to fight with the Allies, and their colonies were always represented as

⁶ B. Lasker, *Race Attitudes in Children*, 1929, pp. 40-41. Courtesy of Henry Holt and Company.

⁷ E. S. Bogardus, "Race Friendliness and Social Distance," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 1927, vol. XI, pp. 282-283.

holding Canada back educationally. This picture, repeated frequently, of an unassimilated group has prejudiced my mind against the French-Canadian. . . . Thrilling north-woods movies or the fact that the most attractive pupil I ever had was a French-Canadian do not remove that dislike from my mind.

The World War has been the cause of my change of feeling for the French. I have heard so many reports from those who were in France during the war that have led me to believe that the standard of morality is very low there. Those I have met since the war seem to be so shallow and unreliable.⁸

A more distinctly communal development of public opinion, however, is described in Lindeman's theoretical analysis of the process of community action in some particular crisis. He presents certain typical steps in the process by which a consensus of opinion is built up about community needs—playgrounds, health centers, a chamber of commerce, a bond issue, or what not. The following is an adaptation from and extension of his analysis:

The first step is the *consciousness of need*. Some person or persons express the desire or need for some definite project which touches the community. This need may arise out of an unforeseen crisis; or it may, as Znaniecki has pointed out, actually be a voluntary crisis, as when a community undertakes such a thing as a great national or international fair or some other project not necessarily thrust upon the group by circumstances.

The second step is *spreading the consciousness of the need*. Here leadership and the work of minorities are important. Educational campaigns and the devices of propaganda may be used with success. Church, labor, business or other groups within the larger community may be instrumental in the diffusion of the awareness of the need for change.

The next step is the *projection of consciousness of need* upon the leadership of the community. There may be some friction at this point. Cross-currents of opinion and allegiance come into play. Questions of group and personal prestige may intrude themselves. Meetings, face-to-face discussion, publicity through the press,—all these further this process.

The fourth step is the *rise of the emotional impulse to meet the need quickly*. This seems to arise out of an heightened feeling of the importance of the project. Our growing sense of shame at not hurrying the project through contrasts with our imagined pride in the accomplished act. This emotional solution may actually block more deliberate consideration. In this period, if it arises, there may actually be a shift in leadership. The minority or leader who can capitalize the emotional fervor of the masses is apt to replace the minority and its leaders

⁸ E. S. Bogardus, "Analyzing Changes in Public Opinion," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 1925, vol. IX, pp. 379-80.

who initiated the project. Sometimes people who are over-impressed with the objective aspects of a project ignore the value of the emotional interest. If they do not see their way clear to correlate their more intellectualized approach with the emotional, a split may occur and the project fall through.

The fifth step is the *presentation of other solutions*. If the emotional appeal is not strong enough to put the project over, other solutions may be presented by other leaders and minorities. Sometimes some minorities and leaders become irritated by this, but as a rule, these additional considerations are valuable and lead to a next step.

The sixth phase of the project is the *conflict of solutions*. Here minority groups come into conflict with each other over which direction the project should take. Leadership again comes to the front. One leader may wish to suppress the conflict of solutions, another may welcome it as a necessary and essential step. If a dominant minority wins out at this stage, in spite of compromises, the chances are large that the conflict may re-appear at a later time with the thwarted impulses of the suppressed minority in a heightened emotional state. This sort of thing has happened over and over again. It represents very neatly the likeness of the crowd to the public in much of its behavior. There may be another way out than suppression. There is either scientific study of the problem or a continued open discussion of it.

The seventh stage, then, may be *investigation*. Objective-minded committees are appointed to discover the facts of the situation and to make recommendations. Crime commissions, labor committees, expert groups to study business, etc., are illustrative. When these investigations are completed they may be the basis for further consideration.

The eighth step is the *open discussion of the issue*, either after an investigation or without it. The community mass-meeting is a favorite device to produce this discussion. Many people fear such a gathering because it is so easy in the mass-meeting to turn discussion into emotional orations and to sweep the people off their feet. In any case, leadership of various sorts develops. Doubtless in many cases the emotional crowd-compeller comes into his own in such situations. Certain minorities may so pre-arrange such meetings as to prevent open discussion, or something of democratic give-and-take of opinion may occur. A study of actual situations makes one skeptical of the extent of rationality developed in such assemblages. Lindeman warns us that if rational and democratic discussion is rare in smaller communities, it is hard to hope for the democratic ideal in the larger arena of national and international opinion.

The ninth step is the *integration of solutions*. If the discussion is successful, it may lead ideally to a synthesis of various suggested solutions into a common project. And in the ideal case, the allegiances of various "vital-interest" groups will be conserved so far as possible. The acceptance of the unified program, however, may not satisfy all groups. This depends on the spread of the general attitude favoring tentative solutions and a willingness to coöperate with a project arrived at by such integration.

Often a tenth step follows. There is *compromise on the basis of tentative progress*. Certain groups may relinquish particular elements of their plans in order not to suffer complete defeat. The solution then consists of compromises or accommodations. We may consider such a solution as "tentatively progressive."⁹

Lindeman admits that not all projects arise or work themselves out in this fashion, but he does present something of the manner in which community projects may be carried through. The present writer believes that Lindeman's theoretical analysis is probably still tinged too much with the doctrine of the rational man. (We are reminded of Dewey's five steps in logical reasoning.) Too frequently our tendency is to solve our public problems at stage four, in a flush of emotion. As groups we sometimes reach stage seven; but our easily wearied community interest almost never carries us beyond the fact-finding reports. Many community projects are more definitely carried out by well-organized minorities who use propaganda to gain their ends. A definite improvement in public opinion would be made if we could develop an increased appreciation of the importance of objective examination of needs and projects, and a willingness of our various special groups to integrate their own interests to the larger community values. Whether we can develop so much community intelligence remains to be seen. A discussion of the whole technique of appeals in these projects would force us to consider the place of the school, the theater, of posters and cartoons, of the newspaper, the radio, and the media of our various special interest groups, such as employers' associations, chambers of commerce, labor unions, racial minorities, and so on. Numerous more or less objective studies of the mechanisms of opinion-making are just now under way, but so far we know very little of the processes in detail.

2. *Quantitative Studies of Changes in Public Opinion*.—Statistical analysis of the formation and changes in public opinion is just beginning. These studies will ultimately be of great value in giving us a cross-section of the changes which occur in a time series of events, but they can hardly describe the psychological mechanisms which bring these alterations about. For the present this must be left to other techniques, which may be called, for want of a better term, *historico-genetic*.¹⁰

⁹ Adapted from E. C. Lindeman, *The Community*, 1921, Chapter IX. Courtesy of the Association Press.

¹⁰ The analysis of public opinion does not differ fundamentally in this respect from the study of other social phenomena, or of personality changes. For a discussion of the statis-

When we come to apply the truly experimental method to complex social and personality data, if we ever do, we may secure a more adequate picture of the mechanisms of change, both from the social and from the psychological points of view. For the present we must depend on the cruder but always valuable methods of case analysis. On the other hand, with the increasing precision of statistical methods, we may expect an increasingly large number of quantitative analyses of the formation of and changes in public opinion, as well as of other social-psychological and social phenomena.

One important question in our discussion of public opinion is the influence of the press upon the accuracy of our reporting of events. Bird made a study of the way in which inaccurate newspaper reports may affect our testimony about events we have actually witnessed. We summarize his report:

He presented the results of certain experiments in suggestibility to two large groups of undergraduate students. Descriptive and statistical material were given, but certain scientific cautions were emphasized in interpreting these data. The following day the college newspaper published a summary of his lecture in which he was reported as having made statements which were obviously false. Bird then attempted to see how much influence the newspaper report of his lecture had upon the accuracy of report of the students themselves. Some of the students had read the article in the college paper; others had not. He thus had an opportunity to compare the accuracy of those who heard of the material solely from the lecture with the accuracy of those who heard of it first from the lecture and again from the news story in the campus paper.

"The four questions used are of the determinative order. They are: (1) Who were the subjects in the experiments on hand-rigidity produced by verbal suggestion? (2) What percentage of these subjects was suggestible? (3) How many college students were used in the experiment on the illusion of warmth? (4) Did you read the article which appeared in *The Minnesota Daily* of Tuesday, January 19, 1926, entitled: 'Wearing Leggin's? You're Suggestible, Says Psychologist'? . . . In answer to all questions pertaining to the lecture material the groups of students who have not read the press are more accurate reporters than those who have read the press. There is no exception to this statement. Of the eighteen differences (differences between percentages and P. E. of differ-

tial and the genetic approach to personality, see K. Young, "The Measurement of Personal and Social Traits," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1927, vol. XXI, pp. 92-105, and also in *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1928, vol. XXII, pp. 431-42. Also S. A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics*, 1928, Chapters III, IV and W. I. & D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America*, 1928, Chapter XIII and pertinent sections in G. A. Lundberg, *Social Research*, 1929.

ences in regard to the first three questions in three groups: business administration students, men of the Science, Letters and Arts college, and women of the latter college), six are approximately three times the probable error of the difference and six are approximately four times the probable error of the difference. The conclusion seems justified, therefore, that the factor which differentiated these groups of students is the knowledge of the press article by the less accurate groups. Reading the press article yields these contrasts when certain conditions of stimulation might be expected to keep the differences in report at a minimum—such conditions for example as, the presentation of the data by lecture required a longer time than that by the press, the repetition of facts in the lecture with verbal and written emphasis, and the transcribing of the data in notebooks for review. The data do not indicate what rôle the press exerts in the formation of attitudes nor do they demonstrate the extent to which beliefs are established when the only source of information is the newspaper. . . .

“In summarizing the material . . . We may say that the data presented show that groups of college students who have not been subjected to the errors of a newspaper report are consistently more accurate in their answers to specific questions which deal with the facts distorted than are other groups of college students who have, perhaps unwittingly, formed contradictory habits through the medium of the newspaper. Furthermore, they yield corroboration of other studies upon two points, namely, (1) that reports which involve numerical statements are less accurate than those which are non-quantitative in character (students made the greatest errors in questions two and three) and (2) the differences in report between the sexes are negligible. They also show to what extent a press article can displace information disseminated by the lecture method.”¹¹

Such a study as this indicates some of the problems of the influence of the press on the accuracy of our reports of events which we have actually witnessed. From this and other studies of the accuracy of testimony, it is clear that the secondary and tertiary dissemination of facts, ideas, and interpretations through the press produces greater distortion than occurs after direct personal perception. This confirms our opinion that the media of public communication increase the probability of inaccuracy and falsification in report. Accordingly public opinion can hardly avoid being tinged with fantasy and falsehood.

Rice and Willey made another study of changes in opinion. They attempted to measure the shifts in belief among college students in the doctrine of biological evolution following an address by the late William Jennings Bryan on “Science *versus* Evolution” at Dartmouth College,

¹¹ Summarized and quoted from C. Bird, “The Influence of the Press Upon the Accuracy of Report,” *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1927, vol. XXII, pp. 123-29.

December 8, 1923. These investigators frankly admitted dealing really with "*a group of related variables*" and not with a single factor because they had no way of segregating the effects of pre-lecture publicity, of incidental personal contact with the speaker, of classroom comments by instructors and of the "vigorous interstimulation between and among the students themselves." The following adaptation of their report gives the essential facts:

At the first meeting of their classes following Bryan's lecture, they submitted the following questionnaire:

With reference to the doctrine that man evolved from lower animal forms in harmony with general principles of organic evolution:

1. I *reject* the doctrine completely.
2. While I do not *reject* it completely I do not believe that the evidence favors it.
3. I am undecided whether to reject or to accept it.
4. While I do not *accept* it completely I believe the evidence favors it.
5. I *accept* the doctrine completely.

Only students who had heard Mr. Bryan's talk answered the questionnaire. Of these, 39 were freshman, who had not had the compulsory college course in evolution, and 136 were sophomores, juniors, and seniors. The total number was nearly 10 per cent of the entire student body. The students were asked also to state which of these five statements coincided most nearly with their own beliefs both before and after hearing the lecturer.

From the three upper classes, 70 of the men had accepted without reservation the doctrine of organic evolution. After hearing the lecture this number was reduced to 59. Four men had changed their attitude on Question 4. On Question 3, 8 men who had previously accepted the theory of evolution were drawn into a position of doubt, and 7 of the men were drawn over to a position of non-acceptance. Although small, the freshman group showed, on the whole, a stronger tendency to be swung by the lecture toward Bryan's view. "Partly, it may be presumed, as a result of greater maturity, but in greater part due to their familiarity with the principles of evolution acquired in the compulsory course, the percentage of students accepting the doctrine without qualifications was four times greater in the sample representing the upper classes than in the freshman group. Conversely, the percentage of freshmen rejecting the doctrine completely was between eight and nine times as great as the percentage of upper classmen." In another computation, the investigators compared the actual changes in opinion with the theoretically possible changes. "The views of more than one-quarter of Mr. Bryan's hearers were changed substantially as a result of his discussion. Among the larger of the two groups represented, nearly one-quarter of the men who were not already complete disbelievers in evolutionary doctrine were influenced in the direction which Mr. Bryan intended." In many instances, he did not convert them, they were merely

strengthened in their views. Some men shifted from complete acceptance of evolution to the position of question 4.

In a subsequently more detailed analysis of the conversions and modifications of views in either direction, it was shown that the shift in opinion was in the "direction of Bryan's doctrine, although reversals of opinion are relatively few." A third conclusion, therefore, is that Mr. Bryan's lecture at Dartmouth "served not so much to create converts as to arouse an attitude of skepticism or caution toward the deductions of the classroom. Whether or not this effect was transitory or permanent is, of course, not made evident."¹²

Rice points out that these analyses are purely statistical. By selections from the narratives of various students he tries to throw some light on how the speech affected the students' ideas and feelings. One thing was clear. Many who were already unqualified believers in evolution were reinforced in their convictions by hearing Mr. Bryan. Another interesting fact was the almost universal agreement on the excellence of Mr. Bryan's oratory. There were also good evidences of the ability of the students to distinguish oratory from reasoning and to detect the speciousness in some of the speaker's arguments. Many, while not convinced by Mr. Bryan, said that they felt the need of greater caution in their own views.

Again the striking thing is the fact that shifts in opinion, even of this sort, are not for the most part very great. There were not many out-and-out conversions from one extreme to the other. In view of the intelligence, training, and situation of the students, this is rather to be expected. If even these students had heard Mr. Bryan as members of a revival audience who had in general a cultural heritage of evangelical religion and no particular training in critical thought, he might have swayed them to a complete reversal of position. To repeat: in comparison with attitudes and habits, opinion seems to be superficial, and it appears to change very much in the direction in which these deeper trends of behavior are moving.

The distribution of opinions on public questions has been the subject of some discussion among students of public opinion. This is not the place to enter into the niceties of the controversy. Certain writers, Rice among them, have said that "Individual attitudes are distributed" under the normal probability curve "*apart from some distorting situation.*" Allport and Hartman believe that opinion on questions of public concern distributes itself in skewed, bi-modal, or even multi-modal form. The problem can

¹² Adapted and selected from S. A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics*, 1928, Chapter XVIII. Published by F. S. Crofts & Co.

be finally solved only by further statistical and qualitative analyses. We may, however, mention one thing. If we recognize the differences between attitudes and opinions about public questions, the facts will be more clearly evident. If we are correct in our opinion that differences as well as agreement are a fundamental characteristic of public opinion, then it seems that bi-modal or multi-modal distributions would occur at some phase of the total stretch of time during which the discussion took place. In other words, public opinion implies just these "distorting" situations which Rice would ignore. These questions aside, it is interesting to note a few of the types of distribution discovered by Allport and Hartman in their study of student opinions:

They chose seven current issues of social and political interest. These were the League of Nations, the qualifications of President Coolidge, the distribution of wealth, the legislative control of the Supreme Court, prohibition, the Ku Klux Klan, and graft in politics. Sixty upper-class students were asked to write their views upon them. From this data seven scales were constructed, one for each topic, giving a wide range of opinion. The degree of certainty of opinion on each topic was also requested. Results were secured from about 367 students. The distribution of opinions on prohibition and the distribution of wealth only will be noted here. "The graphic representation of the results for the 'prohibition question' will illustrate both the scale and its use. The steps, which are represented along the base line, begin with the statement that 'the present prohibition amendment and interpretative statute are satisfactory, and enforcement should be made more severe.' This view is represented in column I, at the left; and the number of the subjects accepting it, as shown proportionally by the height of the column, is 56 (15.5 per cent of the group). At the opposite end, column XIII, we have the view that 'the open saloon should be universally permitted.' It has only two adherents (0.6 per cent of the group). The steps to the right of column I represent a progressive decrease in the favor with which the prohibition laws are held. With step 7 we pass over from prohibition to the side of license, steps 7 to 13 indicating, successively, state option, home brewing of wines and beers, government stores of wines and beers, local option, beers and wines in cafes, government stores for all liquors, and the open saloon.

"In a flat-shaped graph [see, for example, Figure 8], there is plotted, beneath each step of the scale, the average certainty felt by the persons who chose the view represented by the step in question. The vertical distance indicates the average certainty in a possible range of from 1 to 5. The seven certainty curves, in general, *rise toward the extremes of the scales*. That is, reactionary and radical, strong 'pro' and rabid 'anti,' are alike in the fact that they feel more certain of their opinions than those who lie at a mid-region of the scale. Since both ex-

tremes cannot be wholly right, certainty and intensity of conviction do not indicate accuracy, but probably a tendency toward emotional bias."

Here it is evident that opinion falls very largely in the bi-modal form, not on the extremes of the scale, but between one extreme and a modificationist position. The degree of certainty also reveals a bi-modal distribution, in this case more particularly between the two extremes.




FIGURE 8.

Showing Distribution of Opinion on Prohibition.
(From Allport and Hartman.)

The differences in opinion regarding the distribution of wealth show a frequency surface which more nearly approaches the normal probability curve. (See figure 9.) At the one extreme were those who thought the present system ideal; a middle conservative group, the mode, represents a conservative position which "recognizes a problem in the present status but opposes government ownership." The positions to the right in the figure represent a more radical position looking to large taxation of wealth, government ownership, confiscation of private fortunes, and abolition of the wage system.

In addition to the determination of opinions, certain personality traits of these students were studied by a self-rating scheme. "A significant result of this study is the indication of fundamental resemblances between the holders of opinions at the two logical extremes of the scale. Radical and reactionary lie upon the same side (rather than a-straddle) of the conservative group in self-rating on emotionality, rapidity, and self-reliance, in overestimation of mental ability, in failure to react when asked concerning their attitude upon the sex relation, in lack of agreement with the conventional moral code, in tendency to differ from what they understand to be the political views of their parents, and in intensity of conviction upon political issues. The profiles made from the attitude study




FIGURE 9.

Showing Differences
in Opinion on Distri-
bution of Wealth.
(From Allport and
Hartman.)

show that they share one another's attitudes on diverse questions more fully than the conservative shares the attitudes of either. The atypical individual, in other words, may be reactionary in some things and radical in others. Instead, therefore, of speaking of radical and reactionary personalities, we should, perhaps, recognize as a more fundamental category the *atypicality* of the individual. What is the psychological nature of atypicality in opinion? We can suggest tentatively that covert emotional conflict as indicated by tests and interviews, may be an important factor.

"There were also, however, differences between individuals taking the reactionary and the radical view. The reactionaries exceed the radicals in self-ratings on self-reliance, in certainty, as shown in the opinion curves, and in lack of insight into their abilities and traits. The attitude studies show them to be more scientifically-minded and more snobbish and cynical than the radicals. The radicals, on the other hand, seem more retiring, more 'tender-minded' and religious, more aware of their own natures, less self-assertive, more moralistic and meliorative, and more sensitive to the opinions of others. There was a greater proportion of women than men in the radical group, while the reverse relation existed for the reactionary group. In some respects this distinction between re-

actionary and radical resembles that made by psychoanalysts between the extrovert and the introvert."¹³

This study reveals certain distributions of opinion about questions of public concern. The divergence of opinion on prohibition into two major groups in contrast to the somewhat more "normal" distribution of opinions about the distribution of wealth apparently arises from the fact that prohibition, after all, is much more definitely a subject of public discussion than is the question of the distribution of wealth. Certainly, the question of the distribution of wealth is not so acute in the minds of our college populations.

In the autumn of 1924, Rice studied the shifts of the presidential preferences of about 350 Dartmouth College men under campaign stimulation. He secured opinions early in October and at election time in November. He also attempted to determine if there was any relationship between attitudes of radicalism, liberalism, or conservatism, and the tendency during the campaign to change preferences for the candidates. The following summary presents his major findings:

The distribution of judgments on the scale from radical to reactionary approached the normal curve in form but with a slight skewing toward the radical end, which Rice thought rather to be expected in a liberal institution such as Dartmouth. A definite correlation was revealed between October first preferences and the students' estimates of their position on the scale of radicalism-reactionism. All of the radical group preferred La Follette on this first ballot, Davis held the middle ground, and Coolidge got most of his support from the conservative liberals, liberal conservatives and reactionary conservatives.

"The changes from October to November reveal a definite 'drift' to Coolidge. Coolidge gained some ground as first choice, and Davis as second, while both Davis and LaFollette lost strength as first choices. Davis was evidently a good compromise candidate, for in first and second choice votes combined, he possessed a plurality. Moreover, he received a majority of the second choice votes of the supporters of both Coolidge and LaFollette."

The net changes of preference, however, were not large. . . . "Among 340

¹³ Adapted and selected from F. H. Allport and D. A. Hartman, "A Technique for the Measurement and Analysis of Public Opinion," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1926, vol. XX, pp. 241-44 printed as vol. XXXII, No. 1, Part II, *American Journal of Sociology*, July 1926. For a more complete account of this work, see Allport and Hartman, "The Measurement and Motivation of Atypical Opinion in a Certain Group," *American Political Science Review*, 1925, vol. XIX, pp. 735-60. Cf. also Rice, *op. cit.*, Chapter VI for discussion of this study.

students, 44 only or 12.9 per cent changed in their first preferences. An additional 34, or 9.9 per cent changed in their second but not in their first preferences. Hence 264 or 77.2 per cent remained unchanged in first, second and third choice."

The relation of the position of the student on the reactionary-radical scale and his tendency to change political preference is shown in the following table:

Table 17: Showing Changes in Political Preferences in Campaign of 1924

		<i>Per cent of total</i>	
	<i>Unchanged</i>	<i>Changed in first preference</i>	<i>Changed in second preference only</i>
Radical liberals	65.6	24.1	10.3
Conservative liberals	76.6	11.7	11.7
Liberal conservatives	80.5	7.6	11.9
Reactionary conservatives	84.6	7.7	7.7

It is clear that stability of preference varied directly with increasing conservatism. The latter term, it must be remembered, is based upon the subjects' own appraisals.

In this particular study, moreover, it is evident that the "conservative was like the standpatter. . . . LaFollette's supporters did not 'stick,' as did those of Davis, nor did the latter's adherents remain as loyal as did those of Coolidge."¹⁴

We must remember that these quantitative studies have been made in college student populations. We do not know whether similar results would be obtained in the general voting population. We may suppose that college students are not any more consistently rational than the common run of citizens would be under similar stimulation. All of these studies have the virtue of being based more or less on actual life situations. Certainly the topics listed by Allport and Hartman were at the time distinctly under public discussion, with the possible exception of the distribution of wealth. In Rice's investigations the situations were actual in every sense of the word. In fact, the college campus was probably more interested in the campaign of 1924 than many other communities were.

These investigations lend support to our fundamental thesis that public opinion arises chiefly out of crises, that it is more superficial than attitudes and habits, and that it is after all only slightly modified by immediate

¹⁴ Adapted and selected from S. A. Rice, "Differential Changes of Political Preference under Campaign Stimulation," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1926, vol. XX, pp. 297-303. Cf. also, Rice, *op. cit.*, Chapter XIX.

stimulation. Unless the crisis is very extreme, our basic attitudes and values shift slowly and even then they can only move in ways permitted by our surrounding values.

It seems abundantly evident that the fundamental motivations for conduct and for opinion are emotional and irrational rather than intellectual. Once we have arrived at definite attitudes and interpretations, the various stimuli of political campaigns, speeches, and the press do not do much to make us more rational. When we change our opinion very radically, we have probably shifted in our deeper, emotionally toned attitudes.

In a survey made just after the presidential campaign of 1924, Meier secured statements of the motives which people give for their voting. He got returns from 1,088 persons. Of these, 875 were university students, "mostly upper-classmen of voting age or thereabouts" from a middle Western university. The balance were from occupational groups in large cities in four neighboring states.

The successful campaign was the one which dealt least with rational motives and most with simple appeals directed toward the arousal of specific instinctive, emotional, and habit pattern-responses. This fact holds as well for university upperclassmen as for occupation groups.

The appeals employed by the successful party were almost without exception readily classifiable into definite psychological categories, whereas those used by the defeated parties were mostly rational, mixed, or undetermined motives not designed apparently to call out any specific response. . . .

The motive for voting assigned by the largest number of voters was that the successful candidate was believed safe, sane, and secure, while the others were considered "uncertain quantities." In contrast is the fact that one of these uncertain quantities had been pronounced by competent judges to have been the best-qualified man personally for the office, and the other, while maligned and no doubt often misunderstood, still nevertheless has a long and enviable record for social legislation, which appears to be greater than any other person's in Congress.

The second most important reason given by those who voted for the successful candidate was that he (the President) was saving their money in the way of an economy program (bonus, postal salaries, pension vetoes) and tax reduction. This was accorded a prominent place despite the alleged waste of the administration through the oil leases, Veterans' Bureau corruption, and huge naval expenditures of doubtful value.

The results show that such appeals to instinctive, emotional, and habit pattern-responses occupy the attention of the voter to the exclusion of more practical considerations and with such force that counter-appeals based on logi-

cal premises and unscientifically presented have little or minor significance.

The number of individuals voting in accordance with life-long or traditional party inclination is less than expectation. In the case of Republican returns, the constant party-affiliation factor stands in fifteenth place; in Democratic, fifteenth also, though belief in economic program of former stands higher.

Sex differences appear to be inconsiderable. In the case of men the first three reasons in point of frequency are *safety, economy, ability*. For women they are *economy, safety, ability*. In the case of the most important reason they are for men—*safety, ability, best economic principles*; for women—*ability, safety, best economic principles*.¹⁵

Here again we find corroboration of our view that man is motivated by his emotional, irrational attitudes. The fundamental values rest upon emotional conditioning rather than upon intellectualized ideas; and in the face of a threatened crisis, man is moved by the former more often than by the latter. As we know, frequently the intellectual processes are employed in concocting rationalizations rather than in the primary determination of conduct.

D. Leadership and Public Opinion.

Leadership and the formation of public opinion present at once the problem which we have already discussed of the relationship of the masses to the leaders. Much that we said before applies here. Munro among others holds that public opinion is largely made by a minority of leaders who project their beliefs and convictions on their followers. He remarks that public opinion is not a "spontaneous emanation from the mind of the multitude" but that it is "in very large measure, the handiwork of the few." And yet we can hardly imagine that any beliefs or convictions can be thrust upon the masses that do not harmonize with their fundamental feelings and emotions—their attitudes and sentiments. As we shall see in our discussion of propaganda, we can arouse public opinion on all sorts of questions by manipulating the sources of public information and interpretation, but even propaganda can not make public opinion about something entirely foreign to the masses.

What actually happens therefore is not the creation *de novo* of public opinion by the Few or the élite. Rather, they first of all set the pace for others in certain directions of opinions. Second, they crystallize the vague

¹⁵ N. C. Meier, "Motives in Voting: A Study in Public Opinion," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1925, vol. XXI, pp. 210, 211, 212.

but none the less deep-laid feelings of the masses. They make mass attitudes explicit in verbal form, and arouse intellectual assent to subjects about which the masses have already generated feelings and emotions. Finally, by clever manipulation of facts and interpretations, they may enhance and emphasize some particular set of public attitudes and inhibit and negate others. A familiar device of the political speech is to appeal to popular fears so effectively that awkward issues of the campaign may be ignored. In 1924 when Democratic and Progressive leaders were vigorously attacking the oil scandals of the Harding administration, the Coolidge managers were talking of "Coolidge prosperity." They thus provoked a popular fear of bankruptcy and aroused the whole set of popular attitudes involving our desire for security and a continuation of the *status quo*. This is a favorite trick of politicians the world over. It is always effective. Yet because public opinion is thus aroused, it does not follow that the opinion is created by leaders or minorities. Rather, it is the outcome of the stimulation of certain deep-set attitudes to the exclusion of others. Especially it is true that the arousal of fear for our individual economic well-being touches our attitudes and action patterns more decidedly than our indignation at the sight of the government being robbed of a few millions in oil lands. We can not feel the results of the robbery directly at the time. We do, however, get a very real sense of impending disaster when we hear remarks about the empty dinner pail, the closed factory, and a universal reduction in the standard of living. The same thing applies to our inertia and our refusal to be interested in the foreign policy of the country. Senator Borah's appeal to the old Americanisms of isolation, self-determination, and freedom from foreign entanglements—a stereotype of Washington's phrase—is much more effective than the intellectualized appeal for international arbitration and concern with European economic and political problems. In brief, the leaders and their minorities are effective because they direct the currents of popular opinion by crystallizing vague attitudes and feelings, and especially by appealing, in phrases made of old and familiar stereotypes and legends, to our deep-laid desires for security.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter XXV, pp. 722-53.

B. Questions and Exercises.

1. Discuss questions and exercises from assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter XXV, pp. 753-54.
2. How has the making of public opinion altered with the shift from primary to secondary group interest?
3. Criticize the various theories of public opinion.
4. How may changes in opinion finally lead to changes in attitudes and habits? Illustrate from personal experience.
5. What are the current issues in our society around which public opinion tends to develop?

C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.

1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter XXV, p. 754.
2. Review Graves, *Readings in Public Opinion*, Chapter II, papers 1, 2, 3 the rôle of discussion in making opinion.

CHAPTER XXV

THE ORGANS OF PUBLIC OPINION

We shall now examine the various organs of public opinion in modern complex society. Naturally we shall concern ourselves largely with the present-day newspaper; but we must mention other products of the press, the motion picture, and the radio.

A. *The Newspaper.*

As we have seen, the source of news and interpretations has shifted from the gossip and conversation of the primary village group to that of the metropolitan and international area. This shift has been accompanied by the growth of the modern newspaper and other media of information and opinion.

1. *The Nature of News.*—News is not merely printed reports of events. It implies communication. Before they become news in any socio-psychological sense, the reports must have readers. News, then, is really a form of social interaction and is not merely printed matter of a special kind. Journalists start on this assumption. Johnson defines news as follows: “News is anything *selected for treatment by a newspaper that is so treated that it interests a number of persons.*”¹ The selection of material is as important as the interest of readers. Yet this element of interest is fundamental to our understanding of the nature of news. It implies our attention to something out of the ordinary, something related to crises, large or small, to things which appeal to us personally in terms of our social and cultural apperceptions. Thus Ivy Lee comments:

News is that which is interesting to the public today. That does not necessarily mean that it is an event that happened today; the event might have happened a thousand years ago; but if it is *interesting* to the people who read it today, it is news.²

¹ G. W. Johnson, *What Is News?* 1926, p. 49. Published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

² Ivy Lee, *Publicity, Some Things It Is and Is Not*, 1925, p. 12-13. Courtesy of Industries Publishing Company.

News in this sense has existed wherever and whenever men turned their attention to events, situations, or personalities, and whenever their responses to these have been communicated to others of their group or even to strangers. Much myth- and legend-making doubtless began with the narration of events, impressions, and interpretations. The history of the newspaper itself reflects this. In order to get a picture of the cultural setting of the most important single organ of public opinion, we may sketch briefly the story of the newspaper.

2. *The History of the Newspaper*.—In both Greece and Rome placards were posted in public places to announce events, public meetings, and so on. About 40 B.C. Julius Caesar established in Rome the *Acta Diurna* ("Daily Events") which lasted until 309 A.D. They contained short announcements of games, fires, and religious rites, and the official reports of battles made by specially appointed officials. They were posted in conspicuous places, and kept as public records.³ Aside from these semi-official organs, there were perhaps even privately circulated bulletins or newspapers in Rome, at least in the time of Juvenal.

During the Middle Ages the church dispensed official news. Individuals occasionally posted up their reactions to contemporary events for common gaze, as did Aretino when he made public his vilifications of the Popes. Such cases merely show that earlier societies had some formalized method of dispensing news. With the rise of cities, universities, and guilds, certain types of news were circulated through various classes. Then increased mobility widened people's interests, and special newsmongers came into being. For a long time other agencies than true newspapers were principally employed to circulate news. About 1652 the coffee houses of London began to be important sources of news. Each house catered to certain professional groups—literary, medical, and political. These resorts became so important in the formation and crystallization of public opinion that in 1676 the Earl of Danby attempted to suppress the circulation of news in the coffee houses. Throughout the period also the poster, the circular, and the handbill were employed.

As printing became more common, the whole question of its control became a factor in the matter of public interest in current affairs. The Tudors in England, for instance, controlled printing as a royal monopoly

³ So, too, in China, the *Peking Gazette* contained official decrees and official news. It first appeared in the Tang dynasty in the seventh century and has continued down to the present.

and made grants to certain printers only. During the reign of Elizabeth numerous ordinances were passed in an effort to control unlicensed printing. But in all this the problem was to control not the printing of news, but the expression of opinion. Milton's *Areopagitica* was really a defense of freedom to express one's opinion, not of freedom to print news, in our present-day sense.

The evolution of the newspaper was gradual. The invention of printing was of course an important step. The newspaper arose from the pamphlet of opinion, from the verbal newsmonger, and especially from the privately circulated news letters which were sent out regularly by correspondents to their clients outside of London. In the 16th century various kinds of pamphlets containing news circulated in Holland and Germany. In 1566 the *Notizie Schritte* was established in Venice. The first newspaper in our present sense was perhaps the *Frankfurter Journal*, a weekly paper started by Egenolph Emmel in 1615. Antwerp had a similar newspaper the year following. In 1622 the *Weekly News* was founded in London, by Archer and Bourne. As following the Revolution the government of England shifted from the Crown to Parliament, Parliament naturally assumed the right to control the printing of news. In 1702 the first successful daily was established in London. Although the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are filled with controversy over freedom of newspapers and printed opinions generally, and though stamp taxes of various sorts were an effective means of retarding the growth of a free press, there was a gradual growth toward the present-day newspaper. Despite imprisonment, fines, and other means of control the British press finally attained to some degree of freedom. The reign of George III, especially, was marked by attempts to restrain the press. John Wilkes, in fact, is a kind of British martyr to the freedom of the press. On the continent the newspaper in the American or British sense is largely the product of the last century.

In America the earliest newspaper was the *Boston News-Letter* (1704). *The New Hampshire Gazette* (1756) is the oldest living newspaper. Throughout early American history the newspapers were much like those of England; that is to say, newspapers represented various political or other special-interest groups. In 1831 Garrison founded his *Liberator*, the medium of much of the abolitionist propaganda. In 1833 Benjamin Day began to publish the *New York Sun*, to be sold for a penny a copy. This was the first attempt at a genuinely popular newspaper. He supported no

political party and wished his journal to provide only news. In 1835 James Gordon Bennett founded the *New York Herald*. He followed Day's lead and sold his papers for a penny a copy. He violated all of the then established principles of journalism. He secured news wherever he could find it—on Wall Street, in criminal courts, off ships arriving from abroad, from the Mexican War, and elsewhere. He established the Pony Express to the Pacific Coast, and made extensive use of the telegraph as soon as it was commercially available. Altogether he had a profound effect upon the technique and theory of American newspaper journalism. Yet throughout the last century there was much of what is called "personal" journalism in which certain leaders dominated their newspapers in the interest of particular principles. Such papers as the *New York Tribune* of Horace Greeley exerted great political influence for a long time.

Individual influence in journalism was not to last. In the latter part of the nineteenth century began the so-called "yellow" journalism. William Randolph Hearst in the '90's, first on the Pacific Coast, and later in New York, published newspapers which appealed directly to the literate masses with striking headlines and cartoons, and with sensational news that constantly played upon the most primitive mass prejudices. His influence has been steady and always the same. Today even the more conservative press has adopted many of his methods. The *tabloid* with its sensationalism, its pictures, and its appeal to the most rudimentary interests and emotions is the latest thing in American journalism.

As modern life has become more mobile and more complex, as our range of interest or stimulation has extended, the newspaper has for millions of people become the medium of gossip and news about remote events and situations and about personalities whom they never know directly but in whom they are interested. Then, too, the newspaper has become a corporate business conducted to bring profits to stockholders. In truth, a newspaper can be understood only as a business enterprise. To consider it as a personal journal providing its readers with elevating moral interpretations of contemporary life is to misconceive its development and its present place in our society. The pamphlet, the journals of opinion, and other organs may continue to furnish this sort of matter to their respective publics, but for the most part the present American newspaper has passed from a personal to an impersonal basis. Sometimes, as in the support given to particular presidential candidates, something remains of personal

journalism. Even then this support does not prevent the genuine news sections of the paper from presenting relatively unbiased news of other candidates. In some rural newspapers the sense of personal editorial responsibility persists. Still, in most of its general news, in many of the editorials, in the material on fashions, the comic strips, and the stories, the rural press is even more standardized than are the metropolitan papers.

B. *The Organization of News.*

We may now look at the contemporary newspaper to see how its make-up and nature reflect the social organization of our society. If the newspaper is no longer an agency of moral uplift and an interpreter of life, we ought to consider realistically the nature of the present newspaper. In order to understand the psychology of the newspaper, we must review its relationship to the social order.

The appeal of the newspaper can not be separated from the attitude of the paper toward its public. The stimuli in the newspaper are first, the printed word, and second, the picture. In place of the voice and the direct visual stimulation which we have in the crowd, the newspaper arouses our interest through the printed word and lately by illustrations. Just what the differences between the spoken and the printed word are emotionally, and in the realm of association, we do not know. It is evident from the make-up of newspapers that the printed words used are those of distinctly stereotyped sort. The stereotypes of the front page materials, particularly, have an emotional connotation, vague perhaps, but nevertheless significant. The very intellectual vagueness itself is a virtue, for it leaves each reader to interpret the meaning in terms of his own "emotional logic" rather than in terms of the specific meaning carried in closely delimited intellectual concepts. Short, commonly-known words, carrying much emotional freight, are most employed in the sensational news of the day. The appeal of other sections of the paper may be of a very different kind. We must consider together, then, the arrangement of the newspaper and the appeal to the reader, because the one can not be understood without the other.

1. *The Newspaper Reflects Human Interests and Behavior.*—The modern newspaper is designed to interest all types of publics. Its appeals include the unusual, sensational sort which affect most of us, and the special interest groups of sport, business, or polite society. Its clientele is

varied and full of the individual differences of a complex social life and social stratification. The newspaper reflects, for the most part, these diversities.

First of all, the newspaper is organized around current gossip of the more unusual sort. This we call "front page" news. It is sensational. It deals with moral, political, and economic crises, with disasters and conflicts, and finally with personalities. There are other sections of current gossip, such as the sports section. This section includes statistical materials such as baseball scores and averages and a good deal of "human interest" material on personalities. There is a section devoted to business. Another division describes contemporary events in polite society. Another presents the editorials. Then, there are literary, dramatic, and musical columns, and always something about religious activities. A large number of papers have special material on the automobile and the radio. Finally there are the advertisements—the large displays of the retail and wholesale merchants, those of amusements, and the classified advertisement section.

Each of these sections attracts a certain public. Each public has its own universe of discourse, its own vocabulary and set of stereotypes. Some of these vocabularies are those of common, every-day speech. The vocabularies of sports and of stock market reports are usually very special. Thus in its make-up the newspaper is just as heterogeneous as is the social world in which it exists.

a. *The Front Page*.—The front page contains the emotionally appealing news of the day. Although the most ephemeral, it is the most immediately enticing part of the paper. In a sense, the front page material is like the ballyhoo man of a circus who attempts by his shouting to get people into the tent. As noted above, it deals with the more distinct crises: conflict, disaster, rare events and dominant personalities related to these. Conflicts may be incidents of industrial, political, legal, religious, or other social struggles. Under disaster we include catastrophes of nature, homicide, suicide, accidents, and so on. The unusual or "rare" news is usually a story of the strong, the old, the successful. It may be the report of the man who looped the loop 515 times and set a record, or of the man who went over Niagara Falls in a rubber ball. Personalities of public interest are people prominent in political, economic, religious or other circles, who are often related to the conflict situations or who otherwise give rise to human interest stories. The presence in a city of a famous woman evangelist, Edi-

son's birthday celebration, the death of a prominent political leader, are obvious illustrations. The following table is a summary of the column inches devoted to these four types of appeal in four newspapers for March 15, 1928:

Table 18: Giving Front Page News in Four Newspapers on the Same Day ⁴

<i>Newspaper</i>	<i>Column Inches in Various Classes of News</i>			
	<i>Disaster</i>	<i>Conflict</i>	<i>"Rare"</i>	<i>Personalities</i>
<i>Capital Times</i> (Madison)		96½	4	52½
<i>Chicago Daily News</i>	28	30¾		56½
<i>Journal of Commerce</i> (Chicago)	8½	48¼	21	8½
<i>New York Times</i>	50½	60½	2½	45½

These figures show marked divergencies in the sort of material which appears on the front page of various newspapers. Some give more attention to certain things than others. This is partly due to differences in locality. Two of these papers are metropolitan dailies, one is a rather specialized type of organ, and the fourth is distinctly of more local character. An examination of two labor dailies, one from Duluth, one from Washington, D. C., of two days later, showed that all of the front page material was given over to conflict. Since labor organs represent a special-interest group which is particularly concerned with conflict situations, this fact is not surprising. As we shall see, all newspapers select their news, and the editorial selection is naturally determined with reference to the editor's judgment of what will sell the newspaper.

Some front page news is "spot" news; that is, it must be timely. Reports of disasters and conflicts are "spot" news. They can not wait, as their value deteriorates rapidly with lapse of time. Hence the importance of the "scoops" which the various papers attempt to secure in their reports of disastrous conflicts. To be the first with the news is to catch the public interest. Sales are increased, and with them, profits and prestige. "Rare" and personality stories can often wait, and may be used for fill-ups when other front page news is scanty.

The appeal of the front page is the appeal of any crisis to the man on the street. Murders, divorces, robberies, graft, floods, fires, religious and political quarrels—and, most exciting of all, war—these are the situations in

⁴ I am indebted to Mr. Lowry Nelson for the compilation of these figures.

which man is always interested in preference to more intellectual and perhaps more institutionalized phases of his behavior. The prepotent tendencies in man: hunger, sex, rage, fear, and those basic habit patterns built around his ego—desire for new experience, desire for security, desire for power and prestige, desire to get something for nothing, and so on—these account for our interest in reports of disaster, conflict, the unusual and noteworthy personalities. Our vicarious satisfactions in tales of adventure, the fantasies which we satisfy by participating, in imagination, with the heroes who fly the Atlantic, who conquer the frozen South, who win football games, or who rescue dying women and children—all this we must remember in order to understand the psychology of the front page story. We should all like to be heroes or heroines, to take part in stirring adventures, to witness marvelous events; yet we also like to feel secure and safe from dangers. Hence in reading of disasters we have a sense of emotional participation in danger and still retain the sense of security and orderliness of things about us at home. We have an adventure with no trouble and inconvenience. Through our imaginary participation we get something for nothing; we get emotional thrill and excitement without any actual danger. In our feeling of present security we may even have a sense of superiority associated with it all. To say it more abstractly, our ambivalent emotional trends are integrated into a complete act. We are secure, safe, and comfortable, and yet we are also, in our mind's eye, in the land of new adventure.

The make-up of the front page story itself reveals some basic psychological factors. The headline is obviously arranged to catch the reader's attention. The very limitation of space makes it necessary to use short but powerful words. The sensational features of the incident are thus put in the foreground. The banner headline, running across the entire eight columns of the ordinary paper, gives us a clue to what the newspaper force considers the predominantly attention-getting story of the day. The minor heads bring out other features of the story, while the still smaller ones give some notion of the continuity of the account to follow. The story itself is a narrative interspersed with pertinent descriptive matter. The center of the presentation, however, is a narration of the event. Often the story is repeated two or three times, first in a brief, snappy summary, followed by more details in the second part, and finally in considerable detail in the

third part. Thus, one reader may see only the headlines, another may glance over the first paragraph and pass on to the next story. Others may read the complete account. The essential thing the report does is to focus our attention through the headline and then carry us into the heart of the incident by a striking description.

The narrative form is important psychologically because it fits perfectly into the psychology of legend- and myth-making which we have already discussed. American newspapers, at least, replace the face-to-face narration of events and gossip of the primary group. Nevertheless their technique is much the same. As the wandering teller of fabulous tales told of wars, disasters, and foreign places to open-mouthed listeners in the Middle Ages or even in the last two or three centuries, so, now, the newspaper performs much the same function for millions of readers. These stories become the foundation of modern mythology and legend. They thus function in the creation of the world of social reality in which their readers live. Curiously, just as centuries ago the credulity of the listeners was not disturbed by critical attitudes, so today the reverence for the printed word prevents most people from doubting the story as it is set before them in the newspaper. In the age of almost universal education the rationalistic critic of society is often amazed that the masses follow so blindly what they read. The critic forgets that what the reader has before him fits into the fantasy world and the social reality in which he has been brought up from childhood. Learning the three R's and a smattering of history, geography, and science in school does not free us from these basic patterns of behavior. It only extends the range of stimulation by bringing us into contact with the wider world outside our immediate circle of action.

An examination of the vocabulary of front page news will further confirm the nature of the appeals made by the press. Printed speech reactions are, like spoken ones, indicative of the reality in which we live. The subject matter of the front page demands that the words and phrases should be powerful, inflammatory, and suggestive of strongly emotional associations. The following lists were made up from front-page stories of two papers of approximately the same publication date and dealing with much the same news. The first is from a paper in a city of 50,000; the other from a metropolitan daily with nearly a million circulation. The figures after some words indicate the number of times the word was used:

From a Newspaper in town of 50,000 for March 2, 1928

Disaster Stories

disaster (3)	terror-stricken	penitentiary (2)	big
ruins (2)	catastrophe	fatally	crowded
bodies (4)	crumbled	capture	missing
death (2)	hanging	prisoner	thrown
victims	shooting	escape	hurt
threatens	suicide	accident	hospital
dead (4)	revolver	buried	serious
wrecked (2)	overtaxed	avalanche (2)	collision
wreckage	precarious	casualties	killed (3)
stricken	emergency (3)	yawned	seriously
crashing	hopelessly	wounded	detective
crushed (2)	slayer	crazed	shot (3)
weeping	search		

Conflict Stories

wins (3)	courts (10)	defend	charge
tilt	orders	investigation	indictment
fight (2)	contention	testimony	crooked
controversy	injunction	inquiry	speed (3)
title	decision	perjury	record
withdrew (2)	enjoin	picketing	retaliation
patented	obligation	engagement	appeal
entry	election (4)	campaign (2)	statute
candidates (4)	electors	lost	foreclosure (2)
elected	law	attack (2)	victorious
platforms	booze	regulating	petitioning
issues	reconcile (4)	imposes (2)	delinquent (3)
strikers	prohibition	jurisdiction	suit (2)
ticket	oppose	block	receiver (2)
strike			

From a Metropolitan daily for March 13, 1928:

Three Disaster Stories

death (5)	hurt	destruction	alarm
deadly	fracture	crash	shouted
mysterious	hospital	horrified	cry
strychnine (4)	feeble	disappeared	dazed
will (3)	killed (2)	trace (2)	rush
estate	crashes	raged	vain
coroner	tragically	disaster	leap

Four Conflict Stories

victorious	inquiry	dictatorship	victory
team	question	unearthed	scored
speed	deficit	competitive	responsibility
record (4)	disclosures	unfeeling	trust buster
attack	refused	remorseless	strikebreakers
triumph	deny	conspiracy	detective
investigation	denounced	crushing	treason
exceed			

Three Stories of the Rare or Unusual

largest
finest
strange
cheapest
highest

The following list gives some of the more or less stereotyped phrases appearing in all of these stories:

new and mysterious	desperate shorts
investigation of accounts	tidal proportions
senate inquiry	waves of buying
discovery of the fund	bewildered traders
sensational disclosures	excited cries
scandal to be disclosed	badly trapped
refused to name	sensational losses
mystery witnesses	suffered serious reverses
severely attacked	frenzied scene
deny publicity	boiled and bubbled
severe grilling	bedlam
crooked deal	puzzled traders
leading sensation	gambling spirit
carnival of buying	civic cleansing
new record for all time	aroused voter
wildest schemes	whole country awaits
shouts and groans	moral menace

A good many of these phrases occurred in the day's stories of violent buying and selling on the New York Stock Exchange, important news at the moment.

The following selection from the so-called human interest story of the

flood disaster in the Little Santa Clara Valley near Newhall, California, indicates the sort of narrative which catches the reader's attention by striking and colorful language:

HEROES MARK TRAIL OF FLOOD DISASTER

Ed Locke saves 47 lives, then loses his own; pathetic stories told.

Newhall, Cal. March 14 (A.P.)—A sixty-five mile slash through the very heart of a beautiful valley!

Two Associated Press reporters followed that still bleeding wound from the spot where the torrent spewed its brownish flood to sully the white surf of the sea. Thence to where the water giant burst from its narrow canyon lair, exulting in its first gulp of human lives.

They twice staggered and stumbled through the rushing waters of the Little Santa Clara river, red with mud and rainbow tinted with oil. They rode the highway patches, walked and ran through the heavy

mud; they stalked through the slippery slime.

All for a prize more precious than a pot of gold. For they found that men could chuckle at their own deeds of valor and women could carry on dry-eyed, although hearts were breaking. They heard the sagas of a dozen heroes.

And the greatest of these was that of Ed Locke.

Tells of Locke's Heroism

Guard of the Southern California Edison Company construction camp at Blue Bend, Ed Locke, saved the lives of at least forty-seven men and died with his boots on and his belt and gun about his waist. . . .

In short, the front page cuts across all social classes to appeal to the most fundamental and universal features of human personality—the patterns of man's behavior in hunger, sex, rage, and fear. These have ever been the source of man's legends, the delight both of the teller of tales and of his listeners. The deep satisfaction which men secure from such news is simply another reflection of the fact that their worlds are colored by emotional patterns. As in the primary village group, so in the great metropolitan centers of population, men are still moved to the depths by stories of disaster, conflict, the unusual or strange and the narrative of contemporary heroes and their deeds. To say that this function has passed to the newspaper is merely to say that our range of stimulation has so spread that we need these media to keep us conscious of crises in the world about us—a world no longer limited to the arena of our face-to-face contacts, but by the reaches of rapid communication, reflecting the wide extent of all our interests.

An interesting recent development of front page appeal is the increasing use of illustrations to supplement the current news stories. Disasters, conflicts, unusual events, prominent personalities, and the like are freely presented. In fact, the tabloids make very extensive use of illustrations and

the practice is growing in all urban newspapers. Even the rural press is using syndicate picture material in large quantities.

b. *Sports Section*.—In America the news of sports, next to the front page, probably has the most universal interest. It has a very intense appeal to certain classes of readers. In general, the sports section is separated into reports of athletic events, and “dope” stories on approaching events,—discussions of personalities, horses, automobiles, and so on. Finally there is what we may call editorial comment on the current athletic situations. There is a wide range of material in this section. As professional and amateur athletics assume greater place in our society, there is a never-ending procession of sporting events chronicled in the daily press. Though the majority of readers are men, women are reading sporting sections more and more.

The sports material is filled with the element of conflict. Although it is recreational, it nevertheless takes on the characteristics of conflict narratives. In this respect its appeal is like that of the front page. Athletics, in fact, is a kind of make-believe war. Such terms as “opposing camp,” “hostilities,” “defense,” “victorious,” give a clue to the militant features of these activities. The language is colorful and racy. Slang is permitted as it is in the actual speech of athletics and managers. The associations of the language employed are largely emotional and arouse attitudes of opposition toward some teams, cities, or groups and sympathy for others. Sport is so highly organized in this country that our allegiance to both amateur and professional teams of our cities makes the play war all the more real. The techniques of war propaganda are employed. Local papers do not hesitate to color the sports articles with their own bias and wishes. Before college contests, publicity departments wage newspaper battles in their “dope” stories. They attempt to increase the confidence of their own teams and student bodies and to undermine that of their opponents. The condition of the players, the strategy of attack, the preparation for the forthcoming “battles”—all these things are described to enhance the morale of their own group and destroy that of the opponents. In professional sports, such as prize-fighting, the sports directors attempt to provide newspapers with stories which will arouse public interest and thus increase the gate receipts. Cities often compete with each other for a great fight. A good deal of civic pride is developed in the process, at least among that part of the public which is interested in the fight,

As in the case of the front page, the make-up of the sports page is correlated with the type of appeal. Pictures, personalities, and "inside dope" are presented. But unlike the front page stories and more like the business-industrial and society stories, sports stories are written in a special vernacular. The casual reader unfamiliar with the sports vocabulary would have difficulty in understanding it. This description of a baseball game is typical:

PHILLIES VANQUISH ATHLETICS

Winter Haven, Fla., March 10—The Philadelphia Nationals defeated their old rivals the Athletics, 5 to 2, . . . [They] will resume hostilities in Philadelphia, March 31.

The Phils won by consistent hitting. Cy Williams had two hits in two trips to the plate. Al Simmins, for the Athletics, got a triple, a single, and a long sacrifice fly.

The vernacular of baseball, which is meaningless to the uninitiated, is illustrated in the following words and phrases:

single	picked off his shoestring	A B; H; E.
double	warming up	errors
triple	plate	grounder
sacrifice fly	box	spit ball
hit and run	knocked out of the box	hole in the bat
home run	south paw	found for a hit
double play	assists	shut out

In football, similarly, a special set of terms is used in the sports stories. They almost constitute a technical vocabulary. Such are:

kick off	mass formation	end run
line buck	clipping from behind	punt
forward pass	open plays	touchback
thrown for a loss	shift	safety
	lateral pass	

In racing there also is a special vocabulary. Following is a racing report taken at random from the daily press:

New Orleans, La., March 16 (Special)—Long shots were marching past the finish line one after another at Jefferson Park this afternoon. . . .

The parade of longshots started in the first race, when Royal Ruby, ridden by

Jocky Bowden, showed her heels to a band of 2 year old maiden fillies. Her price in the mutuels was \$72.60.

Transfer, paying \$46.60, with Leonard in the saddle, got up in the last strides and beat Fire Dog in the fourth race. Then along came Sister Zoe at \$56.80 for two to win in the six furlong sixth event. . . .

In the same way prize-fighting, basketball, la crosse, polo, tennis, golf, and all other sports have highly specialized vocabularies, known and enjoyed by the various devotees. As in all vocabularies, particularly in technical ones, a kind of mysticism surrounds the words. To the initiates, the vocabulary is sacred. Only scorn and ridicule are given the ignorant person who misuses the vernacular, or worse than this, who attempts to describe in ordinary phrases what he sees and hears. He exposes his lack of understanding; he shows himself to be an outsider, not one of the in-group of sports, just as by his faulty pronunciation, the barbarian betrayed himself to the true Greek.

Some material of the sports section, such as the scores of games, is highly objective; yet much is emotionally toned to interest the readers so that they will attend the games. Thus the sports section is a stimulus to the formation of audiences at athletic contests. However, numerous people get a vicarious satisfaction from merely reading about sporting events. These persons are something like those who are thrilled by the front page dispatches of adventure, tragedy, and conflict in the world at large, but who avoid these situations in actuality whenever they can.

The sports section of the newspaper is related to adult play-life. The play of an adult is much more dissociated from the balance of his life than is the child's, and the specialization of recreation shows this separation. Sport, like business or industry, is a technical, specialized affair. It is recreative, but it is also a phase of the general division of labor. This is particularly true of professional athletics, but it is becoming largely true of amateur sports as well.

c. *Business Section*.—The business and industrial sections of newspapers represent an even greater specialization of content and reader interest than do the pages given to sports. The business-industrial material does not reach the wide group that the sports columns do. It appeals almost exclusively to the possessors of capital, large or small. It has a vocational, not a recreational, appeal. The market reports which comprise the bulk of the section largely reflect the competition of our various industrial

groups. We find the prices and sales of the hundreds of industrial and commercial stocks and bonds; reports of the movements of agricultural and industrial commodities; shipping news; and so on. The significance of these prices and movements is analyzed by special writers and described editorially. Statistics of production, past and present, statistics of money prices, and other objective data find a place in this section.

Again the differences in appeal and purpose are reflected in differences in style, make-up, and vocabulary. There is a characteristic manner of presentation, very different from that of the sports page. This is no play world; this is the world of huge economic activities and it is correspondingly serious. The style of financial pages is usually conventionalized. It seems to reflect a man who is dispassionate and objective and, above all, who has authority. The vocabulary of the financial world is of course as specialized as that of any other of the various publics reflected in the daily press. Much of the editorial comment is to inspire confidence or to produce caution in times of crisis. Many of the articles try to predict economic changes. Thus in his syndicated column B. C. Forbes often becomes a prophet. His prophecies are usually and sensibly very general; he is fondest of expressions like "future prosperity" and "better times," phrases which carry a pleasant emotional toning but no specific promises.

The following excerpt illustrates the type of special writing found in the market columns. While the opening sentence has a front page phrase, the rest of the paragraph is technical:

TAME FINISH IN EGGS

Expected fireworks in fresh gathered February eggs failed to materialize on the Chicago mercantile exchange. Long eggs came out freely and the price dropped 4c from the finish of Tuesday to a low of $35\frac{1}{4}c$, with the finish at $36\frac{1}{2}c$, showing a net loss of $3\frac{1}{4}c$. March closed $\frac{1}{8}c$ lower at $26\frac{7}{8}c$, while April storage, old, finished unchanged at $28\frac{1}{4}c$ and November refrigerators, old, were $\frac{1}{4}c$ higher at $31\frac{1}{4}c$. Receipts were liberal and weather more favorable, which had considerable influence on the February future. Sales were 185 cars, with receipts 18,119 cases.⁵

The following words were culled from a longer list made from one market page of a metropolitan daily. They show certain specific features of the stock market and business vocabulary:

⁵ *Chicago Tribune*, February 28, 1929,

unemployment	value	bears
wages	utilities	bulls
tariff	consumers	refinancing
purchasing power	board	corporation
capital	loss	dividends
production	gain	shipments
supply	fluctuation	cumulative preferred
demand	rise	authorized common
statistics	fall	treasury stock
stockholder	issue	control
bond	output	retail
shares	preferred stock	wholesale
sales	common stock	declared

In spite of the intellectual and objective nature of the business-industrial section of the newspaper, it inevitably produces in most of us a tendency to act on hunches, to gamble on the future. The speculation manias which we have already discussed are partially mass reactions incited by the discussions of writers on business and industry. Economic activity in the profit-seeking age of capitalism is based upon our estimates of the future. It is only natural that prophetic hunches should appear in this material. Thus, while the make-up of the page tends to appeal to our intellectual capacities and not to our emotions, while it officially attempts to promote confidence and conservative action, as a matter of fact market reports and a discussion of them may arouse us emotionally. Our desire to make money by speculation, to get something for nothing, is so strong that merely to warn us not to lose our balance in the presence of a possibility of getting rich without delay or trouble may cause us to do that very thing.

Associated with the business-industrial section are the recent special sections on the automobile and the radio. These are really a part of the business-industrial set-up, except that they appeal to the users as well as to the buyers and sellers of automobiles and radios. There is much informational material about operation of cars or radios. There are announcements of radio programs, notes on the automobile industry, on good roads, and so on.

d. *Society News and Women's Pages.*—The section on polite society is conducted largely for feminine readers. In metropolitan papers the bulk of the news is about the personalities of the upper social classes—their engagements, marriages, dinners, coming-out parties, dances, sporting

activities, etc. Photographs of the members of society are usually printed in great numbers.

Again, the appeal made by the society page controls the style of its make-up and presentation. The form of some news items is highly standardized: announcements of engagements and weddings are usually made in set ways.

The psychology of conspicuous consumption and conspicuous leisure is readily apparent. Tales of the amounts of money spent on gowns, presents, preparations for a wedding, and the like, along with rich descriptions of the events and personalities, make up a considerable part of these stories. Here, as in the sports section, there is a somewhat technical vocabulary. Not merely are such words as "smart," "chic," "gorgeous" in common use, but costumes and decorations are described in special terms which only the initiated understand.

The doings of the leisure class, their sports, travels, teas, dances, dinners, divorces, weddings, births and deaths, are naturally interesting to themselves.⁶ But this is not enough to warrant the space given to the matter in many newspapers. Only because the *hoi polloi* like this news does it have such a place. The vicarious satisfaction of the shop girl, the maid, the poverty-stricken charwoman, and the wives and daughters of the white-collared classes is self-evident. They love to day-dream of a life of unlimited leisure, wealth, and social position. A news story of society events furnishes them with the material out of which their day-dreams may be built. More than that, it convinces them that this Cinderella world is after all just around the corner—as it often actually is—and this fact confirms their hope that by some miracle they may some day acquire a place in this fairyland. Thus by furnishing them with a fantasy built out of real people who after all are not so different from themselves, the newspaper helps them to get through the daily routine.

In the smaller cities and towns the society columns of the papers touch a much wider circle of persons, largely of the small bourgeoisie. Having one's name in print as attending some social function is highly satisfying. As William James said, we should all be pleased to be seen on Piccadilly Circus with a duke on either arm, but in the absence of dukes we like to be known as members of The Magnolia Garden Club or as a guest of a wealthy banker of our city, or to be on the entertainment committee to

⁶ The leisure classes often maintain their own society newspapers, circulated only among themselves.

meet some important political or religious figure. To be mentioned as "among those present" expands our ego, even if we are present at nothing more than a church supper or a small neighborhood card club.

With the society section proper there is developing a section dealing with woman's world in vocational and professional circles. Here we find household hints—recipes, patterns for clothing, advice on the care of children, etc. It probably appeals to the lower income groups, but it also contains special matter on professional work for women also. It reflects the emancipation of women from mere drudgery into a world of wider activities.

e. *Special Feature Section*.—There may also be a section on current literature and drama. Sometimes this does not extend beyond press notices and reviews of current plays, both of motion pictures and the stage drama. On certain days there may be special sections devoted to book reviews and literary discussions; and a few of the large metropolitan papers carry extensive literary and magazine sections in their Sunday editions. In some newspapers that are not so professedly intellectual the Sunday magazine section contains light literature and romantic accounts of the lives of wealthy people. These accounts of the leisure classes furnish a distinct vicarious thrill for the readers. They picture another dream world to which they may escape from their own commonplace life.

f. *Comic Section*.—Another division of the newspaper, although not always separated off from other matter, is that given over to comic strips. The comic strip is an American development. At first it was apparently a continuous cartoon, like the doings of the "Yellow Kid"—a name which gave rise to the term "Yellow Journalism." An analysis of the contemporary comic strips shows that they reflect every phase of life. They have an appeal to various reader audiences. Just as the vaudeville ranges from the sort that more or less polite and well-bred people attend to the ribald and obscene burlesque, so the comics reflect the humorous, pathetic, and tragic elements of life for divergent classes. There are low-brow comics in which the humor is crass and even ribald. Others are of sentimental late adolescence, like "Harold Teen." There are pathetic-sentimental types like "Orphan Annie." Some are the collegiate sort; some reflect the flapper, or the adventures of the stenographer class—from "Tillie the Toiler" to "Winnie Winkle." Others touch human interest, like "Gasoline Alley." "Krazy Kat" and "Skippy" are mildly philosophical. Those of the *nouveau riche*, like "Polly and her Pals" and "Bringing up Father" are popular.

All of these comics reflect interesting phases of current life. In them we see ourselves and our neighbors. They are a kind of continued comedy-drama made up for our entertainment. Many of them are single sketches out of daily life and often expose our contemporary interests in aviation, or the troubles of a dub golfer. Others are based on more universal aspects of pathos and humor—the lost child, the orphan and adopted child, the mother-in-law joke, the rivalry of sentimental lovers, the faithful but disappointed suitor, like “Mack,” the eternal jester like “Salesman Sam” and loud-spoken “Andy Gump”—the latter a particularly popular figure because he reflects so perfectly the blatancy of many males.

A survey of one day's batch of papers revealed the following type of characters portrayed: Jew, negro, English lord, the *nouveau riche*, the orphan, the cripple, the widow, the “grass widow” boarding-house keeper, the hobo, the rich uncle, the scheming widow, the heart-broken young man, the flapper, the late adolescent youth, the philosophic lad of ten, the kidnapper, the rural wit, and others.

Within the past two or three years some of the comic strips have developed an additional feature based on the principle of the continued newspaper or magazine story. Instead of building up the comic around a particular isolated incident every day, the comics run in series, depicting the life, habits, and adventures of the subjects. Thus through months of hardship and near-success “Winnie Winkle” tries to place herself in the movies, and finally returns home. “Orphan Annie” is kidnapped and freed, and finds herself alternately in luxury or hardship so often that we can almost predict the seasonal fluctuations of her positions. The “Gumps” run through a series of adventures, and the “Alger” and “Ella Cinders” pictures are definitely built on romantic adventure story form. Other series like “Moon Mullins,” “Harold Teen,” and “Tillie the Toiler,” usually depict shorter episodes.

g. Editorial Page.—In the days when newspapers often reflected the particular views of one man, like the abolitionist papers of Garrison or the *New York Tribune* of Greeley, the editorial page was an important part of the newspaper and was doubtless a factor in its circulation. The evidence seems conclusive that the editorial page is losing in the proportionate space given it. The opinion prevails that its influence in the molding of public opinion is also waning. It still has a reading public, although probably a much smaller one than many other special sections or divisions of the

newspaper. The content of the editorial page is obvious. It carries interpretations of contemporary events and personalities. Partisan papers normally carry editorials favorable to the party politics with which they are aligned. While some of the editorials may at times be merely vigorous and emotional in nature, generally they employ argument, analysis, and interpretation; and hence the editorial page has a distinctly intellectual tone. The subject-matter is, as a rule, provided by current critical situations. For that reason some emotionalism and bias can scarcely be avoided. On the editorial page there are often quotations from other newspaper editorials, and, in many cases, a section devoted to letters from readers. This correspondence section seems also to be losing ground, but it still has a place in many newspapers. It is a splendid source of material on the opinions of the more outspoken readers. While many of those who write letters to newspapers have a secret wish to see their names and ideas in print, most of the correspondents seem to be genuinely concerned in the situations they discuss. Just how much selection the newspaper makes among the thousands of letters received, no one knows. Perhaps not even the newspaper men themselves realize the extent and meaning of the selection. Our observation of the type of letters printed in various newspapers leads us to believe that the letters which are printed are selected largely from those favorable to the newspaper and its policies. But some newspapers do regularly print unfavorable comment.

h. *Advertising Division.*—Finally, the newspaper is an important advertising medium. In some ways, in fact, the advertisements seem to be more important than the reading matter. The display advertising in the business and industrial sections is always financial and industrial. Bond and trust companies, banks, makers of office equipment, usually place their advertisements in the financial sections of the newspaper. Retail advertising often constitutes the greater part of the entire paper. With the society sections are often advertisements of travel tours, household furnishings, clothes, and so on. In the dramatic and literary sections, theater announcements, magazine and book advertisements are commonest. The close correspondence between the advertising and the subject-matter of the specialized reading sections is obvious at a glance. The two factors no doubt interact on each other. Placing the specialized advertisements with the special reading matter probably increases the attention given to both.

We may say that the metropolitan newspaper, and, to a less degree, all

newspapers, appeal, first, to our universal emotional interest in current crises: conflicts, disasters, unusual events or situations, and noteworthy personalities. Besides this news of interest to everyone, other sections make special appeals to more limited publics. Humor, sports, society, and business-industrial news probably follow in that order in the extent of their appeal. Dramatic and literary news and editorials seem of least general interest. The first pages present their material in flashy, emotional terms which appeal to everyone. The specialized sections are directed at the stabler interests of smaller publics. The sectionized paper, therefore, is a reflection of a community. It first makes a vertical appeal to all classes, and then it makes a number of horizontal appeals to special-interest groups. We may employ a graph to indicate the distribution of a newspaper's appeals.




FIGURE 10.

Showing Relationship of Various Sections of the Newspaper to each Other.
Amount of Space in each Section Shown by Respective Areas.

The front page reaches all classes of society. The special sections reach much more restricted clientele. The dotted lines in Figure 10 on the left of the figure indicate how news which is customarily special may get on the front page. A prize-fight, an exceptional run on a bank, unusual speculation on Wall Street, the wedding of very prominent society people, and, more rarely, even editorials may get into the front page. In some newspapers the comics, in the form of cartoons, are also found on the first page. A great deal of the advertising matter is addressed, like the front page

news, to the wider public. Nevertheless, much of it is very special. This fact is shown by the dotted lines extending from special fields into the advertising area.

The newspaper, then, is a reflection of the society to which it belongs. It is just as heterogeneous in its make-up and appeal as are the social groups which it reaches. It furnishes a cross-section of the world in which it exists. It is a kind of microcosmos of our larger social world.

Just as communities and institutions have continuity, so have the newspaper materials. This continuity varies with the different sections which we have been discussing. For example, the business public which the newspaper reaches is much more stabilized than is the shifting public reached by the sensational, emotional appeals of the front page. In other words, the newspaper's make-up reflects the institutionalization of our social life. This fact is evident in the timeliness, vocabulary, and nature of the printed reports. Institutionalized life activities, such as business and industry, are written up by the journalist in an abstract, standardized, and specialized vocabulary, in contrast with the reports of conflicts and disasters which are interesting to everyone. The general reading public is thus much like an emotional crowd. The journalist accordingly employs common words of emotional significance in his reports of generally interesting crises and personal gossip.

Still there is a kind of continuity even in the sensationalism of the front page. Many serious people worry over the possible immoral influences of news stories about our numerous murder cases. Or they regret the possible evil effects of news reports of society scandal. As a matter of fact, the newspapers serve the function of public discussion and gossip. Johnson wrote:

The newspaper that fails to give any account whatever of the crimes and follies of the day is giving to its readers a biased and misleading account of the human spectacle. Insofar as it covers up discreditable happenings, it deprives the world of the prophylactic effect of sunlight in shadowed places.⁷

In primary groups such events would give rise to violent discussions and actions. In our complex society composed of secondary groups and publics, the newspaper is the chief medium of gossip. The area of discussion is widened, but it is nonsense to believe that these sensational materials do not give rise to opinions in primary groups. Much that was in the mores is

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 60.

now open to discussion. Apparently we are modifying our moral codes. These news reports indicate those parts of the mores which are undergoing change. These newspaper discussions, with their inevitable reverberations on personal face-to-face conversation, remind us that public opinion is made by personal contact as much as by the general mores; and that they thus produce changes in our common attitudes. Changes in our attitudes, in turn, mean new forms of action. Since attitudes are largely incompleated acts, the sensationalism of the newspaper in focusing our attention upon divorce, murder, political corruption, and speculation manias is actually helping to alter the nature of our social reactions in these fields.

Therefore, the front page is as significant a revelation of the public as the more stabilized sections. It reflects the very heart of our social life. In crises any phase of our more stabilized activities becomes front page news, and attracts the interest and emotion of the mass of general readers. Anything may become current gossip and discussion for the whole wider reading public whenever it sufficiently arouses our general interest.

2. *The Selection of News.*—The proportion of space devoted by all newspapers to various classes of news matter differs from day to day and from season to season. The particular clientele of the newspaper also controls its selection of news. Labor papers play up one sort of news, metropolitan dailies another, and organs of the special business public still another. Both labor and commercial papers give unusual space to reports of industrial conflict, and the reports are always presented to please the special reading clientele. In any one day, no paper prints all of the material which reaches it. By omission or deletion of stories or parts of them, the managing editor of a newspaper changes the character of the dispatches which reach him just as truly as he does by "playing up" certain stories. He may omit or include crime news. He may put more emphasis upon local than on national or international political news. In an analysis of one paper in a city of 50,000 it was found that the telegraph editor omitted a considerable amount of news received from the outside press service. International news, unless it had an emotional appeal, was likely to be omitted. Dispatches about federal enforcement of prohibition were neglected. Often in what might seem significant stories, details were omitted and generalities were substituted. Practically all reports bearing on the controversy between the Mexican State and the Catholic Church were omitted. Details damaging to its political party were left out; and news favorable to its party was

usually printed. "Lessons in crime" were deleted from crime stories, and Chicago gun fights, gang wars, riots, and robberies were cut out. Sensational details were cut from divorce suits. Stories favorable to large corporations were cut, as was propaganda material about so controversial an activity as the Ku Klux Klan. Minor political debates and other petty details of politics were not printed.

The total amount of material from the dispatches which goes into the waste-paper basket varies over the week. In the early part of the week, when local news is usually not scarce, less outside news is used. Toward the end of the week, when local news is less abundant, outside news is increased. This occurred not merely in front page news but in all departments of the paper. On Monday, the paper used 41 per cent of the material offered, and on Friday 57 per cent. On an average, this particular daily paper printed only 47 per cent of the material received through the national press service. The table below gives details as to the amount of material deleted and the number of words of that used which appeared on the first page.

It is evident that consciously and unconsciously the newspaper selects the material which it presents to its readers. Thus it furnishes them only with a limited amount of the news which is available. Just as the village gossip gives out only what she wishes, so the newspaper officials have some control over what they present to the public. The newspaper goes even farther, for the stories sent over the wire are those of particular reporters or feature writers. Then in the hands of the "rewrite" men, the headline writer, and the editors, the news may be further changed.

This particular process of the gathering and presentation of material has much to do with the front page news as it finally reaches us. Any story appearing in the daily press has come through the hands of a considerable number of people. The actual witnesses of the events, as we know, are liable to errors of perception and memory. The report of the events is sent out to various press bureaus in as compact form as possible. Many details must be omitted. This means that someone makes a further selection. When the dispatches reach the newspaper office, not only are they, as we noted, selected as entire reports to be printed or not, but printed reports will have details omitted. Then, too, the story may be rewritten for local presentation. Still another person writes the headlines. Headlines are controlled by the amount of space available, by the editor's estimate of the im-

Table 19: Showing Classification of Subject-Matter of Wire News Received from the X Press Service and Printed in a Certain Newspaper for a Period of Ten Days. Amounts on First Page are given. (This covers only "significant" or front page news.)⁸

<i>Kind of News</i>	<i>Received</i>		<i>Used</i>		<i>On First Page</i>	<i>Pct. of total used on first page</i>
	<i>Words</i>	<i>Pct.</i>	<i>Words</i>	<i>Pct.</i>	<i>Words</i>	
1. Accidents, fires	5,753	7.7	2,876	8.0	910	31.60
2. Crime, criminal courts	16,273	21.8	7,432	21.0	2,405	32.30
3. Divorce	330	.5	230	.6	100	47.80
4. Scandal, vice	9,936	13.3	4,965	14.0	4,310	86.80
5. Civil courts	1,245	1.6	380	1.0	340	89.40
6. Government	6,911	9.2	2,326	6.5	1,059	45.50
7. Politics	8,495	11.3	4,380	12.3	1,501	31.90
8. Business, Commerce	3,284	4.4	1,012	3.0	47	.46
9. Agriculture	190	.2	60	.2	60	100.00
10. Labor, Strikes	1,663	2.2	901	2.5	..	..
11. Education	530	.7	60	.2	..	..
12. Religion	630	.8	70	.2	..	..
13. Health	55	.1	55	.1	55	100.00
14. Charity, Uplift	240	.3	..	..	..	..
15. Science, etc.	1,839	2.5	1,334	3.8	..	..
16. Arts, Music, etc.	40	.1	..	..	..	..
17. Society	545	.8	..	..	..	..
18. Deaths	3,097	4.1	1,862	5.2	1,470	78.90
19. Weather	674	.9	327	1.0	30	.92
20. Human Interest	1,700	2.3	1,265	3.4	500	39.50
21. Miscellaneous	2,342	3.1	1,065	3.0	85	.79
22. War	1,153	1.5	658	2.0	228	34.60
23. International	3,208	4.3	1,554	4.0	790	58.30
24. Aviation, Lindy	4,706	6.3	3,028	8.0	2,445	86.70
Totals	74,839	100.0	35,840	100.0	16,335	45.50

portance of the story, and finally, by the capacity and attitude of the headline writer who labels the story with what seem to him its significant aspects. The result is that front page news is largely gossip and legend, if not myth. Hence, our opinion based on a news report may be very different from what it might have been if we had ourselves witnessed the reported event.

We must remember, however, that person-to-person narrative in earlier primary groups also introduced errors and added legendary details to news. Our modern newspaper stories, especially those based on stenographic reports, are probably more reliable than a great deal of news in the pre-

⁸ Tabulations made by Mr. Elmer F. Beth, School of Journalism, University of Wisconsin, 1928-29. Period covered five days each during first week of February and first week of March, 1928.

industrial period of village and town life. No one knows whether, on the whole, newspapers are better or worse in the dissemination of news than were the personal gossips and town criers of old; but probably they are better.

C. Other Types of Printed Opinion.

Although it is the most significant in our time, the newspaper is not the only printed organ of news and opinion. Weekly periodicals furnish us with summaries of news and much opinion—editorial and otherwise—on contemporary life. Some weeklies, such as the *Literary Digest* and *Time*, essay to furnish synopses and quotations from the daily press, from interesting magazine and news articles about inventions, art, religion, politics, and economics. Others, such as the *New York Nation* and the *New Republic*, are directed to a more restricted reading public of liberal economic and political views. Then, too, the various special publics represented in the daily press have their own weekly, if not daily, organs. The journals of business and commerce, of course, are definitely directed toward the industrial-business public, as are the daily racing papers toward their group. Weeklies are common for various special publics. The specialization of monthly magazines is further evident.

The magazines, in general, repeat the same classification of matter that we find in the daily metropolitan newspaper. Some run to sensationalism, to legendary materials which stir the emotions and give the vicarious satisfactions of new adventure. Others carry stories of romantic love-making; still others specialize in humor—Rabelaisian and otherwise. Some magazines interest the intelligent minorities in their discussion of economic, political, and social problems. Others reach largely sporting circles. Some appeal to women and their needs. Again, there are a large number of trade journals and technical periodicals which report the latest developments in industry, business, and scientific research. The art and literary publics are well supplied with media of publication.

Many of the emotional-story magazines appear weekly or bi-monthly. Others are monthly, and many of the most technical and scholarly journals appear quarterly or even at less frequent intervals. Yet in all these, as in the newspaper, there is a continuity of both form and content. The stories of adventure and love-making have a certain pattern as have the front page stories of the daily newspaper. The special business and industrial periodi-

cals follow a certain form, as do all the rest. Even professedly unbiased journals of opinion do not print news which too obviously contradicts their own creeds. The range of magazines is so great that anyone may find a medium to express his ideas if he can present them in a form satisfactory to the editors.

Magazine advertising varies with the type of readers who support the various journals. A perusal of advertisements will reveal contemporary human interests quite as readily as a reading of the stories and articles in which the advertisements are imbedded. The cheap nostrums of the sensational weekly magazine stand in contrast with the expensive luxuries portrayed in smart periodicals such as the *New Yorker*. The advertising matter in trade journals reflects their readers' interests and wants as exactly as the book and apparatus advertisements in a scientific journal reflect the concern of the research expert.

Pamphleteering appears to have lost much of its effectiveness. But special-interest groups still distribute pamphlets designed to influence public opinion on all sorts of questions. Many pamphlets, obviously propaganda, are circulated by public utilities companies, moral agencies of all sorts, philanthropic groups, and political parties. This fugitive literature is particularly evident in political campaigns.

Books also have a part in forming public opinion. Those which deal with contemporary social, religious, economic, and political problems and the personalities connected with them, are occasionally very powerful influences. While the reading public influenced by these books is not generally so large as the publics of the daily press or even the periodicals, an amazing number of copies of some of these books are sold. Such books as Robinson's *The Mind in the Making* and Dorsey's *Why We Behave Like Human Beings* have sold in tens of thousands of copies in the few years since they appeared. Books on religious issues, political questions, prohibitions, and other current problems are sold in large quantities.

Novels have their inevitable effects upon opinion. They frequently deal with present-day problems, and certainly they profoundly influence the social reality of our time. Just how extensive is their effect, no one knows; but we can hardly exaggerate the influence of Lewis' *Babbitt*, for instance. Novels create myths and legends, foster prejudices, and provoke discussion. The novel, like the newspaper and periodical, has a varied range of readers. On the one hand we have the sophisticated, "smart" clientele,

or the serious intellectual. On the other hand, we have those who wish their romance and adventure done in the manner of Zane Grey, Harold Bell Wright, or Ethel M. Dell. The range of books, like the materials of the newspapers, reflects the variety of our contemporary society.

D. The Press and Public Opinion.

All of these printed forms of material—newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, and books, have a two-fold character. They bring information of some sort to the reader. Correct or not, this information furnishes to the reader a body of facts, rationalizations and interpretations upon which he may further construct his own opinions. Yet these organs do not make opinion altogether. They have the second characteristic of reflecting public opinion. Thus, like the leader of a crowd they may help to crystallize opinion already vaguely felt. The press does not uninterruptedly create opinion in a completely passive public. Opinion is, as we have seen, the verbalization of attitudes, usually in terms of acceptable rationalizations. Whatever effect the printed page may have upon the reader, it can influence him only in terms of his apperceptive mass, of his previous habits and conditionings. That it can entirely remake his attitudes is doubtful. To recast attitudes demands time, and usually a crisis in which the individual himself feels that his old values and attitudes are not adequate,

Furthermore, our present opinion, we must remember, is made by conversation as it was in the primary group. What we read we discuss with others. Their reactions may distinctly influence our own, especially if these others are prestige-bearers of any importance.

Opinion is formed in particular interest groups. Various groups—labor, employer, banker, and so on—are constantly interacting on each other through their media of opinion and information. So, too, political parties, religious organizations, and all our special groups foster or oppose particular social reforms. Even advertising affects opinions. We do not distinguish sharply between articles or stories and the advertisements printed beside them. Advertisements thus create the myths and legends of our social reality quite as effectively as any other part of the printed pages. Just how much advertisements do this may be difficult as yet to measure, but the influence is there. The use of historical materials, the appeal to technical interests, to arouse fear, anger or sympathy through advertising—all this is too well known to need much comment. Certainly it is a purblind person

who can not recognize these factors in the opinion-making process. The interplay of advertising and changes in the mores is illustrated in the recent growth of cigarette smoking among women. As after the war women in numbers began to smoke more and more openly, cigarette advertising began to capitalize this new habit of women. The earlier pictorial advertisements showed women enjoying the company of men who were smoking. Later advertisements pictured a woman holding a lighted match for a man. In 1927 one brand of cigarettes was openly endorsed in advertisements by prominent actresses and singers. In 1928 various companies began to picture women in the act of smoking. It is interesting to note that for several years previous to this cartoons had shown women smoking. Even rotogravure sections occasionally pictured some prominent woman holding a lighted cigarette. In short, before open advertising began, it was well recognized that smoking was common among women. Advertising here, as in other ways, followed changes in the mores. And yet many people have protested against the ill effects of such advertisements. Some communities have actually attempted to legislate against such advertising. Once more there has been an organized opposition to changes in the mores; and the opponents of change have mistaken cause for effect.

E. Other Organs of Public Opinion and their Appeals.

The printed page is not the only medium of reaching the wider publics in our day. We must also consider the motion picture and the radio.

1. *The Motion Picture.*—We have already discussed some of the psychological aspects of the motion picture. Here we wish only to call attention to the fact that motion pictures now portray current events from all over the world. Because they have been announced and can be prepared for, public ceremonials and the public appearances of notable people are very easily photographed; and hence such photographs are most frequent in the news reels of the cinema. Now, with an airplane always ready to carry him to the scene of conflict or disaster, the cinema photographer makes his pictures of the most varied events as they occur; and quite at our ease we shortly see a moving picture of the latest fire or flood or riot or even war.

Thus within an incredibly short time millions of people are given a visual portrayal of events from all parts of the world. With the talking motion picture we may not only see but listen to current happenings. It is difficult to measure the effect of these news films on opinion. Obviously

films of disaster arouse sympathetic responses; of the army, patriotic associations, and so on. Thus our stereotypes are fed and our opinions are confirmed or altered or given new directions by seeing and hearing what is going on outside our immediate circles. The selection of news is as easy here as elsewhere. Producers and distributors show only what they wish to the public.

Motion picture dramas inevitably affect our opinions. Like the newspaper they create and feed stereotypes of all sorts. The possible influence of crime pictures on the habits of our youth, the effect of pictures of sexual adventures upon our own sexual conduct—these have been subjects of dispute since the very beginning of the motion picture. Boys in juvenile courts have asserted that they learned the techniques of theft from the movies. Still, we find it difficult to evaluate such remarks accurately. Juvenile delinquency was known before the days of the movie, and blaming the movie is an easy way of shifting responsibility.

As we have already noted, the movies have profoundly influenced our national stereotypes. The cowboys, desperadoes, and Indians of "Western" pictures have definitely colored foreign opinions about the United States. These films may, of course, create a picture of American life which will affect the attitudes of the European and Asiatic masses toward us. The films also create and feed legends about the leisure class, about romantic love-making, about the poor, the successful, the villainous, just as surely as do news stories and novels.

By and large we either do not or can not discriminate between genuine news stories and these creations of the imagination. For most of us the imaginative and the real are fused to make our picture of social reality. Most people are simply incapable of making fine distinctions between consciously created myths and the actualities presented in the press and film.

2. *The Radio*.—The latest addition to opinion-forming agencies is the radio. Like the motion picture its exact influences may be difficult to measure, but no one doubts its effect. In the absence of quantitative data, a few observations on the psychology of the radio may help us to evaluate its place.

In contrast with the press and the silent motion picture, the radio reaches its audience through the ear rather than the eye. We know that sound stirs the emotions very quickly; and our early, fundamental conditioning makes the human voice peculiarly effective in arousing emotion. As entertain-

ment, the radio is a continuous phonograph. We know the powerful emotional appeal of music, of course; but the appeal is so entirely emotional that we can disregard its possible effect on public opinion. We can, however, indicate several factors in the psychology of speeches over the radio.

In the first place, the listeners are not necessarily congregated. Even on special occasions when people gather to hear the radio, the listeners are more passive than those in most crowds. The psychological effects are less emotional, less violent, simply because there are not present the visual, auditory, and kinesthetic stimulations which are so important in the configuration of the crowd. For this reason, as one student noted, the radio can never compete with the theater, the concert, the church, or the motion picture. The radio auditors are isolated or at best gather in small clusters. They can hardly have the sense of common enjoyment and of a common share in the performance so satisfactory in the theater. Still the radio as well as the press may furnish our stereotypes and ideas and arouse emotions which affect our opinions.

We may mention two facts in our consideration of the radio as an agency in social control. The broadcasting stations have the listeners more or less at their mercy; but the listeners may and do make their wishes known, at least their preferences in entertainment. But in programs definitely aimed at forming opinions, it is difficult for the public to exercise much direct positive control over the material. The control of broadcasting raises the question of the influence of the radio in the making of public opinion.

The auditor, of course, need not listen to the radio. We do not know how much our prejudices control our attention to political or religious speeches over the radio. Apparently the same attitudes control us here as control our adherence to a political party or a church creed. We listen to those whom we like and whose stereotypes we already accept, and we ignore speeches from sources against which we are prejudiced. We are no different here than in our attendance or non-attendance at a political rally or at a religious revival. Similarly, most of us read the newspapers with which we already agree and avoid those with which we do not agree. In this respect the radio is like any other medium of news and opinion.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter XXVI, pp. 756-78.

B. Questions and Exercises.

1. Discuss questions and exercises in assignment, *Source Book*, Chapter XXVI, p. 779.
2. List in the order of their importance the organs of public opinion which most influence your own point of view on: prohibition, birth control, control of public utilities, distribution of wealth, child labor, international relations, war. (Add other topics of current interest.)
3. What makes an event news? Why is communication necessary before we have news?
4. Why does Cooley say that newspapers are "organized gossip"?
5. Discuss the relation of the newspaper to moral control in the community. Has the newspaper any influence today as a moral leader?
6. Trace the course of the local metropolitan news story from its occurrence till it is printed in the newspaper. Do the same for the story of international event. How is the story affected by the whole range of people and institutions which deal with it in this course from its origin to printing?

C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Written Papers.

1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter XXVI, pp. 779-80.
2. Review Lippmann's *The Phantom Public*. Compare his view on the nature and control of public opinion in this volume with his views in his earlier book, *Public Opinion*.
3. Review Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems*. How does Dewey deal with the subject of public opinion and social control?
4. Report on Lundberg, "Newspaper and Public Opinion," *Social Forces*, 1926, vol. IV, pp. 709-15, on relation of newspaper to opinion.
- 4a. Review Willey's *Country Newspaper; a Study of Socialization and Newspaper Content*, 1926.
5. Review Graves' *Readings in Public Opinion*, Chapters IX, X, XI, XV.
- 5a. Review Mitchell's *Children and Movies*, 1929, on influence of motion pictures on children.
6. Analyze the words used in headlines in various newspapers in order to discover the kinds of association, emotional and other, which they make.
7. Analyze the vocabulary of the various sections of a metropolitan daily to discover the relation of words used to matter presented.
8. Analyze the make-up and content of a series of metropolitan papers for the same day to discover how they treat the news, differences in emphasis, in editorial comment, etc.
9. Make a study of the readers of adventure-story magazines, as to sex, age, occupation, education, and other types of recreation.
10. Do the same for readers of romantic and love-story periodicals.

CHAPTER XXVI

CENSORSHIP: THE NEGATIVE CONTROL OF OPINION

A. *The Background of Censorship.*

1. *Censorship and Propaganda.*—By the group taboos enforced by group leaders, censorship of a kind exists in primary groups, such as the neighborhood, village, or small community. Today censorship is a phase of social control closely correlated with rapid communication and with the extension of secondary group relationships transcending the usual limitations of space. Just as opinion had a narrow range in the village, so, too, the control of expression of opinion and of action had the same boundaries. Censorship is fundamentally a phase of social taboo against the expression of opinion. If it once had a narrow range in primary groups, today it reaches as far as political power and public opinion extend. In the primary group censorship of opinion for the most part was restricted to control of speech rather than of printing. In secondary groups censorship has moved definitely toward tabooing the printing of opinion as well as controlling speech. The fundamental purpose of censorship of free speech and of free printing is much the same. The censorship of free speech attempted to control the crowd-audience; the censorship of the press attempts to control the public-audience. We shall discuss very largely the censorship of the press, but the social-psychological principles involved are similar to those of the restriction of free speech.

Censorship in the modern sense is linked with propaganda. The deletions made by the censor may be filled up with manufactured news and opinion in the form of propaganda. When we are denied the facts of a crisis which concerns us, we find it easy to create a legend to fill up the deletion of the censor. In the absence of facts we unconsciously create stories to satisfy our curiosity. The clever propagandist simply directs the trend of this legendary material in a manner which seems advantageous to his particular cause. This was the usual device of propagandists during the World War. The propaganda agencies often worked in close harmony

with the censorship bureaus. When men ask for bread and are given a stone, it is the ingenious thing to make the stones seem as palatable as possible. This the war propagandist does most effectively.

All propaganda does not merely replace censored news. Neither are censorship and propaganda active solely in wars and international disputes. They both occur in all the crises of our lives. The threat of social change in politics, economics, or religion produces a social tension which easily produces censorship and propaganda. In the present chapter we shall treat the nature and psychology of censorship. In the following chapter we shall turn our attention to propaganda. Censorship is negative and repressive, and takes on the nature of taboo. Propaganda is positive and creative, and takes on the nature of legend- and myth-making which is so effective, as we have seen, in creating the social realities.

2. *The Social History of Censorship.*—As we saw in dealing with prejudice, group controls, leadership, and crowd behavior, we can not properly understand the psychology of any phase of social behavior without taking into account its historical and cultural background. So, too, we can not understand the psychology of censorship in relation to public opinion without some review of the sources of the attitudes and anticipatory responses upon which it rests. Especially in a group crisis censorship is a phase of modern social control. As we have seen, the mores center about those situations which seem to involve the survival and welfare of the group. Infractions of the non-moral folkways may bring ridicule and mild censure; but violations of the group mores provoke the wrath of the gods. The gods always have earthly vicegerents in the group elders, medicine men, war leaders, kings, and the democratic mobs led by the ever-present demagog. So long as the group follows its usual customs, attempts at suppression of speech or press are slight. But when the values of the group are called into question by a crisis, social pressure is applied in order to insure group solidarity. Morale is essential for group survival, and anything which threatens to disintegrate morale is, for the group, extremely dangerous. A person who questions the procedure of a military, religious, or political leader undermines the strength of the group. A person who exposes facts which run counter to those given out by the group leaders is frowned upon and may be subject to social regulations of all sorts. The author of a realistic novel is felt to injure our long-established morality.

So long as people live in isolated villages, with fairly stable social, politi-

cal, and religious forms, as in the Middle Ages, there was little need for censorship beyond that exercised by gossip and the mild control of the village elders and the church officials. When, however, men began to question the social, economic, political, and religious organizations under which they lived, there was danger of social disruption. With the improvement in communication, with the spread of education, with the rise of nationalism and of freedom of thought in theology, the authorities of the time became concerned to retain their power. In 1501 Pope Alexander VI issued his edict against unlicensed printing in order to prevent the contagion of heresy in the church. As Lea said, the Inquisition began to censor printing as soon as this new means of disseminating heresy came into being. Later, the state began to apply censorship to criticisms of the divine right of kings, of foreign wars, and still later, as in England, to criticisms of parliamentary procedures. In England only stipulated persons or corporations were licensed to print. Subsequently the stamp taxes put a heavy burden on publishers and restricted their activities. Accordingly other means of spreading news and opinion—the coffee houses, the correspondents, the secret printing of pamphlets—were devised.

Yet, as literacy spread, as the bourgeois classes began to compete with the priestly and aristocratic classes for the control of Western Europe, changes occurred which have left their marks on our present culture patterns. The doctrines of social contract and of natural rights, the individualism of the modern world, which is so closely bound up with the Protestant revolt and with the rise of capitalism and its dogma of *laissez faire*—all these have produced a culture pattern, especially in the Anglo-American groups, of freedom of speech and of the press which is of greatest importance for democratic society.

On the Continent modern means of disseminating news and opinion were developed later than in England and America. Nevertheless the development of a public opinion with marked changes in attitudes helped to produce the bourgeois French Revolution. Often printed material was anonymously written, and, in spite of the governmental attempts at censorship, quite freely circulated. During the Revolution itself each succeeding government put as severe a ban upon divergent expressions as it did upon divergent action. In spite of these social pressures, opinion-making went on among those who opposed the government. While he hid from

the Jacobins, Condorcet circulated not only his mathematical treatises, but his political opinions as well.

Censorship during the Napoleonic period was very rigorous. Without it Napoleon's power could scarcely have continued so long as it did. After his downfall, the European governments, beginning with Metternich's repressive measures, continued to penalize the circulation of all divergent opinion. The control of press and speech was very severe. This was true of both radical and conservative governments. The censorship of Napoleon III was even outdone by that of the Commune. The newly created German Empire felt the omnipresent censorship of Bismarck for a generation. Freedom of the press is a recently won prerogative in continental Europe. In all countries today censorship laws still persist. Each governmental administration attempts to prevent the development of opposition to its own régime.

In the nineteenth century England saw a great loosening of governmental control over opinion in political and economic discussion. In morals, however, the taboos have remained intact. In America much the same thing is true. Except during national crises, the American press has won a notable degree of freedom to discuss economic and political problems. The shift toward freedom in morals has been much less marked.

It is evident, then, that ever since the invention of printing censorship has been a device of social control. It arises in times of crisis or social change. When the *status quo* is threatened, the existing power always attempts to prevent the spread of opinions and attitudes hostile to those it holds sacred.

B. The Nature and Psychology of Censorship.

Censorship is essentially a negative process. In contrast to propaganda which is constructive and emotionally expansive, censorship is inhibitory and restrictive of action. It derives its force very largely from fear and the threats of power. Psychologically censorship has its counterpart in individual experience. We all censor or pass judgment of good or bad, like or dislike, on what we see and hear. This censorship, this judgment, depends, naturally, upon our temperament and upon our previous social-cultural conditioning. We do not let our minds dwell on those subjects which are socially disapproved. In this sense censorship is clearly akin to prejudice.

We inhibit our associations on a dangerous subject. We do not like it. We cast it out of our mind. The new idea may disturb our ego proportions. It may seem too strange, too far-fetched, too extravagant, and we set up a defense reaction against it. We tell ourselves that the idea is foolish. It is "no good." It is illogical. As we know, inhibitions are largely created by the introduction of novel or divergent patterns of behavior which block, inhibit, or stop our usual associations. If inhibitions only extended this far, their social consequences might be insignificant. The new associations are blocked by the old ones that have their basis in long-accepted culture patterns. Labeling ideas, images, and attitudes as evil, as immoral, as unpatriotic, is usually an effective method of stopping the development of such notions and attitudes. All forms of social taboos are designed to do just this. They furnish the individual with guide posts in his associative thinking which keep him within the boundaries set by the moral codes. The ideas, images or attitudes with which the new ideas conflict are sacred. They are right. They are proper. Therefore, persons having the same social and cultural heritage may develop a consensus of opinion that the divergent ideas or attitudes ought to be stopped.

Censorship, then, is psychologically a form of negativism. It is a type of repression caused by our fear of the consequences of novel stimuli. In censorship we assume that if there is no stimulation there will be no response. For example, if we keep our school children from seeing motion pictures of crimes or sexual immoralities, we sometimes think we can thus limit their responses to such stimuli.

—As group control, censorship is not created by one man's dislike of some other man's ideas, attitudes or productions in art, literature, or science. It must be a collective dislike. It must involve group control of infractions against some code. When the zealous individual finds another doing and saying things contrary to the code, by securing the aid of like-minded men and women he may attempt to bring pressure to bear upon the offending individual. If a new idea strikes at the central values of the group with which we have been taught to identify ourselves, we inevitably resist it. Attacks by outsiders—opposite political parties, groups adhering to divergent economic views or even literary standards—offend us. By some kind of force we try to prevent any further attacks upon our moral citadels. Often a fanatic, himself full of inhibitions and temptations, will project his paranoid ideas upon whole groups of people who, because of their similar back-

grounds, easily catch his fanaticism. A howling mob may proceed to censor and punish the offenders against the social codes. It is thus that many moral enthusiasts accomplish their work. These bands of militant moralists have the passive if not the active support of thousands of people who feel much as they do, even if they would hesitate to assist in such direct action themselves. Censorship of the drama and motion picture, of immoral books, or of divergent economic-political doctrines like anarchism and communism, depends upon the dominant group sentiment. This sentiment is kept alive, as a rule, by militant minorities, who are, however, given silent but effective support from inactive but interested majorities. Censorship, like other forms of social pressure, is exerted wherever the groups in control feel themselves endangered by the divergent minorities who question their authority by word or deed.

The moral codes do not exist apart from human personalities. They do not exist in a vacuum, but are carried in unwritten form by speech or writing and formally in the legal regulations of our society. Institutional authorities and the leaders of men are the principal agents in enforcing these codes. The group elders symbolize in the flesh these moral formulations. The executive and judicial administrators enforce the codes of law, but they are always subject to the check of public opinion. Hundreds of laws on our statute books are not enforced because public sentiment does not support them. Public opinion in some states does not support the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution; and in some communities the Volstead Act can get no public support. The actions of officers of the law in enforcing political control depend upon the personalities of these officers and the support they receive from the publics interested in political control. The usual swing in American cities between corruption and reform indicates the fluctuations of community opinion and attitude. A reform mayor, with a vigorous district attorney, an enthusiastic police force, and a strong judiciary, may enforce codes in one community which are absolutely neglected in another. The dictum of "divide and conquer" is as true of moral conflicts as any other, and a militant reform group can often dominate a political situation in an effective manner because the opposition is broken or disorganized.

In time of war, the political control of censorship is dominated by the military exigencies of national survival. Here the executive arm of the government, under the stress of national danger, may put terrific pressure

upon newspapers, publishers, and all other makers and reflectors of public opinion.

In a large area of moral conduct not immediately under the control of the law, the censors depend upon public press, preaching, and pamphlets for the dissemination of their views. Organizations agitating against the public dance hall, against the cigarette, against many alleged evils in literature and art, try to develop opinion and action outside the formal legal system. Such an enthusiast as Comstock had the support of thousands who saw in him a crusader for righteousness. He symbolized for them the protection and maintenance of their threatened morals. And much of his power was outside the strictly legal codes of social control.

The dominant moral codes of our own country are in general those of Christianity, and particularly those of Anglo-American Puritanism. These codes are kept alive by church officials, and reform organizations. In speech and in print they discuss in terms of the code all sorts of infractions,—divorce and marriage scandals, the liquor traffic, white slavery, immodest art productions, and literature which does not conform to the Puritan norms of sex. As a means of political-economic control, censorship is directed against divergent political and economic theories, printed or spoken, and in times of war, against any attitudes which those in authority think will destroy group morale and prevent a whole-hearted support of the national cause.

C. Forms of Contemporary Censorship.

For our purposes we may divide censorship into that form which touches our intra-national life and that which is applied in time of war. Both of these types betray in-group—out-group conflicts; but war-time censorship of course indicates a more definite hostility to a more definite out-group. Though the various minorities affected by intra-national censorship assume definite attitudes of conflict, the purpose of such censorship is to preserve those values held essential to the welfare of the whole group. Frequently the mass of people may be rather indifferent to the censorship; and more often the censorship changes its features in varying localities. In this way minorities are often completely submerged, because the censorship is so generally accepted as right and proper.

1. Intra-national Censorship.—Here we shall discuss principally the

intra-national censorship of political-economic theories, literature, art, and drama.

a. *Political-economic Censorship*.—Political-economic censorship forbids the circulation, in the printed page or by word of mouth, of social attitudes and ideas which threaten the economic and political stability of the nation. In our history the Abolitionist discussion of slavery produced a long controversy over censorship. Through the mails the Abolitionists sent into the Southern states great quantities of their papers and pamphlets. Southern postmasters destroyed literally tons of this material as unfit to circulate through the United States mails. Here the public opinion of a large section of the country, coupled with the theory of State's rights, predetermined a censorship by federal officials. In other sections of the country this same type of matter was circulated freely enough.

Since the Civil War the censorship of political or economic opinion has been applied to the extremely radical speakers and newspapers supported by communistic or anarchistic minorities. During the World War these extremist papers were prohibited as a part of the larger censorship. Even in peace times radical newspapers have been suppressed. An editor of *Pater-son*, New Jersey, was arrested for making some remarks about Theodore Roosevelt while he was president.

In 1927 a radical newspaper published a poem in which the United States was compared to a prostitute. The publisher and the author, a lad of seventeen, were both arrested. The author was sentenced to the state reformatory. After protests from various associations and prestige-bearing persons who objected to such punishment of a radically-minded adolescent, the young man was finally released. He had, of course, violated simultaneously our political and sexual taboos.

Suppression of the facts of political history is also a form of censorship. Formerly, the United States history textbooks used in the Southern states painted a very different picture of the Civil War than did those used by the schools of the Northern and Western states. In the last generation, groups in various sections of our country have attacked "pro-British" history texts. Thompson of Chicago made the latest of these attacks. In-group—out-group psychology is apparent in all such attacks. People oppose the printing in textbooks of any thing favorable to the British attitudes and actions during the Revolutionary War. A more objective text will not per-

petuate in the next generation our old antagonistic attitudes toward Great Britain; and thus it may undermine the patriotism of the nation's youth. So argue the defenders of the older stereotyped history. The truth is that the opponents of "pro-British" history texts are maintaining and trying to pass on the old, familiar attitude of the we-group against its traditional enemy. If we teach our children that the British were not so vicious and benighted as we have hitherto declared, we run the danger of dissipating their patriotism. Patriotism, as we know, is made up of negative attitudes toward the enemy quite as much as positive attitudes toward the we-group.

The two following letters indicate divergent viewpoints on censorship. On the one hand, we have the radical immigrant interested in material interpreting social changes. On the other, we have an official who states the conservative opinion about the easy and uncontrolled circulation of these same materials:

To the Editor of *The Nation*:

SIR: "Were you born in this country?" "Why did you come here?"

Thus spake Mr. John H. Leete, the director of the Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh, simply because I contributed to the library a book dealing with a vital phase of American history. The book was John Kenneth Turner's remarkable and most accurate study of America's part in the late war, *Shall It Be Again?* The director refused to place this book on the shelves for general circulation. He told me by letters and by personal interview that this book was anti-American—insidiously anti-American—and that no true American would desire to see it circulated.

The Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh is controlled by a ruthless czar; he is the director, who is appointed by a board of trustees, among them Andrew Mellon, foremost Pittsburgh citizen (on the income-tax returns) and Secretary of the United States Treasury. The director has the final word on all books, magazines, and newspapers that are to enter the library.

After experimenting thus far, I decided to go further. I sent the library three more books, which, I wrote the director, I would be glad to contribute if he would place them on the shelves for general circulation. These books were Scott Nearing's *The American Empire*, Upton Sinclair's *The Goose-Step*, and ex-Senator Pettigrew's *Imperial Washington*. A few days later I received an acknowledgment and thanks for my contribution, but do you think they were ever placed on the shelves for general circulation? No!

BENJAMIN P. CHASS

To the Editor of *The Nation*:

SIR: I appreciate your courtesy in allowing me to see the article criticizing the

policy of the Carnegie Library. As typical of many points in which the article falls short of the truth, let me say that the opening conversation, in order correctly to represent the facts, should be prefaced by statements of your correspondent to the effect: America is all wrong. Her government is altogether corrupt and her public men are all crooks and grafters. It was only then that as a matter of curiosity I asked the question "Were you born in this country?" and obtained the answer that the young man was of Russian birth. Again, to be fair, the article should state explicitly that the books were accepted for reference use, which would make them always available for all readers of maturity.

Yes, there is a distinct difference of opinion between your correspondent and the writer as to the policy which should be pursued by a public library. We do contend that a public library is not only justified in limiting the circulation of certain material to people of maturity of judgment and with sufficient knowledge of the facts in question to enable them to discriminate between true and just charges and unfair and malicious slander, but is obligated to adopt such a policy. While we would not and do not debar from our shelves any material representing the viewpoint of any individual or group of individuals, we do believe that we should not circulate indiscriminately among young and immature minds unproved or false assertions and accusations calculated to defame character and to subvert government and good order. We believe that public funds should not be devoted to such a purpose.

May I call your attention to the fact, also, that every editor and publisher uses discretionary power as to the material he shall circulate and, in that sense, exercises the same right (censorship?) as that claimed for the library? To say that the library shall circulate without question anything that finds its way into print simply makes the publisher the judge rather than the public library.

JOHN H. LEETE

Director, Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh ¹

This same determination to maintain patriotic attitudes is the basis for opposing the publication of biographies of Washington and other national heroes which dissipate our popular legends and myths about them. Thus the Daughters of the American Revolution violently disapprove of Rupert Hughes' and W. E. Woodard's rather frank biographies of George Washington. These women are genuinely convinced that such men are destroying our patriotism and that their books should therefore be suppressed. The process of "de-bunking" our national heroes, which seems to be a popular diversion of some authors, has aroused a distinct protest from the patriotic minorities who think that such activities will destroy our fundamental nationalistic values. We find many other legends under scrutiny by

¹ From correspondence column the *Nation*, Dec. 10, 1924, vol. CXIX, p. 628.

these same authors. The exposure of many of the actual facts about John Brown or Walter Hines Page helps to disrupt our traditional pictures of them. Whether our new picture is fairly accurate or merely another legend, is a question which only the future can answer. Certainly while the controversy is on, many groups of sincere patriots will try to suppress the spread of these new ideas in schools, on the lecture platform, or through the press.

b. *Literary Censorship*.—Our Christian society has always looked askance at any literature, artistic or scientific, which does not respect our mores about sex. In the 1870's the Young Men's Christian Association in New York began a crusade against pornographic literature. One Anthony Comstock joined the crusade and his organization, The New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, has continued the crusade down to the present. The Society was and is supported by ample funds from religious groups. It has caused the destruction of literally tons of improper books, pictures, and playing cards, and it has obtained the imprisonment of a considerable number of people. Through the efforts of the Society and its supporters more rigorous laws against pornographic literature were written into the federal law. Many state laws were also tightened up. The preponderant opinion which, on the whole, had supported the war of the Society against obviously obscene matter, split decidedly, as did the courts, when the Society tried to prevent the publication and distribution of literature long considered classical. Boccaccio, Rabelais, Rousseau, Zola, Balzac, and Daudet were attacked as immoralists; and even such books as Thomas Hardy's *Jude the Obscure* and Harold Frederic's *The Damnation of Theron Ware* were not safe.

Books of scientific merit like Havelock Ellis' *Psychology of Sex* were restricted in circulation. Curiously enough, after circulating for more than thirty years, Sanger's *History of Prostitution* was suppressed. Dr. Malchow and his publisher both went to prison for publishing *The Sexual Life*, a book highly praised by medical journals and professional persons.

The question of whether censorship is right or not is not our concern. We are interested rather in the fact that public opinion, here as elsewhere, reflects divergent attitudes and beliefs. The supporters of censorship maintain that such literature, whether the pornographic pictures and stories sold by newsboys on trains or such books as Havelock Ellis' and Malchow's, is certain to produce morally disastrous effects upon the readers. Schroeder,

describing the trial of Dr. Malchow and his publisher, reports the following:

During the trial, the court refused the defendants the right to prove that all in the book was true, holding, with all the judicial decisions, that their being true was immaterial in fixing guilt. An unsuccessful effort was made to prove the need for such a book because of the great ignorance of the public upon sex matters, and the "learned" judge remarked that he hoped it was true that the public was ignorant of such matters, and excluded the evidence. President Roosevelt being asked by members of Congress to pardon the convicts, because of the propriety of this book, is reported to have expressed an amazing regret that he could not prolong the sentence.²

In the various court decisions, the obscene is held to be anything that may incite "impure thoughts" in the "minds of persons that are susceptible to impure thoughts," or which "tends to deprave the minds" of any, who because of youth or inexperience, are "open to such influences." These opinions continue down to the most recent censorship of Mrs. Mary Ware Dennett's pamphlet on sex education. Books are subject to censorship when they are "unbecoming and immodest," and yet in all this the courts have been vague in their definitions. On the whole, the judges have expressed from the bench the Christian mores as a basis for finding the accused guilty. In *United States vs. Harman* Judge Phillips thus delivered himself to the jury:

There is in the popular conception and heart such a thing as modesty. It was born in the Garden of Eden. After Adam and Eve ate of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, they passed from that condition of perfectibility, which some people nowadays aspire to, and, their eyes being opened, they discovered that there was both good and evil; "and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves aprons." From that day to this civilized man has carried with him a sense of shame, the feeling that there were some things on which the eye, the mind, should not look; and where men or women become so depraved by the use, or so insensate from perverted education that they will not veil their eyes, or hold their tongues, the Government should perform the office for them in protection of the social compact and the body politic.³

² T. Schroeder, *Free Press Anthology*, 1909, p. 254. Cf. also Schroeder, "Obscene" *Literature and Constitutional Law*, 1911, p. 69. Courtesy of T. Schroeder.

³ Quoted by H. Broun and M. Leech, *Anthony Comstock*, 1927, p. 274. Courtesy of Albert and Charles Boni, Inc.

The opinion of the judge reflects the attitude of the masses. And so all frank discussion of sex is commonly censored. While minorities may differ, majority opinion seems to favor the traditional mores, even though in any single case it may be hard to decide what is censorable and what is not.

In addition to the direct censorship of the expression of opinion, there is an indirect pressure of significance. This is the threat of censorship, as it has existed in many countries. Thus without overt action by the authorities, a pretty effective censorship may nevertheless be maintained. Tolstoy described the way in which the very fear of possible censorship affected his work:

You will not believe how, from the very commencement of my activity, that horrible censor question has tormented me. I wanted to write what I felt, but at the same time it occurred to me that what I wrote would not be permitted; and involuntarily I had to abandon the work. I abandoned, and went on abandoning, and meanwhile the years passed.⁴

As Tolstoy implies, the effect of such a fear is to prevent any expression of opinion. This means that censorship may obviously retard the growth of adequate political or economic institutions or of creative art.

Unsuccessful attempts at censorship often give to a book the attention of a much wider public than it might otherwise have gained. For example, Cabell's *Jurgen*, which had an originally limited circulation, was brought before a court by the Society for Suppression of Vice. The book became famous overnight, and for two years it was given attention in the press. Copies of *Jurgen* were in demand through the country at high prices. Thousands of persons read it who otherwise would never have heard of it. After the case was finally dismissed in favor of the publisher, the book had an enormous sale. The notion having got abroad that the book was dangerously spicy, people in all circles became interested in it. A more recent instance was the effort to suppress Radclyffe Hall's *The Well of Loneliness*. This novel must have reached thousands who otherwise would never have heard of it. This sort of thing has happened over and over again in this country. The suppression of a book or a printed play arouses public curiosity. We promptly discuss it and attempt to secure it, and give the book a far greater circulation than it might otherwise have had. In our

⁴ Quoted by E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, 1920, p. 645. Courtesy of The Century Company.

day when such suppression is itself news, the fact or mere threat of suppression soon spreads. Almost overnight the curious become over-anxious to see and read the forbidden thing.

One very definite result of all censorship, as of all taboo, is clear from this. While it may be effective in preventing a lecture or in limiting the circulation of obnoxious books or pamphlets, it also has the effect of calling unusual attention to the prohibited object. The fact of the taboo itself arouses an interest in the forbidden thing. Suppression so complete that no one ever knows about the material is the only effective way of preventing this surreptitious interest in the tabooed object. The very negation of our attention and movement toward an object produces irritation and even rage. Hence, the suppression of a book or play may arouse antagonistic responses not only in the persons directly concerned but in others who hear about it and imagine that they would like to see it.

c. *Dramatic Censorship*.—Much the same sort of experience follows the censorship of the drama. In Great Britain the censorship of plays has been under the control of the Lord Chamberlain since 1737. The Puritan mores are responsible for this control. Although the existence of the law has provoked furious public discussion, the law stands today practically unchanged. The practical administration of the code, like the concrete administration of many such details in the mores, depends in part at least upon the individual judgment, or even caprice, of the official censor. One examiner appointed by the Lord Chamberlain had an obsession against the use of such words as "heaven" and "angel" and forbade their use in dramas. Other examiners have been equally arbitrary. Not only have dramas of sex like Shaw's *Mrs. Warren's Profession* been the storm center of public opinion, but plays thought irreligious have been banned. Such plays as Oscar Wilde's *Salome* (1892), Maeterlinck's *Monna Vanna* (1902), and Housman's *Bethlehem* (1902) have been suppressed, in part on religious grounds.

In the United States the control of the drama is derived largely from general statutes forbidding obscenity and lewdness and from the general police power over immoral acts. In New York the so-called "Padlock Law" is an effective threat to producers of immoral plays, for through it the courts may, on finding a play immoral, close the theater for stated periods.

In late years American censorship has been directed against dramas of sex, religion, and the war. *What Price Glory* was forced to omit some of

its more Rabelaisian action. It was actually forbidden in some cities because it offended the patriotic minorities who declared that it exposed the "wrong side" of war. The censorship of Schildkraut's *God of Vengeance* and of Gantillon's *Maya* reveals the current American mores of sex. Both plays deal with prostitution, the one realistically, the other symbolically, yet in a conscientious manner.

The student of social behavior explains these actions as part of our contemporary Christian mores. The serious treatment of the tabooed topic of sex is banned. Equally interesting to the student of human action is the fact that both in this country and in England the music hall or burlesque thrives with very little censorship. In these stage productions sex is made the subject of humor. It is treated as a joke, under the thin veil of *double entendre*. This substitute fashion of portraying sex frailties is permissible. But serious, frank, and rational treatment is taboo because after all to permit such treatment puts sex into the realm of public discussion.⁵ This the conservative elements wish to prevent.

Our taboos on sex and on the unconventional portrayal of religious characters prevented the showing of Maugham's *Rain* in some cities. As Sumner said, the sacredness of religion is in the mores of this country and any attempts on the stage, in the novel, or in the newspaper to attack it are quickly punished in one way or another. The first scene of O'Neill's *All God's Chillun Got Wings* was censored because it offended the mores of race relations. In 1911 Hebrew groups made some efforts to stop the use of Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice* in the public schools of New York City because it gave a wrong impression of the Jew, Shylock. Had these groups been in control of the schools, the drama would probably have been suppressed.

As with the novel, any censorship or threat of censorship of a play stimulates a great curiosity among people who otherwise might never hear of it. The producers of O'Neill's *Desire Under the Elms* complained of the morbid and ignorant sensation-seekers who crowded into their little playhouse during the weeks when the play was under fire from the censors. A stimulation of our interest in the tabooed subject has always followed from the efforts to enforce the taboo. This seems especially to be a fact in situa-

⁵ An amusing incident in the censorship of sex materials occurred when the Report of the Chicago Vice Commission was barred from the mails. See F. L. Wells, *Mental Adjustments*, pp. 80-84 for a discussion of substitutive words for various tabooed subjects, and of the social factors which govern their usage.

tions where the masses may satisfy their repressions by vicarious indulgence in dramatic situations.

Censorship of the motion picture follows the same cultural patterns. Here, as in all censorship, there are local indifferences. What is cut by the State censors of Pennsylvania or Kansas may be acceptable in other states. Still the taboo in general follows the Christian codes. Scenes dealing with passionate love-making, with crime, or with particular religions are deleted. Often the permissible sections are very short and merely suggestive. The following list of deletions from rather recent films shows concretely what kinds of actions the censors think are offensive to public morals:

Great stress is laid on the fact that children must be protected from all knowledge of evil. In *Brother Officers* the censors cut out scenes showing baby clothes designed for a baby yet to be born and gave as the official reason, "The average child believes a stork brings the baby. We can't disillusion the child."

It is interesting to note that Ohio censors cut out pictures of girls in bathing suits that the stern Pennsylvanians pass. The explanation is that Pennsylvanians and New Yorkers are hardened to bathing suits because they are so much nearer Atlantic City, Coney Island and such places.

The Pennsylvania Board of Censors has a list of about thirty standards which guides it in its work. I will quote a few of the more interesting ones:

- "1. No prenatal or childbed scenes will be approved.
- "2. Pictures including themes and incidents having to do with eugenics, birth control, race suicide.
- "3. Pictures showing men and women living together without marriage.
- "4. Views of women smoking will not be disapproved as such, but when women are smoking in suggestive postures or their manner of smoking is suggestive or degrading, such scenes will be disapproved."

It will interest you to see a few random elimination orders of censorship boards. Ohio censors forbade this joke:

"Bootlegging must be a good business."

"Aw, it ain't the coin that counts so much wit' me, lady. It's the people youse meet."

The reason: "It would incite to crime."

Eliminated from Mack Sennet comedy:

"Will you drink your hair tonic here or take it home?" Another crime incentive.

An uncle was spanking two children. He says, "This hurts me more than it does you." "Yes, but not in the same place." Blotted out as indecent.

Here is one cut out from a picture called *The Best People*.

"The Willow Grove Country Club had heard about prohibition several years ago and didn't believe it yet." The censors made it "The Willow Grove Country Club was smart and snappy."

Close-up views of bottles of champagne and ice were eliminated.

The Manicure Girl—"Eliminate 'Give Anthony and Cleopatra a facial. God knows they need it,' and substitute 'Give Anthony and Cleopatra a facial. Heaven knows they need it.' Profane and objectionable language."⁶

National differences in the mores of course appear in censorship. In Japan kissing scenes in American films are strictly tabooed because kissing is thought highly immoral for Japanese youth. In the United States, while long kissing scenes in the films are usually cut down, kissing as such is not taboo.

d. *Censorship of Fine Arts*.—The censorship of painting and sculpture follows much the same trend. The placing of MacMonnies' "Civic Virtue" in City Hall Square, New York, aroused a storm of protest from organizations and individuals who saw in it an indecent thrust at the female sex. The exposure of paintings of the nude has been tabooed in many cities, as has also the erection of statues of the nude, for much the same reasons as the censorship of plays and novels dealing with sex. The local mores operate here as elsewhere in determining what is "good" and "proper." What is immoral in one country may in another be quite acceptable or at least a mere peccadillo.

2. *International Conflict and Censorship*.—Political, economic, and moral changes provoke a certain amount of censorship in our day. Nevertheless, in spite of all our taboos, we really have much more freedom in these things than ever before. With the changing of moral codes there is bound to be, at least in our cosmopolitan centers, a good deal of liberty in printing, play production and the exhibition of artistic works. While minorities, usually reformer groups with the older Puritan mores, try to enforce their own taboos, other minorities oppose this attempt at censorship. Though the reform groups may feel that the threatening social changes constitute a real crisis, they are only partly successful in suppressing the offensive productions.

In periods, as during the World War, where our national existence is thought to be at stake, the situation is somewhat different. In such times

⁶ Selected from B. Ueland, "Censuring the Movies," Liberty, March 20, 1926.

national survival becomes paramount. Any efforts to hurt the public morale and prevent complete support of the armed force of the nation are dealt with severely. Our official theories of personal liberty seem unable to stretch themselves to tolerate disobedience and disloyalty in a time of national stress. As a consequence we substitute an oligarchic military control for democratic civil procedure. Military tactics seem to demand censorship of military information. As in the recent war, this is easily followed by censorship of political opinion about the war. While those gifted in logical niceties may distinguish military from non-military censorship, in actual practice, with our highly integrated modern life where every detail of our social organization becomes essential to military success, it is impossible to separate sharply the military from other forms of censorship. Thus, in the late war, censorship was applied to every phase of news and opinion. An entire nation or even group of allied nations became a large in-group fighting for existence. We attempted to close up even the slightest difference of idea or attitude. If public opinion implies differences of opinion—and we have so defined it—it practically ceased to exist. Instead whole populations were dragooned into silence and conformity in order to insure the larger good of national survival.

War news has been commonly censored for a long time. Organized governmental censorship is relatively recent. For instance, during the Civil War the censorship of newspapers and periodicals was not systematic. The Northern newspapers printed information and opinions which never would be permitted today in war time. It might be contended that the liberty permitted the press during the Civil War affected unfavorably the success of Northern arms. War correspondents traveling with the Union troops caused some antagonism among many military commanders. Sherman was particularly bitter. He remarked in one of his letters: "If the press can govern the country, let them fight the battles." *Harper's Weekly* was once suppressed for printing sketches of fortifications at Yorktown at the time it was besieged by General McClellan. The *Chicago Times* was suppressed because of its attitudes on the war. Other sporadic efforts were made to control the press in the interests of the Union cause. Still, on the whole, the newspapers during the Civil War were remarkably free from censorship.

The Franco-Prussian War brought into existence a fairly systematic organization for the control of news. However, it was not until the Balkan

Wars and the Russian-Japanese War that censorship began to assume the national significance which we witnessed in the World War. Since the hysteria of war has dissipated itself, a number of recent books and memoirs throw much light on the techniques of censorship during the World War. Two accessible British publications of value are Brownrigg's *Indiscretions of a Naval Censor* and Sir Campbell Stuart's *Secrets of Crewe House*.

Various books formerly thought harmless such as pictorial annuals of the British navy showing pictures of fighting ships were called in and suppressed. The names of mercantile vessels destroyed by mines were suppressed so that the enemy might not know of its successes. The theory early developed that news of disasters should be kept from the public for fear that they might lose heart and fail to support the war. For instance, Brownrigg relates how, in September, 1914, Lord Churchill withheld news of disasters to the British in the Dardanelles in the hope that he might have good news from some other quarter to offset it. One of the most interesting cases of censorship in the whole war occurred following the Battle of Jutland. The Grand Fleet met the Germans on May 31, 1916. Over the radio the Germans proclaimed to the world a complete victory. The British public got nothing official or otherwise in its newspapers for days. Finally men from the crippled ships which had crept into English ports began to tell their stories of the battle. These narratives circulated first by word of mouth and then got into the press. In the end, when the public became sufficiently aroused, the naval officials gave out the news, telling the number of vessels lost and some details about the fight. They still suppressed the names of the vessels lost. Under the theory of military secrecy, the British administration first tried to censor rigidly all news which appeared in the British papers; later, as the war went on, they modified this policy. In the modifications made in published photographs of British ships, we see some curious aspects of censorship. Brownrigg re-publishes a number of original pictures, and then the pictures as they appeared free from details which might give information to the enemy. In all this, there is the attitude of the military authority which feels that it must repress all information and opinion about its operations, and, in opposition, the theory, or culture pattern, of a free press in a democratic country. Inevitably conflicts arose between the press and the government. In 1917 the London *Nation* was forbidden to send one of its issues to America on the ground

that its comment might arouse the wrong attitudes in America toward the war. Yet, in general, the press supported the war whole-heartedly. It so completely complied with the government's wishes that public opinion about the war ceased to exist. The only problems left were the minor ones of just what material to print and what not to.

Partly because we were farther away from the war the American press was not in quite the same situation as was the European press. On the whole, governmental control of news was more quickly and more effectively established here than elsewhere. Dispatches from European sources were all approved. Only official news got through. The Americans were often denied news which was furnished British readers without stint.

Within our country, the feeble minority groups who opposed the war were effectively silenced. The *New York Call*, the *Masses*, and the *Milwaukee Leader*, three radical papers, were suppressed. Censorship did not cease with newspapers. Latzo's *Men in War* was disapproved by Postmaster Burleson and did not circulate through the mails until some time after the war was over. The army officials prepared an official index of tabooed books among them being Frederick Howe's *Why War?*, Barbusse's *Under Fire*, and Latzo's *Men in War*.

Our theory in all this was that suppression of stimulation controls response. If the soldiers do not read realistic novels of the war, we can more easily fill them with the romantic, fantastical images of war which are current in our national legends and mythology. If we prevent people from reading negative, critical articles about the war, we keep them in an emotional rather than a rational attitude toward the war. We must, that is, control the direction of their attention. We must get their behavior under the control of the group leaders who have the responsibility for prosecuting the war to a successful issue. National survival, the persistence of our in-group cultural values, depends on our success; and any means to accomplish this survival are right and proper.

In summary, then, censorship is rooted in our inhibitions of our own and others' expressions of opinion and behavior except in culturally acceptable ways. It is correlated with the whole psychology of authority. That is, censorship is a form of our collective behavior when our cultural values are threatened in crises. If the crisis is intra-group, various publics or interest groups may clash over the direction which social behavior should take. If, as in war, the crisis is inter-group, practically the

whole nation may be forced into silence. Out of its desire for survival the state may mobilize itself to force the small unruly minorities to discontinue the slightest criticism of a war even if such divergent groups will not accept the nationalistic thesis. The use of arbitrary censorship in either intra-group or inter-group crisis is but another evidence of the dominance of emotionalized attitudes in a crisis. Furthermore, with our changing cultural norms, censorship is itself a subject of public discussion, in both peace and war. Although the various organs of public opinion in Europe and this country during the years 1914-18, conformed, more or less under duress, to the standards of the military authority, the democratic tradition of freedom of speech and press persisted and it was not without protest that censorship was so universally applied.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

A. Questions and Exercises.

1. What is the relation of modern censorship to taboo in more primitive and ancient societies?
2. What are the principal crises in which censorship today tends to develop?
3. Why do certain ultra-patriotic groups become so concerned over the publication of the more critical, realistic biographies of Washington, Jackson, John Brown, Grant, Wilson and others?
4. How do you account for the divergences in the type of literary material censored in Boston and in New York?
5. How do you account for differences in matter censored in the motion picture in various states and communities?
6. Why is censorship more severe in time of war than at any other period?

B. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Themes.

1. Report Graves, *Readings in Public Opinion*, Chapters, XXXI, XXXIII, nos. 1, 2.
- 1a. Report Ernst and Scagle, *To the Pure, A Study of Obscenity and the Censor*.
2. Psychological Analysis of World War Censorship: England, America, France, Germany. (Cf. Young and Lawrence, *Bibliography on Censorship and Propaganda*, University of Oregon Press, 1928.)
3. Review Brownrigg's *Indiscretions of a Naval Censor* in order to see the types of technique employed.
4. Do the same for Stuart's *Secrets of Crewe House* and Cook's *The Press in Wartime*.

CHAPTER XXVII

PROPAGANDA: POSITIVE CONTROL OF PUBLIC OPINION

A. *The Nature and Background of Propaganda.*

1. *Definition of Propaganda.*—Propaganda is a word much used during the past decade. Someone once described it as “a good word gone wrong.” Bernays even remarked that “there is more propaganda for and against propaganda—and more of it is false—than about most of the causes in which propaganda is utilized as a weapon.” The term propaganda was first used in any modern sense with the papal establishment in 1633 of the *Congregatio de propaganda fide* to foster Roman Catholic missions. It meant simply religious proselyting. Today the word has acquired a rather sinister connotation. Really the word has been used in two senses—one very broad and vague, the other fairly special. The first sense is simply any form of proselyting, publicity and advertising or even education designed to change our opinions or attitudes through the techniques of suggestion. In the more special sense propaganda means an effort deliberately to manufacture popular opinions and attitudes and thus to control popular conduct; and usually the implication is that the aims of the propagandists are concealed. The objects of propaganda do not know the purposes of the makers of the propaganda. Propaganda then is the propagation of ideas, opinions and attitudes, the real purpose of which is not made clear to the hearer or reader.

The term is related to the Latin “propagare,” meaning “to fasten down layers, shoots or slips of plants for the purpose of reproduction, hence to generate, reproduce, and generally to extend or increase.” Etymologically, then, propaganda is not a breeding that would take place of itself; it is a forced generation.¹

That is, propaganda means an artificial propagation, not an unconscious growth. Psychologically propaganda is much like legend- and myth-making, but it differs in this one respect. Propaganda materials are con-

¹ F. E. Lumley, *Means of Social Control*, 1925, p. 186. Courtesy of The Century Company.

sciously manufactured, while much of the legendary and mythological material in our social reality is quite unconsciously produced. The sinister aspects of propaganda are subjects of social valuation, questions of social ethics, and they need not concern us here. We simply wish to see its relation to social behavior and to examine its psychology and technique both as it is made and as it is received. We must first distinguish between propaganda and advertising. Through the techniques of suggestion, advertising attempts to influence the buying habits of the public but the usual reader knows the purposes of the advertiser. This is not so in propaganda. Propaganda may appear to be education. But education, even when it employs suggestion, is not to be confused with propaganda. Education, if it means anything not only passes on information and teaches skill, it also stimulates critical ability. In this way the most effective education might counteract propaganda.

2. *History of Propaganda.*—As we have already noted, the term was first employed in the founding of the Roman Catholic propaganda college. One of its most modern features was developed in the Napoleonic period when the press of France was encouraged to foster the growing Napoleonic legend. Just as Napoleon censored the news and opinion of his day in order to maintain his control, so too, he deliberately spread ideas favoring his regime. Of course the Napoleonic legend did not arise entirely from this conscious effort of Napoleon himself; but he certainly helped greatly to establish it as a popular French legend. Napoleon III deliberately re-stimulated the Napoleonic legend and used it to help maintain his own position. Guedalla's *Second Empire: Bonapartism, the Prince, the Emperor* is an interesting description of the revival of the legend. Bismarck not only recognized the force of censorship, he was equally aware of the value of propaganda. During the Franco-Prussian War he made every effort to build up opinions favorable to the Prussian cause in the French press as well as in the press of his own and allied countries. Later, to serve his nationalistic designs, he encouraged popular attitudes antagonistic toward England and especially toward Queen Victoria. The World War, however, called out the most colossal propaganda we have yet seen. Every warring country made use of all its devices and our present attitudes toward the whole war are still influenced by this propaganda.²

² Perhaps the best source on the whole subject of censorship and propaganda is L. M. Salmon, *The Newspaper and Authority*, 1923, and her companion volume, *The Newspaper and the Historian*, 1923.

B. *Psychology of Propaganda.*

1. *Propaganda and Fantasy Thinking.*—Propaganda-making is a part of the larger process of legend- and myth-making. Much the same psychological mechanisms are at work in both, but in propaganda the legends and myths are deliberately created. The emotional association of words and pictures with ideas and attitudes is provided by our early conditioning. Through the technique of suggestion the propagandist plays on these associations. He adds new stories, explanations and descriptions of events, all calculated to arouse our fear and anxiety and to make us avoid some things and to accept and enjoy the new legends and by projection to participate in them. Like so much of our behavior, our fears, angers, irritations, avoidances, or acceptances, loves and sympathies reflect our attachment to some particular group and our negative attitudes to other groups.

As we have seen, the legends and myths on which we are all brought up, are largely stories of our national history, of our religion and church, of our political party and of successful men in our historic groups. Propaganda is merely the conscious creation of this same sort of material in the interests of group survival and social control. The reason we believe the propaganda is merely that it fits into the unconscious attitudes which have always been satisfactory both to our own egos and to those of other members of our group. Myths and legends are necessary to preserve our morale, for morale is simply the basic set of group ideas and attitudes emotionally toned toward some common end. Propaganda, then, is merely a modern device for increasing the effects of the usually unconscious means by which we maintain our morale. We feed our egos and maintain our group solidarity out of our day-dream world. The sense of unity which is so essential to morale is increased by feeding everyone a similar set of ideas and attitudes about a critical situation. Each one of us individually projects upon the rest of the group his own attitudes toward a crisis. Since the stimuli and the emotional, experiential background are largely the same for all of us, our attitudes and reactions are going to be much alike. By conversation and observation of the action of others, each one of us is confirmed in his projection of his attitudes, and our more or less unconscious inference of group solidarity is verified. Thus our sense of group solidarity grows.

As we noted in the previous chapter propaganda is really the reverse of censorship. When the latter has deleted facts about critical events, the propagandist is often employed to fill in the gaps. During a war, facts about the movement of troops, casualties, and international agreements may be suppressed and the public supplied with other matter in their place. Propaganda is thus a positive rather than a negative device in the control of public opinion and of our subsequent conduct. Propaganda has the psychological advantage of being creative. Censorship is fundamentally a form of restraint of movement, whether of ideas or actions, and may provoke tendencies to revolt, to throw off the source of the repression. It plays upon our fears, angers, and our prepotent pugnacity. It arouses in us feelings of unpleasantness and attitudes of disgust.

On the contrary, propaganda gives us a basis for active belief and behavior toward the situation. It may bring about an integration of our whole personality in its attitudes and actions. Our anticipatory responses of images, ideas and attitudes are made distinctly satisfying. In this sense well-manipulated propaganda is a much more effective way to influence our conduct than is censorship.

Like censorship, propaganda occurs at various levels of social organization. In the primary group it may be vicious gossip. Thus, in Lewis' *Main Street* Mrs. Bogart put herself out to spread unsavory rumors about one of the town school teachers. Here we have a case of propaganda as a means of social control at the simplest level. It is, however, in our present-day complex society that propaganda has its most marked effects. Since today we are so separated from the sources of news and from situations upon which we are supposed to have opinions and to make judgments, the deliberate falsification and manufacture of news and interpretations of news become increasingly easy.

C. Media and Technique of Contemporary Propaganda.

The principle media of propaganda are the organs of opinion which we have already examined. The newspaper, the pamphlet, the film, the radio, books, and the lecture constitute the principal vehicles of propaganda. We shall analyze contemporary propaganda first as we have it within our own country among various interest groups and then as we find it playing a part in international conflicts.

1. *Intra-national propaganda.*—The most common example of intra-

national propaganda is that of our political parties. We make political propaganda for two purposes. During campaigns our major political parties employ propaganda to win votes for their candidates and measures. Minority reform groups employ propaganda to arouse our public opinion upon the issues which they think are important. Many of these groups ultimately hope to change our laws to give all social control to the organized state. Similarly special economic interests employ propaganda to secure public favor and even political action in their favor.

a. *Party Propaganda.*—If we define propaganda in the looser sense of deliberate effort by suggestion to influence opinion and action, political propaganda is as old as political parties. The Federalist papers, the agitation of the Native American clubs and newspapers against foreign immigration, the Know Nothing Movement, are cases in which political groups sponsored propaganda or affiliated themselves with the organizations which did. In recent years party propaganda has become a much more deliberate effort to create legends and myths of political personalities and their parties. The Republican propaganda of 1896 against the Bryan Democrats is illuminating. The deliberately stimulated fear of radical agrarian movements was especially powerful in the industrial East after the financial panic of 1893. This propaganda was so effective that the Democratic party still has to combat the legend of the bankruptcy, closed factories and hard times which supposedly accompany a Democratic regime. This is the negative picture. The positive picture is the prosperity, good times, the "full dinner pail" for the workman, the rich profits for the business and manufacturing interests which follow from a Republican administration. The Democrats, in turn, describe themselves as saviors of the country from the "Wolves of Wall Street," as the supporters of the "Common Man" against the "Intrenched Interests" of the Republicans. The Socialists and other radicals attack both the major parties. They have sold themselves to the capitalists. They follow the faulty philosophic and economic patterns of Capitalistic monopoly not only of goods, but of production and distribution. Each political party attempts to picture the opposition black and itself white. This is the essence of good propaganda and it always works. It gives a picture of one group against another,—the ever-present we-group against the others-group.

Part of political propaganda technique is the creation of heroic sagas about the personalities who are party leaders. Candidate X is the "friend

of the working man." Through his own efforts he rose from digging ditches or ploughing fields to his present place in the sun. Every man may do the same! For the bourgeois class, the candidate is now a successful lawyer, business man or eminent engineer. Perhaps he has preserved his state in a crisis. It has often been said that ex-President Coolidge became a distinct hero for many people by his alleged breaking of the Boston police strike. Mr. Roosevelt was pictured as a friend of the ordinary man, as a "trust buster." He was a "Progressive." He was a man of courage who was not afraid of those who were robbing the country of its natural resources, —resources which should belong to the common man and to posterity. Mr. Wilson rose from rather humble circumstances to lead a great idealistic movement for "making the world safe for democracy," for destroying the bogey of absolutism and empire. The friends of Roosevelt and Wilson continue to employ propaganda to increase the legends of these men. Such legends, in turn, may affect party destinies. Jefferson, Jackson, and Wilson are names to conjure with before any Democratic convention. Republican heroes are Hamilton, Lincoln, and Roosevelt. Thus, whenever these legendary accounts seem to enhance the present fortunes of the party, political parties actually encourage the legends which have spontaneously grown up around national leaders of the past. No matter if the heroes had quite other views than their political descendents, it is only necessary to play upon their names and to repeat glittering generalities, and the public sets off in mass pursuit of the good things which the heroes are alleged to have striven for.

b. *Minority Propaganda and Political Control.*—Another example of political propaganda is the agitation carried on by minority groups within the party, who hope for the ultimate acceptance of their views by the party. If the party later obtains control of the state, these opinions may be made law. Here the line between propaganda in the narrow sense and in the broader sense of stimulation of public opinion is difficult to draw. Minorities often carry on militant campaigns to accomplish political change. Two of the best historical examples are the Abolitionist movement and the agitation of the Anti-Saloon League for the abolition of liquor traffic. Garrison and his followers profoundly affected public opinion in the North with their propaganda against slavery. Without doubt national prohibition was hastened by the vigorous propaganda of the Anti-Saloon League. In our own day, propaganda of all sorts is carried on in favor of the views of

various minority groups. Recently the public utilities organizations were discovered employing a vigorous propaganda against the public ownership of utilities. In colleges they distributed pamphlets describing the benefits of privately owned public utilities; by lectures and publicity, by lobbies in state and national legislatures, these organizations have attempted to influence public opinion. They appeal to the ideology of private ownership, to the economic doctrines of private entrepreneurs and to the scare-heads of a state socialism which would destroy individual initiative and undermine the democratic political state. Like all propaganda, this propaganda fastens its current materials onto old patterns—prejudice, ideas and attitudes which are our traditional picture of our political-economic world. This is always a world safe, sensible and warmly familiar. Changes will cut under this world, disrupt it, and bring chaos. Not infrequently the conservative masses may be made afraid of radical changes more easily than they may be made enthusiastic for changes designed for their own good. The opponents of unrestricted private manipulation of utilities use the counter arguments of the good which will accrue from municipal or state ownership of electric lighting, gas plants, waterworks and street railways. In one the individualistic thesis is erected into an ultimate, absolute value. With the opposition the collectivistic good of the community or state is emphasized.

All this is curiously analagous to the controversy over the liquor traffic. Those who favored the *status quo* of saloon and liquor re-imbued the doctrine of individual liberty with meaning. The Anti-Saloon Leaguers described the values which would follow our collective abolition of this pernicious evil. Their collectivistic thesis finally won the political fiat of law. It remains to be seen what the outcome of the public utilities dispute will be.

Another kind of political propaganda is based upon our moral-religious prejudices. We have already discussed this feature of the presidential campaign of 1928. Various minority associations circulated amazing tales of the corruption of Tammany Hall, of the Papal threat at American ideals in the candidacy of Mr. Smith and of the danger of the return of the saloon if the Democratic candidate were elected. While the obvious purpose of this propaganda was the defeat of Mr. Smith, it fundamentally represented a fear for the security of our current Puritan mores and for the accomplished moral reform of the prohibition of the liquor traffic.

2. *International Relations and Propaganda*.—Propaganda between nations is carried on today with great vigor. As the relations of men and groups cover an increasing political and economic area, international propaganda is certain to be used more frequently than ever before. We shall discuss first propaganda during international conflict. Then we shall treat of propaganda in times of peace.

a. *Propaganda in War*.—War-time propaganda has attracted the greatest notice in late years. The paper bullets of Mr. Creel may not have won the World War, any more than any of the single, particularistic "reasons" did, but certainly his work and that of the other Allied propaganda artists, had a distinct share in the victory. Creel's "Committee on Public Information in the United States," our official propaganda service, distributed over seventy-five million pamphlets, bulletins and leaflets. These were written in various series. We may summarize his statistical report as follows:

Of the "Red, White and Blue Series," over eighteen million pieces were distributed. In this set alone, nearly five and a half million of "How the War Came to America," over one million of "Conquest and Kultur," and one and a half million of "German War Practices," were printed. Of the "War Information Series," including such titles as "The War Message and the Facts Behind It," and "Why America Fights Germany," nearly fifteen million were sent out. Approximately three and a half million "Loyalty Leaflets" were distributed. Over eight hundred thousand of a series called "Publications for the Friends of German Democracy" were used, made up largely of Prince Lichnowsky's, "My London Mission." An appeal to labor was made in the series called "Publications for Division of American Alliance for Labor and Democracy." This set ran to over one and a quarter million and contained such titles as, "Why Workingmen Support the War" and "German Socialists and the War." More than three-quarters of a million pamphlets were employed in an effort to reach non-English speaking minorities in the "Publications for Foreign Sections." In addition to these considerably over thirty-five million miscellaneous pieces were issued, including five and a half million copies of "The Kaiserite in America," nearly five million bulletins for four-minute speakers and over a million and a half postcards.³

These enormous quantities of material were employed as part of the work of influencing opinion and morale among Allies, the neutrals and the enemies. While propaganda was used in earlier wars, its organization was

³ Summarized from appendix to G. Creel, *How We Advertised America*, 1920, pp. 455-57.

ineffective and infantile compared to the subtle propaganda employed from 1914 to 1920 or even later, to influence public opinion and promote group morale. A number of books and hundreds of periodical articles have already been written on war propaganda.⁴

Propaganda in war time has three objectives. It is directed toward the populations at home, toward citizens of neutral countries, and finally toward the civilian populations of enemy countries and toward their military forces at the front. Using illustrations from the World War, we shall discuss the technique and psychology of these three phases of propaganda.

(i) *Propaganda for Those at Home*.—Propaganda directed at the citizens of our own country tries to keep up our group morale, to increase our feelings of the superiority of our in-group, and to confirm our belief in the righteousness of our war aims. Such propaganda not only praises our own high purposes, but dilates on the evil and vicious purposes of the enemy. The propagandist tries to mobilize our hatred. To do so he must circulate stories fixing upon the enemy the sole responsibility for the war. The war is not the normal outcome of the political and economic organization of the modern world, but the result of deliberate rapacity of the enemy. The first duty of a nation at war is to close its ranks against the enemy. Local differences must be forgotten. Political party lines must disappear. Various antagonistic economic groups must stop their intra-national competition in the presence of the more serious issue of national survival. This is an inevitable social-psychological process whenever the in-group is threatened. During the war it was the duty of the propagandist to produce this integration of attitudes in all the belligerent countries.

In all countries involved in the war the long training in patriotic attitudes proved stronger in time of a national crisis than the intellectual belief in the Marxian doctrine of the class struggle. The Kaiser united his people by saying that he knew no party. The *Union sacrée* was proclaimed in the French Chamber of Deputies and the French Senate. Gustave Hervé, an ardent socialist, *sans patrie*, had long belabored the capitalistic regime of France and the world. At the opening of war he changed the name of his paper from *La Guerre Sociale* to *La Victoire*, and pleaded with his proletarian readers for national unity:

⁴ For an idea of the extent of this material consult K. Young and R. D. Lawrence's *Bibliography on Censorship and Propaganda*, 1928, pp. 114-132. Much of the concrete material in this section is drawn from H. D. Lasswell's admirable treatise *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, New York, 1927.

Amis socialistes, amis syndicalistes, amis anarchistes, qui n'êtes pas seulement l'avant-garde idéaliste de l'humanité; mais qui êtes encore le nerf et la conscience de l'armée française, la patrie est en danger! La patrie de la Révolution est en danger!⁵

Nothing could indicate more effectively the power of the in-group ideal which is laid down in us in our early childhood. Whatever intellectual theories and aims Hervé may have adopted later in life, in the time of crisis, he succumbed to the appeal of national we-group unity. The same thing is evidenced in every country involved in the late war. People in this country, especially academic and professional persons, were amazed at the manifesto of the ninety-three German professors who in 1914 signed a document alleging Germany to be free of the guilt of starting the war. Yet, the intellectuals of France, England, and later of the United States, with few exceptions, followed the masses and the political-military leaders of their own countries. They accepted the belief in the innocence of the Allies and laid the blame on the out-group, the enemy. American professors wrote pamphlets, delivered addresses, and told their college classes all about German aggressiveness and intrigue. They demonstrated the war to be a deliberate plan of the Central Powers to dominate the world. They drew upon the history of Frederick the Great and Bismarck to prove it. They invoked the race theories of De Gobineau to show how innately pugnacious and uncultured the Teutons really are. They tore material from the heart of Nietzsche's writings to prove that his philosophy was the supreme ideology upon which Germany based her aggression. So, too, the German writers told their peoples the long story of "perfidious Albion," of the deliberate plots of French *Révanche* policy and of the Pan-Slavic threat to the security of the Germanic peoples.

The most common stereotype of the Allies was "German militarism." The Central Powers were fondest of "the freedom of the seas." War guilt invariably had a negative correlation with the purity of war aims. The enemy is guilty of the war. We entered the war to defend ourselves and to secure liberty and justice for all. The domestic propaganda of all the warring nations was absolutely forced to make these assertions of an ideal cause. As Lasswell said: "This permits the scrupulous to kill with a clean conscience." But it does more than that. It gives a center around which the personality may organize itself for action. On the out-group we heap all

⁵ Quoted by H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, 1927, p. 55. Published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

of our fears, rages, and evil thoughts. On the in-group we place the wreaths of the final victory of high and righteous ends.

Phrase-making becomes an important aid in this process. "Beat the Kaiser," "Can the Germans," "Hunt the Hun," were American favorites. As the positive statements of the in-group's war aims, such phrases as "making the world safe for democracy," "World Organization," "The United States of the Earth," "The Confederation of the World," "A World Union of Free Peoples," or "A League of Nations" were popular and satisfying. This crystallization of public feelings is the greatest accomplishment of the good propagandist.

Not only is it necessary to prove the enemy responsible for the war, and to show that he is responsible for all the evil resulting from it; it is important further to brace the minds of the in-group by showing really what a concrete devil he is. The casual observer often misunderstands this evocation of demonology. Tirades, with concrete examples of enemy atrocities, do not affect the enemy's behavior so much as they bolster up the feelings of superiority and self-righteousness of our own nation. What is selected by the propagandist as material for the atrocity stories depends upon the mores "of the nation whose animosity is to be aroused." Lasswell cites as the most familiar of the themes: the insolence of the enemy, its sordidness, racial (inherent) perfidy, cruelty, and degeneracy, especially as regards sex crimes and other forms of terrorism. In Berlin "Rule Britannia" produced the same effects as did "Deutschland, Deutschland Über Alles" in London or Paris. Germany's grasping for wealth was also plain. Germany wanted the British markets. The United States entered the war, according to German accounts, to enrich her own coffers. The innate perfidy of the enemy is always self-evident. Sartieux, in his book, *Morale Kantienne et morale humaine* (1916), wrote that:

One of the most subtle tendencies of the German character is the hypocritical lie, which appears under the guise of naïve sincerity, and justifies itself by the most incredible sophisms. . . . The judgment of a Latin historian, Velleius Paterculus, has often been quoted. He found the ancient Germans a race of "born liars."⁶

Each country warned its people of the lying propaganda of the enemy nations. The Germans were much perturbed by the English and later by the

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

American propaganda, especially that which filtered through the official press services.

The story of terrorism is a familiar one. Each side accused the other of atrocities of all sorts.

It was likewise perfectly safe for President Poincaré to flay the barbarous Germans for dropping bombs upon defenceless women and children. Very few among the Allied peoples knew, and very few of them, had they known, would have cared, that on the 26th of June, 1916, French and English aviators dropped bombs upon Karlsruhe, killing or wounding 26 women and 124 children, or that on the 22nd of September, 1915, the Allied bombers had taken a toll of 103 victims in a raid upon the same city. In the fever of combat the news of the slaughter of enemy noncombatants is apt to be met by the exulting cry that the "whelps and dams of murderous foes" are no more.⁷

This atrocity pattern became so common that before the war was over, each side began cataloguing the crimes of the others. To quote Lasswell again:

German sins were sorted into bins (by the French) which were labelled thus:

1. Violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium.
2. Violation of French Frontier before the Declaration of War.
3. Killing of prisoners and wounded.
4. Looting, arson, rape, murder.
5. Use of forbidden bullets.
6. Use of burning liquids and asphyxiating gas.
7. Bombarding of fortresses without notice and of unfortified towns; the destruction of buildings consecrated to Religion, Art, Science and Charity.
8. Treacherous methods of warfare.
9. Cruelties inflicted on civil population.

Dr. Ernst Müller-Meiningen, a member of the German Reichstag, compiled the sins of the Entente. The general scheme of organization is indicated in the Table of Contents:

1. The Neutrality of Belgium (How Belgium connived secretly with the Allies).
2. Mobilization and the Morality of Nations.
3. Violation of the Congo Acts. The Colonial War.
4. The Employment of barbarous and warlike tribes in a European War.
5. The Violation of the Neutrality of the Suez Canal.
6. The Breach of Chinese Neutrality by Japan and England's Assault upon Kiao-Chau.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

7. The use of Dum-Dum Bullets and the like.
8. Treatment of Diplomatic Representatives by the Triple Entente Countries in Violation of International Law. Acts of Diplomatic Representatives of the Triple Entente in Violation of International Law.
9. Non-observances and Violations of Red Cross Rules on the part of the Triple Entente States.
10. Franc-Tireur Warfare and the Maltreatment of the Defenceless before and after the Declaration of War. Also the Imprisonment of Civilians.
11. Unlawful and Inhumane Methods of Conducting War Practised by the Hostile Armies and the Governments of the Triple Entente and Belgium.
12. The Russian Atrocities in East Prussia in especial.
13. Jewish Pogroms and Other Russian Atrocities in Poland, Galicia, the Caucasus, etc.
14. The "Spirit" of the Troops of the Triple Entente. Plundering, and Destruction of their own country's Property. Self-Mutilations. Verdicts upon the Troops of the Triple Entente by their own Officers.
15. The Destruction and Misuse of Telegraph Cables.
16. Further Details as to the Vendetta of Lies of the Press of the Triple Entente. A Method of Waging War contrary to all International Law. The French "Art of War."
17. The Bombardment of Towns and Villages from Aeroplanes. The use of shells that develop Gas.
18. English Business Moral and the Code of English Creditors. Deprivation of the Legal Rights of Germans in Russia and France.
19. Breaches of Neutrality on the Seas by England and the Other States of the Triple Entente. Contraband of War. Blockades, etc.⁸

These instances of the pot calling the kettle black are common features of all war-time behavior. The only addition in technique is that in the modern war these ideas are more systematically prepared for home consumption. Deliberate misrepresentation is common:

This varies from putting a false date line on a despatch, through the printing of unverified rumours, the printing of denials in order to convey an insinuation, to the "staging" of events. One of the world war fakes was the use of pictures of the Jewish pogrom of 1905, some-what retouched, as fresh enemy atrocities. Of a similar type was the following: the London *Daily Mirror* of August 20th, 1915, published a picture of three German Officers, who held various vessels in their hands. The sub-title was, "Three German Cavalrymen loaded with gold and silver loot," which they had taken in Poland. This was, in fact, a defaced reproduction of a picture, which had originally appeared in

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

the *Berliner Lokalanzeiger* for the 9th of June, 1914, and which had shown the winners of the cavalry competition in the Grünewald.⁹

There remains but one item to add to the psychology of atrocity stories. That is to pin the label of sins on one individual or to personify the nation under some common stereotype. Thus the Kaiser was called the "Mad Dog of Europe." Sometimes the out-group is labeled as something non-human, merely animal, just as primitive tribes sometimes have tribal names meaning "We are men," or "Men," implying that all others are something else. So Kipling said in the columns of the London *Morning Post* for June 22, 1915: "But however the world pretends to divide itself, there are only two divisions in the world today—human beings and Germans." One German writer, Karl Henning, combed out of various American vice commission reports cases of children's crimes, especially sex offenses, and reproduced these as typical of American life.

Another type of propaganda is the novel or diary. The British got out a book called *Christine*, by Alice Cholmondeley (1917) which purported to be a collection of letters written by a music student to her mother in England. The book is a picture of German militaristic Kultur bound to impress unfavorably the thousands of girls and women who read it. So too romantic tales, collections of letters, and the like were circulated to keep the illusion of the glories of warfare and to encourage those at home.

Finally the orgy of Satanism projected upon the enemy comes to be sanctified by the church. To hate the enemy is not only to be a good citizen but a good Christian. To support the arms of the righteous against those of evil and sin is the highest mark of religious faith.

In addition to uniting intra-national factions on one aim, and to constructing atrocity stories to bolster up patriotism at home, the in-group must keep up the illusion of victory to the end. In the early days of the war in Germany, the writer recalls that the newspapers were daily filled with accounts of marvelous captures of guns, men, and materials. City after city fell, the troops of the Empire swept on to Paris. It was only a matter of days until the war would be over with the Germans triumphantly marching down the Champs-Élysées. The Allies had at the outset a much harder time to keep up the morale of their people and to give the assurance of victory:

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

Among the Allied powers the official thesis was that Germany, armed to the teeth and crouched to spring, had suddenly, to the consternation of the peaceful and unprepared world, invaded Belgium and swept through Northern France before the pacific and astonished Allies could recover from the shock sufficiently to stem the attack.

So far as the truth is concerned, the fact seems to be that the talk about "surprise attack" and "unpreparedness" was grossly exaggerated for the purpose of covering up the failure of French strategy and of preventing the total eclipse of civilian morale.¹⁰

While we need not here discuss the complex problem of the causes of the World War, it is interesting to note in passing how this official propaganda persists in contemporary accounts—the Sunday School version, as Beard calls it—of the origins of the war.¹¹ For our purposes it is sufficient to indicate that psychologically this sort of thing fosters morale, gives self-confidence and ultimately comes to color the official legends of the conflict. Nothing assists in this whole process better than the unofficial interpreters of the war for the various populaces.

There is a great advantage in having certain unofficial interpreters of the War to the public who can be relied upon to present matters in their most flattering light. Frank Symonds in the United States, Colonel Repington in England and Commander Rousset in France secured the confidence of the public and were of the greatest assistance to the authorities, for they were cogs in the machinery by which those interpretations least damaging to public morale were circulated. They were able to explain why retreats were "strategic retirements," and how evacuations could be "rectifications of the line."¹²

Propaganda was also employed to keep up friendly relations between the Allies. Thus, we in America were told how close we were to French culture, the legends of French aid in our own Revolutionary War were trotted out for use on both sides. And General Pershing's "Lafayette we are here!" was a very effective statement of this inter-allied good-will.

The development of legends about the military leaders is an aid to the morale of those at home. Popular accounts of the generals and prominent leaders were widely circulated in all the belligerent countries.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

¹¹ For a strong polemic on the war guilt problem, see H. E. Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War*, 3rd ed., 1928. See also S. B. Fay, *Origins of the World War*, 2 vols, 1928, for an extremely critical review of the mass of material on the origins of the war which has accumulated in the past ten years.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

(ii) *Propaganda for the Neutrals*.—It is necessary to maintain a favorable impression among the spectators of any conflict—political, religious, economic, pugilistic. As two militant minorities like the Anti-Saloon League and the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment try to capture the attention of the more passive spectators of a political fight, so nations at war find it important to enlist the favorable influence of neutrals.

Since for nearly three years of the war the United States was the most powerful neutral power, the Central Powers and the Allies made tremendous efforts to enlist our support. To offset pro-British influences, the Germans attempted to stir up pro-Irish feeling in America. The French made a most effective image of suffering France “bled white” in the cause of civilization. The large German elements in our population were played upon by German propaganda. But in the end the British won, partly because their cultural traditions are nearer our own, partly because of our strong economic ties, and psychologically because they and the French used sentimental, emotional appeals. The Germans depended too much on rational arguments. They proceeded not as good propagandists, but too much as logical debaters.

Their lack of insight into the strength of emotional appeals is wonderfully illustrated in the case of Edith Cavell, the English nurse, whom the Germans shot as a spy. The British used this incident against the Germans most effectively as a most ghastly atrocity. An American newspaper man in Berlin who knew the German officer in charge of the propaganda work for the General Staff asked him why he did not do something to counteract the propaganda of the British over the shooting of Nurse Cavell, especially in view of the fact that the French had executed two German nurses under almost precisely the same circumstances. But there was “not a murmur in the German press.” The American remarked to the German official:

“Why don’t you do something to counteract the British propaganda in America?”

“Why, what do you mean?”

“Raise the devil about the nurses the French shot the other day.”

“What? Protest? The French had a perfect right to shoot them!”¹³

While this was a rational reply, it revealed an amazing lack of sense of the nature of effective propaganda. Similarly the formal lecturers for the

¹³ Quoted by Lasswell, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

German cause in America were far less effective than the British travelers who came over, called casually on university and professional men, and chatted in clubs and at teas about the war. Then tales of war were rapidly spread by the eager-eared Americans who thought the tales must be true since they had been told "confidentially" by the famous British author or traveler, Mr. So and So.

A frank and clear picture of how the British reached the then neutral American public was given by Sir Gilbert Parker in the winter of 1918. He wrote:

Practically since the day the war broke out between England and the Central Powers I became responsible for American publicity. I need hardly say that the scope of my department was very extensive and its activities widely ranged. Among the activities was a weekly report to the British cabinet on the state of American opinion, and constant touch with the permanent correspondents of American newspapers in England, I also frequently arranged for important public men in England to act for us by interviews in American newspapers. Among these were Lloyd George, Viscount Grey (Earl of Falloiden), Balfour, Bonar Law, Archbishop of Canterbury, Sir Edward Carson, Lord Robert Cecil, Walter Runciman (Lord Chancellor), Austin Chamberlain, Lord Cromer, Lord Curzon, Lord Gladstone, Lord Haldane, Henry James, I. Zangwill, Mrs. Humphry Ward, John Redmond and at least 100 others.

Among other things, we supplied 360 newspapers in the smaller States of the United States with an English newspaper, which gives a weekly review and comment of the affairs of the war. We established connection with the man in the street through cinema pictures of the Army and Navy, as well as through interviews, articles, pamphlets, etc.; and by letters in reply to individual American critics, which were printed in the chief newspapers of the State in which they lived, and were copied in newspapers of other and neighboring States. We advised and stimulated many people to write articles; we utilized the friendly services and assistance of confidential friends; we had reports from important Americans constantly (e. g. Roosevelt) and established association, by personal correspondence, with influential and eminent people of every profession in the United States, beginning with university and college presidents, professors and scientific men, and running through all the ranges of the population. We asked our friends and correspondents to arrange for speeches, debates and lectures by American citizens, but we did not encourage Britishers to go to America and preach the doctrine of entrance into the war. Besides an immense private correspondence with individuals, we had our documents and literature sent to great numbers of public libraries, Y. M. C. A. societies, universities, colleges, historical societies, clubs and newspapers.¹⁴

¹⁴ G. Parker, "The United States and the War" *Harper's Magazine*, 1918, vol. CXXXVI, pp. 522. (This article must have been written late in 1917 or early in 1918.)

This method influenced public opinion far more effectively than any logical arguments could ever have done. In his book on the art of influencing the American public in America, Schönemann described the British war-time propaganda in America.¹⁵ He points out how the British employed the newspaper, the motion picture, the social club, and the church to put over their message. The effectiveness of this technique, however, lay not alone in its emotional appeal, but also in the fact that after all American ideals and attitudes were much closer to those of the British than they were to those of the Germans.

Literature of all sorts was very effective. Wells' *Mr. Britling Sees It Through* was enormously popular in America. British sympathizers like Roosevelt maintained close relations with the British officials and prominent men, and their leadership of opinion in this country was very effective.

Another device to catch our neutral interest was to play up the actions of our citizens who in any way assisted in the war. Any chance American in the Allied armies, any volunteer ambulance driver, nurse, or correspondent who did anything which might be considered unusual was made much of, decorated, written up in the Allied press, and the news of his activities was scattered widely in America. This was a very effective means of influencing the American public in the war and doubtless had its part in getting us into the struggle. In general, neutrals are enlisted to write articles and even books about the belligerents toward whom they are friendly. All in all, the propaganda attack upon the neutral "boils down to the problem of leading the neutral to identify his own interests with your own in defeating the enemy. . . . The most astute means of drawing in neutral sympathy is to draw the neutral into overt co-operation in some form. . . . Among all the means to be exploited, the use of personal influence is peculiarly important, as is the practice that in general neutrals should be addressed by neutrals."¹⁶

(iii) *Propaganda Against the Enemy*.—Finally there is the propaganda directed against the morale of the enemy itself—military and civilian. During the World War several devices were used to do this. The Germans circulated ostensibly French papers in the occupied territories to undermine the morale of the French and to show what fine fellows the invaders

¹⁵ F. Schönemann, *Die Kunst der Massenbeeinflussung in den Vereinigten Staaten von America*, Stuttgart, 1924.

¹⁶ Lasswell, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

really were. The doctrine of defeatism was circulated by leaflets, and by surreptitiously intruding news items in these papers. The enemy population was told over and over again that their cause was hopeless, that in the end they could only meet defeat.

The Americans used several types of material. Leaflets and cards dropped into German trenches emphasized the increasing strength of American arms in Europe. Over a million troops were already in France and ten to twenty times as many more were preparing in America to join their compatriots. Against this enormous power, surely the Germans could do nothing. Other leaflets and cards pointed out the privation of the loved ones at home, the hopelessness of the struggle, the fact that America was fighting a personified devil called "German Militarism," but not the *gemütlich* German citizen.

After the defeat of Russia, the Germans came into possession of the documents of Allied secret treaties and they tried to circulate these among the Allies. Earlier the Germans had tried to stir up anti-British sentiment in Ireland and thus divide the military attention of the British. Again to divide the military attention of the British, they tried to foment trouble among the natives in India.

All in all, the propaganda of one country against another depends for its success upon its ability to manipulate enemy morale at home, to attract neutral sympathy and even support, and finally to attack and destroy the enemy military morale. Appeals to prejudices and to common cultural backgrounds, to common historical legends and ideologies, the stimulation of fear of the enemy, and the exaggeration of contemporary crises—all these are effective. Newspapers, books, and motion pictures are effective agencies to reach public opinion. What people see in print they tend to believe. Whispering campaigns are as effective in warfare propaganda as in national or local political campaigns.

Modern publics are much like the mob. They are fickle, mobile, easily led by the nose by this and that advertisement, this or that cant phrase, this or that emotional bias. All the clever propagandist has to do to make his work effective is to remember this process. Here, emotional appeals are more effective than rational ones, as they are more effective elsewhere in social behavior and for the same reason. The successful appeal is not purely and crudely emotional. It must ring the changes on all levels. For the man in the street, for the ditch-digger and factory hand, the appeal

must be primitive and elemental. For the professional man and the academician, it must be couched in more exalted terms of apparent rational meaning. But in the end, the purpose is the same,—the arousal of antagonistic attitudes and actions toward the enemy and of favorable, sympathetic, loyal, helpful attitudes and actions toward one's own national we-group. Successful propaganda agencies will employ any organizations, devices, and suggestions which will produce these attitudes. And, of course, this is as true of intra-national as of international conflict. The stage is smaller, but the psychology is the same.

b. *Peace-Time International Propaganda*.—International propaganda may still be effective in times of peace. It is now well known that for years before 1914 the Czarist Russian government carried on pro-Russian propaganda in certain sections of the French press. Today the crises which attract international public opinion are economic problems, the migration of peoples, and the possibility of some international organization to prevent war and to promote amicable relations between nations. And even higher tariff in the United States is certain to arouse European countries to efforts to change American public opinion on our tariff. Other nations are bound to use propaganda within our own country. On the other hand, the jingoistic press of Europe may use a new tariff as a stimulus to arouse anti-American opinions abroad. Our restrictive immigration policy has already excited public opinion both in Europe and Asia. After our Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924, the Japanese displayed a good deal of anti-American sentiment. Many Japanese regarded this act as a direct blow at Japanese pride and as *prima facie* evidence of our aggressive policy in the Pacific. Again the problem of some sort of international political organization has been the subject of propaganda in the major nations of the world. In our country the problem has been a subject of active public discussion. Without doubt deliberate propaganda in favor of various types of international world organization has been active in this public discussion. It has undoubtedly met another deliberate propaganda of opposition to our coöperation in any such international organization.

Peace-time propaganda uses much the same sort of appeal as does the propaganda of war. The propagandist attempts to create new stereotypes, myths, and prejudices and to strengthen old ones which lend themselves to his purposes. Thus, those who favor our national isolation appeal to old stereotypes of national patriotism, of non-participation in foreign in-

trigues, of "America for Americans." Other groups attempt to create the stereotypes and living myths of a world bound by most intimate social, economic, and political relations. They tell us that rapid communication and travel, international commerce, and the modern mobility of people have made impossible our older self-centered nationalism. They attempt to create stereotypes which will convince us emotionally, if not altogether rationally, that as peace-loving Americans we ought to adjust ourselves to these changes.

CLASS ASSIGNMENTS

- A. Further Reading: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chapter XXVII, pp. 782-826.
- B. Questions and Exercises.
 1. Discuss questions and exercises from assignment in *Source Book*, Chapter XXVII, pp. 826-27.
 2. Differentiate between censorship and propaganda. What is the function of each?
 3. What are the principal media for propaganda today?
 4. Why are atrocity stories during a war effective as propaganda for those at home?
 5. Cite illustrations of atrocity stories which you heard about the belligerents during the World War.
 6. Contrast the comparative effectiveness of rational arguments and emotional appeals in changing people's opinions and attitudes.
- C. Topics for Class Reports and Longer Themes.
 1. See assignments for reports and longer papers in *Source Book*, Chapter XXVII, p. 827.
 2. Report Graves, *Readings in Public Opinion*, Chapters XVI, XXXIII, no. 3, XXIV, nos. 1-4.
 - 2a. Review contemporary literature on public utilities propaganda, pro and con. See *Utility Corporations* (Report of Federal Trade Commission), Senate Document, Part I, nos. 1-15, 70th Congress, 1st Session, 1929; and subsequent reports. Also Raushenbush, *High Power Propaganda*, 1928; Mosher, *et al*, *Electrical Utilities, the Crisis in Public Control*, 1929, Chapter V.
 3. Review Scott's *The Menace of Nationalism in Education*.
 4. Review Ponsonby's *Falsehoods in Wartime* on war propaganda.
 5. Review articles on Propaganda in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 12th and 13th editions, as illustrating a change of attitude toward the whole subject. The first account was written during the heat of the World War, the

second afterwards. Compare both of these with the account of the 14th edition.

6. Report Lasswell, "The Theory of Political Propaganda," *American Political Science Review*, 1927, vol. XXI, pp. 627-31.
7. Review Bernays, *Propaganda* for the viewpoint of a man actively engaged in using propaganda in business.
8. Review Hobson's *Jingoism in War* as illustrative of propaganda in an earlier war.
9. Analyze the propaganda techniques of the "Wets" and "Drys" in regard to national prohibition. (On the historical side, see Odegard, *Pressure Politics*, 1928.)

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